Kenny Barnes a/k/a Kenneth Barnes v. Department of Human Services, State of Mississippi
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00438-SCT
KENNY BARNES a/k/a KENNETH BARNES
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
02/18/2009
HON. DEBRA K. HALFORD
FRANKLIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
PATRICIA PETERSON SMITH
RUSSELL WILLIAM HOLMES
CIVIL - OTHER
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND
RENDERED IN PART - 06/03/2010
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case requires that we address three competing interests: the supremacy of federal
law over state law; the compelling public interest in child support;1 and the compelling
public interest in the protection of the mentally disabled.
1
We note and laud the dissent’s recognition of our constitution’s concern for minors (or as
the dissent puts it, “defenseless and helpless children”). However, for the sake of completeness, we
point out that our chancery courts, this Court, and the federal government must be equally concerned
for others in our society who are defenseless and helpless, such as the mentally infirm. See Miss.
Const. art. 6, § 159(d) (“[t]he chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and
cases, viz.: . . . (e) . . . persons of unsound mind”). The SSI benefits at issue in this case are paid
by the federal government only to persons who are “blind or disabled and who do not have
sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal
minimum income level.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2009).
¶2.
Kenny Barnes fathered a child out of wedlock. According to a determination made
pursuant to Social Security guidelines, Barnes was mentally incompetent. After a paternity
test established him as the father, the trial court ordered Barnes to pay child support in the
amount of fourteen percent of his income, which consisted entirely of Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) payments, and entered an order of withholding. The questions presented are
whether a federal law which prohibits garnishment or attachment of SSI payments: (1)
prohibits inclusion of SSI benefits in income used to calculate child support, and (2) prohibits
an order of withholding on SSI benefits to satisfy a child-support order.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
¶3.
On February 18, 2009, the Chancery Court of Franklin County entered a paternity
order adjudicating Kenny Barnes the father of Cindy London’s minor child, L.L. Because
London had received services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, the Mississippi
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed suit on London’s behalf, seeking child support
from Barnes.
¶4.
Barnes’s only source of income was Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), a benefit
he had received since infancy because of a physical disability. Barnes is illiterate. Although
he possesses a driver’s license, he does not drive. He testified that he is “slow” and has been
determined to be incompetent under the Social Security guidelines for purposes of handling
his own financial affairs. He could not remember the name of the child he fathered.
¶5.
When asked at trial to stand up and show the court how much money he had on his
person, Barnes had only one quarter in his pocket. His SSI checks are made payable to his
2
sister, Hazel Henderson,2 whom the Social Security Administration designated as his “caregiver.” 3 Barnes replied “Uh-uh” when asked whether he had ever worked anywhere or was
capable of working. When asked where his SSI money went he replied “Bills, I guess. Bills.
. . . Like, light bill.”
¶6.
Upon determining Barnes’s monthly income to be $637 – which was derived entirely
from SSI benefits – the trial court ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $89 per
month, which the court found “compatible with the child support guidelines as set out in
Section 43-19-101 of the Mississippi Code Annotated.” The chancellor ordered child
support to be paid at the statutory guideline rate of fourteen percent. The chancellor also
ordered Barnes to pay an additional amount toward arrearages, court costs and fees, as well
as the cost of genetic testing. To collect these amounts, the court entered an order for
withholding the amounts due from Barnes’s SSI benefits. Barnes now appeals from this
order.
ANALYSIS
¶7.
Barnes argues that the Social Security Act precludes use of SSI payments in
calculating child support and that federal law protects his SSI benefits from garnishment or
other legal process. In analyzing Barnes’s assignments of error, our standard of review is
2
Because Henderson was the payee on Barnes’s SSI checks, Barnes’s counsel moved to make
her a necessary party to the action. The trial court denied the motion.
3
Barnes’s former Social Security care-giver was his wife, Sandra Barnes, who testified that
she married him because she “believed [she] was able to change him and teach him how to read and
how to do these things and et [cetera].” At the time of the hearing, Barnes and Sandra remained
married, but had been separated for nine years.
3
clear: We will not disturb a chancellor’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous
or manifestly wrong, but we must reverse a chancellor’s application of an erroneous legal
standard. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. 1994).
I.
¶8.
We first shall review various federal statutes and interpretive caselaw applicable to
the issues presented in this case.
The Social Security Act
¶9.
As a part of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), the United States Congress
established SSI for the aged, blind, and disabled to “assure a minimum level of income for
people who are age 65 or over, or who are blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient
income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal minimum
income level.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2009). To receive SSI benefits, Barnes was required
to establish that he was disabled – as defined by the Act – and that his income and resources
were below the permitted limit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (2009). The Act defines disability as
the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months. To meet this definition, [one]
must have a severe impairment[] that makes [him] unable to do [his] past
relevant work . . . or any other substantial gainful work that exists in the
national economy.
20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2009).
¶10.
SSI benefits are, in some cases, paid directly to the beneficiary. However, where the
Social Security Administration has determined that the beneficiary is mentally incompetent,
4
the benefits are paid to a “representative payee.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.610 (2009). Once SSI
benefits are awarded, “[n]o restrictions, implied or otherwise, are placed on how recipients
spend the Federal payments.” 20 C.F.R. 416.110 (2009).
¶11.
Barnes argues that the Social Security Act prohibits the transfer, assignment,
garnishment, or attachment of his SSI payments to anyone other than himself. He relies on
the portion of the Act commonly referenced as its “Anti-Attachment Clause,” which reads
as follows:
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter 4 shall
not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys
paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
42 U.S.C. § 407 (2006) (emphasis added).
United States Supreme Court Precedent
¶12.
In reaching our decision today, we are assisted by three United States Supreme Court
decisions involving attempts by States to attach Social Security benefits. In Bennett v.
Arkansas,5 addressing the State of Arkansas’s attempt to attach the Social Security benefits
of some of its prisoners as reimbursement for the cost of their imprisonment, the Court held
4
Section 407 is found in Title 42 – Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 7 – Social Security,
Subchapter II - Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits. Barnes receives
Social Security benefits under Subchapter XVI – Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind,
and Disabled. Section 1383(d)(1) incorporates this provision by reference and applies it to
Subchapter XVI of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (2006).
5
485 U.S. 395, 108 S. Ct. 1204, 99 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1988).
5
that “Section 407(a) unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits.”
Id. at 397. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the statute included an “implied
exception” which allowed it to attach benefits in cases in which a state has provided a
recipient with “care and maintenance.” Id.
¶13.
In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 6 the state of New Jersey attempted to
attach retroactive Social Security payments, which were paid to a citizen who had been the
recipient of state welfare benefits. The state’s claim was based on the citizen’s written
agreement to reimburse the county welfare board for all payments received. In rejecting the
argument, the Court stated that Section 407 “imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal
process to reach all social security benefits. That is broad enough to include all claimants,
including a State.” The Court also stated, “We see no reason why a State, performing its
statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as compared with
any other creditor.” Id. at 416-417.
¶14.
Finally, in Keffeler,7 a group of foster children who were Social Security beneficiaries
brought a class-action suit against the State of Washington, alleging that the State had
violated federal law when it reimbursed itself for foster-care expenditures from the children’s
benefits.
The children’s benefits actually were paid to the State of Washington as
“representative payee,” and the Court held:
6
409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590, 34 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1973).
7
537 U.S. 371, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 154 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2002).
6
Although it is true that the State could not directly compel the beneficiary or
any other representative payee to pay Social Security benefits over to the State,
that fact does not render the appointment of a self-reimbursing representative
payee at odds with the Commissioner’s mandate to find that a beneficiary’s
‘interest . . . would be served’ by the appointment. . . . a representative payee
serves the beneficiary’s interest by seeing that basic needs are met.
Id. at 389-90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A), 1383 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006)). Stated
another way, the Court held that the Department of Social and Health Services’s
reimbursement did not violate Section 407 of the Social Security Act where the State – as
“representative payee” for the children – used the funds to care for the basic needs of the
beneficiaries and employed no legal process that was barred by Section 407 to reimburse
itself.
Federal Child Support Enforcement Act
¶15.
DHS points out that Congress enacted the Federal Child Support Enforcement Act,
42 U.S.C. Section 659, to facilitate collection of child support from parents who receive
Social Security Benefits. That act, however, reads in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407 of [the
Social Security Act]) . . . moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon
remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States or
the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality
thereof) to any individual . . . shall be subject, in like manner and to the same
extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private person,
. . . to any other legal process brought, by a State agency administering a
program . . . to enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide child
support or alimony.
42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (2006)(emphasis added). This provision allows a state or litigant to attach
(for alimony or child support) Social Security payments calculated and paid based on
7
amounts withheld from wages and paid into the Social Security system. However, as
explained by the Supreme Court of Nevada in addressing a similar issue in that state:
SSI is intended to supplement a recipient's income, not substitute lost income
because of a disability. The recipient is not required to pay into the social
security system in order to qualify for SSI benefits. Thus, SSI provides a
person with a minimum income and is designed to help poor, needy people.
Metz v. Metz, 120 Nev. 786, 790, 101 P.3d 779 (Nev. 2004). Because the entitlement to SSI
benefits is not based on “remuneration for employment,” Section 659(a) is inapplicable to
them and, therefore, not applicable in the present case.
¶16.
Section 407 is clear: SSI payments are not “subject to execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”
42 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
II.
¶17.
In Mississippi, the parent of a child born out of wedlock is held to the same financial
responsibilities for supporting the child as parents who are married. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-97 (Rev. 2004). The Legislature passed guidelines to assist chancery courts in determining
the amount of child support to award in an individual case. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19101 (Rev. 2009). The guidelines’ suggested percentages are based on the noncustodial
parent’s adjusted gross income and the number of children to be supported. Id.
The
statute’s definition of gross income includes “disability . . . benefits” and “any other
payments made by . . . federal or state government.” Id.
8
¶18.
Thus, because SSI payments are “payments made by . . . federal . . . government,”
Section 93-9-7 includes SSI payments in the amount available for child support. The
question thus is whether Section 93-9-7 or federal law prevails. This issue is one of first
impression for this Court. However, the Mississippi Court of Appeals has twice addressed
a similar issue. In Lee v. Lee, 859 So. 2d 408 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), the court held that a
chancellor did not abuse his discretion when ordering child-support payments from a man
whose only source of income was SSI benefits. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the
chancellor
did not believe [the man] was as destitute as he claimed or that [he] was as
incapacitated as he claimed . . . .The chancellor determined that [he] was
capable of finding a way to raise money in order to support [his daughter],
even if it was not a great sum.
Id. at 410. The Court of Appeals found some comfort in the chancellor’s finding that the
father could, “if nothing else, [pick] up Coke cans and [turn] them in for a refund.” Thus,
while we would have preferred more developed evidence as to income-earning capacity, Lee
is distinguishable from the case before us today, as it was grounded in the chancellor’s belief
that the father could earn income separate from his SSI benefits.
¶19.
Three years following Lee, the Court of Appeals decided Bailey v. Fisher, 946 So.
2d 404 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), in which it held that – where SSI recipients agree to pay child
support out of their SSI payments – courts may enforce such agreements. Id. at 410. In
Bailey, an agreed judgment was entered into the court record, in which the father agreed to
use his SSI benefits to pay back child support. Id. at 409. When the father refused to fulfill
9
his obligations under that agreement, the chancellor enforced the agreement by ordering the
father to deposit his SSI payments into the registry of the court. Id. at 410. The Court of
Appeals held the chancellor did not commit error in doing so. Id.
¶20.
There was no finding in the record before us that Barnes could do any work that
would produce income, as the trial court found in Lee. Furthermore, Lee had received
approximately $7,000 in back pay prior to the trial, and he gave only $100 of that to the
support of his daughter. There is no evidence in the record that Barnes ever received any
income other than his SSI benefits.
¶21.
DHS argues that Barnes agreed to pay child support using his SSI payments, as did
the father in Bailey. The alleged agreement took place during the hearing when Barnes
testified that his sister had provided him approximately $100 of his SSI payment each month
for his personal use.8 When asked what he did with this money, Barnes did not respond.
When asked, “Wouldn’t you say that’s $100 you could put on your child support?” he
responded, “Yeah, I can say that.” We hold that Barnes’s statement did not constitute an
agreement, and thus we have no need to further address the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Bailey. We again note that Barnes has been declared incompetent to handle his own
financial affairs.
III.
8
Barnes initially said he received “A few dollars.”
10
¶22.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law is
the “supreme Law of the Land.” Specifically, it provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
¶23.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the power of the Supremacy Clause, even in
family law matters traditionally left to the States. In Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625, 107
S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987), the Court considered the question of whether a state
court could hold a disabled veteran in contempt for failing to pay child support, where the
veteran’s only means of satisfying this obligation was compensation he received for his
service-related injuries. Id. at 621-22. The Court stated:
The whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. On
the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal
statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a
determination whether Congress has positively required by direct enactment
that state law be pre-empted. Before a state law governing domestic relations
will be overridden, it must do major damage to clear and substantial federal
interests.
Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
¶24.
The veteran in Rose based his arguments on 38 U.S.C. Section 3101(a), which
provides that “payments of benefits . . . under any law administered by the Veteran’s
Administration . . . made to, or on account of, a beneficiary . . . shall not be liable to
11
attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before
or after receipt by the beneficiary.” Id. at 631. The Court examined the legislative history
behind this provision, and concluded that “Veteran’s disability benefits . . . are intended to
provide reasonable and adequate compensation for disabled veterans and their families.” Id.
at 630
(citation to legislative history omitted).
On this basis, the Court stated
“enforce[ment] of a valid child support order coincide[s] with Congress’ intent to provide
veterans’ disability compensation for the benefit of both appellant and his dependents.” Id.
at 632.
¶25.
Our analysis must therefore hinge on whether enforcement of a child-support order
would impede Congress’ purpose in delivering SSI benefits. As already stated, SSI benefits
are to “assure a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who are
blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard
of living at the established Federal minimum income level.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2009).
¶26.
We agree with the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ reasoning when it considered the
application of Rose to SSI benefits. The court noted that “veteran’s benefits are more similar
to subchapter II benefits [based on remuneration for employment] than SSI benefits. Both
subchapter II benefits and veteran’s benefits are received for time on the job. SSI benefits,
by contrast, are awarded solely on the basis of need.” Becker County Human Servs. v.
Peppel, 493 N.W. 2d 573, 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The court also noted that veterans’
benefits are intended to compensate the veteran and his family, while SSI benefits are
awarded to protect only the recipient. Id.
12
¶27.
Thus, we must conclude that, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts
Mississippi Code Section 43-19-101, and SSI benefits are not subject to attachment,
garnishment or other legal process to satisfy a child-support order. That being said, the
federal statutes do not specifically prohibit a chancellor from using SSI benefits to calculate
child support. Therefore, we affirm the chancellor as to the award of child support.
However, we also wish to make it clear that chancellors are not required to consider SSI
benefits in determining whether and in what amount to award child support. Stated another
way, we do not hold that chancellors may never – or must always – consider SSI benefits
to calculate child support. Rather, we hold that chancellors must utilize discretion based on
the facts of a particular case.
CONCLUSION
¶28.
We hold the chancellor did not err by using Barnes’s SSI benefits to calculate child
support. However, we also hold that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a), SSI payments are
not subject to withholding orders to satisfy child-support obligations. We further hold that
42 U.S.C. Section 659(a) has no relevance to the present case. For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
¶29.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
CARLSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
GRAVES, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. WALLER, C.J., CONCURS IN
PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, LAMAR, KITCHENS AND
PIERCE, JJ. RANDOLPH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
13
¶30.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 407(a), SSI
benefits may not be garnished or withheld to satisfy child-support obligations. However, I
believe that SSI benefits should be considered as income for purposes of calculating child
support, and that chancellors may order child support even when the parent’s sole source of
income is SSI benefits.
¶31.
Nowhere in Section 407(a) does it expressly require courts to disregard SSI payments
from consideration or calculation of the parent’s income. The statute simply prohibits
garnishment or attachment of those funds to satisfy a child-support award, even after it is
paid to the recipient.9 42 U.S.C.A. § 407(a) (2000). Furthermore, Mississippi Code Section
43-19-101(3)(a) provides that a parent’s gross income “shall be calculated by . . .
determin[ing] all potential sources that may reasonably be expected to be available to the
absent parent including . . . disability [and] any other payments made by any . . . federal or
state government.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(3)(a) (Rev. 2009). Thus, nothing prohibits
a chancellor from using SSI benefits as income for purposes of calculating child-support
obligations. In fact, SSI “shall” be considered, under Section 43-19-101. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 43-19-101(3)(a) (Rev. 2009).
¶32.
Similarly, nothing prohibits a chancellor from ordering child support, even if the
paying parent’s sole source of income is SSI benefits. In determining child support,
9
Section 407(a) states that “none of the monies paid or payable. . . under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, [or] garnishment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)
(emphasis added).
14
chancellors may consider, inter alia, the health, income, and earning capacity of both parents,
the reasonable needs of the child, and the necessary living expenses of the noncustodial
parent. Brabham v. Brabham, 84 So. 2d 147, 153 (Miss. 1955). See also, Deborah H. Bell,
Bell on Mississippi Family Law 286 (1st ed. 2005). Additionally, the Legislature has
provided chancellors with statutory guidelines to aid in their calculation of child-support
awards. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101 (Rev. 2009). The guidelines “allow the needs of
a child and the financial ability of a parent to be blended.” Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273,
1279 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Kilgore v. Fuller, 741 So. 2d 351, 354 (Miss. Ct. App.
1999) (emphasis added). Thus, the chancellor can choose to take into account the “total
available assets of the obligee, obligor, and the child” and “[a]ny other adjustment which is
needed to achieve an equitable result . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-103(h) & (i) (Rev.
2008). I am confident that our chancellors are capable of reasonably and equitably applying
all the appropriate standards for determining child support.
¶33.
Here, the chancellor ordered Barnes to pay $89 per month as child support (fourteen
percent (14%) of his SSI income of $637 per month). See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1)
(Rev. 2008). If the chancellor had found – based on Barnes’s health, income, earning
capacity, necessary living expenses, and available assets, Brabham, 84 So. 2d at 153, Miss.
Code Ann. § 43-19-103(h) & (i) – that Barnes was unable to contribute $89 of his SSI
benefits per month to help support his child, or that the amount was otherwise unjust or
inappropriate, the chancellor could have ordered less child support or no child support at all.
Thus, while I agree that SSI is not subject to withholding, levy, execution, garnishment, or
15
attachment, I cannot say that the chancellor erred in ordering Barnes to pay child support,
even though Barnes’s sole source of income is SSI.10
CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, LAMAR, KITCHENS AND
PIERCE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶34.
The Majority asserts that this case presents “competing interests,” including “the
supremacy of federal law over state law” and “the compelling public interest in child
support.” (Maj. Op. at ¶ 1). The Majority also discusses “the compelling public interest in
the protection of the mentally disabled.” (Maj. Op. at ¶ 1). SSI benefits are payable to those
over 65, the blind, and the disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2009). However, facts taken
from the record do not establish that Barnes is “mentally disabled” and “mentally infirm.”
(Maj. Op. at ¶ 1) (emphasis added). The chancellor commented that “[t]here’s been no
evidence offered to the court of a showing of any adjudication of incompetency by a court
of competent jurisdiction[,]” 11 and added that Barnes’s obligation arose “out of the
procreation of a child without regard to whether he had contractual capacity.” 12 Accordingly,
10
Because the question is not before us, however, we do not address what judicial
mechanisms are potentially available to the chancellor, such as her contempt powers, to enforce such
a child-support award.
11
At the hearing, Barnes testified to being previously employed, to possessing a Mississippi
driver’s license, and to previously owning a car. Additionally, Barnes’s wife testified, pursuant to
questioning from the chancellor, that Barnes was sufficiently competent to enter into a marriage
ceremony. Moreover, Barnes merely referred to himself as “[s]pecial [e]d.”
12
I note that the child at issue in this proceeding is from Fayette County, but Barnes has also
fathered an illegitimate child in Claiborne County.
16
I cannot agree that the case sub judice requires consideration of “the compelling public
interest in the protection of the mentally disabled.” (Maj. Op. at ¶ 1).
¶35.
Furthermore, the Majority’s analysis fails to affirm the chancellor who recognized the
chancery court’s constitutional obligation to protect minors. Under the Tenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. The law of domestic relations has long been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court as “belong[ing] to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States.” Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 2033-34, 95
L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S. Ct. 850, 852-53,
34 L. Ed. 500 (1890)).
¶36.
The Mississippi Constitution established that our chancery courts are exponents of
defenseless and helpless children. See Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159(d) (“[t]he chancery court
shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and cases, viz.: . . . (d) Minor’s business
. . . .”). This Court has stated that:
[l]ong ago it became the established rule for the court of chancery to act as the
superior guardian for all persons under such disability. This inherent and
traditional power and protective duty is made complete and irrefragable by the
provisions of our present state constitution. It is not competent for the
Legislature[13 ] to abate the said powers and duties or for the said court to omit
or neglect them. It is the inescapable duty of the said court and of the
chancellor to act with constant care and solicitude towards the preservation
and protection of the rights of infants and persons non compos mentis. The
13
This is no less true for the United States Congress.
17
court will . . . rescue them from faithless guardians, . . . and even from
unnatural parents, and in general will and must take all necessary steps to
conserve and protect the best interest of these wards of the court. The court
will not and cannot permit the rights of an infant to be prejudiced by any
waiver, or omission or neglect or design of a guardian, or of any other person,
so far as within the power of the court to prevent or correct.
Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 138 So. 593, 595 (1932) (emphasis
added). To further this purpose, our Legislature has enacted laws to protect minors through
the provision of child support. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-19-31 to 43-19-103 (Rev. 2009).
¶37.
As regards the Supremacy Clause, the United States Supreme Court rightfully has
declared:
“[o]n the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a
federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to
a determination whether Congress has ‘positively required by direct
enactment’ that state law be pre-empted.” [Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572, 581, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979),] quoting Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77, 25 S. Ct. 172, 175, 49 L. Ed. 390 (1904). Before a
state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it “must do ‘major
damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.” Hisquierdo, supra, 439
U.S. at 581, 99 S. Ct. at 808, quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,
352, 86 S. Ct. 500, 506, 15 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1966).
Rose, 481 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). Under the facts presented, I cannot conclude that
a withholding order directed to Barnes, requiring that he pay child support from his SSI
benefits, does “‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests,” after the SSI
benefits are paid to the recipient. Id. (emphasis added). I find no legitimate reason that
“[o]ur analysis must . . . hinge on whether enforcement of a child-support order would
impede Congress’ purpose in delivering SSI benefits[,]” and no support in the record that the
judgment of the chancellor has impeded Congress’ purpose. (Maj. Op. at ¶ 25) (emphasis
18
added). The issue should be limited to whether enforcement of said order would “do ‘major
damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.” Rose, 481 U.S. at 624.
¶38.
The Majority acknowledges that Congress has expressed a strong federal interest in
“facilitat[ing] collection of child support from parents who receive Social Security
[b]enefits[,]” via the Federal Child Support Enforcement Act. See Maj. Op. at ¶ 15 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 659). While SSI benefits are not a form of “remuneration for employment,” such
that Section 659 is inapplicable, that does not minimize the expressed federal interest in the
provision of child support. Moreover, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in Rose,
family law is controlled by state law, except in “rare” instances. See Rose, 481 U.S. at 625.
The Mississippi Court of Appeals twice has affirmed orders of child support from individuals
whose sole source of income was SSI benefits. See Bailey v. Fischer, 946 So. 2d 404 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006); Lee v. Lee, 859 So. 2d 408 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶39.
Fundamentally, the purpose of an exemption statute like the “Anti-Attachment
Clause”:
is to protect the recipient and his family from the claims of creditors. Since
family members fall into the protected category, there is no reason to allow the
recipient to escape liability to his family. . . . [Additionally], alimony and child
support are not a debt in the same sense as a debt owed to a creditor. As one
court expressed it, they are “a duty of a higher obligation.”
Ex parte Griggs, 435 So. 2d 103, 104 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (quoting Schlaefer v. Schlaefer,
112 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1940)).
19
¶40.
In Schlaefer, Anna Katherine Schlaefer (“Anna”) sought unpaid alimony from her ex-
husband, Wallace Clayton Schlaefer (“Wallace”). Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 179. Anna alleged
that:
[i]n addition to other income, . . . [Wallace] receives $100 per month from
appellee insurance company as disability benefit payments under two policies
of insurance. She asked for sequestration of his property, its conversion into
cash and application of the proceeds to pay arrears and future monthly
installments of $60 in alimony.
Id. Wallace acknowledged receipt of the disability benefit payments, but contended that they
were “exempted specifically from process under Section 16a of the Life Insurance Act for
the District of Columbia, Act of Congress of June 19, 1934 . . . .” 14 Id. The district court
agreed with Wallace and dismissed Anna’s petition. See Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 180. The
D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. See id. at 187. According to that court, in an opinion
authored by future United States Supreme Court Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge:
[t]he basic issue boils down to whether Congress intended to relieve the
disabled insured to the extent of his disability payments from legally
enforceable obligation to support his family and those legally dependent upon
him. So far as general creditors are concerned the purpose is clear, with the
14
Section 16a provided, in pertinent part, that:
Exemption of disability insurance from execution. – No money or other benefit
paid, provided, allowed, or agreed to be paid by any company on account of the
disability from injury or sickness of any insured person shall be liable to execution,
attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated or
applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law, to pay any debt or
liability of such insured person whether such debt or liability was incurred before or
after the commencement of such disability . . . .
Life Insurance Act for the District of Columbia, Act of Congress of June 19, 1934, c. 672, 48 Stat.
1175, D.C. Code (Supp. IV 1938) (emphasis added).
20
exceptions stated, to make the disposition of these funds a matter solely for his
judgment. Congress regarded it as better for the creditors to go unpaid than to
deprive the debtor and his dependents of this means of support when earning
capacity would be cut off. Hence it used broad language prohibiting recourse
to the fund by legal process. By removing it absolutely from the reach of such
claims, to this extent it protected the insured from want during disability . . .
.
Id. at 185. However:
[b]y law and the most sacred contract [Wallace] is obligated to employ
[disability benefit payments], while it exists, for dependents’ support.
Disability does not relieve him of that obligation, though it may affect the
extent to which he can perform it. The obligation which he assumes upon
marriage operates “in sickness and in health.” Though he may not be able to
work, if he has other means he is required to apply them equitably in the
discharge of this duty. For the head of a family, the essentials of sustenance
for his dependents remain “necessaries” as much when he is disabled as when
he is well and employed. His disability does not terminate the wife’s power
to pledge his credit for them, whether for her own or for his children’s
support. Claims so created prior to any award of alimony or support money
appear to fall squarely within the letter and the purpose of the statutory
exemption.[15 ]
Id. (emphasis added). See also Stirgus v. Stirgus, 172 Miss. 337, 160 So. 285, 286 (1935)
(“[t]he obligation of a husband to support his wife is not a debt in the sense of this statute,
but is an obligation growing out of the marriage status and public policy . . . .”); Walker v.
Walker, 204 N.C. 210, 167 S.E. 818, 819 (1933) (“the amount allowed for the support and
15
The court added that:
the usual purpose of exemptions is to relieve the person exempted from the pressure
of claims hostile to his dependents’ essential needs as well as his own personal ones,
not to relieve him of familial obligations and destroy what may be the family’s last
and only security, short of public relief.
Id. (emphasis added).
21
maintenance of the infant . . . is not an ordinary debt in the sense of a financial obligation
against which the plaintiff may claim his homestead and personal property exemptions”);
Littleton et al. v. Littleton, 224 Ala. 103, 139 So. 335, 336 (1932) (“[t]he decree for alimony
. . . was not a ‘debt contracted’ within the meaning of our Constitution and statutes . . . , and
the defendant’s claim of exemption as to the garnished sum was properly disallowed”);
Caldwell v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 158 Ga. 392, 123 S.E. 708, 709 (1924) (quoting Bates
v. Bates, 74 Ga. 105 (1884)) (“‘[a] decree for alimony stands upon a different basis from an
ordinary debt.’ . . . All laws exempting any portion of one’s earnings from the process of
garnishment are primarily based upon the necessity of exempting in behalf of a debtor, even
against his just debts, something with which to care for his family or dependents as well as
himself. This is the only principle upon which a debtor should be permitted to withhold
money within the power of the court from a creditor, the justness of whose claim is
undisputed.”) (emphasis added).
Based upon the aforementioned “duty of higher
obligation[,]” as well as the fact that applying the exemption like the lower court “can
operate only in favor of a head of a family who appropriates to his exclusive sustenance or
pleasure income received in times of adversity[,]” the court concluded that “[w]e cannot
believe that Congress intended to create an exemption so broad and so inconsistent with the
policy which it has declared in other acts.” Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 185-86.
¶41.
A “higher-obligation” analysis is particularly persuasive. Has the United States
Congress truly exempted parents from honoring their primal obligation of nurture and
22
protection of their offspring? 16 Certainly among “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” 17
is an obligation of a parent to support his minor child. Barnes’s status as an SSI benefit
recipient “does not relieve him of that obligation” and, in my estimation, he is required to
apply such benefits “equitably in the discharge of this duty.” Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 185.
¶42.
Under the specific factual scenario presented (in which Barnes acknowledged that
$100 of what he received monthly could be put toward child support), I cannot join opinions
that subjugate not only the needs of an impoverished,18 helpless two-year-old, but also the
constitutional mandate to our chancery courts to exercise full jurisdiction over the business
of minors under Article 6, Section 159(d) of the Mississippi Constitution.
¶43.
Taking into account “the nature of the fund exempted, the purposes for which it
ordinarily is created, the circumstances in which it becomes available . . . and the uses
normally made of it in those conditions[,]” Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 185, I find the chancellor’s
judgment to be eminently sound and based on established legal principles. Given the federal
statutory expressions of interest in the provision of child support, along with the clear
pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Rose, I fail to discern how enforcing
an order requiring Barnes to honor an obligation to support his child does “‘major damage’”
to any identifiable “‘clear and substantial federal interests.’” Rose, 481 U.S. at 625. Rose
16
As well as giving SSI benefit recipients, as argued by MDHS, “carte blanche to procreate
without any regard to a child’s support and upbringing.” In the case sub judice, such disregard is
evidenced by Barnes’s inability to recall the name of his two-year-old daughter at trial.
17
The Declaration of Independence ¶ 1 (U.S. 1776).
18
The child’s mother receives Social Security benefits under Title IV-D.
23
recognized that state courts (learned in law and equity) are better suited to require an
irresponsible parent to share a loaf of bread with his children than Congress. To rule
otherwise would allow a parent to purchase cigarettes and beer, while at the same time
depriving his or her child of formula or baby food. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
24
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