Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Judy Case Martin
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-JP-00504-SCT
MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE
v.
JUDY CASE MARTIN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
02/23/2005
HON. PATRICIA D. WISE
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE
LUTHER T. BRANTLEY, III
DARLENE D. BALLARD
W. BRADY KELLEMS
CIVIL - JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE - 12/15/2005
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶1.
On
January
12,
2004,
the
Mississippi
Commission
on
Judicial Performance
(“Commission”) filed a formal complaint charging Judy Case Martin (“Judge Martin”), Justice
Court Judge, Lincoln County, Mississippi, with judicial misconduct in office. The Commission
alleged that her conduct in the Schifano matter violated Article 3, Section 29 of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890 1 and Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(7), and 3B(8)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi and was therefore actionable pursuant to
subsections (b) and (e) of Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. 2
1
Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 29, states:
(1) Excessive bail shall not be required, and all persons shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses (a) when the proof
is evident or presumption great; or (b) when the person has previously been
convicted of a capital offense or any other offense punishable by imprisonment
for a maximum of twenty (20) years or more.
(2) If a person charged with committing any offense that is punishable by death,
life imprisonment or imprisonment for one (1) year or more in the penitentiary
or any other state correctional facility is granted bail and (a) if that person is
indicted for a felony committed while on bail; or (b) if the court, upon hearing,
finds probable cause that the person has committed a felony while on bail, then
the court shall revoke bail and shall order that the person be detained, without
further bail, pending trial of the charge for which bail was revoked. For the
purposes of this subsection (2) only, the term "felony" means any offense
punishable by death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than five (5)
years under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the crime is committed. In
addition, grand larceny shall be considered a felony for the purposes of this subsection.
(3) In the case of offenses punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of
twenty (20) years or more or by life imprisonment, a county or circuit court
judge may deny bail for such offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great upon making a determination that the release of the person
or persons arrested for such offense would constitute a special danger to any
other person or to the community or that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.
(4) In any case where bail is denied before conviction, the judge shall place in
the record his reasons for denying bail. Any person who is charged with an
offense punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of twenty (20) years or
more or by life imprisonment and who is denied bail prior to conviction shall
be entitled to an emergency hearing before a justice of the Mississippi Supreme
Court. The provisions of this subsection (4) do not apply to bail revocation
orders.
2
Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 177A, subsections (b) and (e), state:
On recommendation of the commission on judicial performance, the supreme
2
¶2.
On September 9, 2004, three members of the Commission held a hearing on these
charges and filed their Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations on
December 15, 2004. On December 28, 2004, Judge Martin filed her Objection to Committee
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations and her Motion for Additional
Time to Supplement Response and Objections.
¶3.
On February 9, 2005, Judge Martin filed an amendment to her Objections.
¶4.
On March 10, 2005, the full Commission rendered and adopted its
Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations.
COUNT ONE
¶5.
The first charge of judicial misconduct against Judge Martin involved Sam Schifano
(Schifano), who was arrested on a series of charges beginning on or about May 28, 2003. The
Commission concluded that Judge Martin, using the power of her office as Justice Court
Judge, by having Schifano arrested, incarcerated and denied the right of bail on two separate
occasions, violated Article 3, Section 29 of the Mississippi Constitution 1890, which gives
the authority to deny bail only to County and Circuit Judges, and therefore she violated Canons
1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(7), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi.
court may remove from office, suspend, fine or publicly censure or reprimand
any justice or judge of this state for: (b) willful misconduct in office; or
(e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial
office into disrepute; and may retire involuntarily any justice or judge for
physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the performance of his
duties, which disability is or is likely to become of a permanent character.
3
¶6.
This Court finds the Commission’s conclusion of law that “Judge Martin in using the
power of her office as Justice Court Judge in having Mr. Schifano arrested, incarcerated and
to deny him bond on two separate occasions violated Article 3, Section 29 of the Mississippi
Constitution” is overly broad. Article 3, Section 29 addresses solely the issue of bail, but does
not address wrongful arrest or unjust incarceration.
Therefore, this Court will focus on
whether Judge Martin’s denial of bail to Schifano contrary to Article 3, Section 29,
violated
the aforementioned canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi.
¶7.
The Commission recommended that Judge Martin be publicly reprimanded, suspended
from office without pay for a period of thirty days, and assessed the costs of this proceeding
in the amount of $1,925.08 for her willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, which brings the judicial office into disrepute.
COUNT TWO
¶8.
The Commission concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence that
Judge Martin had committed judicial misconduct in the matter of Bridges v. Daly, Docket
No. 168, Case No. 115. The Commission recommended this matter be dismissed.
ISSUE FOR DECISION
¶9.
Judge Martin is only challenging the Commission’s recommendation involving the
Schifano matter and argues that the evidence is not clear and convincing that she committed
judicial misconduct.
Judge Martin contends, however, that if the Court were to impose
disciplinary sanctions, then according to judicial precedent, a private reprimand would be more
appropriate than a public reprimand.
FACTS
4
¶10.
The facts are undisputed. On May 28, 2003, as a result of ongoing domestic disputes,
Schifano was arrested on misdemeanor charges of stalking and telephone harassment filed by
his estranged wife, Paula Ratcliff. Judge Martin released Schifano on $5,000 bond on the same
day, an amount based upon conversations between Judge Martin and law enforcement officers
and the Justice Court clerks. On June 5, 2003, Schifano was again arrested based upon
affidavits filed by Ratcliff and his mother-in-law alleging stalking and trespassing.
Judge
Martin initially denied bail on June 5, 2003, and then subsequently set a $5,000 bail on June
10, 2003.
Schifano was incarcerated until he was bonded out on June 10, 2003. On July 3,
2003, Schifano was again arrested for telephone harassment based upon his estranged wife’s
affidavit. He was immediately released on $2,500 bail.
On August 13, 2003, Judge Martin
held a hearing on all of the above charges. Schifano was found not guilty on all charges, as all
of the witnesses either failed to appear or declined to testify at court.
¶11.
On August 26, 2003, Schifano was again arrested and incarcerated,
telephone harassment on a warrant filed by his estranged wife. Judge Martin
charged with
initially denied
bail to Schifano. Subsequently on September 2, 2003, bail of $1,000 was set, and Schifano was
released on the same day. Schifano requested that Judge Martin recuse herself from the case,
to which she consented, and thus another judge was assigned the case.
Schifano was found
guilty of telephone harassment and fined.
¶12.
Judge Martin testified that she was unfamiliar with Section 29 of the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890, as amended, as to the setting of bail and if and when said bail could be
denied.
She further testified that she did not try to initiate any contempt proceedings against
5
Schifano for violating any conditions of his bond or conditions of release, nor did she set a
bond revocation hearing.
¶13.
The Commission concluded that Judge Martin in using the power of her office as
Justice Court Judge in having Schifano arrested, incarcerated, and denying bail to Schifano on
two separate and distinct occasions violated Article 3, Section 29 of the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890, as amended, and therefore violated of Canons
1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2),
3B(4), 3B(7), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi.
The Commission
found that this conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, which brings the judicial office into disrepute pursuant to
subsections (b) and (e) of Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14.
This Court reviews judicial misconduct proceedings de novo.
Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Perdue, 853 So.2d 85, 88 (Miss 2003) (citing Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Vess, 692 So.2d 80, 83 (Miss. 1997)). Great deference is given to
the Commission’s findings when those findings are based on clear and convincing evidence.
Id. (citing Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Lewis, 801 So.2d 704, 707 (Miss.
2001); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Bishop, 761 So.2d 195, 198 (Miss.
2000)).
However, this Court is not bound by the Commission’s findings and must use
independent judgment in assessing [the] misconduct [of judges].
So.2d
Id. (citing In re Collins, 524
553, 556 (Miss. 1986)). It is within the exclusive province of the Supreme Court to
impose sanctions
for judicial misconduct.
Id.
6
(citing Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial
Performance v. Fletcher, 686 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Miss. 1996); In re Garner, 466 So.2d 884,
885 (Miss. 1985)).
ANALYSIS
¶15.
We believe our judicial system is more just and fair than any legal system which
presently exists, or for that matter, which has ever existed in the history of civilization
preceding our experiment in democracy. Yet at the same time, the system is not perfect.
Judges are human, and as such, do on occasion err. Ultimately, it is this Court’s constitutional
duty to separate honest errors of a judge from willful misconduct, wrongful use of power,
corruption, dishonesty, or acts of moral turpitude which negatively reflect upon the judicial
branch of government.
¶16.
We agree with the Commission that Judge Martin’s rulings were contrary to Article
3, Section 29 of the Mississippi Constitution. We find that Judge Martin erred in denying bail
to Schifano, but this error does not necessarily equate to sanctionable conduct as enunciated
by this Court in Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Carr, 786 So.2d 1055(Miss.
2001). In Carr, this Court established the grounds for sanctionable conduct as follows:
Willful misconduct in office is the improper or wrongful use of power of his
office by a judge acting intentionally or with gross unconcern for conduct and
generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack
of diligence. Necessarily, the term would encompass conduct involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and also any knowing misuse of office
whatever the motive. However, these elements are not necessary to finding bad
faith. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish
a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate
exercise of authority constitutes bad faith....Willful misconduct in office is
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. However, a judge may also, through negligence or ignorance not
amounting to bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of
justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute. Miss. Comm’n on
7
Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 937 (Miss. 1997). This
Court can generally recognize examples of willful misconduct when they are
presented for review. In re Anderson, 412 So.2d 743, 752 (Miss. 1982)
(Hawkins, J. specially concurring). The misconduct complained of need not be
intentional or notorious; rather negligence, ignorance, and incompetence suffice
as grounds for behavior to be classified as prejudicial to the administration of
justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute and thus worthy of
sanctions. In re Quick, 553 So.2d 522, 527 (Miss. 1989).
786 So. 2d at 1058-59.
¶17.
While exercising her judicial discretion, Judge Martin committed an error. All judges
will err, if they serve long enough. There is no evidence in the record to support the clear and
convincing threshold that her errors were committed “intentionally, with gross unconcern, or
generally in bad faith.” Russell, 691 So.2d 937.
It is our opinion that Judge Martin has not
violated the Judicial Canons, so as to bring her “judicial office into disrepute” under Article
6, Section 177(A) of Mississippi Constitution. Id.
¶18.
In our analysis, we examine the interplay of the Mississippi Constitution Article 6,
Section 177A, and the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Article 3, Section
29 of the Mississippi Constitution and the grounds for sanctionable conduct as outlined in our
decision in Carr. Judge Martin identified a variety of statutes which led to her confusion and
her failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement, and thus argues her actions do not
constitute willful misconduct.
Judge Martin cited Section 99-5-11 of the Mississippi Code
of 1972, as amended, which authorizes Justice Court Judges to require such bail as the justice
or conservator of the peace may require, which she argues impliedly authorized the denial of
bail in proper cases.
Additionally, Judge Martin contends that Section 9-11-18 of the
Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, gives Justice Court Judges similar powers as
8
authorized for a Municipal Court Judge, which under certain conditions found in Section 2123-7 of the Mississippi Code, allows a Municipal Judge to refuse bail.
Rule 3.04 of the
Uniform Rules of Procedure for Justice Court authorizes the Judge to set bail using the
“judge’s own discretion.” Judge Martin testified she was unfamiliar with Article 3, Section 29
of the Mississippi Constitution, which grants authority to deny bail only to County and Circuit
Judges.
Judge Martin maintains that if she made a mistake, it was an honest mistake.
Furthermore, she testified without contradiction from others, that the issue was never
addressed in her training or at judicial seminars she attended.
¶19.
Before formulating its ultimate opinion, the Court examined the evidentiary record, as
well as each Canon, to determine if clear and convincing evidence existed of a violation of a
specific Canon under which she was charged, to bring such conduct under the constitutional
provisions.
CANON 1 - A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
¶20.
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing
high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions
of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
¶21.
The commentary to Canon 1 states that “although judges should be independent (defined
as acting without fear or favor), they must comply with the law.” This Court has recently
clarified that Canon 1 “emphasizes failures which rise to the level of impugning the
independence of the judiciary.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Former Judge
U.U., 875 So.2d 1083, 1088 (Miss. 2004).
9
The Commission urges that twice denying
Schifano bail violates the mandate of the Mississippi Constitution. We agree. The Commission
then concluded these errors ipso facto are clear and convincing evidence of a breach of this
Judicial Canon. We are unable to make the same quantum leap in the absence of clear and
convincing proof.
¶22.
We cannot agree with the Commission’s conclusion that Judge Martin’s purposefully
violated Canon 1.
Judge Martin testified she was under the honest belief that she had the
authority to deny bond. She further testified that she was not aware of any distinction in the law
between justice court judges and circuit judges insofar as denial of bond. Judge Martin was
confused that the constitutional right to deny bail enjoyed by the judges of the circuit and
county court did not extend to justice court.
Although Judge Martin failed to comply with
Article 3, Section 29, her actions do not arise to sanctionable conduct; albeit she made an error
in judgment. However, there is no corollary that an honest error equates to a violation of the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.
We are required on a regular basis to reverse
cases, where scholarly, well-intended judges err in applying the correct law. Accordingly, this
Court finds that Judge Martin did not fail to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.
CANON 2 - A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All His Activities
¶23.
Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “A judge shall respect and comply
with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
10
¶24.
The commentary to Canon 2A further states that “Public confidence in the judiciary is
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges.”
The Commission concluded that
Judge Martin’s violation of Schifano’s constitutional rights was evidence of her failure
to
respect or comply with the law, and accordingly, brought the integrity and impartiality of the
Justice Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi, into question and therefore eroded public
confidence in the judicial system.
¶25.
We disagree. Commentary to Canon 2A defines actual impropriety as “violations of
law” while “the test for appearance of impropriety is whether, based on conduct, the judge’s
impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances.”
It
appears that there was no appearance of impropriety, as Judge Martin’s decision to deny bond
to Schifano, whom she described as a “public menace,” was based upon the testimony and
opinions of the putative victim, relatives, arresting officers and court clerks, combined with
a lack of training. It is also evident that there is no actual impropriety as Judge Martin’s
conduct was based upon lack of knowledge and appreciation of the controlling law, not a willful
desire to disregard the Constitution or to fail to treat Schifano impartially. This conduct calls
neither her integrity nor her impartiality into question; therefore, the public’s confidence in
either or both does not come into play.
This Court finds that Judge Martin did not violate
Canon 2A.
CANON 3 - A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and
Diligently
¶26.
Canon 3B addresses adjudicative responsibilities.
Martin violated Canon 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(7) and 3B(8).
11
The Commission found that Judge
¶27.
Canon 3B(1) states: “A judge shall hear and decide all assigned matters within the
judge’s jurisdiction except those in which disqualification is required.”
¶28.
The Commission urges that Judge Martin refused to hear Schifano on the question of
bail when he was entitled to same pursuant to Article 3, Section 29 of the Mississippi
Constitution. We do not agree with the Commission that Judge Martin violated Canon 3B(1).
The Schifano matter was within Judge Martin’s jurisdiction, and there is no evidence in the
record to indicate disqualification was required. Judge Martin was authorized to hear and
decide Schifano’s case. Additionally, after entering a not guilty verdict for Schifano, Judge
Martin later recused herself from a subsequent similar case upon Schifano’s request.
A judge
from another county entered a guilty verdict on the August 26, 2003, charge against Schifano.
¶29.
Further, Judge Martin believed that she had the authority to deny bail in accordance with
the statutes found in the Mississippi Code, as well as the
Uniform Rules of Procedure for
Justice Court. Judge Martin testified that in her five years on the bench no one has questioned
her authority to deny bond. She testified no manuals or procedural handbooks exist on whether
or not justice court judges can deny bail. No conflicting evidence was presented; therefore, it
is our opinion that Judge Martin did not violate Canon 3B(1).
¶30.
Canon 3B(2) states: “A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.”
The Commission urges that Judge Martin was not faithful to the law, and Judge
Martin did not maintain professional competence in it. Although Judge Martin is a not a lawyer,
she has attended the Judicial College and has had to successfully pass eighteen hours of
continuing education each year. Judge Martin met these required standards and attempted to
12
maintain her professional competence. Judge Martin legitimately believed she had the
authority to deny bail, as do the judges of the circuit and county courts. Judge Martin erred in
her decision to deny bail; however, this error was based upon Martin’s lack of knowledge. This
error was not made malevolently or as an abuse of office. Judge Martin has stated denial of bail
was not addressed in any training or judicial seminars that she attended. In denying bail for
Schifano, Judge Martin was not “swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.” Canon 3(B)(2). No evidence was presented that Judge Martin was less than faithful
to the law as she understood it. We do not find her conduct to be in violation of Canon 3(B)(2).
¶31.
Canon 3B(4) requires:
Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacities, and shall
require similar conduct of lawyers, and of their staffs, court officials, and
subject to their direction and control.
¶32.
The Commission urges that Judge Martin was neither patient, dignified, nor courteous
to Schifano when she twice denied him bail on bailable misdemeanor charges.
The
Commission seizes upon Judge Martin’s reference to Schifano as a “public menace,” despite
the fact she had found him not guilty on the prior charges filed against him. We disagree with
the Commission. Both the exhibits and transcript reveal that Judge Martin made her decision
to deny bail on Schifano’s misdemeanor charge because of the statements of the arresting
officers, information received from court clerks, the frequency of Schifano’s alleged multiple
offenses against his estranged wife, and her misunderstanding of the applicable law. However,
this Court fails to find clear and convincing evidence in the record that Judge Martin was not
13
patient, dignified, and courteous to the litigant, Schifano. We find the claim of a Canon 3B(4)
violation against Judge Martin is without merit.
¶33.
Canon 3B(7) states, in pertinent part:
A judge shall accord to all who are legally interested in a proceeding, or their
lawyers, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit,
or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made
to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or
impending proceeding.
¶34.
The Commission urges that Schifano had a right to be heard on the issue of bail and that
Judge Martin refused that right. Schifano was
afforded multiple hearings. Judge Martin
testified that no ex parte conversations with either party existed and she had no preconceived
notion of Schifano’s guilt or innocence during his August 13, 2003, trial
which resulted in
his acquittal.
¶35.
Conversations with a court clerk are not considered
prohibited under Canon 3B(7).
ex
parte communications
Judge Martin was fully permitted to obtain information from
court personnel as enumerated in the list of exceptions located in Canon 3B(7)(b)-(c).
Judge
Martin’s decision to deny bond after Schifano’s second and fourth arrest did not contravene
Canon 3B(7).
¶36.
Canon 3B(8) provides: “A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently, and fairly.” The Commission urges that Judge Martin did not dispose of Schifano’s
request for bail promptly, efficiently or fairly.
Instead, the Commission urges that Judge
Martin improperly denied bail on two occasions and made Schifano spend approximately
fourteen days in jail.
Judge Martin testified that she set no bail for the June 5, 2003, charge
because of the arresting officers’ statements regarding the defendant and also because she took
14
into account the previous May 28th bond and subsequent allegation. With respect
to the
second occasion when Judge Martin denied bail to Schifano, she argues that she held the
hearing for Schifano’s August 26, 2003, arrest on the next business day after he submitted his
request on Friday, August 29, 2003, which
due to the Labor Day holiday was Tuesday,
September 2, 2003. We find that Judge Martin exercised judicial discretion, and disposed of
the Schifano matter promptly, efficiently and fairly within her understanding of the controlling
law. There is no evidence that Judge Martin acted in contravention of the Code of Judicial
Conduct when making this decision. Judge Martin did not violate Canon 3(B)(8).
CONCLUSION
¶37.
Our review of this case does not support the Commission’s recommendation to publicly
reprimand and suspend Judge Martin from office for thirty days without pay. A simple mistake
in the face of reasonable efforts to base decisions on controlling law is not sanctionable.
To
find otherwise could subject any judge to disciplinary action for honest errors. If one were to
extend the Commission’s logic to all cases, every judge, who honestly erred in determination
of the appropriate law, would be subject to judicial performance review and possible sanctions.
This result would most certainly disrupt the efficiency and independence of the judiciary, a
consequence neither intended nor contemplated by the authors of the Constitution or the
Canons of Judicial Conduct.
¶38.
In matters of judicial performance, this Court scrutinizes the conduct of a judge on an
individual basis. An unsupported claim of ignorance will not insulate a judge from sanctions.
This Court has previously sanctioned judicial officials who claimed ignorance. In the case of
In re Collins, 524 So.2d 553 (Miss. 1987), a judge was removed from office by this Court for
15
failure to keep records, imposing excessive fines, and utilizing prisoners for personal and
county use. In the case of In re Gunn, 614 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1993), a judge was sanctioned for
“fixing” or improperly dismissing tickets. In the case of In re Stewart, 490 So.2d 882 (Miss.
1986), a judge was removed from office for converting money to his own use which came to
him by virtue of his office and for falsifying records to cover up this misconduct. In the case
of In re Garner, 466 So.2d 884 (Miss. 1985), a judge was removed from office for receiving
for his own benefit, fines and penalties paid to the county. In the case of In re Anderson, 451
So.2d 232 (Miss. 1984), a judge was removed from office for knowingly committing perjury
and improperly failing to refund garnishment costs.
¶39.
However, each of these cases are clearly distinguishable from the case sub judice. The
errors of Judge Martin clearly do not rise to the level of judicial misconduct exhibited in any
of the aforementioned cases. In each of those cases, this Court found that a mistake of law was
indeed made, but the mistake was more than a mere error in judgment; therefore, sanctions
were appropriate.
¶40.
In this case, no proof was presented that Judge Martin exhibited bad faith or gross
unconcern in exercising her duties as outlined in In Re Lloyd W. Anderson, 412 So.2d at 745.
In the case sub judice, Judge Martin made an error in judgment, and she will not be sanctioned
by this Court for her mistake.
¶41.
We, who sit on the bench, strive to be fair and make well-reasoned decisions; however,
we will never attain a standard of perfection. Our wish is that errors would never occur. Our
more realistic hope is that only a minimum number of errors will occur. Generally, these
errors are corrected by the erring judge on motions to reconsider. When this procedure fails,
16
our system provides additional safeguards in the form of our appellate courts. It is our duty to
judge based upon the facts and law of each particular case that comes before us; and in the case
sub judice, we find that clear and convincing evidence of judicial misconduct is not present.
Therefore, we reject the Commission’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations and finally dismiss its complaint against Judge Martin with prejudice.
¶42.
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON AND
DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.
17
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