Rheuvonia Buck v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CT-00345-SCT
RHEUVONIA BUCK
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
HON. FRANK G. VOLLOR
WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JAMES L. PENLEY, JR.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CHARLES W. MARIS
G. GILMORE MARTIN
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART - 2/13/2003
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
WALLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
We granted certiorari in this post-conviction relief case to address the issue of
whether Rheuvonia Buck's drug case was properly transferred from youth court to circuit
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Warren County Circuit Court's denial of Buck's
motion for post-conviction relief. Finding that Buck's case was improperly transferred, we
reverse and remand. However, we affirm the Court of Appeals' finding of no ineffective
assistance of counsel by Buck's previous representatives.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
Rheuvonia Buck was arrested for two counts of sale of cocaine to an undercover
informant. At the time, she was sixteen years old. At another proceeding in Warren County
Youth Court involving other members of her family, Buck and her mother requested that she
be certified as an adult. The following exchange took place before the youth court:
Mr. Bonner [Buck's attorney]: Your Honor, this is R.B., who
has been charged with the sale of cocaine. She is a child from
this household, but she is not listed in this petition. She's before
this Court to be certified as an adult today, and I was going to
point out to the Court, that she's not a party to this particular
cause number.
The Court: All right. Do you have any objection to her being
certified as an adult?
Mr. Bonner: Your Honor, I have advised her not to seek
certification. She has indicated and her mother has indicated to
me that it is her wish to be certified as an adult against my
advice and best wishes, but that's what she wants to do.
***
The Court: You understand what you're doing? You've been
explained this?
R.B.: Yes, sir.
The Court: You've been to training school before, haven't you?
R.B.: Yes, sir.
The Court: How many times?
R.B.: Two.
The youth court thereafter accepted Buck's request to be certified as an adult, ordered her
confined in an adult facility, and imposed a $25,000 bond.
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¶3.
In circuit court and with different counsel, Buck entered an open plea to one count
of sale of cocaine; the second count having been dismissed by the State. The court informed
Buck that she was entering an open plea and that he could give her the maximum sentence.
After an exhaustive inquiry to determine Buck's understanding of what she was doing and
being satisfied that she did understand, the court sentenced her to ten years' imprisonment,
with five years suspended.
¶4.
On October 11, 2000, Buck filed a motion for post-conviction relief. She was
represented by yet another attorney. The motion argued a failure of statutory procedure
since no motion to transfer had been filed, neither she nor her mother understood the
ramifications of being transferred, the youth court failed to find no reasonable prospects of
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The
circuit court denied Buck's motion, finding that Buck's guilty plea had been voluntary and
that the youth court had substantially complied with statutory requirements before allowing
transfer to circuit court.
¶5.
Buck appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no ineffective
assistance of counsel, but not addressing the assigned error of the youth court's failure to
follow statutory requirements for transfer of a case. Buck v. State, 2002 WL 1278063
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Presiding Judge Southwick dissented without opinion. Three
additional judges, Presiding Judge King and Judges Lee and Irving, dissented, stating that
Buck's counsel's raising the issue of transfer to circuit court was constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel that was "akin to a confession of guilt. . . ." Id. at *4. We granted
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certiorari thereafter. Since the issue of transfer is, in our opinion, central to the resolution
of this case, we will address it.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief, we will not disturb the court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous; however, we
apply the de novo standard to questions of law. Harris v. State, 757 So. 2d 195, 197 (Miss.
2000); Pickett v. State, 751 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Miss. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I.
¶7.
WHETHER JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY
TRANSFERRED FROM YOUTH COURT TO
CIRCUIT COURT.
Buck argues that the Warren County Youth Court's improper transfer of jurisdiction
under Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (2000) failed to confer authority in the circuit court to
act in her case. The State responds that, while procedurally irregular, the transfer order was
sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to circuit court.
¶8.
Section 43-21-157 establishes an elaborate procedure to be followed in transferring
jurisdiction from youth court to another court and states in pertinent part:
(1)
If a child who has reached his thirteenth birthday is
charged by petition to be a delinquent child, the youth
court, either on motion of the youth court prosecutor or
on the youth court's own motion, after a hearing as
hereinafter provided, may, in its discretion, transfer
jurisdiction of the alleged offense described in the
petition or a lesser included offense to the criminal court
which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if
committed by an adult. The child shall be represented by
counsel in transfer proceedings.
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(2)
A motion to transfer shall be filed on a day prior to the
date set for the adjudicatory hearing but not more that
ten (10) days after the filing of the petition. The youth
court may order a transfer study at any time after the
motion to transfer is filed. The transfer study and any
other social record which the youth court will consider
at the transfer hearing shall be made available to the
child's counsel prior to the hearing. Summons shall be
served in the same manner as other summons under this
chapter with a copy of the motion to transfer and the
petition attached thereto.
(3)
The transfer hearing shall be bifurcated. At the transfer
hearing, the youth court shall first determine whether
probable cause exists to believe that the child committed
the alleged offense. For the purpose of the transfer
hearing only, the child may, with the assistance of
counsel, waive the determination of probable cause.
(4)
Upon such a finding of probable cause, the youth court
may transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense and the
youth if the youth court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that there are no reasonable prospects of
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.
(5)
[Fourteen factors to be considered in determining
reasonable prospects of rehabilitation are listed here.]
(6)
If the youth court transfers jurisdiction of the alleged
offense to a criminal court, the youth court shall enter a
transfer order containing:
(a)
Facts showing that the youth court had
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties;
(b)
Facts showing that the child was represented by
counsel;
(c)
Facts showing that the hearing was held in the
presence of the child and his counsel;
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(d)
A recital of the findings of probable cause and
the facts and reasons underlying the youth court's
decision to transfer jurisdiction of the alleged
offense;
(e)
The conditions of custody or release of the child
pending criminal court proceedings, including
bail or recognizance as the case may justify, as
well as a designation of the custodian for the time
being; and
(f)
A designation of the alleged offense transferred
and of the court to which the transfer is made and
a direction to the clerk to forward for filing in
such court a certified copy of the transfer order of
the youth court.
(emphasis added).
¶9.
In the instant case, the transfer was not initiated on motion of the youth court
prosecutor or on the youth court's own motion,1 but it was brought up by counsel in another
related case. Contrary to clear statutory requirements, there was no bifurcated transfer
hearing held, and the transfer order does not contain the requisite findings of probable cause.
The State, however, responds that Buck waived the above-quoted statutory procedure by
requesting that she be certified as an adult and transferred to circuit court.
¶10.
The very purpose of the Youth Court Law is to preclude allowing Buck to do what
she did. A youth court is a division of a county court if the county has a county court, or a
division of a chancery court. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-107. As such, "No proceeding by
1
The order transferring Buck's case to circuit court indicated that it was on the State's
motion. Since it was Buck who initiated the certification and transfer, it appears that the
State acquiesced in her request. The statute does not contemplate a juvenile's transfer
request.
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the youth court in cases involving children shall be a criminal proceeding but shall be
entirely of a civil nature." (emphasis added). The Legislature's goal in creating the youth
court was one of rehabilitation:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each
child coming within the jurisdiction of the youth court shall
become a responsible, accountable and productive citizen, and
that each such child shall receive such care, guidance and
control, preferably in such child's own home as is conducive
toward that end and is in the state's and the child's best interest.
It is the public policy of this state that the parents of each child
shall be primarily responsible for the care, support, education
and welfare of such children; however, when it is necessary that
a child be removed from the control of such child's parents, the
youth court shall secure proper care for such child.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-103. Thus, the objective of all those involved should focus on
rehabilitation and what is in the best interests of the child. The Louisiana Supreme Court
stated as much in finding "the unique nature of the juvenile system is manifested in its
noncriminal, or 'civil' nature, its focus on rehabilitation and individual treatment rather than
retribution, and the state's role as parens patriae in managing the welfare of the juvenile in
state custody." In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 396-97 (La. 1998). This goal surely is the
reason for the stringent procedural requirements, for a transfer sends a child from a civil
court with a paramount goal of rehabilitation to a criminal court with goals of incarceration
and retribution.
¶11.
It certainly appears that Buck knew precisely what she was doing in requesting
certification and transfer to circuit court, although doing so defies any all notions of common
sense and self-preservation. We cannot, however, get past the proposition that the State and
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the youth court, in their exercise of their parens patriae duties to Buck, would have found
that certification would be beneficial to her. Nonetheless, the Youth Court judge should not
have transferred without the specific statutory findings and conducting a bifurcated hearing.
II.
¶12.
WHETHER BUCK RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
On the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that Buck's representation before the youth court and circuit court was not ineffective. At
the youth court proceeding, Buck was adamant about being transferred to circuit court
despite her attorney's professed opposition to doing so. As for the guilty plea in circuit
court, we echo the Court of Appeals' observation that Buck's circuit court counsel opposed
her entering an open plea. The rule regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in the context
of a guilty plea is that
when a convicted defendant challenges his guilty plea on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show
unprofessional errors of substantial gravity. Beyond that, he
must show that those errors proximately resulted in his guilty
plea and that but for counsel's errors he would not have entered
the plea.
Reynolds v. State, 521 So. 2d 914, 918 (Miss. 1988). Buck has failed to establish that her
representation prejudiced her. On the contrary, all of the prejudice she sustained came of
her own volition despite the opposition of her attorneys. We therefore affirm the circuit
court and the Court of Appeals on this issue.
CONCLUSION
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¶13.
We certainly do not wish to see criminal defendants take a tactical gamble and then
cry "foul" when it backfires. However, the statutory youth court transfer procedure is
comprehensive and must be followed. The consequences of carving exceptions are far too
grave. We therefore affirm the Warren County Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals on
the finding that Buck's counsel was not ineffective, reverse on the issue of transfer of
jurisdiction, and remand to the circuit court with instructions that it (1) vacate Rheuvonia
Buck's conviction and sentence and (2) transfer this case to the Warren County Youth Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶14.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB, DIAZ, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ.,
CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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