Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Eddie J. Meeks
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-JP-01126-SCT
MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE
v.
JUSTICE COURT JUDGE S.S.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
7/3/2002
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE
LUTHER T. BRANTLEY, III
PATRICIA HANCOCK
AZKI SHAH
CIVIL - JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
PRIVATE REPRIMAND - 01/02/2003
EN BANC.
EASLEY, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
On August 15, 2001, the Mississippi Commission of Judicial Performance (“Commission”) filed
a formal complaint against Justice Court Judge S.S. (Judge), alleging judicial misconduct in violation of
Article 6, § 177A Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. The Judge filed an answer to the formal
complaint on September 18, 2001.
¶2.
The Commission’s Finding of Facts and Recommendation was filed with this Court on July 12,
2002. Specifically, the Commission found that the Judge's conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), and
4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi Judges. The Commission failed to find any proof that the
Judge violated Canon 3C1. Furthermore, the Commission found that proof presented that the Judge
violated Canons 5A, 5B and 7A(4) did not rise to the level of proof of a political violation by clear and
convincing proof. The Commission found that the Judge’s behavior constituted willful misconduct in office
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute
pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended.
The Commission
recommended to the Court that the Judge be publicly reprimanded and assessed the costs of this
proceeding in the amount of $718.40.
FACTS
¶3.
The Facts and Recommendation adopted by the Commission were submitted to this Court. The
Judge admitted that he was a member of a county concerned citizens association. As a member of the
association, the Judge participated in writing a petition and getting the petition typed. The Judge's
participation in drafting the petition was not done in his official capacity as justice court judge. The petition
requested the removal of a Deputy Sheriff from the County Sheriff's Office citing (1) disrespect to the black
community, (2) violation of civil rights of black citizens, and (3) little or no law enforcement training. The
Judge denied any involvement in signing or circulating the petition. The petition was prepared some time
after the Deputy had stopped the Judge for speeding and requested a field sobriety test. The Judge also
had complained to the highway patrol of the conduct of the highway patrolman who stopped him with the
Deputy.
¶4.
Between the time the Judge helped formulated the petition and the complaint being filed against the
Judge, the Judge heard cases that involved the Deputy. The Judge testified that he heard three cases that
had the Deputy's name listed as the law enforcement officer. The Judge testified that he considered that
once a law enforcement officer made a complaint, the law enforcement officer was only a witness.
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¶5.
One of the three cases was bound over to the grand jury, and one was a DUI where the person
pled guilty by an agreement between the defendant's attorney and the Deputy and was assessed a fine. The
Judge testified that in each case that the Deputy was an affiant, an agreement was presented to the court
between the prosecutor and the defense. The Judge agrees that his conduct was an effort to improve law
enforcement in the County and did not amount to willful misconduct of office. The Deputy testified that he
had not been adversely affected by the petition. The Deputy also stated that he was not aware of the
petition ever being presented to his boss, the Sheriff.
¶6.
The Commission found that the Judge violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1) and 4, as follows:
Canon 1 was violated by Judge S.S.'s failure to uphold the integrity and independence
of his office (judiciary) by participating in a petition procedure against an officer who
regularly presented cases in his court and "cautioning" the sheriff of his county with said
petition.
Canon 2 was violated when Judge S.S. became publicly involved with the public, while
a judicial officer, in petitioning the general public against a law officer, both deputy and
sheriff, which put the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in question.
Canon 2B was violated by allowing his actions and relationship with others to influence
his conduct and judgment.
Canon 3A(1) was violated by Judge S.S.'s failure to disqualify himself on subsequent
cases brought by the Deputy which followed the drafting of the "petition."
Canon 4 was violated when his extra-judicial activities did cast a reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge and did interfere with the proper performance
of his duties.
¶7.
The Commission failed to find any proof that the Judge's motive arose out of the traffic stop.
Therefore, the Commission found no violation of Canon 3C(1). The Commission found that proof of any
violation of Canon 5A, 5B and 7A(4) did not prove a political violation by clear and convincing proof. The
Commission determined that the Judge's conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct
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prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute as defined by this
Court. The Commission recommended that this Court publicly reprimand the Judge with no fine assessed
and the assessment of all costs herein. The costs associated with this inquiry are $718.40.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8.
The standard of review for judicial misconduct proceedings is de novo. Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Boykin, 763 So.2d 872, 874 (Miss. 2000) (citing Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Gunn, 614 So.2d 387, 389 (Miss. 1993)). The Commission’s findings,
based on clear and convincing evidence, are given “great deference.” Id. This Court however, is obligated
to conduct an independent inquiry. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Neal, 774 So.2d
414, 416 (Miss. 2000). Even though the Commission’s findings are considered, this Court is not bound
by the findings and additional sanctions may be imposed. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance
v. Whitten, 687 So.2d 744, 746 (Miss. 1997).
DISCUSSION
I.
¶9.
WHETHER THE JUDGE’S CONDUCT CONSTITUTES WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE WHICH BRINGS THE JUDICIAL OFFICE INTO
DISREPUTE PURSUANT TO SECTION 177A OF THE
MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION.
In judicial performance proceedings, this Court determines whether the conduct of a judge
constitutes willful misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into
disrepute pursuant to Article 6, § 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended.
¶10.
This Court has held:
Willful misconduct in office is the improper or wrongful use of power of his office by a
judge acting intentionally or with gross unconcern for his conduct and generally in bad faith.
It involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of diligence. Necessarily, the
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term would encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and
also any knowing misuse of the office, whatever the motive. However, these elements are
not necessary to a finding of bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial
office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond
the legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad faith....
Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. However, a judge may also, through
negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the
administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute.
Whitten, 687 So.2d at 747 (quoting In re Quick, 553 So.2d 522, 524 (Miss.1989)) (emphasis in
original).
¶11.
The Commission determined by clear and convincing evidence that the Judge violated Canons 1,
2A, 2B, 3A(1) and 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Mississippi Judges. In the case sub judice, the
Judge participated in drafting a petition against a law officer while serving as a judicial officer and continuing
to preside on cases involving the Deputy without disqualifying himself. “Whether this behavior was actually
willful is of no consequence.” As this Court has held:
While the conduct of Respondent, in our opinion, amounted to willful misconduct in office
and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, bringing the judicial office into
disrepute, we recognize as quoted in In re Anderson, supra, that a judge may also,
through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial
to the administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute. The result is
the same regardless of whether bad faith or negligence and ignorance are involved and
warrants sanctions.
Boykin, 763 So.2d at 875 (quoting In re Anderson, 451 So.2d 232, 234 (Miss.1984)).
¶12.
This Court finds that while the Judge’s involvement in drafting the petition against the Deputy was
not performed in his official capacity as justice court judge, Judge S.S.'s conduct does constitute willful
misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office
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into disrepute. Accordingly, the Commission's findings, as to the willfulness of the conduct before this
Court, are correct, upheld, and adopted.
II.
¶13.
WHETHER THE JUDGE SHOULD BE PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED AND ASSESSED ALL COSTS AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION.
The Commission's recommendation determined that the Judge should be publicly reprimanded and
assessed all costs associated with this proceeding in the amount of $718.40. However, imposing sanctions
is left solely to the discretion of this Court. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Jones, 735
So.2d 385, 389 (Miss. 1999). The sanction, however, ought to fit the offense at issue. Boykin, 763
So.2d at 876.
¶14.
In determining the appropriate sanction for each case before this Court mitigating factors are
reviewed pursuant to this Court’s holding in In re Baker, 535 So.2d 47 (Miss. 1988). In determining
whether a reprimand should be public, this Court considers mitigating factors which weigh in favor of
confidential, private action. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Walker, 565 So.2d 1117,
1125 (Miss. 1990). The factors from In re Baker, Walker, 565 So.2d at 1125 (citing In re Baker,
535 So.2d at 54), along with the evidence from the case sub judice, are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
¶15.
The length and character of the judge's public service.
Positive contributions made by the judge to the courts and the community.
The lack of prior judicial precedent on the incident in issue.
Commitment to fairness and innovative procedural form on the part of the judge.
The magnitude of the offense.
The number of persons affected.
Whether "moral turpitude" was involved.
At the time of the hearing before the Commission, the Judge had served as a justice court judge
approximately ten years and four months. There is no record of any prior judicial complaints against the
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Judge. The Judge's position was that he thought he was serving to improve the quality of the county law
enforcement. The Judge did not preside on any case involving the Deputy after drafting the petition that
was not presented to the court as an agreement between the defense and the prosecution. The Deputy
testified that he received no adverse effect from the Judge's actions. The Judge acknowledged that in
hindsight he made a unwise decision.
¶16.
The Judge testified that he was concerned that the Deputy was not living up to the standards
required for his position. The Judge testified that the Deputy seemed to have a problem with the amount
of bonds that were set and some of the rules, regulations and laws that he had to follow. The Judge testified
he had talked to Minimum Standards, the Sheriff, and the board of supervisors about the Deputy in the past
with no results. The Judge testified that he told the Sheriff that since the Deputy seemed to have a problem
with him that the Sheriff should transfer the Deputy to another side of the county to limit the number of cases
that came before him.
¶17.
Moral turpitude was not involved in the case before this Court. There was no proof that the
Judge's actions were motivated by his traffic stop by the Deputy. No negative outcome to any case or the
Deputy's career was established as a result of the conduct of the Judge.
¶18.
Based on the assessments of all the factors involved in this case, we find that a private reprimand
rather than a public reprimand is a sufficient sanction in this case. See Miss. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance v. A Municipal Court Judge, 755 So.2d 1062, 1063-65 (Miss. 2000); Miss.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Justice Court Judge R.R., 732 So.2d 224 (Miss. 1999).
CONCLUSION
¶19.
In conclusion, we find that the conduct of Justice Court Judge S.S. constituted willful misconduct
in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute
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pursuant to Article 6, § 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. Justice Court Judge
S.S. shall be privately reprimanded and assessed court costs in the amount of $718.40.
¶20. JUSTICE COURT JUDGE S.S. SHALL BE PRIVATELY REPRIMANDED AND
IS ASSESSED COSTS OF $718.40.
McRAE, P.J., WALLER, DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, P.J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION
JOINED BY PITTMAN, C.J., AND COBB, J. CARLSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
SMITH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
¶21.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that judicial misconduct occurred, but dissent as to the
lenient punishment imposed by the majority. I would affirm the recommendation by the Commission of
a public reprimand.
PITTMAN, C.J., AND COBB, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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