The Mississippi Bar v. Alan W. Carter
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 95-BA-00062-SCT
THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
v.
ALAN CARTER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
12/2/94
NA
COMPLAINT TRIBUNAL
J. DAVID WYNNE
MICHAEL B. MARTZ
NO BRIEF FILED
CIVIL - BAR MATTERS
REVERSED AND RENDERED - 7/18/96
EN BANC.
PRATHER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case involves Alan Carter, an attorney who has previously been reprimanded, suspended, and
disbarred from practice for neglecting his clients and converting their funds. In April 1995, this Court
upheld Carter's disbarment. One of the reasons for the disbarment was Carter's continued practice of
law while under an order of suspension. See Carter v. The Mississippi Bar, 654 So. 2d 505 (Miss.
1995) (hereinafter Carter I). In Carter I, this Court took note of other bar complaints filed against
Carter, which were the result of similar actions taken by him during his suspension; the case sub
judice, is one of those cases. See Carter I, 654 So. 2d at 510.
¶2. On the merits of the bar complaint sub judice, the Complaint Tribunal ordered that Carter be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. The Bar appealed, and argued that Carter should
have been disbarred -- particularly in light of the fact that the acts complained of occurred during a
period in which Carter was not supposed to have been practicing law. Because Carter was
subsequently disbarred in Carter I, the matter discussed above, the issue in this appeal is as follows:
WHETHER REVIEW OF A BAR MATTER IS PROPER, WHEN THE ATTORNEY IN
QUESTION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISBARRED?
¶3. This is a case of first impression in Mississippi. However, the Supreme Court in our neighboring
state of Louisiana has addressed the issue, and the reasoning used by that court is persuasive. See
Louisiana State Bar Ass's v. Krasnoff, 502 So. 2d 1018 (La. 1987). In Krasnoff, the court held that
it must consider the bar complaint, even though the attorney had already been disbarred:
As this court has stated in the past, the purpose of lawyer discipline is not so much to punish
the errant attorney as it is to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct necessary
to protect the public and the administration of justice. Naturally, where the complaint alleges
misuse of client funds, it is the duty of the court to hear all such matters as they arise. This is
necessary for the proper administration of justice and to insure public confidence in the legal
profession's ability to regulate and discipline its members. Accordingly, we find our exclusive
jurisdiction in disciplinary matters allows us to hear and act upon all complaints of misconduct
alleged to have occurred while an attorney was a member of the bar and regardless of whether
or not the attorney has already been disbarred. This finding is consistent with the mandates and
the obvious intent of the disciplinary scheme included in the Articles of Incorporation of the Bar
Association. The Court's jurisdiction over a disbarred attorney is continuing as evidenced by our
decisional authority to readmit or not to readmit a disbarred attorney to the practice of law.
Here, the misconduct occurred prior to the finality of the decision ordering respondent's
disbarment. Respondent was a member of the Bar at the time the misconduct occurred and
clearly the Court's jurisdiction attaches to such misconduct.
We believe it is proper for the Committee on Professional Responsibility to go forward with
disciplinary proceedings regardless of the stage of development, when the misconduct occurred
prior to the finality of a disbarment order. It would not be appropriate for such matters to be
held in abeyance and referred to any readmission application the disbarred attorney might file.
Delay in such matters would prejudice the availability of witnesses, restrict or defeat
appropriate restitution, and impede fairness to the involved respondent and the complainant. . . .
Finally, a failure by the Committee on Professional Responsibility to go forward with
disciplinary proceedings regardless of the state of development, or a failure by this Court to
exercise its jurisdiction and act on such matters, would inevitably damage the integrity of the
legal profession and lead to a loss of respect in the minds of our citizens. Judicial economy and
use of the Committee's time and resources are policy considerations which must be
subordinated to the need for prompt response to complaints of professional misconduct.
Krasnoff, 502 So. 2d at 1020-21.
¶4. Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court holds that consideration of this bar matter is proper.
The next question to be addressed is the sanction to be imposed on Carter -- who is no longer a
member of the Bar. In the Krasnoff case cited above, the court determined that the attorney's
misconduct would have merited disbarment. Id. at 1022-23. The discipline meted out in that case,
therefore, was to require the attorney to wait the mandatory period of years from the second
judgment of disbarment, before applying for reinstatement. Id. at 1023.
¶5. In considering bar matters, this Court examines the evidence de novo, and renders such orders as
it deems appropriate. Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 662 So. 2d 586, 589 (Miss. 1995).
Sanctions are imposed under the following factors: (1) the nature of the misconduct involved;
(2) the need to deter similar misconduct; (3) the preservation of dignity and reputation of the
legal profession; (4) the protection of the public; and (5) sanctions imposed in similar cases.
Additional guidelines, as suggested by the American Bar Association (ABA), include "(1) the
duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors."
Carter I, 654 So. 2d at 511 (citations omitted).
¶6. The facts in this case are that, during a period when Carter was suspended from practice, he
represented a client, converted that client's funds, and then became unavailable to that client. In
Carter I, this Court considered the factors enumerated above and disbarred Carter for similar
misconduct. This Court again finds that such actions merit disbarment, and holds that Carter is
prohibited from applying for reinstatement to the Bar for a period of three years after this judgment
becomes final. See Rule of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar 12.1; Krasnoff, 502 So. 2d at
1022-23.
¶7. REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALAN CARTER IS PROHIBITED FROM APPLYING
FOR READMISSION TO THE BAR FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS AFTER THE
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE IS FINAL.
LEE, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, ROBERTS, SMITH AND
MILLS, JJ., CONCUR.
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