Robert Moody v. Phillip Cates
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-01340-COA
ROBERT MOODY AND BETTY MOODY
APPELLANTS
v.
PHILLIP CATES AND SHARON CATES
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEES
04/29/2009
HON. JACQUELINE ESTES MASK
ITAWAMBA COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
RAYMOND G. O’NEAL III
LORI NAIL BASHAM
CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DETERMINED BOUNDARY BETWEEN
ADJOINING LOTS
AFFIRMED: 04/05/2011
EN BANC.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Robert and Betty Moody and Sharon Cates1 own adjoining lots in the Bud Isaiah Lake
Subdivision in Itawamba County, Mississippi. This dispute arose over an action brought by
the Moodys against Sharon to quiet and confirm title regarding an area encompassing the
boundary line dividing their properties. The Chancery Court of Itawamba County ruled that
the Moodys had gained ownership by adverse possession of a portion of the disputed
property, originally owned by Sharon. The extent of the property awarded to the Moodys
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The case was originally filed against Phillip and Sharon Cates. The Cates have
separated, and Phillip is no longer a party to this suit.
is at issue in the instant appeal. The chancellor found that only a portion of the area in
dispute had been adversely possessed; therefore, she only awarded that portion to the
Moodys. The Moodys have appealed arguing that the chancellor erred in failing to award
the entire disputed area.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
The Moodys and Sharon own adjoining lots within their subdivision, and both lots
consist of waterfront property on the southwest shore of Bud Isaiah Lake. In 1967, the
Moodys purchased Lot 50. Within four years of purchase, the Moodys built a retaining wall,
a sidewalk and patio, a fence, a well and well house, and a house on the property. In order
to access the property, Robert built two driveways leading to the property, including a main
driveway which passes through the area in dispute. The Moodys claim to have continuously
used and maintained the disputed property since 1967.
¶4.
In approximately 1980, Archie Cates purchased the adjoining property, Lot 51.
Archie testified that he was aware that the Moodys had built a cabin and a well within the
disputed area, but he never considered the Moodys to be building on his land. Archie
testified that he continuously used the main driveway to access Lot 51.
Archie
acknowledged that there was an existing fence when he purchased the land, but he was
uncertain as to the exact location of the fence. Archie stated that he used Lot 51 primarily
for fishing and maintained the property during his ownership.
¶5.
In 1998, Archie sold Lot 51 to Danny Howard Shefield. Shefield also testified to
using the main driveway to access Lot 51. Sheffield stated that the fence was built near the
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boundary line dividing Lot 50 and Lot 51, and the fence began at the lake and stretched
approximately half the boundary line. Shefield testified that he maintained the property
during his ownership.
¶6.
In 2005, Shefield sold Lot 51 to Sharon, and Sharon began constructing a house.
Problems began when the Moodys alleged that the cabin was being constructed too close to
their lot line, in violation of the restrictive covenants. The Moodys had surveys completed
on both properties, and the results of the surveys revealed that the Moodys had overestimated
their property area by a tenth of an acre. As a result, the Moodys filed a complaint requesting
the court to quit and confirm title.
¶7.
The Moodys argued that the subdivision plat must contain a mistake because they
believed their lot was larger than what is described within the plat. The focus of the dispute
turned upon the location of two old iron pins found by Robert, which he described as the
original pins designating the boundary line between the two properties. If the pins defined
the boundary line, Lot 50 is larger than shown by the subdivision plat, and correspondingly,
Lot 51 is smaller. Basically, the Moodys claim title to the property encompassed by the iron
pins, including the main driveway. If the iron pins do not control the description of the lot,
then the Moodys argue that they are entitled to ownership by adverse possession of the
disputed area. Sharon answered and argued that the description of the lots, as set forth in
the subdivision plat control the boundary line, and she filed a counter-complaint alleging
ownership by adverse possession of the main driveway.
¶8.
Two surveyors, Randy Boyd and Joe Mears, testified as to the possible discrepancy
between the boundary line suggested by the two iron pins and the subdivision plat. Boyd
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used the iron pins for his survey and stated that the plat was incorrect in its description of the
location of the pins. Mears, on the other hand, could not locate the iron pins and testified that
his survey is consistent with the requirements of the plat description.
Mears also
acknowledged that the plat may contain an erroneous description.
¶9.
The chancellor addressed the alteration of the subdivision plat, citing Mississippi
Code Annotated section 19-27-31 (Rev. 2003), and held that the description set forth in the
recorded plat controls the description of the individual lots. Section 19-27-31 provides
statutory procedures for altering or vacating a description within a platted area, and because
the statutory procedures were not satisfied, the chancellor held that the description in the plat,
rather than the location of pins, defined the property’s boundaries.
¶10.
The chancellor then found that the Moodys had gained ownership by adverse
possession of a portion of the disputed property and divided the property accordingly. The
Moodys have appealed arguing that the chancellor erred in failing to award them the entire
disputed area.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11.
“Chancellors are vested with broad discretion, and this Court will not disturb the
chancellor’s findings unless the court’s actions were manifestly wrong, the court abused its
discretion, or the court applied an erroneous legal standard.” Andrews v. Williams, 723 So.
2d 1175, 1177 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
“When reviewing a
chancellor’s decision, we will accept a chancellor’s findings of fact as long as the evidence
in the record reasonably supports those findings. In other words, we will not disturb the
findings of a chancellor unless those findings are clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal
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standard was applied.” Peagler v. Measells, 743 So. 2d 389, 390 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(citation omitted). “The chancellor, as the trier of fact, evaluates the sufficiency of the proof
based on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony.” Ellison v. Meek, 820
So. 2d 730, 734 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶12.
The Moodys argue that they are entitled to ownership by adverse possession of the
entire disputed area of land rather than just the portion awarded by the chancellor. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has identified six elements that are necessary to make a
successful claim of adverse possession. The possession of the property must be: (1) under
claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious, and visible; (4) continuous and
uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful. Ellison, 820 So.2d
at 734 (¶13). The burden of proof is on the adverse possessor to show by clear and
convincing evidence that each element is met. Id.
¶13.
In this case, the chancellor found each element was satisfied, but for only a portion
of the property in dispute. The chancellor determined that through adverse possession, the
Moodys gained ownership of the portion of the property on which they constructed the well,
well house, walkway with steps, retaining wall, and placed the fence posts. As for the
remainder of the property, through which the main driveway passes, the Moodys failed to
satisfy the necessary elements of adverse possession.
1.
¶14.
Claim of Ownership
“In most cases, the underlying question is whether the possessory acts relied upon by
the would-be adverse possessor are sufficient to put the record title holder upon notice that
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the lands are held under an adverse claim of ownership.” Cook v. Robinson, 924 So. 2d 592,
595 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). The chancellor held that the Moodys had
established a claim of ownership as to a portion of the property, stating: “The Moody’s
utilized the property as their own, and based on their position with regard to the displaced
pins, believed the same was their property insofar as they utilized the same.”
¶15.
The Moodys argue that they established a claim of ownership to the entire disputed
area because they paid a higher price for their lot compared to the price of other lots within
the subdivision under the assumption their lot was larger. This Court has held the purchase
of property does not automatically establish a claim of ownership in property other than that
described within the deed. See Niebanck v. Block, 35 So. 3d 1260, 1264 (¶12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2010).
¶16.
The Moodys also claim there was a fence dividing the properties and that the
construction of the fence is evidence of their claim of ownership. Even so, “the mere
existence of a fence near the actual boundary line does not establish that the fence is the
accepted boundary between the properties.” Ellison, 820 So. 2d at 734 (¶16) (citations
omitted).
¶17.
In the instant case, the record reveals that the exact location of the fence is ambiguous
and insufficient to prove to adverse possession. Stewart v. Graber, 760 So. 2d 868, 869 (¶¶89) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The owners proceeding Sharon testified to the existence of the
fence, but they stated that it only spanned half of the alleged boundary line. There is no
evidence that the fence ever enclosed or completely divided one property from another.
Sharon testified that when they began clearing their lot to build their cabin, there was no
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fence or remnants of a fence, except for one post. Because there is no evidence to prove the
location of the fence, there is no evidence to support the Moodys’ claim of ownership as to
property allegedly divided by the fence. This element is not satisfied.
2.
¶18.
Actual or Hostile Possession
Actual possession is “effective control over a definite area of land, evidenced by
things visible to the eye or perceptible to the senses.” Wicker v. Harvey, 937 So. 2d 983,
993-94 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Blankinship v. Payton, 605 So. 2d 817, 819-20
(Miss. 1992)). The chancellor found that this element was satisfied and recognized that,
“[t]he Moodys’[] actions, beginning in 1967 were done without permission from [Sharon],
or her predecessors in title.” The main driveway, constructed by the Moodys, lies within the
remainder portion of the disputed property. The record indicates that the main driveway was
also constructed without permission from Sharon or her predecessors in title. Accordingly,
this element is satisfied.
3.
¶19.
Open, Notorious, and Visible
A “land owner must have notice, actual or imputable, of an adverse claim to his
property in order for it to ripen against him, and the mere possession of land is not sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of open and notorious.” Scrivener v. Johnson, 861 So. 2d 1057,
1059 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted). An adverse possessor “must unfurl his
flag on the land, and keep it flying, so that the (actual) owner may see, and if he will, that an
enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.” Wicker, 937 So. 2d
at 994 (¶35) (quoting Blankinship, 605 So. 2d at 820).
¶20.
The chancellor held that the Moodys satisfied the element of open, notorious and
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visible possession. “Since 1967, the Moodys utilized the driveway, constructed a well, well
house, walkway with steps, retaining wall, and placed fence posts along the line in dispute,
and maintained the same.” As to the remainder of the disputed property, there is no dispute
that the main driveway was constructed by the Moodys, and it is visible to Sharon and all
successive owners. This element is satisfied.
4.
¶21.
Continuous Use or Possession
The chancellor found that: “Beginning in 1967, the Moodys constructed the driveway,
well, well house, walkway with steps, retaining wall and placed the fence posts, and
continued to use the same without interruption for approximately 28 years, until the dispute
precipitating this action in 2005.” The record indicates that the main driveway was also
constructed in 1967, and the Moodys used the main driveway continuously since the date of
construction. This element is satisfied.
5.
¶22.
Exclusive Use or Possession
The chancellor held that: “No proof was presented to show [Sharon], or her
predecessors in title, utilized the particular portion of property in dispute nor interfered with
the Moodys’[] use thereof prior to the present dispute.” The record indicates that the
chancellor was referring to only a portion of the disputed property, the portion encompassing
the well, well house, walkway with steps, and retaining wall. The remainder of the property
was used by both the Moodys and Sharon. The main driveway is within the remainder of the
disputed property, and the Moodys and Sharon, and all previous owners of Sharon’s
property, testified to using the driveway. Furthermore, the previous owners of Lot 51 and
Sharon testified to utilizing/maintaining the remainder of the disputed property and also
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paying taxes on the property. Only the portion granted by the chancellor to the Moodys by
adverse possession was exclusively used. Thus, this element is not satisfied.
6.
¶23.
Peaceful
There is no dispute as to this element. Both parties agree that ownership of their
adjoining lots was peaceful until this present dispute arose.
¶24.
For the foregoing reasons we find that the Moodys have failed to satisfy each
necessary element of adverse possession. Accordingly, we affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE ITAWAMBA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANTS.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ.,
CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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