Samuel D. Jernigan v. Amy Young
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CA-00304-COA
SAMUEL D. JERNIGAN
APPELLANT
v.
AMY YOUNG
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/13/2010
HON. TALMADGE D. LITTLEJOHN
MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
DONALD W. MEDLEY
LUANNE STARK THOMPSON
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AMY YOUNG
AFFIRMED: 04/19/2011
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS AND CARLTON, JJ.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Samuel D. Jernigan sought to recover a parcel of real property that he had previously
conveyed to his then wife, Mae Bell Jernigan, who had conveyed it to her daughter, Amy
Young. Samuel attempted to have the chancery court set aside the judgment in his divorce
from Mae Bell in an effort to reopen the property division. Samuel also attempted to set
aside the two deeds of conveyance. The chancery court found that Amy was the rightful
owner of the property and that summary judgment against Samuel was proper. We find no
error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Samuel owned a .38-acre tract of commercial real property located in Nettleton,
Mississippi. He had operated a car-repair shop on the premises for some time.
¶3.
In 1997, Samuel married Mae Bell. Two years later, Samuel conveyed the property
to Mae Bell by quitclaim deed.
¶4.
At the summary-judgment hearing, Samuel’s attorney explained the reason for the
conveyance. Samuel had hurt his back and could no longer work on cars. His shop had been
shut down. Mae Bell had opened up a seamstress shop on the property. Samuel was to apply
for social-security disability benefits. Samuel thought his chance for benefits would be
improved if the property was not titled in his name. Mae Bell gave the same explanation in
response to Samuel’s interrogatories.
¶5.
Samuel claims that although the deed, on its face, transferred all of Samuel’s rights
in the property, there was an agreement that Mae Bell would eventually deed the property
back to him. There was no written evidence of such an agreement.
¶6.
A year after Samuel had conveyed the property to Mae Bell, Mae Bell conveyed the
property to Amy, her daughter from a previous relationship, by warranty deed. The record
does not make it clear whether Samuel was aware of this conveyance at that time.
¶7.
A year after Mae Bell had deeded the property to Amy, Samuel and Mae Bell decided
to get a divorce. Neither of them hired a lawyer. Instead they used fill-in-the-blank forms.
They filed a joint complaint for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences with an
accompanying property-settlement agreement. The property-settlement agreement did not
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award either of them any property. In the blanks provided to list which spouse gets what
property, the word “none” was written. Four months later, the chancellor entered a final
decree of divorce that simply dissolved the marriage and incorporated the property-settlement
agreement.
¶8.
Four days after the divorce decree was entered, Samuel filed a “Withdrawal of
Consent.” In the withdrawal of consent, Samuel stated that he no longer consented to an
irreconcilable-differences divorce. Approximately one month later, Samuel filed a new
complaint for divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or,
alternatively, irreconcilable differences.
¶9.
In this complaint, Samuel asked the chancellor to award him the Nettleton property.
Also, one month later, Samuel filed a complaint to set aside both the quitclaim deed to Mae
Bell and the warranty deed to Amy. He also filed a motion to set aside the original divorce
decree pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Shortly thereafter, Samuel
filed a lis pendens notice on the Nettleton property. The chancellor consolidated all of these
separate filings into one case.
¶10.
The case made no progress for approximately seven years. In October 2009, Amy
filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the chancellor granted summary
judgment against Samuel on all of the above claims. It is from this judgment that Samuel
appeals.
ANALYSIS
1.
Claim to Reopen the Divorce
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¶11.
Samuel’s motion to set aside the original divorce decree, pursuant to Mississippi Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b), asked the chancellor to reopen the divorce judgment. Samuel
wanted the chancellor to reconsider the property division and find the Nettleton property was
marital property. Samuel wanted the chancellor to award him an equitable share of the
property. The chancellor denied the motion.
¶12.
This Court’s standard of review of the denial of a Rule 60 motion is abuse of
discretion. In re Dissolution of Marriage of De St. Germain, 977 So. 2d 412, 416 (¶7) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008). We turn to the merits of Samuel’s arguments.
a.
¶13.
Did Samuel consent to an irreconcilable-differences
divorce?
First, Samuel argues that an irreconcilable-differences divorce should not have been
granted because he did not consent to it. Samuel claims that, although his “Withdrawal of
Consent” was filed four days after the divorce decree was entered, he actually signed that
document in his lawyer’s office on the day before the decree was entered. He claims that an
“unexplainable delay” led to the untimely filing. He also claims that he communicated to
Mae Bell that he had changed his mind and that she went forward anyway and presented a
prepared divorce decree to the chancellor.
¶14.
Both spouses must consent to an irreconcilable-differences divorce. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 93-5-2(5) (Supp. 2010). However, this Court has stated: “[w]avering on whether a divorce
should be entered may often occur and does not invalidate the divorce. . . . What is important
is that agreement be validly expressed on the day that the chancellor is considering the
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issue.” Sanford v. Sanford, 749 So. 2d 353, 356 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶15.
In Sanford, this Court granted the wife relief from her irreconcilable-differences
divorce on the basis that she had not actually consented. The facts there are very different
from this case. Ms. Sanford was unrepresented by counsel, and she had written numerous
letters to the chancellor that unequivocally expressed her desire not to be divorced. Id. at 355
(¶5). Also, she had clearly misunderstood Mississippi law and thought that a divorce was
unavoidable even if she refused to consent. Id. at 356 (¶12). Further, the only time she
expressed consent was at a hearing when she nodded her head. Id. at 360 (¶27). Under those
circumstances, this Court found sufficient accident or mistake to grant relief from the
judgment under Rule 60(b)(2). Id. at 360 (¶28).
¶16.
Indeed, relief under Rule 60(b) requires a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”
In re Dissolution of Marriage of De St. Germain, 977 So. 2d at 416 (¶7). Samuel has not
carried that burden here. Instead, this case is more like Harvey v. Harvey, 918 So. 2d 837
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
In Harvey, this Court denied the husband relief from his
irreconcilable-differences divorce. Id. at 839 (¶9). We reaffirmed that “[w]hat is important
is that the agreement be validly expressed on the day that the chancellor is considering the
issue.” Id. Here, on the day the chancellor entered the decree, the chancellor had no reason
to believe that Samuel did not consent.
¶17.
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
b.
Was a hearing required before a judgment of divorce could be
entered?
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¶18.
Next, Samuel argues that the chancellor erred when he entered the divorce decree
without holding a hearing. Samuel points out that the statute states: “Complaints for divorce
on the ground of irreconcilable differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before
being heard.”
Miss. Code Ann. 93-5-2(4) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
Samuel,
however, ignores the next sentence. It states that, when there are no disputed issues to be
decided by the chancellor, a joint complaint for an irreconcilable-differences divorce “shall
be taken as proved and a final judgment entered thereon, as in other cases and without proof
or testimony[.]”
Id.
Indeed, “‘[t]he parties bargain on the premise that reaching an
agreement will avoid the necessity of presenting proof at trial.’” Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So.
2d 1256, 1263 (¶21) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Grier v. Grier, 616 So. 2d 337, 340 (Miss. 1993).
We can find no authority to support Samuel’s argument that a hearing was necessary before
a judgment could be entered, and it appears he had the same difficulty.
¶19.
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
c.
¶20.
Was the chancellor required to recite that he found the
property-settlement agreement “adequate and sufficient?”
Third, Samuel argues that the chancellor erred when he incorporated Samuel and Mae
Bell’s property-settlement agreement into the divorce decree without finding the agreement
to be “adequate and sufficient” as required by the statute. The statute provides, “[i]f the
parties provide by written agreement . . . for the settlement of any property rights between
the parties and the court finds that such provisions are adequate and sufficient, the agreement
may be incorporated in the judgment[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(2) (Supp. 2010). Samuel
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is correct that the chancellor did not recite that he found the agreement “adequate and
sufficient.” However, that is not a “magic phrase,” and the absence of it is not a ground for
reversal. Cobb v. Cobb, 29 So. 3d 145, 149 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
¶21.
Rather, this Court will reverse only if convinced that the “agreement is [in]adequate
and [in]sufficient in terms of equity and entirety.” Id. Turning to that question, Samuel
makes no argument that the agreement was actually inadequate and insufficient, aside from
his central claim that he should get the Nettleton property. As will be discussed below, that
property belonged to Amy at the time of the divorce; therefore, it could not have been
awarded to either spouse in the judgment of divorce.
¶22.
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
d.
¶23.
Was it reversible error for the chancellor to fail to require Rule
8.05 statements?
Finally, Samuel argues the chancellor committed reversible error when he failed to
require Samuel and Mae Bell to submit financial-disclosure statements pursuant to Uniform
Chancery Court Rule 8.05. This rule provides, “[u]nless excused by Order of the Court for
good cause shown, each party in every domestic case involving economic issues and/or
property division shall provide the opposite party” certain financial information.
Id.
However, a chancellor’s failure to require such statements is not necessarily reversible error.
In re Dissolution of Marriage of De St. Germain, 977 So. 2d at 417-18 (¶¶16-17). If the lack
of disclosure allowed one spouse to conceal major assets, it could be reversible error. Id.
(citing Kalman v. Kalman, 905 So. 2d 760, 764 (¶¶11-13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)).
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¶24.
Samuel makes no argument that Mae Bell was allowed to conceal major assets.
Indeed, Samuel’s argument is that the chancellor’s failure to insist on the financial statements
must result in reversal and remand. That argument is contrary to the existing authority.
Accordingly, this issue has no merit.
¶25.
We find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion when he denied Samuel’s Rule
60(b) motion for relief from the judgment of divorce.
2.
¶26.
The Deeds
In his second attempt to regain the Nettleton property, Samuel makes a two-pronged
attack on both the quitclaim deed to Mae Bell and the warranty deed to Amy. First, he
argues that both conveyances are invalid because they were not supported by consideration.
Second, he argues that he and Mae Bell had an enforceable oral agreement, whereby she
would hold the property in trust and deed it back to him at a later date. That agreement,
Samuel contends, precluded Mae Bell from deeding the property to Amy.
¶27.
First, we consider his argument that the conveyances are invalid for lack of
consideration. Samuel’s argument fails because Mississippi law recognizes inter vivos deeds
of gift. In Holmes v. O'Bryant, 741 So. 2d 366, 370 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), this Court
stated:
“[I]nter vivos deeds of gift are a perfectly respectable mode of conveyance.”
Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1190 (Miss. 1987). “A man of sound
mind may execute a will or a deed from any sort of motive satisfactory to him,
whether that motive be love, affection, gratitude, partiality, prejudice, or even
a whim or caprice.” Herrington v. Herrington, 232 Miss. 244, 250-251, 98 So.
2d 646, 649 (1957) (quoting Burnett v. Smith, 93 Miss. 566, 47 So. 117, 118
(1908)).
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¶28.
Next, we consider his allegation of an oral trust agreement. Samuel’s argument again
fails because Mississippi law does not recognize oral trusts in land. Mississippi Code
Annotated section 91-9-1 (Rev. 2004) states in part:
Hereafter all declarations or creations of trusts . . . in any land shall be made
and manifested by writing, signed by the party who declares or creates such
trust . . . or else they shall be utterly void.
Since there was no writing, the law will not give effect to the alleged agreement.
¶29.
We note that, in the proper circumstances, equity may impose a constructive or
resulting trust on the legal owner of real property despite the absence of a written trust
agreement. Simmons v. Simmons, 724 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).
However, that specific argument was never presented to the chancellor or raised on appeal.
¶30.
Because we find that the chancellor was correct to issue a summary judgment on
Samuel’s Rule 60 motion and Samuel’s complaint to set aside the deeds, the remaining issues
are moot. Because the initial divorce was valid, Samuel’s second complaint for divorce was
a nullity because it asked for a divorce to a non-existent marriage. Further, since the
conveyances to Mae Bell and Amy were valid and Amy is the rightful owner of the property,
Samuel has no claim to the property and no basis for the lis pendens notice. Therefore, the
chancellor was correct to find that the lis pendens notice should be cancelled.
¶31.
Finding no error, we affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
¶32. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF MONROE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON
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AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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