Isaac Chambers v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CP-00321-COA
ISAAC CHAMBERS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/17/2009
HON. LILLIE BLACKMON SANDERS
WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ISAAC CHAMBERS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY JR.
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 04/12/2011
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Issac Chambers appeals the Wilkinson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion
for post-conviction relief. Chambers asserts that: (1) his guilty plea was not entered
voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently; (2) the circuit court did not grant him an evidentiary
hearing before it dismissed his motion for post-conviction relief; and (3) his counsel was
ineffective. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
In July 2007, a grand jury indicted Chambers for two counts of aggravated assault and
one count of aggravated assault as an accessory after the fact. On October 29, 2007,
Chambers pled guilty to two counts of simple assault. He also pled guilty to possession of
a Schedule II controlled substance – cocaine – in an amount more than ten grams but less
than thirty grams. On November 1, 2007, the circuit judge sentenced Chambers to six
months in the Wilkinson County Jail for each count of simple assault, with the sentences to
run consecutively. On the charge for possession of cocaine, the circuit judge sentenced
Chambers to serve a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections, with this sentence to be served concurrently with his sentence for the two counts
of simple assault.
¶3.
On July 13, 2009, Chambers filed a motion for post-conviction relief.1 The circuit
judge denied this motion, and she filed the order denying relief on December 15, 2009. A
notice of appeal regarding this order does not appear in the record; however, we note that
Chambers filed a “Notice of Out of Time Appeal” on February 16, 2010, claiming that he
did not learn of the circuit court’s action denying his motion for post-conviction relief until
February 3, 2010.
¶4.
On March 29, 2010, the circuit judge issued an order in response to Chambers’s
notice of appeal regarding both his motion for post-conviction relief and his affidavit to
proceed in forma pauperis. We find that the language in this order by the circuit court
granted Chambers’s notice for appeal and allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis;
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Only the first page of this motion appears in the record before this Court.
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therefore, the order is sufficient to provide this Court with jurisdiction. Chambers now
appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for post-conviction relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
Our standard of review for a denial of a motion for post-conviction relief is well
established. We will not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless we find that the court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Kirksey v. State, 728 So. 2d 565, 567 (¶8) (Miss. 1999)). However, when
reviewing issues of law, this Court's proper standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State,
731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I.
¶6.
Guilty Plea
Chambers contends that at the time of the plea hearing, he was under the influence
of medication; therefore, he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter his guilty
plea. Chambers claims that on the morning of his plea hearing, he ingested more than the
prescribed amount of Zoloft, which impaired his mental state and affected his judgment.
Chambers argues that his assertions that he had been in and out of mental hospitals in the
past and had attempted to kill himself while in jail provide support for his claim of an
impaired mental state. However, outside of his own assertions, Chambers provides no
evidence or support in the record for the claim that he was mentally impaired at the time of
the plea hearing.
¶7.
In determining whether the entry of a plea of guilty was properly accepted by the trial
court, we are bound by the rule that the guilty plea must be entered voluntarily and
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intelligently. Goss v. State, 730 So. 2d 568, 573 (¶20) (Miss. 1998). The defendant must be
advised of the nature of the crime charged and the consequences of the guilty plea. Id.
¶8.
Although “[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to designate the record pursuant
to Rule 10(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure in a manner sufficient to allow
this Court to review the appellant's issues[,]” the full plea colloquy, among other relevant
documents, does not appear in the record before us. Austin v. State, 971 So. 2d 1286, 1287
n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). However, in its order denying Chambers’s motion for postconviction relief, the circuit court quoted extensively from the plea colloquy. Chambers also
appears to have attached an excerpt from the plea hearing to his brief. The dialogue from
the plea colloquy, which we find transcribed in the circuit court’s order, shows that
Chambers admitted to taking depression medication on the morning of the plea hearing. The
circuit judge then explained that to accept his guilty plea, the court must determine whether
or not Chambers knowingly, understandably, freely, and voluntarily entered his plea.
Chambers acknowledged that he understood and agreed that he possessed awareness as to
his decision to plead guilty. Chambers expressed that his counsel had informed him of the
maximum and minimum sentences that he could receive for his offenses, and Chambers
stated that he still wanted to enter a plea of guilty. Chambers’s attorney also testified at the
plea hearing that Chambers did not appear intoxicated or under the influence of any drugs.
¶9.
Chambers's argument regarding the involuntariness of his guilty plea is contradicted
by the plea petition. “The plea petition was not an oral statement in open court, but it was
a sworn document presumptively prepared with an appreciation of its fateful consequences.”
Ward v. State, 879 So. 2d 452, 455 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Similar to sworn statements
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made before the court, the plea petition “may be used to discredit post-plea allegations.” Id.
Chambers signed his plea petition on October 29, 2009, and he admitted that at the time of
signing, he was neither under the influence of any drugs, nor alcohol, nor suffering from any
mental disease. Accordingly, this issue lacks merit.
II.
¶10.
Evidentiary Hearing
Chambers also appears to assert that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion
for post-conviction relief without granting him an evidentiary hearing. Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-9(1) (Supp. 2010) provides, among other things, that a motion for
post-conviction relief must include (1) a concise statement of the grounds for relief, (2) a
sworn statement of those facts within the prisoner's personal knowledge, and (3) a statement
of facts outside of the prisoner's personal knowledge and how or by whom these facts will
be proven. Affidavits of these persons and any supporting documents should also be
attached. Id.
¶11.
Upon receipt of this information, Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(1)
(Supp. 2010) requires the circuit judge to examine “[t]he original motion, together with all
the files, records, transcripts and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack[.]”
If after doing so, it appears that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the circuit judge is
authorized to enter an order of dismissal without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Supp. 2010). The decision to deny an evidentiary hearing is a
matter within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Stovall v. State, 770 So. 2d 1019,
1021 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
¶12.
Chambers argues that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing based on
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his claims that “there was no evidence then and there is not evidence now.” He also claims
that at the plea hearing, the prosecutor recited the facts of the case from memory and, thus,
never presented any actual evidence of Chambers’s guilt. However, the plea colloquy
reflects that Chambers admitted his guilt at the plea hearing. In addition, Chambers
informed the circuit judge that he possessed full awareness of the consequence of pleading
guilty, and he made his plea freely and voluntarily. In the present case, we find that
Chambers's assertions are substantially contradicted by the court record; therefore, the circuit
court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing.
III.
¶13.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chambers also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his plea
hearing. He submits that his defense counsel failed to have him undergo a psychological
evaluation, which Chambers claims would have shown that he was under the influence of
medication at the time of his plea hearing. The record does not reflect that Chambers raised
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim with the circuit court. Therefore, we find that this
suggestion of error is procedurally barred from being raised for the first time before the
appellate court. Foster v. State, 716 So. 2d 538, 540 (¶7) (Miss. 1998).
¶14.
In spite of the procedural bar, we acknowledge that in order to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel, Chambers must prove that: (1) his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced Chambers’s defense. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). After reviewing the record before us, we cannot say that
Chambers's counsel provided ineffective assistance, and Chambers has failed to provide any
affidavits or evidence in support of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Miss.
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Code Ann. § 99-39-9(1). The record reflects that his counsel negotiated a plea, counseled
with him, and worked on his behalf. We also note that from the scant excerpts of the plea
colloquy provided in the record, Chambers admitted that he was guilty of possession of
cocaine, stated that he had sold drugs, and the drugs at issue were found in his mother’s car.
Chambers claimed that the drugs did not belong to him, but he admitted he had sold them
to someone else. The face of the record fails to provide any support to Chambers’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Chambers failed to provide any supporting affidavits
or evidence with his motion herein.
¶15.
Chambers also appears to assert various other claims for relief in this appeal.
However, after reviewing the circuit court’s order denying Chambers’s motion for postconviction relief, these issues do not appear to be raised in his motion for post-conviction
relief. As stated, the Mississippi Supreme Court has long held that issues not raised below
may not be raised on appeal, stating: “Questions will not be decided on appeal which were
not presented to the trial court and that court given an opportunity to rule on them. In other
words, the trial court cannot be put in error, unless it has had an opportunity of committing
error.” Stringer v. State, 279 So. 2d 156, 158 (Miss. 1973) (citing Boutwell v. State, 165
Miss. 16, 27-28, 143 So. 479, 482 (1932)). Thus, we find any other suggestions of error to
be procedurally barred.
¶16.
We, therefore, find that the circuit court properly denied Chambers’s motion for
post-conviction relief.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILKINSON COUNTY
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO WILKINSON COUNTY.
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LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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