Ronnie Moore v. Mississippi Gaming Commission
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00235-COA
RONNIE MOORE AND JEFF MOORE
APPELLANTS
v.
MISSISSIPPI GAMING COMMISSION
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/06/2009
HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR.
CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JERRY L. MILLS
JEFFREY J. HOSFORD
JOHN P. SCANLON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: THOMAS H. MUELLER
DEANNE B. SALTZMAN
LOUIS P. FRASCOGNA
CIVIL - OTHER
REVERSED JUSTICE COURT RULING
ORDERING RETURN OF MACHINES
AFFIRMED – 03/29/2011
EN BANC.
IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On September 12, 2007, agents of the Mississippi Gaming Commission (MGC)
raided Paradise Isle Internet Café in West Point, Mississippi. The agents seized thirty-nine
computer terminals, a computer server, and a point-of-sale system, which they believed were
illegal gambling devices.
¶2.
The State filed criminal charges against Ronnie Moore and Jeff Moore in the Clay
County Justice Court for their involvement with the internet café. On October 16, 2007, the
State requested that the charges against the Moores be dismissed without prejudice until its
cybercrime unit could analyze the machines. On October 18, 2007, the justice court heard
arguments regarding whether the seized equipment should be returned to the Moores
following the State’s dismissal of the criminal charges. The State requested three weeks to
analyze the machines, and the justice court ordered the State to either file charges against the
Moores by November 8, 2007, or return the machines. The State appealed the justice court
order to the Clay County Circuit Court, arguing that the justice court lacked jurisdiction to
order the return of the machines. Following a non-jury trial, the circuit court found that the
Moores had no property right in the machines because they were illegal slot machines.
¶3.
Feeling aggrieved, the Moores appeal and raise four issues, which we have
consolidated into two: whether the circuit court erred in finding that the machines were
illegal slot machines and that the justice court did not have jurisdiction over the seized
machines.
¶4.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶5.
The Moores owned and operated the Paradise Isle Internet Café, which provided
internet access at an hourly rate and sold long-distance telephone cards. Telephone cards
could be purchased using a point-of-sale register operated by an internet-café employee for
a minimum of one dollar. Customers who wished to purchase more than five dollars worth
of phone time were instructed to complete their purchase at one of the internet café’s
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computer terminals. For each dollar spent, customers received 100 “sweepstakes points.”
No purchase was required to participate in the sweepstakes, and customers could request a
free entry form from an internet-café employee.
¶6.
Customers could redeem sweepstakes points by mailing in a free entry form, using the
“quick redeem” feature, or using one of the internet café’s computer terminals. The “quick
redeem” option allowed customers to redeem their sweepstakes points at the point-of-sale
register. A customer using a computer terminal to redeem his sweepstakes points would
swipe his phone card, which has a magnetic strip, through a card reader at the computer
terminal. Sweepstakes points would be displayed on the computer screen, and the customer
would be given the option of playing a variety of sweepstakes games. The games simulated
those traditionally played on slot machines. As a customer played a game, points would be
accumulated and displayed in a separate “win account.” Points won could not be used for
additional play. Instead, when a customer had played all of his sweepstakes points, he would
be given the option of using the points from the “win account” to buy additional phone time,
which included additional sweepstakes points, or redeem his points for cash. The Moores
contend that playing the games had no impact on sweepstakes winnings; instead, winnings
were pre-determined upon activation of the telephone card.
¶7.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of
the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶8.
“The findings of a circuit court judge sitting without a jury ‘will not be reversed on
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appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.’” City of
Jackson v. Spann, 4 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (¶9) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Donaldson v. Covington
County, 846 So. 2d 219, 222 (¶11) (Miss. 2003)).
1. Legality of Seized Machines
¶9.
The Moores argue that the circuit court erred in finding that the seized machines were
illegal slot machines because the elements of consideration and chance were not present.
Mississippi’s Gaming Control Act defines a slot machine as:
any mechanical, electrical or other device, contrivance or machine which, upon
insertion of a coin, token or similar object, or upon payment of any
consideration, is available to play or operate, the play or operation of which,
whether by reason of the skill of the operator or application of the element of
chance, or both, may deliver or entitle the person playing or operating the
machine to receive cash, premiums, merchandise, tokens or anything of value,
whether the payoff is made automatically from the machine or in any other
manner.
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-76-5(ff) (Rev. 2002). Relying on the above definition, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has held that a gambling device is a slot machine if:
1. Its play or operation requires the insertion of money, tokens or similar
objects, or payment of consideration; and
2. As a result of playing or operating the device, the player or operator has the
potential to win a reward in the form of cash, premiums, merchandise, token,
or anything of value; and
3. The winning of some part or all of the potential reward is dependent in
substantial part on an element of chance.
Miss. Gaming Comm’n v. Henson, 800 So. 2d 110, 113 (¶10) (Miss. 2001).
¶10.
The Moores argue that Mississippi Gaming Commission v. Treasured Arts, Inc., 699
So. 2d 936 (Miss. 1997) is analogous to their case. In Treasured Arts, our supreme court
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considered whether a “scratch-and-win” game piece that accompanied a long-distance
telephone card constituted a lottery. Id. at 938 (¶9). The supreme court found that the
consideration was paid for the telephone card itself, not the attached game piece. Id. at 940
(¶20). Because no additional consideration was paid for the opportunity to win a prize, the
element of consideration was not present, and the game piece did not constitute a lottery. Id.
at 940 (¶22).
¶11.
We find that Treasured Arts is inapplicable. As stated, in Treasured Arts, the issue
was whether the game pieces attached to the telephone cards violated the lottery statutes. Id.
at 939 (¶15). Here, we are concerned with whether the equipment seized from the internet
café is a slot machine. As such, we find that Mississippi Gaming Commission v. Six
Electronic Video Gambling Devices, 792 So. 2d 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) is controlling.
In Six Electronic, this Court considered whether a “Lucky Shamrock” vending machine that
dispensed telephone cards constituted an illegal slot machine. Id. at 327 (¶22). The Lucky
Shamrock operated as follows:
For one dollar, the Lucky Shamrock dispense[d] a two[-]minute emergency
long[-]distance calling card, good only for one call no matter the time actually
used. With each card, the purchaser also receive[d] a game piece. This ha[d]
a bar code on the back which [was] read by the machine as the card [was]
being dispensed. The display on the machine then simulate[d] a slot machine
by spinning nine squares. After a few moments the display show[ed] the same
combination of squares as on the game piece. Again simulating a slot
machine, the machine light[ed] up and play[ed] music if the patron [was] a
winner. A cashier at the store verifie[d] the winning card. This clerk then
[paid] the prize money[, which could] be in the amount of one dollar up to five
hundred dollars.
Id. at 323 (¶3).
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¶12.
The Six Electronic court found that the Lucky Shamrock was an illegal slot machine,
and we see no reason to hold differently here. Id. at 327 (¶22). While the gambling devices
seized from the internet café were computer terminals and not vending machines, they
operated in a nearly identical fashion. Internet-café customers would purchase a telephone
calling card, swipe the card through a card reader attached to the computer terminal, and
“play” sweepstakes points by selecting various video games that simulated slot machines.
Customers could use points won to purchase more phone time or redeem points for cash.
¶13.
Other jurisdictions have also held that internet cafés offering sweepstakes schemes
violated gambling laws. See Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Assoc., Inc., 960 So. 2d 599
(Ala. 2006). Barber involved an internet café that sold internet access or “cybertime.” Id.
at 604. Customers who purchased cybertime were given a plastic access card with an
assigned account number. Id. at 605. For every dollar of cybertime purchased, the customer
received 100 sweepstakes entries. Id. Customers would swipe their access cards through an
electronic reader, which revealed whether they had won or lost. Id. at 608. The electronic
readers allowed customers to reveal their sweepstakes entries by playing “casino-style”
games. Id. at 606.
¶14.
The owners of the internet café in Barber argued, like the Moores do here, that the
elements of consideration and chance were missing from the sweepstakes. Id. at 609-10.
The owners argued that consideration was paid for cybertime and that no additional
consideration was paid to participate in the sweepstakes. Id. at 610. However, the Barber
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court noted that few customers used the internet kiosks while customers “were lined up at
all hours to use the readers.” Id. at 611. Additionally, customers “purchased additional
cybertime–with the accompanying entries–even though they already had large quantities of
unused cybertime.” Id. The court concluded that if customers were “paying to play the
readers, rather than to acquire, or in addition to acquiring, cybertime, the element of
consideration . . . [was] satisfied.” Id.
¶15.
At the Moore’s internet café, there were thirty-nine computer terminals equipped with
card readers, but only a single computer was devoted to internet access. Additionally, Agent
E.W. Williams, an MGC agent who participated in the undercover investigation of the
internet café which led to the charges against the Moores, testified that the employee who
sold him a telephone card did not explain how to use the card or tell him how many minutes
were on the card. In fact, Agent Williams testified that he did not know that the access card
that he received was also a telephone card.
¶16.
Like the customers in Barber, it is clear that the customers of the Moores’ internet
café were purchasing prepaid telephone cards to play the computer terminals rather than to
make telephone calls. As such, we find that the element of consideration is satisfied. This
issue is without merit.
¶17.
The Moores also argue that the element of chance is not present because the outcome
of each sweepstakes entry was determined before the customer purchased the telephone card.
However, in Six Electronic, this Court explained that the element of chance is considered
from the player’s point of view; “[w]hat the machine ‘knows’ does not affect the player’s
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gamble.” Six Electronic, 792 So. 2d at 326 (¶15). Additionally, the Barber court concluded
that even though the outcome of the sweepstakes entries was predetermined and not impacted
by playing games on the electronic readers, the element of chance existed at the point of sale.
Barber, 960 So. 2d at 609. We see no reason to find differently here. While playing the
games at the computer terminals did not impact the outcome of the sweepstakes points, an
element of chance still existed because a consumer who purchased a telephone card did not
know whether the card contained a winning or losing sweepstakes points. This issue is
without merit.
2. Jurisdiction Over Seized Machines
¶18.
The Moores contend that the justice court retained jurisdiction over the seized
machines; therefore, it was the proper court to order their return. This issue is now moot
given our finding that the seized machines were illegal slot machines. Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-33-7(2) (Rev. 2006) states:
No property right shall exist in any person, natural or artificial, or be vested in
such person, in [slot machines]; and all such devices are hereby declared to be
at all times subject to confiscation and destruction, and their possession shall
be unlawful, except when in the possession of officers carrying out the
provisions of this section. It shall be the duty of all law-enforcing officers to
seize and immediately destroy all such machines and devices.
Because the computers and other equipment seized from the Moores constitute illegal slot
machines, the Moores have no property rights to assert. Consequently, there was no legal
basis for the justice court’s November 1, 2007, order. This issue is without merit.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
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APPELLANTS.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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