Timber Lake Foods, Inc. v. Stephanie Estess
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CA-00980-COA
TIMBER LAKE FOODS, INC.
APPELLANT
v.
STEPHANIE ESTESS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/21/2009
HON. PAUL S. FUNDERBURK
LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BERKLEY N. HUSKISON
J. DOUGLAS FORD
JOHN A. FERRELL
CIVIL - CONTRACT
DENIED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION TO ENFORCE A COVENANT
NOT TO COMPETE
REVERSED AND REMANDED: 03/08/2011
EN BANC.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Timber Lake Foods, Inc. (Timber Lake) filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction and
damages against its former employee, Stephanie Estess, based on her alleged violation of a
covenant not to compete. The Lee County Circuit Court found that the geographic scope of
the covenant not to compete was unreasonable. Timber Lake’s motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied. On appeal, Timber Lake argues that Stephanie entered into a valid
and enforceable covenant not to compete, and its restrictions should be enforced. We find
that the covenant not to compete is reasonable; therefore, the judgment of the circuit court
is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶2.
On January 13, 2003, Stephanie was hired by Timber Lake, a Mississippi corporation
operating in Tupelo, Mississippi. She was nineteen years old, and she had only minimal
prior work experience as a waitress. Stephanie’s job at Timber Lake required her to broker
meat and poultry products between buyers and sellers nationwide.
¶3.
Stephanie signed an employment agreement when she began work at Timber Lake.
The agreement included the following covenant not to compete:
Employee agrees that, except with written permission from Employer, he will
not, during his employment by Employer and for a period of two (2) years
after the end of his employment by Employer, perform any services regarding
the brokerage of meat and/or poultry products (or the transportation thereof),
directly or indirectly, either as owner, partner, joint venturer, shareholder,
employee, or consultant, for any person or business entity (or a subsidiary
thereof) within a two hundred fifty (250) mile radius of Tupelo, Mississippi.
Employee acknowledges that such period is a reasonable period of time and
that the geographical area set forth in the foregoing paragraph is reasonable.
Employee represents and admits that in the event of the termination of his
employment, for any reason whatsoever, his experience and capabilities are
such that the enforcement of a remedy by way of injunction will not prevent
him from earning a livelihood.
¶4.
On October 8, 2005, Stephanie married Brian Estess, the son of Timber Lake’s owner,
Joe Estess. On March 30, 2008, Brian required a kidney transplant. Brian’s friend, Ashley
Perkins, volunteered to donate a kidney to Brian. Perkins worked for Vector Transportation,
a truck-brokerage business owned by Joe and operated out of the same building as Timber
Lake.
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¶5.
Stephanie testified that she began an affair with Perkins at some point prior to the
kidney transplant. Brian learned of the affair and confronted Stephanie about it in the days
following his kidney transplant. Despite the strain on the family caused by the affair,
Stephanie continued to report to work at Timber Lake. Joe testified that news of the affair
caused tension at Timber Lake. As a result of that tension, Joe terminated Stephanie’s
employment on April 4, 2008. Stephanie and Brian have since divorced.
¶6.
On April 24, 2008, Stephanie was hired by Lawrence Wholesale (Lawrence), a direct
competitor of Timber Lake. Stephanie performed the same job at Lawrence that she had
performed at Timber Lake. Because of the nature of the job, Stephanie could work from any
location where she had access to a telephone and computer. She testified that she had
worked out of Lawrence’s main office in California and from her home located in Baldwyn,
Mississippi, which is within 250 miles of Tupelo.
¶7.
Timber Lake filed suit in the Lee County Chancery Court seeking a permanent
injunction enforcing the covenant not to compete, compensatory damages for breach of
contract, and attorney’s fees. The chancellor found that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit
court, and the case was transferred to the Lee County Circuit Court.
¶8.
The complaint specifically alleged that Stephanie was in violation of the covenant not
to compete. Additionally, the complaint stated Stephanie was using confidential and
proprietary information in violation of her employment agreement.
The employment
agreement, which was attached as Exhibit A to the complaint, contains the following clause
entitled “Nondisclosure”:
Employee agrees not to disclose to any unauthorized person, firm, corporation
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or other entity, and Employee further agrees not to use for his own benefit or
for the benefit of any unauthorized person, firm, corporation or other entity
any of Employer’s trade secrets or any other information which is proprietary
and confidential. Trade secrets or confidential proprietary information shall
mean all such information and shall not be limited to information which has
not been made available by Employer to the public. Trade secrets or
confidential proprietary information shall include, but shall not be limited to
the following: customer account information; credit histories; customer lists;
supplier lists; supplier account information; price schedules; job descriptions;
cost data; vendor lists; contracts; carrier lists; and all operational forms created
by or for Employer.
Employee acknowledges that the unauthorized disclosure and/or use of
Employer’s trade secrets or other confidential proprietary information, either
during Employee’s tenure of employment or following his termination, would
constitute a clear threat to the business of Employer. The provisions of this
paragraph shall be enforceable by Employer and shall without limitation
survive the termination of this Employment Agreement.
¶9.
Following a hearing on Timber Lake’s request for an injunction, the circuit court
entered an order on April 21, 2009, holding that the covenant not to compete was
unenforceable. The court concluded:
Considering the telephonic nature of the business, enforcement of the covenant
would be unreasonable and ineffective. If Ms. Estess were required to conduct
business 250 miles from Tupelo, Mississippi, she could continue to contact the
same buyers and suppliers she is currently doing business with at Lawrence
Wholesale as well as those she contacted while working for Timber Lake
Foods. Therefore, this Court finds that the geographic scope of the covenant
is unreasonable. Furthermore, enforcement of the covenant would prove
ineffective in preventing injury to the business interests Timber Lake Foods
seeks to protect.
The order denied Timber Lake’s request for a permanent injunction. The circuit court’s order
did not address Timber Lake’s allegation that Stephanie was using confidential and
proprietary information to compete with Timber Lake. The order also failed to address
Timber Lake’s claims for compensatory damages and attorney’s fees.
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¶10.
Timber Lake filed a notice of appeal on May 21, 2009. On May 27, 2009, the circuit
court entered a judgment of dismissal as to the claims against Stephanie. The order stated:
“This Court’s Order on the preliminary injunction and holding that Timber Lake’s noncompete agreement is unenforceable effectively ends all remaining claims included in the
Complaint[,] and there is no need for further consideration of this case by the Court.”
Timber Lake’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Timber Lake then filed an amended
notice of appeal, on June 2, 2009, which stated that its appeal was from both the circuit
court’s orders of April 21, 2009, and May 27, 2009.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has provided the following standard of review for
appeals concerning covenants not to compete:
When considering the enforceability of restrictive employment agreements, we
review the entire record and “the evidence which supports or reasonably tends
to support the findings of fact made below, together with all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn therefrom and which favor the lower court’s
findings of fact, must be accepted.” Sta-Home Health Agency v. Umphers, 562
So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Miss. 1990) [(]quoting Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So. 2d
705, 707 (Miss. 1983)[)]. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court
when they are supported by substantial evidence unless the Chancellor has
abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous
legal standard was applied. Bowers Window and Door Co. v. Dearman, 549
So. 2d 1309 (Miss. 1989) [(]citing Culbreath, 427 So. 2d at 707-708[)];
Bullard v. Morris, 547 So. 2d 789, 791 (Miss. 1989).
Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 975 (Miss. 1992).
ANALYSIS
¶12.
“[R]estrictive covenants are not favored in law; the employer has the burden of
proving their reasonableness; and the reasonableness as to time and space limitations must
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be determined from the facts of each case.” Texas Rd. Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194
So. 2d 885, 889 (Miss. 1967). “But they are valid unless unreasonable, and when reasonable,
the courts will not hesitate to hold the parties to their contracts.” Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg.
Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 172, 154 So. 2d 151, 156 (1963). When considering the
enforcement of a covenant not to compete, this Court must weigh the rights of the employer,
the rights of the employee, and the rights of the public. Texas Rd. Boring Co., 194 So. 2d
at 888.
¶13.
There has been no allegation of harm to the public in this case because there are many
other buyers, sellers, and brokers of poultry who are in competition with Timber Lake and
Stephanie. In Empiregas, the supreme court stated “that non-competition agreements are
only valid ‘within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee
or agent. . . .’” Empiregas, 599 So. 2d at 975 (quoting Wilson v. Gamble, 180 Miss. 499, 177
So. 363, 365 (1937)). Thus, we must look to whether the scope of the agreement was
reasonably necessary to protect Timber Lake without imposing an undue hardship on
Stephanie.
¶14.
The covenant not to compete restricted Stephanie from brokering meat within 250
miles of Tupelo for a period of two years after her termination from Timber Lake. Joe
testified that Timber Lake’s customers were located throughout the United States. As a
broker, Stephanie could buy from and sell to these nationwide customers from any location
with a computer and a telephone. Stephanie argued, and the circuit court agreed, that the
250-mile geographic scope was an arbitrary restriction considering that the nature of
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Stephanie’s job allowed her to work from any location. The circuit court found that the 250mile restriction was arbitrary because Stephanie could contact the same customers and
conduct the same transactions in competition with Timber Lake outside that radius.
¶15.
In essence, the circuit court’s finding is that, in order to protect its interests, Timber
Lake would have had to impose a nationwide geographic restriction on competition by its
former employees. We understand the reluctance of Timber Lake to draft a covenant not to
compete containing a nationwide restriction. While other jurisdictions have acknowledged
that advancements in technology have created a need for such a broad geographic scope in
covenants not to compete,1 Mississippi law has yet to address the issue.
¶16.
In an effort to make the agreement reasonable to Stephanie, and thereby enforceable,
Timber Lake chose to limit the geographic restriction to 250 miles instead of a nationwide
restriction. On cross-examination, Joe was asked the reasoning behind the 250-mile limit
when it had no connection to Timber Lake’s customers. He testified: “There is not a magic
to the 250, but it keeps us from saying that [the employee] cannot earn a living.”
¶17.
The circuit court was correct that the 250-mile limit was an arbitrary number that
would not keep Stephanie from competing with Timber Lake outside that limit. However,
1
See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 237 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“In this
Information Age, a per se rule against broad geographic restrictions would seem hopelessly
antiquated, and, indeed, Pennsylvania courts (and federal district courts applying
Pennsylvania law) have found broad geographic restrictions reasonable so long as they are
roughly consonant with the scope of the employee’s duties.”); National Reprographics, Inc.
v. Strom, 621 F. Supp. 2d 204, 225 (D.N.J. 2009) (“It should be noted that all parties have
acknowledged that technology in the industry is becoming more advanced, and the Court
notes that technological advances are a factor that could increasingly affect the
reasonableness of geographic limitations.”)
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such finding does not establish the unreasonableness of the geographic limit. The 250-mile
limit provided some protection to Timber Lake by preventing her from competing in the
Tupelo area. Joe testified that the covenant not to compete was designed to prevent
employees who were provided extensive training at Timber Lake from moving across the
street and competing against Timber Lake.2 At the same time, the covenant did nothing to
prevent Stephanie from competing with Timber Lake on a nationwide level anywhere outside
the 250-mile radius, thereby balancing her interest in finding employment with a Timber
Lake competitor.
¶18.
Since we find that a nationwide geographic restriction would have reasonably
protected Timber Lake’s interests, we cannot say that Timber Lake’s effort to balance
Stephanie’s interest by reducing that restriction to within a 250-mile radius of Tupelo was
unreasonable.
The circuit court’s finding of unreasonableness based solely on the
arbitrariness of the 250-mile limit was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the
2
On appeal, Stephanie argues that Timber Lake has no legitimate business interest
to protect because its potential customers are nonexclusive and the price of the chicken that
Stephanie brokered is listed in a national market report. We disagree. “The primary right
of the employer is that of ‘protecting the business from loss of customers by the activities
of the former employees who have peculiar knowledge of and relationships with the
employer's customers.’” Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Magee, 813 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (S.D.
Miss. 1993) (quoting Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 43, 157 So. 2d 133,
136 (1963)). The record shows that Timber Lake provided extensive training to Stephanie.
She had no prior sales experience before her employment with Timber Lake. Timber Lake
provided the training and opportunities for Stephanie to establish relationships with Timber
Lake customers. Joe testified that a customer’s relationship with the broker will often cause
a customer to pay a higher price to that broker as opposed to paying a lower price to an
unfamiliar broker. The record shows that the overwhelming majority of Stephanie’s sales
during her employment at Lawrence were to former customers of Timber Lake with whom
she had formed a relationship.
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circuit court is reversed.
¶19.
We recognize that the two-year time limitation of the covenant not to compete has
expired during the pendency of this appeal. As such, the issuance of an injunction would be
improper; therefore, we remand this case for a determination of Timber Lake’s claim for
damages.
¶20.
We further note that Timber Lake also stated a claim for compensatory damages for
Stephanie’s alleged violation of the nondisclosure clause of the employment agreement. Joe
testified that Stephanie had access to Timber Lake’s customer lists, supply lists, actual costs,
selling price, and negotiation strategies. He further stated that Stephanie had gained inside
knowledge of the business when she became a member of the Estess family. This claim is
independent of Timber Lake’s request for a preliminary injunction, and it should be
addressed by the circuit court on remand.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND
MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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