Brenda Peters v. Belk Incorporated
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-WC-00438-COA
BRENDA PETERS
APPELLANT
v.
BELK INCORPORATED AND LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
02/08/2010
HON. PAUL S. FUNDERBURK
LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
STEVEN H. FUNDERBURG
GEORGE E. READ
GINGER M. ROBEY
CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
AFFIRMED COMMISSION’S ORDER
AWARDING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BENEFITS FOR CERVICAL STRAIN AND
DENYING BENEFITS FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY
AFFIRMED – 03/01/2011
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On September 14, 2007, Brenda Peters filed a petition to controvert, alleging that she
had injured her cervical spine while lifting boxes within the course and scope of her
employment with Belk, Inc. Peters also alleged that the cervical-spine injury had resulted
in depression. Belk and its insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, admitted
that Peters had suffered a cervical-spine injury, but disputed the extent of Peters’s disability.
Belk and Liberty denied that benefits were owed for any psychological or mental injury. A
hearing was held before an administrative judge (AJ), who found that Peters had suffered a
psychological injury related to her cervical-spine injury. The AJ concluded that Peters was
permanently and totally disabled.
¶2.
Belk and Liberty appealed the AJ’s decision to the Mississippi Workers’
Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission reversed the AJ’s decision,
finding that Peters was not permanently disabled or entitled to benefits for any psychological
injury. However, the Commission awarded Peters temporary total-disability benefits. Peters
appealed the Commission’s decision to the Lee County Circuit Court. The circuit court
affirmed the Commission’s decision.
¶3.
Feeling aggrieved, Peters appeals and asserts four issues on appeal, which we will
consolidate into two issues: (1) whether the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard
in denying benefits for Peters’s psychological injury and (2) whether the Commission’s
reversal of permanent total-disability benefits and its denial of benefits for Peters’s
psychological injury were not supported by substantial evidence and were arbitrary and
capricious.
¶4.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶5.
On March 12, 2003, Peters sustained an injury while working at a cosmetic counter
at Belk. Peters testified that when she arrived at work that morning, she began moving and
unpacking boxes of inventory. Later that day, she testified that she began to experience pain
in her neck. Peters left work early and sought treatment at the Barnes Crossing Emergency
2
Medical Clinic. Dr. Billy Walton examined Peters at the clinic. He prescribed antiinflammatory medications and advised Peters to return if her pain continued. Peters returned
to work and continued to move boxes. Peters’s neck pain returned, and she went back to the
clinic. Dr. Walton ordered an x-ray, which showed some degenerative changes in Peters’s
spine. Dr. Walton also ordered an MRI, which confirmed the existence of disk-space
narrowing and mild degenerative changes in Peters’s spine.
¶6.
Peters was referred to Dr. Thomas McDonald, a neurosurgeon. Dr. McDonald
diagnosed Peters with cervical spondylosis and stenosis. Dr. McDonald recommended that
Peters use a neurostimulator to relieve pain and muscle spasms, and he placed Peters on light
duty with no lifting. On May 5, 2003, Peters visited Dr. McDonald, again complaining of
neck pain and headaches. Dr. McDonald took Peters off of work and scheduled a myelogram
and CT scan of her cervical spine. Additionally, Dr. McDonald prescribed Paxil, an antidepressant, and Xanax, an anti-anxiety medication. Dr. McDonald did not believe that Peters
would benefit from surgery, but he referred Peters to Dr. Louis Rosa for a second opinion.
Peters visited Dr. Rosa on May 28, 2003, and Dr. Rosa agreed with Dr. McDonald that
surgery would not benefit Peters. On June 13, 2003, Dr. McDonald released Peters to work,
noting that Peters had achieved maximum medical improvement.
Additionally, Dr.
McDonald noted that he saw “no significant injury in this case.”
¶7.
On July 29, 2003, Peters saw Dr. Kenan Arnautovic for a neurosurgical evaluation.
Dr. Arnautovic reviewed Peters’s previous MRI and CT scans and agreed that they showed
degenerative disease in her cervical spine. Dr. Arnautovic referred Peters to Dr. Roger
Cicala for pain treatment. Dr. Cicala determined that Peters had thoratic outlet syndrome,
3
a rotator cuff injury, cervical degenerative disease, and left occipital neuralgia. Dr. Cicala
advised Peters to place her arm in a sling for four to six hours each day and recommended
that Peters see an orthopedic shoulder specialist.
¶8.
Dr. Arnautovic also referred Peters to Dr. Lance Wright, a neurologist, for further
evaluation of her symptoms.
Dr. Wright noted that Peters complained of numerous
symptoms and that she had difficulty describing them. Additionally, he noted that Peters
described her symptoms in a “very histrionic and exaggerated sort of way.” Dr. Wright noted
that Peters denied being depressed and that she appeared close to tears during her
appointment. Dr. Wright felt that he had nothing he could offer Peters, and he recommended
that she follow up with her pain specialist.
¶9.
Peters testified that following her visit with Dr. Wright, she began experiencing chest
pains, and she consulted Dr. Gerhard Mundinger, a cardiologist and family friend. He
recommended that Peters use a cervical collar at night to relieve her neck pain, but he advised
Peters that she could continue to work. Dr. Mundinger referred Peters to Dr. Salil Tiwari.
Dr. Tiwari noted that Peters’s sensation of pain was “highly exaggerated” and
disproportionate to her physical condition. Furthermore, he noted that Peters had difficulty
describing the exact nature of her pain. Dr. Tiwari diagnosed Peters with chronic pain and
depression and referred her to Dr. Sudhakar Madakasira, a psychiatrist.
¶10.
During her visit with Dr. Madakasira, Peters advised him that she had seen at least
fifteen doctors in eight months, but none had successfully treated her pain. She stated that
she was depressed and reported feeling suicidal. Peters stated that she had never suffered
from depression prior to her injury. Dr. Madakasira diagnosed Peters with depression and
4
chronic pain and prescribed anti-depressants.
¶11.
In December 2003, Dr. Madakasira had Peters admitted to St. Dominic Hospital in
Jackson, Mississippi, to regulate her medications and treat her depression. Peters was
hospitalized for ten days. While hospitalized, Dr. Carroll McLeod evaluated Peters and
recommended a course of steroid injections, which seemed to improve Peters’s neck pain.
Dr. Jacob Mathis, a neurosurgeon, also evaluated Peters while she was hospitalized. He
diagnosed Peters with cervical spondylosis, but he determined that she would not benefit
from surgery. In Peters’s discharge summary, Dr. Madakasira diagnosed Peters with major
depressive disorder and psychosomatic pain. He further noted that Peters was “totally fixated
on her pain.”
¶12.
Peters returned to work in January 2004, but her position at the cosmetics counter had
been filled in her absence, and Belk transferred her to the clearance warehouse. Later, Peters
was transferred to the fragrance counter, but the fragrances irritated her sinuses, and she
requested a transfer to the dress department. Peters then complained that the dresses were
too heavy to lift, and she requested a transfer to the sportswear department.
Belk
accommodated each of Peters’s requests.
¶13.
In November 2004, Peters requested three days off to have a colonoscopy in Jackson,
Mississippi. Peters presented her manager with a doctor’s note, but she was already
scheduled to work during Belk’s charity sales event. Belk’s human resource manager, Kraig
Crumpton, called Peters’s doctor and confirmed that Peters only needed one day off for the
procedure. Crumpton approached Peters about her leave request, and he offered to allow
Peters to work a later shift the day after her appointment, but Peters insisted that she needed
5
three days off. Crumpton informed Peters that refusal to work her scheduled shift constituted
grounds for termination. Peters refused to work her shift, and Belk terminated her on
November 10, 2004.
¶14.
In December 2005, Dr. Madakasira admitted Peters to the Psycamore Partial Hospital
Program for intensive out-patient psychiatric therapy. Peters was discharged from the
program on April 26, 2006, but Dr. Madakasira noted that Peters had seen little improvement
in her symptoms and gave her a poor prognosis for recovery. He further noted that he
considered Peters permanently and totally disabled.
¶15.
On February 11, 2005, Dr. David Collipp evaluated Peters at the request of Belk and
Liberty. Dr. Collipp acknowledged that Peters suffered from depression, but he opined that
Peters’s depression was not caused by her work-related injury. Dr. Collipp agreed that Peters
had cervical spondylosis, but he believed that it was due to arthritis and not caused or
exacerbated by lifting. Dr. Collipp determined that Peters had reached maximum medical
improvement from her cervical strain as of April 2003 and that she had no permanent
impairment.
¶16.
On May 11, 2005, Dr. Mark Webb evaluated Peters, also at the request of Belk and
Liberty. Dr. Webb noted in his medical report that Peters had seen multiple doctors, but she
had experienced little relief for her symptoms. Dr. Webb concluded that Peters suffered from
hypochondriasis and exhibited histrionic personality traits. While Dr. Webb recommended
continued psychiatric treatment, he concluded that Peters’s personality traits likely arose
during childhood and were not work- or incident-related. Furthermore, he did not believe
that Peters was psychiatrically disabled and assigned no psychiatric impairment rating.
6
¶17.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of
the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶18.
An appellate court’s standard of review in a workers’ compensation claim is well
settled:
Appellate courts are bound by the decision of the Mississippi Workers’
Compensation Commission if the Commission’s findings of fact and order are
supported by substantial evidence. Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So. 2d
314, 317 (Miss. 1988). “This is so, even though the evidence would convince
[the reviewing court] otherwise, were [it] the fact finder.” Id. (citations
omitted). “Stated differently, [the reviewing court] will reverse the
Commission’s order only if it finds that order clearly erroneous and contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Id. “A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is some slight evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made by the Commission in its findings of
fact and in its application of the Act.” Weatherspoon v. Croft Metals, Inc., 853
So. 2d 776, 780 [(¶17)] (Miss. 2003) (citations omitted).
Hardaway Co. v. Bradley, 887 So. 2d 793, 795 (¶11) (Miss. 2004).
1. Claimant’s Burden of Proof
¶19.
Peters argues that the Commission improperly evaluated the evidence of her
psychological injury under the “clear and convincing” standard. However, “a review of this
state’s precedent shows that ‘clear evidence’ and ‘clear and convincing evidence’ are used
synonymously, and apply to a claimant’s burden of proof under either a mental/mental or
physical/mental case.” Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., Inc. v. Townsend, 993 So. 2d 418, 424
(¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
¶20.
In reviewing Peters’s claim, the Commission stated that “the [c]laimant failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that she sustained a psychological overlay causally
7
related to her cervical strain, and therefore, any disability associated with [the] [c]laimant’s
psychological problems is irrelevant.” Because this Court held in Townsend that the “clear
and convincing evidence” and “clear evidence” standards are synonymous, Peters’s
assignment of error is without merit.
2. Commission’s Decision Regarding Peters’s Depression and Permanent Disability
¶21.
Peters also argues that the Commission’s denial of benefits for her depression and its
finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled are not supported by substantial
evidence and, consequently, are arbitrary and capricious.
¶22.
The Commission found that Peters had failed to present clear-and-convincing
evidence that her depression was causally related to her cervical strain. The Commission
noted that the only evidence that Peters presented in support of her claim that her depression
was causally related to her physical injury came from Dr. Madakasira, Peters’s psychiatrist.
In his deposition testimony, Dr. Madakasira stated that most patients with Peters’s level of
depression and emotional instability are not able to work. While Dr. Madakasira testified
that he believed that Peters’s depression was related to her work injury, he admitted that his
belief was “speculation.” Dr. Collipp and Dr. Webb, who evaluated Peters at the request of
Belk and Liberty, both opined that there was no causal relation between Peters’s depression
and her work-related injury.
¶23.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that when examining conflicting opinions
by medical experts, “it is not the role of the [reviewing court] to determine where the
preponderance of evidence lies . . . .” Raytheon Aerospace Support Servs. v. Miller, 861 So.
2d 330, 335 (¶11) (Miss. 2003) (quoting Hale v. Ruleville Health Care Ctr., 687 So. 2d 1221,
8
1224-25 (Miss. 1997)). Instead, “it is presumed that the Commission as trier of fact has
previously determined which evidence is credible and which evidence is not.” Id. (quoting
Hale, 687 So. 2d at 1224-25). Our supreme court further stated that “whenever the expert
evidence is conflicting, [the reviewing court] will affirm the Commission[’s decision]
whether the award is for or against the claimant.” Id. at 336 (¶13) (quoting Kersh v.
Greenville Sheet Metal Works, 192 So. 2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1966)). Given our deferential
standard of review and the Commission’s position as the ultimate fact-finder, we do not find
that the Commission erred in relying on the opinions of Dr. Collipp and Dr. Webb, especially
when Dr. Madakasira admitted that his conclusions were mere speculation. As such, we find
that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Peters failed to present
sufficient evidence that her depression was causally related to her work injury.
¶24.
Peters seems to rely solely on her depression in support of her claim of permanent
disability, as no physician assigned a permanent impairment rating to her cervical strain.
However, as discussed above, Peters’s depression was not causally related to her on-the-job
injury.
As such, we find that the Commission’s determination that Peters’s was not
permanently and totally disabled is supported by substantial evidence. This issue lacks merit.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
BARNES AND MAXW ELL, JJ., NOT
PARTICIPATING.
9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.