Robert E. Lewis, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CP-02041-COA
ROBERT E. LEWIS, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
12/02/2009
HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR.
LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT E. LEWIS JR. (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED - 03/08/2011
BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Robert Lewis, Jr., appearing pro se, appeals the Circuit Court of Lowndes County’s
dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
In August 2006, Lewis was indicted for capital murder stemming from an incident that
occurred in May 2006 where Lewis shot the victim twice in the head while robbing the
victim of his automobile, cellular telephone, money, and other items. In June 2008, the State
moved to amend Lewis’s indictment to include the proper date of the crime and his three
prior felony convictions in order to reflect Lewis’s status as a habitual offender. The trial
court subsequently granted the motions to amend. According to the plea-hearing transcript
of August 28, 2008, Lewis’s trial had already commenced when he decided, outside of the
presence of the jury, to plead guilty. The trial judge sentenced Lewis to life imprisonment
without eligibility for probation or parole, as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007), in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC).
¶3.
In November 2009, Lewis filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the circuit court,
wherein he claimed his indictment was defective because it did not include the relevant
subsection for capital murder; his guilty plea was involuntary; and the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to life imprisonment. The circuit court dismissed Lewis’s
motion, finding his claims without merit. Lewis timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
This Court will not disturb the trial court’s dismissal of a motion for post-conviction
relief unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 872 So. 2d 711, 712 (¶2)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶5.
Lewis raises three issues, arguing that his indictment was defective; his guilty plea
was involuntary; and the trial court erred in failing to quash his indictment. Because Lewis’s
first and third issues involve his indictment, we shall discuss them together.
1.
The Indictment
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¶6.
Lewis argues that his indictment violates Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-
20 (Rev. 2007) because it fails to list the subsection of the capital murder statute under which
he was charged. Thus, Lewis claims that the trial court erroneously denied his oral motion
to quash his indictment.1 Lewis contends that because of the omission of the subsection in
his indictment, he was misinformed about the true nature of the charged crimes. He frames
his argument, however, around the trial court’s alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
but the issue is actually one of whether his indictment was defective.
¶7.
“The purpose of the indictment is to provide the accused reasonable notice of the
charges against him so that he may prepare an adequate defense.” Brawner v. State, 947 So.
2d 254, 265 (¶31) (Miss. 2006) (citing Brown v. State, 890 So. 2d 901, 918 (¶61) (Miss.
2004)). Indictments thus must contain “a plain, concise and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation.” URCCC 7.06. The Mississippi Supreme Court has
stated “that the ultimate test, when considering the validity of an indictment on appeal, is
whether the defendant was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense.” Medina v. State,
688 So. 2d 727, 730 (Miss. 1996).
¶8.
Additionally, when the charge is capital murder, section 99-17-20 states in pertinent
part:
No person shall be tried for capital murder, or any other crime punishable by
1
Documentation of this motion is not in the record before us, but Lewis contends that
it is found in his trial transcript. However, he claims that his trial transcript was never
produced for him. Regardless, inclusion of any documentation of the oral motion to quash
the indictment would not change the final disposition of this opinion.
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death as provided by law, unless such offense was specifically cited in the
indictment returned against the accused by setting forth the section and
subsection number of the Code defining the offense alleged to have been
committed by the accused. . . . Any conviction of the accused for an offense
punishable by death shall not be valid unless the offense for which the accused
is convicted shall have been set forth in the indictment by section and
subsection number of the Code which defined the offense allegedly committed
by the accused.
(Emphasis added.) “It is the intent of Section 99-17-20 that the relevant code section be cited
to place the defendant on notice as to what makes the offense a capital one.” Davis v. State,
914 So. 2d 200, 205 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Gray v. State, 728 So. 2d 36, 70
(¶173) (Miss. 1998); Rhymes v. State, 356 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Miss. 1978)). However, when
a defendant pleads guilty, as here, it is well established that “[a] valid guilty plea waives all
technical and non-jurisdictional defects in an indictment.” Garner v. State, 944 So. 2d 934,
939 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So. 2d 1350, 1355 (Miss.
1990)). Such is the case here.
¶9.
Lewis’s indictment states in pertinent part: “that ROBERT EARL LEWIS, JR. . . .
did unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously, with or without the design to effect death, kill and
murder [the victim], a human being, without authority of law and not in necessary selfdefense, while engaged in the commission of the crime of Robbery, in violation of Section
97-3-19 MCA 1972 as amended. . . .” At the top of the indictment is typed the offense
“CAPITAL MURDER (§97-3-19).” Admittedly, Lewis’s indictment does not include the
relevant subsection for capital murder anywhere in the document. However, the indictment
does provide essential facts concerning the offense charged and adequately informs Lewis
of the nature of the charges against him, meeting all of the requirements of URCCC 7.06.
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We cannot see from the indictment’s language how Lewis could be misinformed, as he
contends, about the nature of the offenses charged.
¶10.
In its brief, the State does not address Lewis’s argument about the indictment’s lack
of a subsection for capital murder. However, the indictment specifically states that Lewis
was charged with “capital murder” under section 97-3-19 “while engaged in the commission
of . . . robbery.” Thus, the indictment was sufficient to give Lewis reasonable notice of the
crime charged so he could prepare an adequate defense. Moreover, the intent of section 973-19, which is to put the defendant on notice as to why the murder was capital, is met, even
if the subsection of the capital murder statute is missing. We fail to see how Lewis’s defense
could be prejudiced here by the missing subsection, because the indictment specifically
charges him with “capital” murder and gives essential facts for the crimes of the murder
while engaged in a robbery. We note that the indictment need not set forth the facts of the
underlying felony of robbery. See Gray, 728 So. 2d at 71 (¶174) (citing State v. Berryhill,
703 So. 2d 250, 256 (¶23) (Miss. 1997)) (“A capital murder indictment based on an
underlying felony, other than burglary, does not have to specifically set forth the elements
of the underlying felony used to elevate the crime to capital murder.”)
¶11.
Importantly, even if Lewis’s indictment was defective for not including the subsection
for capital murder, by pleading guilty Lewis waived his rights to any technical or nonjurisdictional defects in his indictment, which would include this omission. Additionally,
section 99-17-20 states that “[n]o person shall be tried for capital murder, or any other crime
punishable by death,” unless the offense’s subsection is specifically cited in the indictment.
Here, Lewis was not convicted by a jury, but abandoned his trial to plead guilty and thereby
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avoid the possible imposition of the death penalty. The record shows Lewis had reasonable
notice of the crimes charged, even without the inclusion of the subsection, and his defense
was in no way prejudiced by its omission. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
2.
¶12.
The Guilty Plea
Next, Lewis argues that his guilty plea was invalid because he was misinformed about
the nature of his crime due to his indictment’s omission of the subsection for capital murder,
even though he admitted to the trial court during his plea hearing that he understood the
charges against him. He claims that the record indicates that neither he, his counsel, nor the
court understood the essential elements of the crime charged. Since he was not provided
“real notice” of the nature of the charges against him, Lewis concludes his plea is void.
¶13.
A guilty plea will be found valid if it is voluntarily and intelligently made by the
defendant before the trial court. Burrough v. State, 9 So. 3d 368, 373 (¶11) (Miss. 2009).
A plea is voluntarily and intelligently given if the trial court advises “the defendant of his
rights, the nature of the charge against him, as well as the consequences of the plea.” Id.
(citing Harris v. State, 806 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (¶9) (Miss. 2002)). Furthermore, there is a
“strong presumption of validity that goes with solemn declarations made in open court and
the need for finality.” Hannah v. State, 943 So. 2d 20, 25 (¶11) (Miss. 2006) (citing Baker
v. State, 358 So. 2d 401, 403 (Miss. 1978)). The burden of proof is on the petitioner to prove
that his plea was invalid. Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 531 So. 2d 805, 810 (Miss. 1988)).
¶14.
The transcript of Lewis’s plea hearing shows that he voluntarily admitted under oath
that he was guilty of the charge of capital murder. The State explained its proof would show
that Lewis shot and killed the victim while robbing him. The trial judge also advised Lewis
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of the nature of the charge, the effect of the plea on his rights, and the sentence. The judge
clearly explained that if the jury convicted Lewis of the charge, the jury could impose the
death penalty. If the jury did not agree on the death penalty, the judge explained that he
could impose the sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Lewis stated he
understood. There is no evidence in the transcript to suggest that Lewis was “misinformed”
or lacked “real notice” of the charge of capital murder just because the subsection of the
murder statute was not included on his indictment.
¶15.
Moreover, the record shows Lewis was not under any duress or coercion to enter the
plea, nor was he under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Lewis stated his defense counsel
fully discussed his case with him and any possible defenses. Finally, Lewis signed a petition
to enter a guilty plea that reiterated his plea was voluntary and intelligent; thus, it was valid.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOWNDES COUNTY
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LOWNDES COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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