Eric DeShawn Jackson v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-KA-00550-COA
ERIC DESHAWN JACKSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
03/26/2009
HON. ISADORE W. PATRICK JR.
WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PHILLIP BROADHEAD
JERRY CAMPBELL
LESLIE S. LEE
BRANAN PATRICK SOUTHERLAND
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD
SCOTT STUART
RICHARD EARL SMITH, JR.
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF THREE COUNTS OF
DEPRAVED-HEART MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS ON EACH COUNT
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY
AFFIRMED - 03/01/2011
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A jury convicted Eric DeShawn Jackson in the Warren County Circuit Court of three
counts of depraved-heart murder.
The circuit judge then sentenced Jackson to three
consecutive life sentences in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(MDOC) without the possibility of parole.
¶2.
Jackson argues on appeal that the jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence; thus, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial or,
in the alternative, his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Jackson
also argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to admit multiple photographs
of the victims into evidence, claiming that the photographs possessed no probative value.
Jackson now asks this Court to reverse and vacate both his convictions and sentences for the
three counts of depraved-heart murder, and he urges this Court to remand this case to the
circuit court for a new trial. We, however, find no error and affirm Jackson’s convictions and
sentences.
FACTS
¶3.
On June 26, 2008, at approximately 6:00 p.m., officers from the Vicksburg Police
Department responded to a call regarding a shooting on Ken Karyl Avenue. When the
officers arrived on the scene, they found Denise Jackson, who was mortally injured from a
bullet wound to the chest. She subsequently died as a result of the injury. Denise was
pregnant when she was shot, and her unborn fetus also died due to deprivation of oxygen as
a result of Denise’s death.
¶4.
Marquis Bland testified that on the afternoon of the shooting, he was at 2634 Ken
Karyl Avenue, the home of Lucius Jackson, where Bland lived with Denise, his fiancée and
also Lucius’s granddaughter, and Denise’s children, Jamari and Toni, and Bland’s child with
2
Denise, Ashley. Bland testified that he went outside onto the porch of the house at
approximately 5:30 p.m.. Bland stated that he noticed people at his mother’s house located
next door at 2632 Ken Karyl Avenue. He observed people standing around “like they was
[sic] watching something.” Bland walked next door; he testified that he saw Jackson and
Rodriguez Lyons, Bland’s fifteen-year-old brother, arguing. Bland stated that he saw
Jackson holding Lyons by the collar, and he heard Jackson yelling: “Give me my shit. You
broke off in my house. You stole my shit. Where’s my shit at?” Bland proceeded to run
into the house, where Bland testified that he and his cousin, Jonathan Jackson, grabbed
Jackson and pushed him out of the house. Bland stated that after he and Jonathan removed
Jackson from the house, Jackson told them that he was “fixing to go get my scrap.” 1 Jackson
further stated that “when I get back, every mother f**ker better be gone.”
¶5.
Bland testified that Jackson left, and Bland remained outside of the house and talked
to Preston Qualls. While talking to Qualls, Bland stated that he heard someone say, “there
he go [sic] right there.” Bland observed Jackson walking down Ken Karyl Avenue, “coming
off the hill with a rifle.” Bland testified that Jackson stopped, raised the rifle, and started
shooting. Lucius testified that he heard one shot, followed by four or five shots a few
minutes later. Bland ducked, and Qualls ran in between the houses. After the shooting
stopped, Bland stated that he ran to Lucius’s house and saw Denise “sliding down the wall,
and she was holding her chest.” Bland held Denise and screamed for help. Bland heard
Denise gasp, and he put his hand on her stomach. Bland testified that he “felt like some
kicks in her stomach, and then the kicks just stopped.”
1
Bland testified that he understood the word “scrap” to mean a pistol or gun.
3
¶6.
Vicksburg Police Officer Eric Proctor arrived first on the scene. Officer Proctor
testified that he spoke to Bland, who seemed “very hysterical, upset.” Officer Proctor stated
that Bland told him he heard shots, but he never mentioned a suspect. However, in an
interview with Investigator Ken Smith, conducted approximately two hours after the
shooting, Bland identified Jackson as the shooter, and he reported that he had seen Jackson
seconds before the shooting started. Lieutenant Linda Hearn of the Vicksburg Police
Department arrived on the scene approximately an hour after the shooting and found twentyone shell casings lying in the street on Ken Karyl Avenue; she also located three ninemillimeter shell casings on the opposite side of the street.
¶7.
A neighbor, Brenda Shelby, also testified that she saw Jackson with a large rifle in the
same vicinity where over twenty of the shell casings were found. Shelby had previously
dropped her children off at her home on Royal Street, which intersects Ken Karyl Avenue,
and proceeded to drive to the grocery store. On the way to the store, Shelby testified that she
saw Jackson get out of a car and pull a gun out of the back of the car. Shelby stated that she
told Jackson, “don’t get yourself into any trouble,” but he just stared at her. Shelby drove
to a gas station to call the police, but as she began to call, she saw police cars drive by and
heard an ambulance. Shelby immediately drove back home to check on her children. Shelby
testified that police officers never contacted her regarding the shooting, and she never
contacted the police department. The first time that Shelby was contacted for information
regarding the shooting was by Assistant District Attorney Dewey Arthur.
¶8.
On the day after the shooting, Lieutenant Hearn responded to a call from 2630 Ken
Karyl Avenue, where the police had found the body of Qualls in the backyard of a house,
4
which was located approximately eighty-four feet from where Denise had been shot. The
State presented evidence at trial to show that Qualls’s gunshot wounds were inflicted during
the same time period as the incident that had killed Denise and her unborn child.
¶9.
Early the following morning, June 27, 2008, Jackson turned himself over to the police,
and a grand jury subsequently indicted him on three counts of depraved-heart murder.
Following the trial held on March 23-25, 2009, the jury convicted Jackson of three counts
of depraved-heart murder and sentenced him to three consecutive life sentences. Jackson
subsequently filed a motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The
circuit court entered an order denying these post-trial motions on March 30, 2009. Jackson
now appeals.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶10.
Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to grant Jackson's
motion for a new trial or, alternatively, motion for a JNOV.
Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a new trial,
claiming that the overwhelming weight of the evidence failed to support the jury’s verdict.
Jackson also argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a JNOV, alleging
that the facts and inferences presented at trial were legally insufficient to prove Jackson’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶11.
The Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the difference between a motion for a
JNOV, as opposed to a motion for a new trial, in stating: “While a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is considered with regard[] to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, a motion for a new trial delves into the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”
5
McLendon v. State, 945 So. 2d 372, 384 (¶34) (Miss. 2006) (citing Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d
836, 843-44 (¶¶16-19) (Miss. 2005)). Therefore, Jackson's motion for a JNOV and Jackson's
motion for a new trial will be addressed separately with the proper application of the correct
standard of review.
A.
¶12.
Motion for a New Trial
We note that for a verdict to survive, motions for a new trial require “[a] greater
quantum of evidence favoring the State.” Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731, 737 (¶20) (Miss.
2005). This standard requires reversal if the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial. Id. We, therefore, defer to the discretion of the circuit judge, and “we
will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable
injustice.” McLendon, 945 So. 2d at 385 (¶40) (citing Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297,
300 (Miss. 1983)).
Thus, the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in
exceptional cases where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Bush, 895
So. 2d at 844 (¶18) (citing Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 947 (¶18) (Miss.
2000)).
¶13.
Jackson argues that the State failed to raise any reasonable inferences during the trial
to support the jury verdict. Jackson specifically points to inconsistencies between Bland’s
statements to the police and his testimony at trial. Jackson argues that when Officer Proctor
interviewed Bland about the shooting, immediately after responding to the 911 call, Bland
told Officer Proctor that he had heard gunshots. Jackson asserts Bland never identified
Jackson as the shooter.
However, during Investigator Smith’s interview with Bland,
6
approximately two hours after the shooting, Bland identified Jackson as the shooter, stated
that he saw the top of Jackson’s head, and also stated that he saw Jackson firing shots. Then,
at trial, Bland testified that he saw Jackson, “totally visible,” raise his rifle and start shooting.
Jackson argues that these inconsistent statements relate to the credibility of Bland’s
testimony and provide support for his argument that the jury verdict is contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence and, thus, warrants reversal.2
¶14.
Jackson next points to the testimony of Shelby, claiming that her testimony suffers
from the same “fatal inferential credibility issues” as Bland’s testimony due to her failure to
come forward to the police after the shooting. At trial, Shelby testified that the police
department never contacted her regarding the shooting; she stated that she never spoke to
anyone about the shooting until Assistant District Attorney Arthur contacted her nine months
after the shooting. When asked about her failure to contact police regarding the shooting,
Shelby testified that she “was scared for [her] and her kids,” and that she had “known
[Jackson’s] family forever.” During cross-examination, Jackson’s attorney attempted to
question Shelby about her statements to Assistant District Attorney Arthur, where he
transcribed that Shelby told him that she had heard gunshots on the day of the shooting.
Shelby testified that she saw Jackson with the gun, but she never heard any gunshots. Both
attorneys approached the bench, and Assistant District Attorney Arthur admitted that he
2
We note the record reflects that during his testimony, Bland explained the
inconsistencies in his statements to Officer Proctor and Investigator Smith. Bland provided
his statement to Officer Proctor moments after seeing his fiancée and unborn child die.
Bland testified that at the time he spoke to Officer Proctor, he was more concerned with the
condition of his loved ones than giving an accurate statement about the details of the
shooting.
7
might have made a mistake when transcribing his interview with Shelby. However, at trial,
Assistant District Attorney Arthur stipulated to the document containing Shelby’s previous
statements to him, and the circuit judge entered the document into evidence.
¶15.
Despite Jackson’s arguments attacking the credibility of Bland’s and Shelby’s
testimonies, we note that the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “the jury is the sole
judge of the credibility of witnesses, and the jury's decision based on conflicting evidence
will not be set aside where there is substantial and believable evidence supporting the
verdict.” Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 463 (Miss. 1984). Where the verdict turns on the
credibility of conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witnesses, we note that it is the
jury's duty to resolve the conflict. Nicholson v. State, 523 So. 2d 68, 70-71 (Miss. 1988);
Gandy v. State, 373 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Miss. 1979); Shannon v. State, 321 So. 2d 1, 2 (Miss.
1975); Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 356-57, 162 So. 2d 510, 512 (1964). As stated above,
a jury’s findings will not be disturbed by this Court unless “the verdict is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an
unconscionable injustice.” McLendon, 945 So. 2d at 385 (¶40). In addition, in Mask v.
State, 996 So. 2d 106, 111-12 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), we held that the verdict was not
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence where the impeachment of a witness at trial
“involved insignificant details that happened prior to the shooting.”
¶16.
Jackson also submits that the physical and forensic evidence contradicted and
discredited eyewitness testimony at trial. Jackson claims that since investigators failed to
recover any gunshot residue off of his hands after he was taken into custody the morning
after the shooting, the forensic evidence did not establish him as the shooter. In addition,
8
Jackson asserts that his fingerprints were not found on any of the twenty-six rifle shell
casings recovered by the police.
¶17.
However, we note that Lieutenant Robert Stewart of the Vicksburg Police Department
testified that the instructions on the gunshot-residue kit warn that after four hours, gunshot
residue could either deteriorate or no longer be present on living subjects. The testimony
then reflected that the crime lab typically does not perform gunshot-residue tests more than
four hours after the discharge of a firearm. Lieutenant Stewart testified that despite this
warning, he proceeded to perform a gunshot-residue test on Jackson approximately twelve
hours after the shooting. Lieutenant Stewart stated that Jackson informed him that he had
bathed prior to submitting to the gunshot-residue test. James Burchfield, a forensic scientist
at the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, also testified regarding the four-hour rule regarding
gunshot-residue testing. He opined that it would be highly unlikely to find gunshot residue
on a person twelve hours after having fired a weapon. Regarding Jackson’s claim that his
fingerprints were not found on the shell casings, Lieutenant Stewart testified that the police
department seldom recovers fingerprints on shell casings due to the oil and powder residue
that accumulate on the casings after they are fired. Despite Jackson’s argument that the lack
of physical evidence provides proof of his innocence, we note that in Bownes v. State, 861
So. 2d 1061, 1063 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted), this Court held that “the
absence of physical evidence does not negate a conviction where there is testimonial
evidence.” The verdict herein is supported by the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
We, therefore, find no merit to Jackson’s assertion that the circuit judge abused his discretion
in denying the motion for a new trial.
9
B.
¶18.
Motion for a JNOV
In turning to the denial of Jackson’s motion for a JNOV, we note that this Court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review for post-trial motions. Dilworth, 909 So.
2d at 736 (¶17). In a motion for a JNOV, we examine whether the verdict was based on
legally sufficient evidence. Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (¶16). In Bush, the supreme court
explained that when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction,
“the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that [the]
accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every
element of the offense existed[.]’” Id. (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss.
1968)). The evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction where it fails to meet this test.
Id. As a result, “the applicable question is whether ‘after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” McLendon, 945 So. 2d at 384 (¶35)
(citing Dilworth, 909 So. 2d at 736 (¶17)). On appeal, the reviewing court is not required “to
‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id.
¶19.
In addition, when the facts and inferences “point in favor of the defendant on any
element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable [jurors] could not have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for us to
reverse and render. Dilworth, 909 So. 2d at 736 (¶17); Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70
(Miss. 1985). On the other hand, when the facts and inferences considered reveal a result in
which “reasonable fair-minded [jurors] in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach
10
different conclusions on every element of the offense, ” the evidence is deemed sufficient.
Dilworth, 909 So. 2d at 736 (¶17).
¶20.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2006) defines depraved-heart
murder as:
(1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or
in any manner shall be murder in the following cases:
(b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous
to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human
life, although without any premeditated design to effect the
death of any particular individual;
Jackson argues that the State had to prove that Jackson killed Denise, her unborn child, and
Qualls while in the commission of an eminently dangerous act, and he submits that the State
failed to meet this burden. Jackson claims that after hearing the inconsistencies between the
eyewitness testimony and the forensic evidence, no reasonable juror could have found him
guilty of murder. Jackson also alleges that the forensic evidence failed to identify him as the
shooter.
¶21.
However, a review of the record shows that the State presented evidence that Denise
and Qualls died as the result of gunshot wounds. Byron McIntyre, a forensic scientist at the
Mississippi Crime Laboratory, testified that Denise and Qualls were killed by the same type
of bullets and that the bullets were fired from the same weapon, an AK-47 rifle. Dr. Steven
Hayne further testified that Denise’s gunshot wound caused the death of her unborn fetus.
Also, as previously stated, Bland provided testimony that moments before the shooting, he
heard Jackson threaten to “go get [his] scrap,” and then saw Jackson fire a rifle into the
neighborhood where Qualls and Denise were shot. Shelby also testified that she observed
11
Jackson retrieve a gun from a car moments before the shooting occurred.
¶22.
In the present case, we find that sufficient evidence exists to support the jury verdict
finding Jackson guilty of three counts of depraved-heart murder. Accordingly, we find no
abuse of discretion by the circuit court in denying either of Jackson’s post-trial motions. This
issue lacks merit.
II.
¶23.
Whether the circuit court violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403
when it admitted photographs of the victims’ bodies.
Jackson next argues that the circuit court violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403
in admitting three photographs of the victims – Denise, her unborn fetus, and Qualls – which
were introduced during the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses. With respect to the
photographs in issue, the photograph of Qualls was a closeup, color photograph of his head
and face, which revealed that his body had already started to decompose by the time the
police found him. The photograph of Denise showed the inside of the house where she died,
and it shows her topless body with medical tubes inserted in it. The photograph of Denise’s
unborn fetus was an autopsy photograph taken at Dr. Hayne’s laboratory. Jackson claims
that these photographs rose to the level of graphically disturbing, and he alleges that the State
tactically contrived the admission of the photographs into evidence to inflame the jury. He
asserts that the photographs possessed no probative value.
¶24.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 states that: “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” In McNeal v. State, 551 So. 2d 151, 159 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi Supreme
12
Court established two guidelines for the admission of “gruesome” photographs, stating: “(1)
whether the proof is absolute or in doubt as to [the] identity of the guilty party, as well as,
(2) whether the photographs are necessary evidence or simply a ploy on the part of the
prosecutor to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury.” Additionally, the supreme court
held: “Some ‘probative value’ is the only requirement needed to buttress a trial judge's
decision to allow photographs into evidence.” Parker v. State, 514 So. 2d 767, 771 (Miss.
1986).
¶25.
The supreme court further established that the admissibility of photographs rests
within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Manix v. State, 895 So. 2d 167, 177-78 (¶30)
(Miss. 2005). Additionally, we will uphold the decision of the circuit judge unless an abuse
of discretion occurs. Id. We acknowledge that the discretion of a circuit judge “runs toward
almost unlimited admissibility regardless of the gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the
extenuation of probative value.” Id.
¶26.
The record shows that in the present case, the circuit judge reviewed the photographs
in his chambers before the trial, and he also conducted a Rule 403 balancing test, wherein he
carefully weighed the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudice to
Jackson. The circuit judge acknowledged that the State bore the burden of proving the
elements of the indictment, including the following: Jackson fired a weapon multiple times
toward Denise’s residence, which resulted in Denise’s death and the death of her unborn
child; Jackson fired a weapon multiple times in the direction of Qualls, which resulted in
Qualls’s death; and these acts constituted acts which were eminently dangerous to others,
thus, evincing a depraved heart. Additionally, the State asserted that the photographs
13
constituted necessary evidence to corroborate the testimony of the witnesses for
identification, cause of death, and circumstantial purposes. The State charged Jackson with
three counts of depraved-heart murder; thus, the circuit judge concluded that the photographs
possessed probative value as to material issues in controversy or an element that the State
must prove. The circuit judge also ruled that Jackson could not force the State to stipulate
to the fact that an unborn child had died. The circuit court found that this fact pertained to
an element of the offense charged in the indictment. Since the State bore the burden to prove
each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then the circuit court held
that State could enter the photographs into evidence as probative, relevant evidence to prove
these elements.
¶27.
In the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion by the circuit judge in determining
that the photographs of the victims’ bodies had substantial probative value. The photographs
of Denise and Qualls identified the victims, and the photographs showed the bodies as the
police found them at the crime scene. The State offered the photograph of Qualls into
evidence, during the cross-examination of Lieutenant Hearn, in an attempt to counter
questions from the defense about whether a possibility existed that Qualls did not receive his
gunshot wounds on the same day as Denise. The State offered the photograph of Qualls’s
decomposing face to show the exposure of his body to the weather elements, thus, providing
support to the State’s argument that Jackson had shot Qualls on same day as Denise. The
photograph of Denise shows her pregnant body lying on the floor inside of her house and
also depicts the injuries she received as a result of the shooting. The State offered this
photograph into evidence to meet its burden of proving the elements of depraved-heart
14
murder by showing that Jackson indeed shot into Denise’s residence and killed her. Finally,
the State offered the photograph of the third victim, Denise’s unborn fetus, during Dr.
Hayne’s testimony to aid in his explanation of how the unborn fetus died. The State also
offered the photograph for the purpose of showing proof that Denise was pregnant when she
was shot and that her unborn fetus had died as a result of the gunshot wound received by
Denise.
¶28.
All three photographs also helped corroborate the State's assertion of the manner,
time, and cause of death. Thus, we cannot say the admission of the photographs, either
individually or collectively, prejudiced Jackson's right to a fair trial. Moore v. State, 932 So.
2d 833, 838 (¶¶10-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, no abuse of discretion exists in
the circuit court’s admission of the photographs. Thus, this assignment of error is without
merit.
¶29.
In conclusion, we find both of Jackson’s assignments of error lack merit; therefore,
we affirm Jackson’s convictions and sentences.
¶30. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF THREE COUNTS OF DEPRAVED-HEART MURDER AND
SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS ON EACH COUNT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF
PAROLE WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
15
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.