Michael D. Leggett v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-KA-01713-COA
MICHAEL D. LEGGETT
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEE
02/20/2009
HON. MICHAEL M. TAYLOR
LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
DEE BATES
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF MURDER AND
SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY
FOR PROBATION OR PAROLE
AFFIRMED: 02/15/2011
BEFORE KING, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A jury in the Lincoln County Circuit Court found Michael D. Leggett guilty of
depraved-heart murder pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19 (Rev. 2006).
Leggett was sentenced as a habitual offender to life without eligibility for probation or
parole. Subsequently, Leggett filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and/or a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion. Leggett has appealed and raises the
following issue: whether the verdict of the jury was contrary to the sufficiency and weight
of the evidence.
¶2.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
In October 2006, Leggett and Jewel Duane Douglas both worked for Ard’s Tree
Service. Douglas allowed Leggett to live in his home and provided him with transportation
to work. On the morning of October 11, 2006, Leggett and Douglas traveled to Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, for work and returned home later that afternoon. Leggett and Douglas
drank daiquiris and beer throughout the day.
¶4.
Once at home, they began repairing a truck. The two engaged in a heated argument
over the proper repair procedure. As a result, Leggett drove off in a work vehicle. While
Leggett was gone, Douglas called Jason Ard, owner of Ard’s Tree Service, to inform him
that Leggett had taken the truck. Leggett returned approximately thirty minutes later, and
soon afterwards, Ard arrived.
Ard fired Leggett for taking the work truck without
permission. Leggett was upset; he punched out a window in the storm door to Douglas’s
home and injured his hand. Leggett then began walking to a family member’s house, the
Odom residence.
¶5.
Douglas went after Leggett and offered him a ride. Leggett refused the ride from
Douglas, but within ten or fifteen minutes, he accepted a ride from Mississippi State
Highway Patrol Trooper Larry Foster. During the ride, Leggett told Trooper Foster that he
believed Douglas had stolen his wallet.
¶6.
Once at the Odom residence, Leggett received assistance for his injured hand.
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Leggett then called Douglas, and the conversation escalated into an argument over the
alleged stolen wallet. Mark Culbertson, a friend of the Odom family, arrived at the Odom
residence. Leggett asked Culbertson to take him to Douglas’s house. Culbertson agreed, and
Leggett armed himself with three kitchen knives, which he tucked into the waistband of his
pants. It is undisputed that upon arrival at Douglas’s house, Culbertson remained in the car
while Leggett went inside. Once inside, Douglas and Leggett continued to argue. Exactly
what happened next was disputed at trial.
¶7.
Culbertson testified that he saw Leggett pulling Douglas out of the house with one
hand while waving a knife in the other. According to Culbertson, Douglas broke away and
started running toward his truck, and Leggett yelled, “Get him!” Culbertson admitted that
he responded by grabbing a tire iron from the floorboard of his car and throwing it toward
Douglas. Culbertson testified that the tire iron hit Douglas in the back causing him to fall,
and Leggett then retrieved the tire iron, straddled Douglas, and beat him repeatedly.
¶8.
Leggett denied any involvement in the beating of Douglas. Leggett claimed that when
Douglas exited his home and was walking toward his truck, Culbertson threw the tire iron.
According to Leggett, the tire iron struck Douglas in the back of the head, and the single
impact to Douglas’s head resulted in his death.
¶9.
After the altercation, Culbertson and Leggett noticed another vehicle approaching
Douglas’s home; they decided to flee and return to the Odom residence. Witnesses inside the
Odom residence testified that upon their return, Culbertson and Leggett appeared distraught.
The occupants of the other vehicle arrived at Douglas’s home and noticed Douglas’s
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condition, followed Culbertson and Leggett to the Odom residence, and notified the
authorities. The police arrived at the Odom residence and took Culbertson and Leggett into
custody.
¶10.
Douglas was taken to the hospital for medical treatment. As a result of the injuries,
Douglas died the next day. Culbertson pled guilty to manslaughter and testified against
Leggett at trial; Leggett was convicted of murder.
ANALYSIS
¶11.
Leggett has appealed the circuit court’s decision to deny the motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and/or a new trial. Leggett requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and grant him a new trial or simply render a manslaughter conviction. Leggett
suggests that the murder conviction is contrary to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶12.
A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict challenges the legal sufficiency
of the evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005). This Court must
consider whether the evidence shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed
the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense
existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a
conviction.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶13.
Leggett was convicted of depraved-heart murder, which is defined as:
(1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or
in any manner shall be murder in the following cases:
(b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous
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to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human
life, although without any premeditated design to effect the
death of any particular individual[.]
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2006).
¶14.
Leggett suggests the evidence is insufficient to support a murder conviction because
the State failed to introduce evidence of premeditation or deliberate design. It is a wellestablished principle of law that the lack of premeditated design is not an essential element
of the offense of depraved-heart murder. Montana v. State, 822 So. 2d 954, 963 (¶39) (Miss.
2002). “[T]he State is not required to prove lack of premeditated design in order to convict
a defendant pursuant to § 97-3-19(1)(b).” Id. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
2. Weight of the Evidence
¶15.
A motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Bush, 895 So. 2d at
844 (¶18) (citation omitted). An appellate court “will only disturb a verdict when it is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction
an unconscionable injustice.” Id. “In determining whether a jury verdict is against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which
supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial.” Miller v. State, 980 So. 2d 927, 929 (¶10) (Miss.
2008) (citation omitted).
¶16.
Leggett argues the jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,
and this Court should reverse and grant a new trial or render a manslaughter conviction.
Manslaughter is defined as:
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The killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a
cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without
authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35 (Rev. 2006).
¶17.
Leggett claims contradictory testimony presented at trial cast a reasonable doubt as
to murder, and during the fatal altercation, he was acting in the heat of passion.
A. Contradictory Testimony
¶18.
Leggett relies on Clemons v. State, 473 So. 2d 943 (Miss. 1985), in support of his
request to reverse his murder conviction based on contradictory testimony. In Clemons, the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that reversal was appropriate when “there is such
contradictory testimony that it is virtually impossible to reconstruct what actually happened”
and the conflicting evidence “cast at least a reasonable doubt, as to murder.” Id. at 944-45.
¶19.
In Clemons, an argument between two men erupted into a fatal stabbing. Numerous
witnesses provided conflicting accounts of the fatal event; the witnesses did not agree as to
whom the aggressor was or how many times the defendant had stabbed the victim. Id. The
situation before us is distinguishable from Clemons because there are only two accounts of
the fatal event, and the evidence is not so contradictory that it is virtually impossible to
reconstruct what happened.
¶20.
Leggett’s and Culbertson’s versions of the events that occurred after arriving at
Douglas’s house are contradictory. Leggett testified that Culbertson threw the tire iron
striking Douglas in the back of the head, which resulted in Douglas’s death. Culbertson
testified that he did, in fact, throw the tire iron at Douglas, but it only struck him in the back;
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and Leggett then retrieved the tire iron and proceeded to strike Douglas in the head.
¶21.
The State provided evidence to support Culbertson’s account of the events. Dr.
Stephen Hayne, an expert in pathology, testified that the autopsy revealed numerous injuries,
including: lacerations, contusions, three fractures of the skull, and evidence of brain
hemorrhaging resulting from the skull fractures.
Dr. Hayne’s testimony supported
Culbertson’s testimony that the victim was struck more than once. Therefore, unlike
Clemons, the evidence is not so contradictory as to create a reasonable doubt as to the charge
of murder.
¶22.
Thus, the issue becomes a determination of witness credibility. The determination of
witness credibility lies within the sole province of the jury. Moore v. State, 969 So. 2d 153,
156 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). A reviewing court should not disturb a jury’s finding on
conflicting testimony where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. See Taylor
v. State, 744 So. 2d 306, 312 (¶17) (Miss. 1999). The jury heard the conflicting statements
coupled with evidence offered on behalf of each side and resolved the statements in favor
of the State. The jury reasonably relied on Culbertson’s version of the events -- that Douglas
endured a severe beating.
B. Heat of Passion
¶23.
Leggett argues that he was acting in the heat of passion; therefore, the weight of the
evidence supports a manslaughter conviction rather than murder. This Court has defined
“heat of passion” as:
A state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain
other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from a grade of murder
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to that of manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by
some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the
time. The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger,
rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror.
Griffin v. State, 13 So. 3d 833, 837 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
¶24.
Mississippi law has consistently held that a “heat-of-passion” defense requires
evidence of adequate provocation. See Magee v. State, 752 So. 2d 1100, 1104 (¶16) (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999). The supreme court has addressed the necessity of adequate provocation
stating:
One of the primary elements of a heat-of-passion crime is “immediate and
reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time.” This Court has
held that “it is essential that the excited and angry condition of the party
committing the act which would entitle him to the milder consideration of the
law, should be superinduced by some insult, provocation, or injury, which
would naturally and instantly produce, in the minds of ordinarily constituted
men, the highest degree of exasperation.” This Court further held that “there
must not only be passion and anger to reduce a crime to manslaughter, but
there must be such circumstances as would indicate that a normal mind would
be roused to the extent that the reason is overthrown and that passion usurps
the mind destroying judgment.”
Jones v. State, 39 So. 3d 860, 866-67 (¶36) (Miss. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
¶25.
Leggett testified that once he arrived at Douglas’s house, their conversation did
escalate into an argument. Leggett also explained Douglas’s attitude changed during the
argument, and Douglas went from “being mad to being nice.” Leggett stated that the arguing
had ceased, and Douglas walked outside in order to retrieve Leggett’s wallet from his truck
and return it. Leggett testified that he had no part in beating Douglas with the tire iron or
throwing it at Douglas. Contrary to Leggett’s assertion, there was no evidence offered
which established, or even suggested, that Leggett had reacted and killed Doulgas in the heat
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of passion.
¶26.
Leggett further relies on Dedeaux v. State, 630 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1993) to support his
argument in favor of manslaughter. In Dedeaux, the supreme court reversed a murder
conviction and remanded the case for re-sentencing for manslaughter. The defendant
claimed that he had acted in self-defense, and the supreme court found adequate provocation
in support of his self-defense claim. Because Leggett testified that he was not provoked and
had no part in the murder of Douglas, his reliance on Dedeaux is unfounded. This issue is
without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶27.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the elements of the crime were
satisfied, and the evidence does not weigh heavily against the jury’s decision to find Leggett
guilty of depraved-heart murder. The State provided evidence of Leggett’s participation in
an eminently dangerous act, the lack of provocation leading to the altercation, and the
injuries Douglas sustained in a continuous beating. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the motion; therefore, the judgment is affirmed.
¶28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF
LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PROBATION OR PAROLE, IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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