Sylvester Young, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2009-CP-02026-COA
SYLVESTER YOUNG, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/10/2009
HON. LESTER F. WILLIAMSON JR.
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
SYLVESTER YOUNG JR. (PRO SE)
STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED – 01/11/2011
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
After Sylvester Young Jr.’s probation was revoked, he was sentenced to serve twelve
years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). While serving
that time, Young filed a motion requesting habeas corpus relief. The Lauderdale County
Circuit Court reframed the motion as one for post-conviction relief and subsequently denied
the motion. Young contends that the circuit court’s judgment is in error.
¶2.
The circuit court correctly found no merit to Young’s complaint; therefore, we affirm
the circuit court’s judgment.
FACTS
¶3.
In 1997, Young pleaded guilty to the crime of armed robbery and was sentenced to
twenty years’ confinement in the custody of the MDOC, with eight years to serve, twelve
years suspended, and five years of reporting probation. On September 13, 2007, while on
probation after serving the eight years, an agreed order of probation revocation was entered,
sentencing Young to serve the twelve suspended years. On the same day, Young entered a
guilty plea to a separate crime involving a gun possession and was sentenced to serve one
year in the custody of the MDOC, with 364 days suspended and one day to serve.
¶4.
On August 13, 2009, Young filed his motion for habeas corpus, alleging that his
sentence was illegal. From the motion, it appears that Young mistakenly believed that he
was confined only on the 2007 gun-possession charge. On November 10, 2009, the circuit
court denied the motion, noting Young’s 2007 probation revocation and resulting twelve-year
sentence. The circuit court observed that Young was unable to articulate “why his sentence
is illegal or allege any factual basis in support of his assertion,” and found Young’s motion
“absolutely meritless on its face . . . .” The motion was “denied as being frivolous,” and
Young was ordered to forfeit sixty days of earned time for filing the motion.
¶5.
Additional facts, if necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the
issue.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶6.
When a trial court has denied a petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief, we “will
not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.
However, where questions of law are raised[,] the applicable standard of review is de novo.”
2
Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 932 (¶13) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Callins v. State, 975 So. 2d
219, 222 (¶8) (Miss. 2008)).
¶7.
Young presents the following allegation of error, which we state verbatim: “Whether
Appellant’s earned probation ‘after’ serving eight (8) years in confinement, pursuant to
Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-47, exempted the Circuit Court of Lauderdale
County of any authority to alter or vacate its original judgment.”
¶8.
Prior to 2001 and at the time of Young’s sentencing, section 47-7-47(2)(a) read: “Any
circuit court or county court may . . . acting upon the advice and consent of the commissioner
at the time of the initial sentencing only . . . suspend the further execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on earned probation . . . .” Young essentially contends, based on this
statute, that the circuit court could not sentence him to serve the remainder of his sentence
after he violated his probation.
¶9.
Young misinterprets the restrictions of section 47-7-47. That section as it was written
at the time of Young’s sentencing governed the jurisdiction of a circuit court to suspend a
sentence after an initial sentencing hearing. There is no evidence in the record before us that
any part of Young’s sentence was suspended at a time other than his initial sentencing
hearing. Young’s assertion that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to reinstate the
suspended portion of his sentence after he violated his probation is without merit.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-37 (Supp. 2009) states that, upon an alleged
violation of probation, a circuit court “may continue or revoke all or any part of the probation
or the suspension of sentence, and may cause the sentence imposed to be executed or may
impose any part of the sentence which might have been imposed at the time of conviction.”
3
In other words, circuit courts have the jurisdiction to revoke probation upon proof of a
violation. In the present case, Young apparently agreed to an order finding that he had
violated his probation.
¶10.
We find no error in the circuit court’s denial of Young’s motion for post-conviction
relief.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
4
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