Kenneth H. Harris v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-KA-01063-COA
KENNETH H. HARRIS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
05/13/2010
HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR.
LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY JR.
DEE BATES
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF BURGLARY AND
SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
TO SEVEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY
FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION
AFFIRMED - 08/16/2011
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Kenneth H. Harris was convicted of burglary and sentenced, as a habitual offender,
to seven years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without
eligibility for parole or probation. Aggrieved, Harris appeals and argues that the Lincoln
County Circuit Court erred when it declined to grant his motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because there was insufficient evidence of the
“breaking” element of burglary. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
Sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. on August 14, 2009, Alan and Wanda Kent
returned to their home in Brookhaven, Mississippi. As the Kents drove closer to their home,
they realized that an unfamiliar car was parked nearby. The trunk and the rear driver’s side
door were open, and the car was running. Alan got out of his vehicle, but Wanda remained
inside.
¶3.
Upon closer inspection, Alan noticed that someone was behind his truck, which was
parked in the carport. That person, later identified as Harris, quickly ran to his car and drove
away. However, Alan memorized Harris’s license plate number, which ultimately led to
Harris’s arrest. After calling the Brookhaven Police Department, Alan performed a brief
inventory of the storage room attached to the house. Alan noticed that a toolbox had been
stolen, and a shelf had been knocked over.
¶4.
Harris was later indicted for burglary. He pled not guilty, and on May 13, 2010, he
went to trial. The prosecution called Detective Nolan Jones of the Brookhaven Police
Department as its first witness. Detective Jones testified that after Harris was arrested on
August 18, 2009, Harris gave a brief statement. According to Harris’s statement, Harris had
stopped at the Kents’ house to steal a weedeater, but he was interrupted before he was able
to steal it. Harris denied that he went inside the Kents’ storage room. Harris also denied that
he had stolen Alan’s toolbox. However, Detective Jones testified that Harris “stated that he
didn’t go into the storage room, but at one point[,] he did state that he couldn’t get the light
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to come on in there. I don’t know if the door was locked or not on the storage room, but he
did make the statement that he couldn’t get the light to come on.”
¶5.
The prosecution called Alan as its second and final witness. Aside from his testimony
regarding the events that led to his brief encounter with Harris, Alan testified that: “we
always kept the [storage-room] door shut. There’s times that it may or may not be locked,
depending on my wife or I going in and out at the end of the day, but we always keep it
shut.” Furthermore, Alan testified that although a shelf had been knocked over and some of
the contents had been knocked onto the floor, he could only be certain that his toolbox was
missing from the storage room.
¶6.
Alan elaborated on the status of the light fixture in his storage room. According to
Alan, “[t]here’s a flourescent light on the ceiling that works sometimes. I had a short in the
light, and sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t. We’ve had a lot of trouble with it.”
Alan also testified that he was present when Detective Jones interviewed Harris. Alan went
on to testify that he “heard [Harris] say something to the effect that he couldn’t see in the
[storage] room, [because] it was too dark.” The prosecution rested after Alan had testified.
¶7.
Harris opted to testify. According to Harris, he stopped at the Kents’ house because
he intended to steal a weedeater that was left outside. Harris did not dispute that he was in
the Kents’ driveway when they returned home. However, Harris maintained that he “did not
go to the storage room.” Furthermore, Harris claimed that he did not even put his hand on
the doorknob of the door to the storage room. Specifically, Harris testified as follows:
Well, my plans were, actually, I was looking; looking maybe for something to
take. But at the time, I didn’t take anything. I panicked. I got scared when
they pulled up, and I, you know, just ran to my car. I didn’t go into their
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storage room. I didn’t steal anything. I didn’t knock down any shelf that Mr.
Kent stated that was on the picture. I didn’t do anything. I didn’t even turn on
the light switch as he stated. I didn’t do anything. I just stood right there on
the side of that truck and when they pulled up I got in my car, I ran to my car
and left. Wasn’t nothing taken, wasn’t nothing moved.
¶8.
Harris rested after he testified. As previously mentioned, the jury found Harris guilty.
During a bifurcated proceeding, the circuit court found that Harris qualified for enhanced
sentencing as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81
(Rev. 2007). The circuit court then sentenced Harris to seven years in the custody of the
MDOC. Following his unsuccessful post-trial motion for a JNOV, Harris appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9.
“A motion for a [JNOV] is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Gilbert
v. State, 934 So. 2d 330, 335 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). As our Mississippi Supreme Court
has stated:
in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the
face of a motion for . . . [a JNOV], the critical inquiry is whether the evidence
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and
that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense
existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to
support a conviction. . . . [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence point in favor of the defendant on any element of
the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the proper remedy
is for the appellate court to reverse and render.
Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). However, this Court will determine that there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the jury’s verdict if the evidence was “of such quality and weight that, having in mind the
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beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the
exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the
offense.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶10.
Harris claims there is insufficient evidence that he was guilty of burglary. Mississippi
Code Annotated section 97-17-33(1) (Rev. 2006) provides as follows:
Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering, in the day or
night, any . . . building or private room . . . in which any goods, merchandise,
equipment or valuable thing shall be kept for use, sale, deposit, or
transportation, with intent to steal therein, or to commit any felony . . . shall be
guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than seven (7)
years.
Harris argues that there was insufficient evidence of the “breaking” element of burglary.
According to Harris, there was no evidence that he opened the door to the shed. Harris
further claims that there was no evidence the door to the shed was shut when the Kents left
their home that evening.
¶11.
To constitute burglary, a “structure must generally be closed. Otherwise the entry is
merely a trespass, not a ‘breaking’ and a burglary.” Hill v. State, 929 So. 2d 338, 340 (¶5)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005). However, “any effort, however slight, such as the turning of a
[doorknob] to enter, constitutes a breaking.” Templeton v. State, 725 So. 2d 764, 766 (¶5)
(Miss. 1998) (quoting Alford v. State, 656 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Miss. 1995)). “Even if the
door was unlocked or if only slight force was needed to gain entry, such entry has been
viewed as forcible for the purposes of our burglary statute.” Wheeler v. State, 826 So. 2d
731, 735 (¶12) (Miss. 2002).
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¶12.
Alan testified that: “we always kept the [storage-room] door shut. There’s times that
it may or may not be locked, depending on my wife or I going in and out at the end of the
day, but we always keep it shut.” Moreover, Alan testified that a toolbox was missing after
Harris fled. Alan also testified that a shelf inside the storage room had been knocked over.
The jury also heard testimony that Harris was not able to turn on a light inside the storage
room. That testimony corroborated Alan’s testimony that the flourescent light inside the
storage room was malfunctioning at the time.
¶13.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier
of fact could have found that Harris opened the closed storage-room door, knocked over a
shelf, and stole Alan’s toolbox. Consequently, the jury could have found the essential
elements of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the standard of review that
applies to questions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we are obligated to affirm.
We, therefore, find no merit to this issue.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
OF SEVEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LINCOLN
COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE,
CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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