City of Cleveland, Mississippi v. Mid-South Associates, LLC
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CA-00971-COA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
v.
MID-SOUTH ASSOCIATES, LLC
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/27/2010
HON. VICKI B. COBB
DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
THOMAS L. KIRKLAND JR.
ANDY LOWRY
JOHN L. MAXEY II
WILLIAM HOLCOMB HUSSEY
CIVIL - OTHER
DENIED ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO CITY OF
CLEVELAND WHICH OPPOSED MEDICAL
CLINIC’S RELOCATION TO DESOTO
COUNTY
AFFIRMED: 08/09/2011
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS AND CARLTON, JJ.
GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The City of Cleveland, Mississippi appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of
DeSoto County denying the City’s request for attorneys’ fees related to Mid-South
Associates, LLC’s attempt to relocate a nursing home. The City claims it is owed attorneys’
fees under the statutory requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-7-201(2)(f)
(Rev. 2009). We find no error and affirm the chancellor’s judgment to deny the City’s
request for attorney’s fees.
FACTS
¶2.
In 2006, Mid-South filed an application for a Certificate of Need (“CON”) with the
Mississippi Department of Health in an effort to relocate seventy-five nursing-home beds
from Bolivar County to DeSoto County. The City, which is located in Bolivar County,
joined the action in opposition to Mid-South’s request. The CON was denied.
¶3.
Mid-South appealed the Health Department’s decision to the Chancery Court of
DeSoto County. The chancellor reversed the denial of the CON. The Health Department and
the City then appealed the chancellor’s decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court. That
appeal was deflected to this Court, and we reversed the chancellor’s judgment and reinstated
the Health Department’s denial of the CON. Miss. State Dep’t of Health v. Mid-South
Assoc., 25 So. 3d 358 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). On January 21, 2010, the supreme court denied
Mid-South’s request for certiorari review. Id.
¶4.
On January 27, 2010, the City filed a motion in the chancery court seeking statutory
attorney’s fees and costs under section 41-7-201(2)(f), which states, in part: “The [chancery]
court, as part of the final order, shall make an award of costs, fees, reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in favor of appellee payable by the appellant(s) should the court
affirm the order of the State Department of Health.”
¶5.
The City argued that since the Health Department’s decision was ultimately affirmed
by this Court’s reversal of the chancellor’s reversal, the Mississippi Legislature intended for
attorneys’ fees to be awarded in this situation. The chancellor, applying the precise language
of the statute, held that she could not award attorney’s fees because she had reversed, and not
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affirmed, the Health Department’s decision.
¶6.
The chancellor further found that she had no jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees
because this Court did not remand the case for such an award. Instead, this Court reversed
the judgment and rendered an opinion that reinstated the Health Department’s decision.
Accordingly, the chancellor found that she had no authority to reopen the case for an award
of attorney’s fees. The City now appeals the chancellor’s judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law that we
review de novo. Finn v. State, 978 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (¶6) (Miss. 2008).
ANALYSIS
¶8.
The question here is whether the City is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under
section 41-7-201(2)(f). There are two instances where the Legislature has made it explicitly
clear that attorney’s fees must be awarded following an unsuccessful appeal of the Health
Department’s decision on a CON.
¶9.
First, if a party appeals a CON decision to the chancery court and the chancery court
fails to act on the appeal within 120 days of the Health Department’s final decision, the
chancery court’s inaction acts as an affirmance. If this constructive affirmance is upheld by
the supreme court on appeal, the supreme court must award attorney’s fees to the appellee.
Section 41-7-201(2)(c) provides in part:
The chancery court shall give preference to any such appeal from a final order
by the State Department of Health in a certificate of need proceeding, and shall
render a final order regarding such appeal no later than one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the final order by the State Department of Health.
If the chancery court has not rendered a final order within this 120-day period,
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then the final order of the State Department of Health shall be deemed to have
been affirmed by the chancery court, and any party to the appeal shall have the
right to appeal from the chancery court to the Supreme Court on the record
certified by the State Department of Health as otherwise provided in paragraph
(g) of this subsection. In the event the chancery court has not rendered a final
order within the 120-day period and an appeal is made to the Supreme Court
as provided herein, the Supreme Court shall remand the case to the chancery
court to make an award of costs, fees, reasonable expenses[,] and attorney's
fees incurred in favor of appellee payable by the appellant(s) should the
Supreme Court affirm the order of the State Department of Health.
(Emphasis added).
¶10.
Second, if a party appeals a CON decision to the chancery court and the chancery
court affirms the Health Department’s final decision, the chancery court shall award
attorney’s fees. Section 41-7-201(2)(f) provides:
The court, as part of the final order, shall make an award of costs, fees,
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in favor of appellee payable
by the appellant(s) should the court affirm the order of the State Department
of Health.
¶11.
The Legislature has also given the chancery court discretion to award attorney’s fees
as a part of its final ruling on an appeal of a CON. Section 41-7-201(2)(f) provides:
The court may dispose of the appeal in termtime or vacation and may sustain
or dismiss the appeal, modify or vacate the order complained of in whole or in
part and may make an award of costs, fees, expenses[,] and attorney's fees, as
the case may be. . . .
(Emphasis added).
¶12.
There is no provision in the statute concerning an award of attorney’s fees when, as
here, the chancellor reversed the Health Department’s decision and the chancellor was then
reversed on appeal. Consequently, the City must depart from the clear language of the statute
and argue the intention behind such language. The City argues that the purpose of the statute
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is to limit an unnecessary appeal of the Health Department’s decision by mandating an award
of attorneys’ fees when the Health Department’s decision is ultimately upheld. Thus, the
City claims that, while the procedural path of this case is not included in the language of the
statute, it falls within the Legislature’s intent to award attorney’s fees when the Health
Department’s decision is upheld.
¶13.
The supreme court has stated the following rule regarding the interpretation of a
statute:
We will not engage in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and
unambiguous. However, statutory interpretation is appropriate if a statute is
ambiguous or is silent on a specific issue. In either case, the ultimate goal of
this Court is to discern the legislative intent. The best evidence of legislative
intent is the text of the statute; the Court may also look to the statute's
historical background, purpose, and objectives. If a statute is ambiguous, it is
this Court's duty to carefully review statutory language and apply its most
reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.
Buffington v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 43 So. 3d 450, 454 (¶13) (Miss. 2010) (citation
omitted).
¶14.
It is undisputed that the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The statute
is not silent on the issue of attorney’s fees; instead, it explicitly provides for an award of
attorney’s fees in the situations discussed above. Again, we are left with the City’s claim that
the Legislature clearly intended to award attorney’s fees in all instances where the Health
Department’s decision is ultimately upheld.
¶15.
However, our rules of statutory construction insist that the best evidence of the
Legislature’s intent is the text of the statute. Here, the Legislature enacted section 41-7-201,
which delineates the procedure used to appeal a final decision pertaining to a CON.
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Attorney’s fees are mandatory in some cases, discretionary in some cases and, as here, not
specifically addressed. Looking at the language of the statute, we cannot say that this was
an oversight on the part of the Legislature.
¶16.
Nor can we determine, as the City argues, that the Legislature’s failure to include a
mandatory award of attorney’s fees for this procedural path works an absurd result. The City
argues in its brief that the intention of the Legislature is to prevent the unnecessary appeal
of the Health Department’s decision. But it is entirely possible that the Legislature did not
intend to discourage an appeal that initially showed some level of merit. The statute
mandates an award of attorney’s fees where the appeal of the Health Department’s decision
showed no merit at the first level of review – the decision was either affirmed by the
chancellor or affirmed by the supreme court upon the chancellor’s inaction in the matter.
¶17.
Here, the chancellor found that Mid-South’s appeal of the Health Department’s
decision had merit; therefore, the appeal passed through the first level of review before it was
reversed by this Court. Although this distinction has no effect on the ultimate outcome in
the case, it is possible that the Legislature considered the distinction when it determined
which type of appeal to discourage by mandating attorney’s fees.
¶18.
We find that the language of section 41-7-201 is clear and unambiguous. There is no
provision for attorney’s fees when, as here, this Court reverses the chancellor’s reversal of
the Health Department’s decision. We are bound to follow the clear language of the statute
as it is our best guide to the Legislature’s intent. Accordingly, we find that the chancellor
properly denied the City’s motion for attorney’s fees because there was no statutory basis for
the award.
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¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF DESOTO COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON,
MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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