Jimmie Lee Bond v. Donna Shanell Bond
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CA-00637-COA
JIMMIE LEE BOND
APPELLANT
v.
DONNA SHANELL BOND
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
02/17/2010
HON. KENNETH M. BURNS
OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
WILLIAM L. BAMBACH
ROBERTA LYNN HAUGHTON
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DIVORCE GRANTED TO HUSBAND ON
GROUND OF ADULTERY; MARITAL
ASSETS DIVIDED
AFFIRMED - 08/16/2011
BEFORE LEE, C.J., MYERS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
MAXWELL, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Jimmie Lee Bond argues the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court’s equitable division
must be reversed because the chancellor did not make sufficient findings regarding Donna
Bond’s adulterous affair. Yet the chancellor’s final judgment of divorce clearly reflects that
he weighed Donna’s adultery against her in ordering the equitable division, which heavily
favored Jimmie. Finding no manifest error in the chancellor’s Ferguson analysis, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Jimmie and Donna were married in June 2005. They have no children together.
Almost four years after marrying, the parties separated. Shortly after, Jimmie filed for a
divorce. The chancellor granted the divorce based on Donna’s adultery. In dividing the
property, the chancellor awarded approximately ninety percent of the marital assets to
Jimmie. Dissatisfied that Donna received even a ten-percent share in light of her adulterous
affair, Jimmie filed a motion to reconsider, which the chancellor denied. He now appeals
arguing that the chancellor, in his Ferguson analysis, failed to make sufficient findings
regarding Donna’s adultery.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
“Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic
relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported
by substantial credible evidence in the record.” Henderson v. Henderson, 757 So. 2d 285,
289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000). We will not disturb a chancellor’s factual findings unless the
chancellor’s decision was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the chancellor applied
an improper legal standard. Wallace v. Wallace, 12 So. 3d 572, 575 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App.
2009). We do not substitute our “judgment for that of the chancellor, even if [we disagree]
with the findings of fact and would arrive at a different conclusion.” Coggin v. Coggin, 837
So. 2d 772, 774 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
But when reviewing a chancellor’s
interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v.
Prisock, 791 So. 2d 190, 192 (¶10) (Miss. 2001).
DISCUSSION
¶4.
The sole issue Jimmie asserts is whether the chancellor abused his discretion by
failing to expressly consider Donna’s adulterous acts when dividing the marital estate.
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Donna counters that the chancellor obviously considered her adulterous affair and weighed
it against her.
¶5.
In ordering an equitable distribution of property, chancellors must apply the Ferguson
factors, which include:
(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) dissipation of assets, (3)
the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of
assets not subject to distribution, (5) the tax and economic consequences of the
distribution, (6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need
for alimony, (7) the financial security needs of the parties, and (8) any other
factor that in equity should be considered.
Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994)). Chancellors should also consider each
party’s marital fault. Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1013-14 (¶26) (Miss. 2002). There
is a presumption that “the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether
economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value.” Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909,
915 (Miss. 1994). In reviewing a chancellor’s findings, we do not conduct a Ferguson
analysis anew. Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So. 3d 1251, 1264 (¶45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Rather, we examine the chancellor’s judgment and the record to ensure the chancellor
applied the correct legal standard and did not commit an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1266
(¶52).
¶6.
In Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 905 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that a chancellor erred in finding a wife’s “adulterous conduct precluded her from
being entitled to any form of equitable distribution of the property upon divorce.” The
Carrow court instructed that chancellors should not view equitable distribution as a means
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to punish the offending spouse for marital misconduct. See id. at 904 (citing Chamblee v.
Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850, 863 (Miss. 1994)). Rather, “marital misconduct is a viable factor
entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the
stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Id. at 904-05 (citing Ferguson,
639 So. 2d at 927).
¶7.
Here, the chancellor followed Carrow’s instructions. In assessing the factor for the
parties’ contribution to the stability and harmony of the marriage, the chancellor found:
Neither Jimmie nor Donna did all they could to provide stability and harmony
to the family. Donna became infatuated with another man[,] and her romantic
relationship with this third party caused the dissolution of the marriage.
Thus, Jimmie’s contention that the chancellor did not make explicit findings on Donna’s
marital fault is simply incorrect. The order shows he explicitly considered Donna’s adultery
in his Ferguson analysis, as well as its causal effect on the deterioration of the marriage. And
it is implicit in the order that the chancellor weighed this factor heavily against Donna.
¶8.
We affirm the chancellor’s judgment.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS, CARLTON AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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