Richard K. Dickerson v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CP-01149-COA
RICHARD K. DICKERSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/09/2008
HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
RICHARD K. DICKERSON (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED – 11/17/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND BARNES, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On January 22, 2007, Richard Kerry Dickerson pleaded guilty in the Grenada County
Circuit Court to one count of aggravated assault and one count of armed robbery. He was
sentenced on each count to 19 years and 350 days in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC) with 19 years suspended and 19 years of post-release
supervision, with the sentence in count two to run concurrently with the sentence in count
one. After serving the 350 days, Dickerson was released on post-release supervision for 19
years. Sometime thereafter, Dickerson violated the terms and conditions of his post-release
supervision. Accordingly, Dickerson’s post-release supervision was revoked, and he was
ordered to serve 19 years in the custody of the MDOC. On January 18, 2008, Dickerson filed
a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that his lawyer rendered ineffective
assistance for failing to advise him of various matters which caused his guilty plea to be
entered involuntarily. He also alleged that his attorney failed to advise the court at the time
of his plea that he was suffering from mental stress. The circuit court summarily denied
Dickerson’s motion. Aggrieved, Dickerson appeals, pro se, and asserts that the circuit court
erred in failing to grant his motion, because (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
(2) his sentence is illegal, (3) his guilty plea was involuntary, and (4) his request for an
evidentiary hearing should have been granted.
¶2.
We find no reversible error; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court,
which denied Dickerson’s PCR motion.
FACTS
¶3.
On October 15, 2007, Dickerson violated the terms of his post-release supervision by
(1) testing positive for cocaine, (2) failing to report to the MDOC from July through October
2007, and (3) failing to pay supervision fees and court costs. As a result, the Grenada County
Circuit Court revoked Dickerson’s post-release supervision and ordered him to serve his 19year sentence. As stated, Dickerson filed a PCR motion, which was promptly and summarily
denied by the circuit court. It is from this denial of his PCR motion that Dickerson
prosecutes this appeal.
2
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶4.
As stated, Dickerson asserts that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing
and that the circuit court erred in not granting his PCR motion for several reasons—the first
being that his guilty plea was involuntary. “When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny
a petition for post-conviction relief [an appellate court] will not disturb the trial court’s
factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However, where questions of
law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Reeder v. State, 783 So. 2d 711,
714 (¶5) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Pickett v. State, 751 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (¶8) (Miss. 1999)).
¶5.
In Harris v. State, 806 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (¶9) (Miss. 2002) (quoting Alexander v.
State, 605 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992)), our supreme court held that “[i]f the defendant
is advised regarding the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, it is
considered ‘voluntary and intelligent.’” In his guilty plea petition, Dickerson acknowledged
the accuracy of the following statement as it related to his counsel: “My lawyer has
counseled and advised me on the nature of each charge, on any and all lesser-included
charges, and on all possible defenses that I might have in this case.”
¶6.
Further, the following exchange occurred at Dickerson’s plea qualification hearing:
THE COURT:
Now under the state and federal constitutions there are a
number of constitutional rights that you will be waiving
or giving up by entering a plea of guilty.
The constitutional rights are these: You’ve got the
constitutional right to a speedy, public trial by a jury of
your peers. You’ve got a right to be present at trial.
3
You’ve got a right to testify at trial or a right to remain
silent at trial.
You’ve got the right to cross-examine witnesses who
come into court and testify against you. You’ve got the
right to use the process of this court to compel witnesses
to come to court and testify on your behalf.
If you chose to go to trial you would have the right to
have the jury instructed you are presumed to be innocent.
In order to convict all 12 jurors would have to agree on
your guilt, and they would have to find you guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, if you were tried by a jury and convicted you could
appeal that conviction to the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals of this state, and an attorney would be appointed
to represent you for appeal purposes in the event you
couldn’t afford to hire a lawyer. But by entering a plea
of guilty, there cannot be any appeal whatsoever from
these proceedings.
Mr. Dickerson, do you understand all the constitutional
rights I’ve gone over with you, as well as those listed in
Paragraph 6 of this petition to enter a plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Is it your desire at this time to waive or give those
constitutional rights up and enter a plea of guilty to the
charges of aggravated assault and armed robbery?
THE DEFENDANT:
¶7.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
We conclude that Dickerson’s plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, as he
4
acknowledged that his attorney had advised him of the nature of the charges against him and
the consequences of his guilty plea. Further, he was informed of his right to have a jury
decide whether he committed aggravated assault and armed robbery as well as of the
consequences of waiving his right to a jury trial.
¶8.
Dickerson also asserts that he should have been afforded a competency hearing.
However, we decline to address this issue, as it is raised for the first time on appeal. Dunn
v. State, 693 So. 2d 1333, 1339 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Crowe v. Smith, 603 So. 2d 301, 305
(Miss. 1992)).
¶9.
As for Dickerson’s assertion that his attorney failed to inform the court of his mental
status, we conclude that Dickerson did not inform the court of any mental disability that he
suffers from when he had the opportunity to do so. When asked by the trial judge during the
plea qualification hearing whether he suffers from any mental problems, he responded that
he did not. Specifically, the trial judge asked Dickerson whether he suffers from any
“disabilities of [the] mind or problems with [his] thought processes or problems that would
interfere with [his] ability to understand [the] proceedings.” Dickerson responded that he did
not. Also, in his Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, Dickerson acknowledged that his “physical
and mental health are presently satisfactory.”
¶10.
Therefore, we cannot hold Dickerson’s attorney in error for failing to inform the court
that Dickerson suffers from some mental disability when Dickerson himself did not do so,
despite being asked by the court about his mental health. Further, there is nothing in the
5
record to establish that Dickerson, in fact, suffers from a mental disability. This issue lacks
merit.
¶11.
Dickerson also asserts that his attorney failed to advise him of the maximum and
minimum sentences applicable to the charges and of the elements of the charges against him.
Again, the record clearly belies Dickerson’s assertions, as reflected by the following
exchange, which occurred at Dickerson’s guilty plea qualification hearing:
THE COURT:
I understand your attorney and the district attorney’s
office have discussed a possible plea recommendation.
It’s my understanding that it’s a little different from
what’s written in the petition.
But your attorney and Mr. Hill, assistant district attorney,
advised me that they would recommend on each count
that you be sentenced to serve a term of 19 years and 350
days. And that upon completion of 350 days, they would
recommend that you be released onto post-release
supervision for a period of 19 years. And further, you
will be recommended -- they will recommend that you
pay all court costs and assessments. Now, is that your
understanding of the recommendation that will be made
to this Court?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Do you understand the Court does not have to accept that
recommendation?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
Do you understand for the crime of armed robbery you
could be sentenced anywhere from suspended jail time,
6
and if it was done by the Court, up to maybe a day less
than your life expectancy, which means one day less than
life in prison. And then if you were tried by a jury, they
could actually sentence you to life in prison on armed
robbery. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, sir.
And then on aggravated assault, if you were tried by a
jury and convicted you could be sentenced anywhere
from suspended jail time to a maximum of 20 years in
prison. And on each of these two charges you could be
fined anywhere from suspended fine or no fine at all to
up to $10,000 on each of those. Do you understand that?
****
THE COURT:
Now, have you had an opportunity to go over the charges
that have been brought against you in the case with your
attorney . . . .
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Has he advised you of the elements of the crime of armed
robbery and the elements of the crime of aggravated
assault, that being the facts the State would have to prove
before you could be found guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, I have.
Yes, sir.
Has he also discussed with you any possible defenses
you might have to the charges?
THE DEFENDANT:
What do you mean by that?
7
THE COURT:
A defense means a jury might look favorably upon your
case or might find you not guilty.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
So he has discussed that with you as well.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, sir.
Are you completely and totally satisfied in all respects
with the representation you have received from [your
attorney]?
THE DEFENDANT:
¶12.
No, sir.
Has he in all respects met the expectations of what you
believe a lawyer representing you in a case such as this
should have done for you?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, sir.
Do you have any complaints at all about the
representation you have received from [your attorney]?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
It is clear in this state that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity.” Harris, 806 So. 2d at 1130 (¶9) (quoting Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d
401, 403 (Miss. 1978)). Based on the exchanges set forth in the colloquy above, we conclude
that Dickerson has failed to show that his attorney’s representation was deficient and that he
8
was prejudiced as a result of that representation. The record reflects that he informed the
court that his attorney had advised him of the elements of the charges against him, as well
as of the maximum and minimum sentences that he could receive. This issue lacks merit.
¶13.
Finally, we note that Dickerson offered only his affidavit, attached to his reply brief,
to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Our appellate courts have
“implicitly recognized in the post-conviction relief context that where a party offers only his
affidavit, then his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.” Vielee v. State,
653 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1995) (citing Brooks v. State, 573 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (Miss.
1990)). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court properly denied Dickerson’s PCR motion.
¶14.
Dickerson further alleges that his sentence is illegal because he was released on post-
release supervision the day that he was sentenced. We find nothing illegal about Dickerson’s
sentence. As noted, he was sentenced to 19 years and 350 days in the custody of the MDOC
on each charge. The circuit judge ordered Dickerson released on post-release supervision
after he served 350 days. However, because Dickerson was given credit for time that he had
already served, he was released on post-release supervision the same day. There is no merit
to this issue.
¶15.
In his last issue, Dickerson asserts that the circuit court erred in failing to grant him
an evidentiary hearing. Dickerson contends that the circuit judge did not inform him that by
pleading guilty he waived his right to a jury trial. However, as we have already pointed out,
the record contradicts this assertion and reveals that the circuit judge informed Dickerson of
9
his constitutional right to a jury trial and asked him whether he wanted to waive this right and
enter a plea of guilty to the charges. Dickerson responded by saying, “Yes, sir.” Therefore,
we find no merit to this issue.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO GRENADA COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
10
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
