Rodney Mendenhall v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00226-COA
RODNEY MENDENHALL
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
08/15/2007
HON. W. SWAN YERGER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM R. LABARRE
VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
ROBERT SHULER SMITH
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF COUNT I, ARMED
ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED TO
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS; COUNT II,
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND
SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, WITH
THE SENTENCE FOR COUNT II TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE
FOR COUNT I; AND COUNT III, BUSINESS
BURGLARY, AND SENTENCED TO
SEVEN YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCE
FOR COUNT III TO RUN CONCURRENTLY
WITH THE SENTENCE FOR COUNT I, ALL
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 10/06/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A Hinds County grand jury indicted Rodney Mendenhall for aggravated assault with
a weapon, armed robbery, and business burglary, all in connection with the July 6, 2006,
shooting of Curtis T. Addison, Jr. A jury found Mendenhall guilty on all charges. The trial
court sentenced Mendenhall to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(MDOC). After denial of post-trial motions, Mendenhall timely appeals. Upon review, we
find that the trial court violated Mendenhall’s right of confrontation in prohibiting defense
counsel from impeaching the credibility of the trial testimony of a material state witness as
to a material fact in issue through cross-examination with a prior inconsistent statement. This
limitation on the scope of Mendenhall’s cross-examination of the sole eyewitness unfairly
compromised Mendenhall’s fundamental right to a fair trial.
Therefore, we reverse
Mendenhall’s conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On the morning of July 5, 2006, Addison noticed that a pair of yellow, Suzuki motor
scooters were missing from his business, Addison’s Body Shop, in Jackson, Mississippi.
Addison called his friend, James Hampton, to see if Hampton had borrowed the scooters over
the Fourth of July holiday. Hampton had not, but he promised Addison he would keep an
“eye out” for the missing scooters. After speaking with Hampton, Addison called law
enforcement and filed a report about the missing scooters.
¶3.
Later that day, Hampton rode through the neighborhood, finding a man, whom he later
identified as Mendenhall, riding one of the missing scooters. Hampton testified that he
2
possessed a visible gun when he confronted Mendenhall, but he did not draw his gun on
Mendenhall. Hampton obtained the scooter from Mendenhall, and Addison later retrieved
the scooter from Hampton.
¶4.
On the evening of July 6, 2006, Addison dozed off in front of the television at his
business. Addison testified that he woke up around midnight with “a gun stuck in [his] face.”
Addison said the intruder motioned with his gun for Addison to follow him from the
television room into the hallway. Addison described the hallway as well-lit. Once in the
hallway, the intruder told Addison to take his pants off.
¶5.
Once Addison removed his pants, the intruder knocked Addison to the ground and
fired twice, shooting Addison in the leg. Addison fled, and the man left the area through the
heavy metal swinging shop doors. Addison then went into the office area of his shop where
he attempted to call 911, but the assailant returned and shot Addison two more times.
Addison testified that the two of them talked for about five minutes before the man shot him
again. Addison again fled and hid in the shop’s kitchen.
¶6.
Thinking the man had finally left, Addison again tried to call 911, but the man
returned a third time, and threatened to kill Addison. The man shot Addison two more times,
firing until the gun clicked on an empty chamber. At this point, Addison testified that he
reached for his rifle, and the man ran out of the rear of the shop. Addison finally managed
to call 911. Officers arrived and emergency personnel immediately transported Addison to
the hospital.
¶7.
After the hospital released Addison, he provided law enforcement with a description
of his assailant. Addison described his attacker as “kind of a dark brown color,” between
3
5'10 and 5'11 in height, “kind of slim,” and between twenty and twenty-three years of age.
Addison also stated that the intruder wore a scarf “halfway around his face” 1 and a baseball
cap on his head.
¶8.
Hampton also gave law enforcement a description of the man on the stolen scooter
that he had recovered. Hampton described this man as six feet tall, slender, and “with a low
haircut.” Detective Reginald Cooper, with the Jackson Police Department, testified at trial
that at the time of the shooting, Mendenhall weighed 150 pounds, measured six feet in
height, and was either twenty-two or twenty-three years of age. At trial, Addison identified
Mendenhall as the man who had shot him multiple times, and Hampton identified
Mendenhall as the man from whom he had obtained one of Addison’s stolen scooters.
¶9.
Additionally, during the evening of July 8, 2006, two days after the shooting, Jackson
Police Officer Ben Williams saw someone on Capitol Street in Jackson riding a yellow
scooter that matched the description of Addison’s other stolen scooter. Officer Williams
gave chase in his car. The rider, whom Officer Williams could not identify, lost control of
the scooter, crashed, and fled on foot. Law enforcement subsequently recovered the scooter
and tested it for fingerprints.
¶10.
While law enforcement waited for the results of the fingerprints taken from the
recovered scooter, they developed Mendenhall as the main suspect in Addison’s case. Law
enforcement then put Mendenhall’s photograph in a photographic lineup consisting of six
1
We note that during direct examination by the State, Addison contradicted this
earlier statement to law enforcement when he testified that the intruder “had a scarf on” and
that the scarf rested “right up under his nose and covered [the man’s face] from the lips
down.”
4
black males. On July 13, 2006, Detective Cooper took the photographic lineup to Hampton’s
workplace where Hampton identified Mendenhall as the man from whom he had retrieved
the scooter on July 5, 2006.
¶11.
Later that same day, law enforcement showed Addison the same photographic lineup,
and Addison identified Mendenhall as his assailant. Additionally, fingerprints from the
scooter, which law enforcement had recovered two days after Addison’s assault, matched
the fingerprints taken from Mendenhall.
¶12.
A grand jury indicted Mendenhall, and he was tried by a jury on the charges of
aggravated assault with a weapon, armed robbery, and business burglary, all in connection
with the July 6, 2006, shooting of Addison. The jury found Mendenhall guilty on all charges.
The trial court sentenced Mendenhall to the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC) as follows: (1) twenty-five years for Count I, armed robbery; (2)
twenty years for Count II, aggravated assault, to run consecutively to the sentence for Count
I; and (3) seven years for Count III, business burglary, to run concurrently with the sentence
for Count I.
¶13.
Mendenhall appeals and alleges the following errors: (1) the trial court erred in
refusing to allow Mendenhall to stand before the jury in closing argument in order to draw
particular attention to the size of his nose; (2) the trial court erred in granting the State’s
motion in limine that barred Mendenhall from impeaching Addison regarding medical
records that indicated that Addison had consumed alcohol on the night his attacker shot him;
and (3) the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions. We find merit
to the second and third assignments of error.
5
DISCUSSION
I.
¶14.
Presentation of Mendenhall’s Nose to the Jury During Closing
Arguments
Mendenhall contends that the trial court denied him the opportunity to present a
meaningful defense, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, by denying his request to stand before the jury in closing argument to
exhibit his “large” nose. However, Mendenhall made this request after both parties rested
and after the court closed the record for the reception of further evidence. Mendenhall made
no application for the reopening of the record for the reception of further evidence. In turn,
the State argues that “any error was harmless” regarding this issue because “counsel for
defendant was clearly and demonstrably able to point out [Mendenhall’s] nose to the jury”
in closing arguments. We note that the reopening of a case for the purpose of receiving
further evidence is a matter addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court.
Perkins v. State, 253 Miss. 652, 655, 178 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (1965) (citation omitted).
¶15.
At trial, Mendenhall raised the defense of misidentification and elected not to testify.
The State argued that such an exhibition of Mendenhall’s nose constituted testimonial
evidence and, therefore, fell within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause requirements as
outlined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). The trial court agreed with the
State and refused to permit Mendenhall to stand before the jury to display his nose close-up
during closing arguments. However, we find that the proper analysis on this issue pivots not
upon whether such an exhibition of Mendenhall’s nose constituted testimonial evidence.
Instead, the central question is whether defense counsel sought to introduce new relevant
6
evidence probative of a material fact of consequence through the exhibition of the
defendant’s physical characteristics of his nose to the jury during closing arguments. See
MRE 401(relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than without the evidence).2
¶16.
We find the supreme court case of Perkins on point with the issue before us. In
Perkins, the jury was permitted to examine the defendant’s scars after the record was closed
for the reception of further evidence and submitted to the jury. Perkins, 253 Miss. at 655-56,
178 So. 2d at 696. The supreme court found reversible error in such a display. Id. The court
explained that ordinarily, the reopening of the case after submission to the jury and before
the verdict for the purpose of receiving further evidence constituted a matter addressed to the
sound judicial discretion of the trial court. Id. at 655, 178 So. 2d at 695-96.
¶17.
The Perkins court further explained that:
This rule imports a requirement that a cogent reason be found to exist which
demands reopening in order that justice may be done. Moreover, when a case
is reopened for the reception of further evidence, it must be done in such a
manner that the rights of all parties will be protected and ample opportunity
afforded them for cross-examination or rebuttal, and even for requesting
additional instructions, if the matters introduced should reasonably require
them.
Id. at 655, 178 So. 2d at 696.
¶18.
In light of Perkins, we find no merit to this assignment of error since Mendenhall
2
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 991 So. 2d 593, 599 (¶18) (Miss. 2008) (stating that the
display of a physical characteristic lies outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment and
its exhibition does not waive a defendant’s rights against self-incrimination).
7
failed to request to reopen the record for further evidence, and then for the first time
requested to exhibit the physical characteristics of his nose to the jury during closing
arguments after the record had closed for the receipt of further evidence. See State v.
Candelaria, 636 P.2d 883, 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
¶19.
We also note that defense counsel highlighted the defense of misidentification to the
jury during closing arguments by drawing specific attention to Mendenhall’s nose and
exhibited a photograph of Mendenhall to the jury from the photographic lineup display
previously admitted into evidence. During the closing argument, defense counsel asserted
the following:
I want you to look at this photograph of [Mendenhall], and I want you to look
at him now. Look at him closely. If he had a mask across the bottom of his
face what would stand out in your mind[?] Look at that nose. It’s as big as
Rudolph the red-nosed reindeer’s nose. Did Mr. Addison say anything about
a nose[?] [N]ot one thing.
¶20.
We find no merit to this first assignment of error and no prejudice to Mendenhall’s
ability to present his defense of misidentification.
II.
¶21.
Addison’s Medical Records
Mendenhall contends that the trial court fatally prejudiced his defense and abused its
discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine to bar impeachment of Addison with
medical records allegedly showing that Addison admitted to his treating physician that he
consumed alcohol on the night of the shooting. However, Mendenhall has awkwardly
framed this assignment of error. We find that the error lies in the trial court’s prohibition on
the defendant’s ability to fully cross-examine and impeach, via prior inconsistent statements,
the trial testimony of the sole eyewitness.
8
¶22.
Mendenhall argues that Addison’s statements to his treating physician fell within the
exception to hearsay found in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(4); therefore, these
statements constituted admissible evidence. Mendenhall also contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in denying him the right to fully cross-examine Addison with his
prior inconsistent statement to the emergency-room doctor regarding Addison’s alcohol
consumption on the night of the shooting. The statement went to Addison’s credibility as to
his ability to perceive and identify the perpetrator of the crimes charged.
¶23.
In turn, the State argues that Addison’s medical records do not fall within any hearsay
exception due to Mendenhall’s inability to authenticate such records. As a result, the State
contends that the trial court properly ruled that defense counsel could not use the medical
records to impeach Addison. However, impeachment of the trial testimony of a witness is
not limited by what constitutes admissible evidence. See M.R.E. 613 (In examining a
witness concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by him, whether written or not, the
statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time). Rather, counsel
must possess a good-faith basis to inquire as to a matter on cross-examination for
impeachment purposes. Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 551-52 (¶55) (Miss. 2003)
(citations omitted).
¶24.
During the hearing, defense counsel conceded that the medical records required
authentication before admission into evidence, and the defense failed to provide such an
authenticating witness. However, defense counsel argued that wide latitude should be
granted during cross-examination to ask Addison whether or not he told the doctor he
consumed alcohol on the night of the shooting. Defense counsel stated Addison “[was] the
9
horse’s mouth in this case” and that “there would be no need to bring in the doctor to testify
to what Mr. Addison said.” In response, the State contended that defense counsel “[was]
trying to impeach [Addison] on a prior inconsistent statement without the person who heard
the prior inconsistent statement.”
¶25.
After hearing the arguments of both parties, the trial court stated the following in
making its ruling on the motion:
Well, the way the Court views this is just the fact that he was, quote, drinking
is not enough. It has to be you were intoxicated, was he intoxicated. . . . Just
because somebody had a beer or whiskey . . . that doesn’t mean anything as far
as this is concerned. So I think the danger here is [Mississippi Rule of
Evidence] 403. Even if it is relevant, which the Court doesn’t know at this
point[,] I think there [is] a danger this 403 would be unfairly prejudicial to the
victim and the State in this instance.
The trial court then granted defense counsel permission to ask Addison whether he consumed
alcohol on the night of the shooting, but it prohibited defense counsel from engaging in a full
cross-examination as to whether Addison made a prior statement to the doctor the night of
the shooting inconsistent with his trial testimony. See M.R.E. 613 (examination of a witness
concerning a prior statement).
¶26.
Note, defense counsel in this case did not seek admission of the medical record into
evidence. Therefore, the critical analysis in this case is whether a good-faith basis existed
for the cross-examination inquiry and whether the impeachment of the credibility of
Addison’s trial testimony prejudiced Mendenhall’s ability to receive a fair trial. We need not
analyze the foundational requirements for admitting medical records under a hearsay
exception since the basis of error does not pertain to the introduction of the record into
evidence.
10
¶27.
The limitation of the defendant’s ability to confront his accuser with a full cross-
examination is the basis of error. The analysis to determine whether an inquiry constitutes
proper cross-examination regarding a prior inconsistent statement differs from laying the
foundational requirements to admit a medical record. To engage in impeachment of trial
testimony through a prior inconsistent statement, counsel must possess a good-faith basis
for any question asked on cross-examination and the requirements of Rule 613 must be met.
Flowers, 842 So. 2d at 551-52 (¶55). In Flowers, the supreme court stated the following in
explaining the policy behind the good-faith basis requirement:
The asking of questions without a factual basis leaves an impression in the
mind of jurors that the prosecutor actually had such facts in hand and that the
insinuations through questioning contained some truth. This leaves false and
inadmissible ideas in the minds of jurors that cannot be adequately rebutted by
the testimony of witnesses or instructions from the court.
Id. at 552 (¶55) (citation omitted).
¶28.
In the case at bar, the State provided Addison’s medical records to the defense prior
to trial. The medical records contained a notation that Addison stated that he had consumed
alcohol on the night of the shooting. Thus, inquiring of Addison on cross-examination as to
prior inconsistent statements provided to the defense in discovery by the State would not
lend itself to “false and inadmissible ideas in the minds of jurors.” See id.
¶29.
Moreover, our governing case law affords defense counsel wide latitude in cross-
examination. Nalls v. State, 651 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Miss. 1995) (citation omitted). “[T]he
right of confrontation and cross-examination extends to and includes the right to fully crossexamine the witness on every material point relating to the issue to be determined that would
bear on the credibility of the witness and the weight and worth of his testimony.” Id.
11
(citations omitted).
¶30.
The credibility of Addison’s trial testimony as to the identity of the perpetrator bore
directly on the truthfulness of his testimony regarding a material fact in issue, and not a
collateral matter. See id.; see also Evans v. State, 382 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Miss. 1980)
(stating that State has the duty to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the
defendant as the one guilty of the offense charged”).
The trial court analyzed this
impeachment as if it were a collateral matter addressing the content of substantive evidence.
The court found that evidence of mere drinking, without sufficient proof of intoxication, was
so prejudicial as to outweigh its probative value, rendering the evidence inadmissible under
Rule 403. This analysis incorrectly evaluated a prior inconsistent statement for the truth of
the matter it asserted rather than evaluating the probative value of a prior inconsistent
statement used to impeach the credibility of the accuser. M.R.E. 613. The prior inconsistent
statement at issue was highly probative of the credibility of Addison’s testimony identifying
the perpetrator of the crimes charged. We find the trial judge abused his discretion in
limiting Mendenhall’s right to confront Addison, the sole eyewitness in this case, and
impeach his credibility during cross-examination using his prior inconsistent statement. We
find merit to this assignment of error.
III.
¶31.
Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mendenhall contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in this case as
it possessed the duty to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the
one guilty of the offense charged.” Evans, 382 So. 2d at 1085. The State counters that
legally sufficient evidence supported Mendenhall’s conviction.
12
¶32.
This Court has articulated the following general standard of review in challenges to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence:
[I]n reviewing whether the evidence supporting a jury verdict is legally
sufficient, this Court does not ask whether from the evidence we would have
voted to convict or acquit. Rather, we inquire whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime were
satisfied. The proper remedy for insufficient evidence is for the Court to
reverse and render.
Cooper v. State, 977 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Bush v. State, 895
So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005)). Underlying this standard of review is the presumption
that the jury “resolved questions regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Dear
v. State, 960 So. 2d 542, 546 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Pratt v. State, 870 So. 2d
1241 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
¶33.
However, when involving the violation of a basic constitutional right, the supreme
court set forth the test for determining whether the error is harmless by ascertaining whether
it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained. Brown v. State, 995 So. 2d 698, 704 (¶25) (Miss. 2008). Applying this
analysis to this case, we note that the constitutional error herein strikes at the heart of a
material fact in issue – the limitation of the defendant’s right to confront his accuser and test
the credibility of the trial testimony of the sole eyewitness identifying him as the perpetrator
of crimes charged.
¶34.
Given the importance of Addison as the State’s sole eyewitness and the importance
of impeaching Addison to Mendenhall’s theory of misidentification, the error in limiting
cross-examination colors the analysis of the evidence’s sufficiency. In prohibiting cross13
examination regarding the prior inconsistent statement, the trial court limited Mendenhall’s
ability to present relevant evidence regarding Addison’s truthfulness for the jury to consider
in evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Identifying the perpetrator is an
essential element in proving the crime. The jury was denied the ability to properly resolve
the weight and credibility of the testimony of the only witness capable of identifying the
perpetrator. See Nalls, 651 So. 2d at 1076. Therefore, the record fails to reflect beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. In sum, the
trial court violated Mendenhall’s right of confrontation by prohibiting Mendenhall’s
impeachment of the credibility of the sole eyewitness, Addison, with a prior inconsistent oral
statement made by Addison. We find merit to this assignment of error. Therefore, we must
reverse Mendenhall’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
¶35. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. MYERS, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
14
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.