Jermail Humphries v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00912-COA
JERMAIL HUMPHRIES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
02/13/2008
HON. W. SWAN YERGER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LESLIE S. LEE
BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
ROBERT SHULER SMITH
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED - 09/15/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A Hinds County Circuit Court jury convicted Jermail Humphries of the murder of
Armond Butler. The trial court sentenced Humphries to life in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC).
¶2.
Humphries argues on appeal that he is, at most, guilty of manslaughter, and asks this
Court to reverse his murder conviction and remand his case for a new trial or for resentencing on manslaughter. We find no error and affirm Humphries’s conviction and
sentence.
FACTS
¶3.
On September 28, 2006, Zarccheaus Anderson and Michael Buckhalter got into a fight
in Jackson, Mississippi over a basketball game. Following the initial altercation, Anderson
went to a nearby house, where he related the story of the fight to, among others, the
defendant, Humphries.
¶4.
Humphries, Buckhalter, and two other people then drove back to the basketball court,
where Buckhalter and Anderson began to fight again. During this second fight, other people
became involved, including Buckhalter’s friend, Selester Jones, who fought directly with
Humphries. After ending up on the ground and receiving a blow to the head, Humphries
drew a gun and fired in the air, breaking up the fight and dispersing the crowd.
¶5.
When Anderson and Humphries later encountered Jones, Tian Short, and a group of
young people walking down a street, a verbal confrontation ensued. Humphries again fired
his gun in the air, causing Jones, Short, and the group to flee. He then fired shots in the
general direction of the fleeing group.
¶6.
Later on, while still walking around the neighborhood, Jones, Short, and others
encountered Butler and Jerrick Nichols and discussed the fight between Anderson and
Buckhalter. A car in which Humphries rode passed by this group once, with Humphries
hanging out of the window brandishing a gun. The car soon reappeared, at which time
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Humphries stepped out of the car, drew his gun, rested his hands on the car’s roof, and began
shooting at the fleeing group. Butler suffered a fatal gunshot wound. Humphries claims he
fired his gun over the top of a house in the direction the group ran and that someone else fired
shots, although he does not know who.
¶7.
A Hinds County grand jury indicted Humphries for depraved-heart murder pursuant
to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19 (Rev. 2006). After the trial, the jury
convicted Humphries of murder. The trial court then sentenced Humphries to life in the
custody of the MDOC.
¶8.
Humphries now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising the following
assignments of error: (1) the jury instructions did not properly distinguish between depravedheart murder and culpable-negligence manslaughter because the instructions did not
accurately state the law and did not define the elements of manslaughter, and (2) the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support a murder conviction.
I.
¶9.
Whether the jury instructions were confusing regarding the
difference in depraved-heart murder and culpable-negligence
manslaughter.
Humphries alleges in his first assignment of error that the trial court’s failure to
properly distinguish between depraved-heart murder and culpable-negligence manslaughter
in its jury instructions constitutes reversible error. Humphries further alleges that the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of culpable-negligence manslaughter.
¶10.
This Court has articulated the standard of review for challenges to jury instructions:
“In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the
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instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly
announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.”
Johnson v. State, 823 So. 2d 582, 584 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Collins v. State,
691 So. 2d 918, 922 (Miss. 1997)).
¶11.
“In order to preserve a jury[-]instruction issue on appeal, a party must make a specific
objection to the proposed instruction in order to allow the lower court to consider the issue.”
Crawford v. State, 787 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (¶35) (Miss. 2001). Ordinarily, a “party’s failure
to object to jury instructions at trial procedurally bars the issue on appeal.” Hawthorne v.
State, 835 So. 2d 14, 19 (¶20) (Miss. 2003) (citing Walker v. State, 729 So. 2d 197, 202 (¶19)
(Miss. 1998)). Humphries not only failed to object at the trial level to jury instruction D-4,
which defined culpable negligence, he submitted the instruction. Moreover, the instruction
is virtually identical to the instruction defining culpable negligence manslaughter upheld in
Mullen v. State, 986 So. 2d 320, 324 (¶¶13-15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶12.
Although Humphries did object to jury instruction S-2, which defined depraved-heart
murder and distinguished it from culpable-negligence manslaughter, he based his objection
on the sufficiency of the evidence. At no time did Humphries object to the jury instruction
defining depraved-heart murder and distinguishing it from culpable-negligence manslaughter
on the grounds that it was an unclear misstatement of the law. Lacking such an objection,
we find this assignment of error is procedurally barred.
¶13.
Where a party fails to raise an objection at trial, he is limited on appeal to arguing that
the error constituted plain error, which requires the party to show that the trial court’s failure
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affected a substantial right. Waldon v. State, 749 So. 2d 262, 267 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Brown v. State, 690 So. 2d 276, 297 (Miss. 1996)). Humphries makes no such
showing. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2006) provides the
following definition of depraved heart murder:
(1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or
in any manner shall be murder in the following cases:
....
(b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and
evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any
premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual[.]
¶14.
The challenged jury instructions recited this statutory language almost verbatim. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has “consistently held that instructions in a criminal case which
follow the language of a pertinent statute are sufficient.” Crenshaw v. State, 520 So. 2d 131,
135 (Miss. 1988).
¶15.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-47 (Rev. 2006) defines manslaughter as
“[e]very other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of
another, and without authority of law[.]” The jury instructions properly defined culpable
negligence as “conduct which exhibits or manifests wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of human life, or such indifference to the consequences of the defendant’s acts under
the surrounding circumstances as to render his conduct tantamount to wilfulness.” In
addition to the fact that Humphries offered the instruction in question, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has endorsed a functionally identical jury instruction. See Shumpert v. State,
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935 So. 2d 962, 967 (¶14) (Miss. 2006) (defining manslaughter by culpable negligence as
“such gross negligence . . . as to evince a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of
human life, or such an indifference to the consequences of an act under the surrounding
circumstances as to render such conduct tantamount to willfulness”).
¶16.
While Humphries argues that the definitions for depraved-heart murder and culpable-
negligence manslaughter are so similar as to create confusion in the minds of jurors, the two
crimes are made distinct by the degree of mental culpability, an issue properly resolved by
a jury. Id. Jury instruction S-2 drew attention to this distinction, stating that depraved-heart
murder “involves a higher degree of recklessness from which malice or deliberate design .
. . may be implied.”
¶17.
Humphries correctly observes that the jury did not receive instructions on the elements
of manslaughter. He neglects to mention, however, that he failed to object to this omission
at trial and even withdrew his proposed jury instruction that would have provided these
elements. Moreover, a review of the record reflects that the offense of manslaughter was not
fairly raised by the evidence. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of depravedheart murder, the difference between depraved-heart murder and culpable negligence
manslaughter, and the meaning of culpable negligence. When the instructions are read as a
whole, as the law requires, the jury instructions given correctly and clearly summarized the
law; therefore, we find that no injustice resulted from the lack of a separate instruction
containing the elements of manslaughter. This assignment of error is without merit.
II.
Whether the evidence was legally sufficient.
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¶18.
Humphries alleges in his second assignment of error that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction for murder, arguing that: (1) the State presented no
evidence of premeditation; (2) Humphries did not intend to hurt Butler when he fired shots
in Butler’s direction; and (3) another person must have fired the fatal shot.
¶19.
In reviewing issues of legal sufficiency, the Court does not “ask itself whether it
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v.
State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
315 (1979)). Rather, the Court will “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational juror could have concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime were satisfied.” Readus v. State, 997 So. 2d
941, 944 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). “The proper remedy for insufficient
evidence is for the Court to reverse and render.” Id. (citation omitted). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find sufficient evidence in the
record to support Humphries’s conviction of murder.
¶20.
Several eyewitnesses testified that Humphries stepped out of a car, placed his hands
on the roof of the car, and pointed a gun in the direction of a group of people that included
Butler. The eyewitnesses fled from Humphries but heard bullets “whizzing” past them. No
one testified to seeing anyone else fire a gun; Humphries presented no evidence in support
of his theory of a second shooter. While Humphries argues there is no evidence of
premeditation and that he did not intend to harm Butler, the depraved-heart murder statute
does not require a premeditated design to kill or animus toward any particular individual.
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Humphries’s argument, quite simply, misses the point. Instead, the inquiry should focus on
whether there is sufficient evidence that Humphries’s actions were eminently dangerous to
others, evincing a depraved heart or without any regard for human life. Rational jurors were
free to conclude, despite Humphries’s asserted defenses, that: Humphries was the only
shooter; he shot into a fleeing crowd of people; and his bullet struck Butler. These inferences
were perfectly rational in light of the evidence presented at trial. Shooting into a crowd of
people is not only a possible form of depraved-heart murder, it is the classic example of
depraved-heart murder. See Readus, 997 So. 2d at 942-944 (¶¶4-11) (calling the act of
shooting into a crowd the “classic example of depraved[-]heart murder” and holding that
evidence was sufficient to support depraved-heart murder where the defendant fired shots
inside an apartment that contained several unarmed individuals, even though the defendant
claimed to have only intended to fire his gun in the air).
¶21.
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case. Examining the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational juror could find Humphries
guilty of depraved-heart murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Humphries may have
disputed where he pointed his gun when he shot and whether anyone else fired shots, factual
disputes raised at trial “are properly resolved by the jury and do not mandate a new trial.”
Jones v. State, 791 So. 2d 891, 895 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Benson v. State, 551
So. 2d 188, 193 (Miss. 1989)). This assignment of error is without merit.
¶22. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL
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COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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