Daniel Alan Brady v. Deborah C. Brady
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00254-COA
DANIEL ALAN BRADY
APPELLANT
v.
DEBORAH C. BRADY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/26/2007
HON. JAMES B. PERSONS
HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
FRANK P. WITTMANN
BLEWETT W. THOMAS
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
FINAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE
ENTERED AND REHABILITATIVE
ALIMONY GRANTED
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED: 08/04/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Daniel Alan Brady (“Daniel”) appeals the chancellor's judgment of divorce. Daniel
argues that the chancellor erred by awarding Deborah Brady (“Deborah”) rehabilitative
alimony because: (1) Deborah had returned to the workforce in a job that is comparable to
her job prior to the marriage, and (2) the alimony will not end until three years following the
sale of the marital home. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Daniel and Deborah were married on July 24, 2004, and separated on February 28,
2005. No children were born of this marriage. On March 24, 2005, Deborah filed her
complaint for divorce alleging adultery or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences.
¶3.
Prior to the marriage, Deborah owned a home, which became the marital home, and
four acres in Saucier, Mississippi. The property appraised for $225,000 in September 2004.
The only debt associated with the home was two years of unpaid property taxes.
¶4.
On August 3, 2004, Deborah executed a warranty deed conveying a joint tenancy in
the property and home to Daniel in order to secure a home equity loan. Both parties testified
that neither was capable of acquiring a loan individually due to credit problems; she had no
income, and he had no collateral. In September 2004, Daniel and Deborah mortgaged the
marital home for $100,000. In November 2004, the couple mortgaged the marital home for
the second time. The total mortgage on the home was $158,000, and the monthly payment
was $1,191.53. The couple used the borrowed money to buy four wheelers, a vehicle, horses,
a grandfather clock, and exotic birds. They also paid for some home improvements, medical
expenses, debts acquired prior to marriage (largely attributable to Daniel), and vacations. By
February 2005, all of the borrowed money had been spent.
¶5.
In February 2005, Daniel claimed that he was in love with a former girlfriend.
Deborah and Daniel both testified that Deborah arranged for the couple to attend marriage
counseling and that she begged Daniel to stay. However, Daniel moved to an apartment in
Diamondhead, Mississippi and established a relationship with his former girlfriend. Deborah
filed for divorce based upon Daniel’s adultery. After Deborah filed for divorce, but prior to
trial, the marital home was rendered uninhabitable by Hurricane Katrina.
¶6.
The chancellor granted Deborah a divorce based on the ground of adultery. The
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chancellor distributed the marital assets and ordered the sale of the marital home with the
proceeds to be used to pay off any remaining portion of the mortgage. Deborah was awarded
any remaining equity in the home, as compensation for the loss, and rehabilitative alimony
in the amount of $1,500 per month. The alimony was to begin on November 1, 2007, and
terminate thirty-six months after the month the real property was sold.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial
evidence unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So. 2d 623,
625-26 (¶8) (Miss. 2002).
ANALYSIS
1.
¶8.
Whether the chancellor erred by awarding Deborah rehabilitative
periodic alimony when she had returned to the workforce in a job that
is comparable to her job prior to the marriage.
Daniel claims that rehabilitative periodic alimony was inappropriate because Deborah
has a job that is comparable to her job prior to their marriage. Deborah responds that
rehabilitative periodic alimony is necessary because she no longer owns her home debt free
and is unable to support herself on her income.
¶9.
“‘Rehabilitative periodic alimony’ is not intended as an equalizer between the parties
but is for the purpose of allowing the less able party to start anew without being destitute in
the interim.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So. 2d 124, 130 (Miss. 1995). This Court has
affirmed similar awards where the less able party was already employed. In Wesson v.
Wesson, 818 So. 2d 1272, 1277-78 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), the wife’s rehabilitative
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periodic alimony award was affirmed even though she continued to work as a teacher's
assistant. In Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So. 2d 1021, 1028 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001),
we found that the amount of the husband’s income along with the disparity between the
incomes of the husband and wife justified rehabilitative periodic alimony to the wife so that
she might “rehabilitate herself in order to maintain the standard of living she has become
accustomed to or somewhere near it.”
¶10.
Upon our review of the record, we find that the chancellor was presented ample
evidence about the couple’s financial status before and after the divorce. Deborah left her
full-time job shortly before the marriage. She testified that Daniel wanted a stay-at-home
wife, but Daniel testified that he left the decision up to her.
¶11.
Following Hurricane Katrina, Deborah moved to San Antonio, Texas. She currently
earns $24,000 a year working for a newspaper and estimates her monthly living expenses
at $3,148. Daniel earns $83,949 a year working as a safety engineer for NASA and receives
$30,000 a year from a military pension.
¶12.
Prior to the marriage, Deborah did not have the burden of rent because she owned her
home debt free. After her seven-month marriage to Daniel, the home was encumbered by
a substantial mortgage. Without rehabilitative periodic alimony, Deborah will become
destitute. This is precisely the situation that rehabilitative periodic alimony is designed to
protect against.
¶13.
“Alimony awards are within the chancellor's discretion, and we may not reverse unless
we find the chancellor committed manifest error in his findings of fact and abused his
discretion." Graham v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 277, 280 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Daniel has
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not presented any evidence of the chancellor's abuse of discretion, and we have not found
any. This issue is without merit.
2.
¶14.
Whether the chancellor erred by awarding Deborah rehabilitative
alimony for three years following the sale of the marital home.
Daniel argues that the chancellor erred by conditioning termination of rehabilitative
periodic alimony upon the sale of the marital home because rehabilitative alimony is for a
fixed period of time, and it is unknown when the house will sell. Deborah argues that the
chancellor may terminate rehabilitative periodic alimony upon the occurrence of a specific
event.
¶15.
“Periodic alimony is for an indefinite period vesting as it comes due and modifiable.
Rehabilitative periodic alimony is modifiable as well, but is for a fixed period of time vesting
as it accrues.” Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 849 (¶15) (Miss. 2003) (emphasis added).
¶16.
The chancellor awarded Deborah rehabilitative periodic alimony “in the amount of
$1,500 per month, to begin [on] November 1, 2007, and [to terminate] 36 months after the
month the real property is sold as directed in this judgment.”
¶17.
Before we address the merits of the claim, we must address an inconsistency in the
chancellor’s opinion.
The chancellor provided the parties with an illustration of the
termination of the alimony, but in the illustration, the last month of alimony was due six
months after the house was sold. Because the chancellor uses thirty-six months multiple
times in his opinion, we use it as our fixed time period for consistency in the discussion of
this issue. However, we remand for clarification.
¶18.
The chancellor’s award was unconventional, but it was not an abuse of discretion.
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The rehabilitative periodic alimony is not for an indefinite period of time as Daniel suggests.
It will terminate thirty-six months after the month that the marital home is sold. Daniel
argues that Deborah has no incentive to sell the house and will benefit if the house is not
sold, because her rehabilitative periodic alimony will terminate once the house is sold. If
Deborah is purposely delaying the sale of the house as Daniel suggests, then he is free to
bring a motion of contempt against Deborah in chancery court. The record indicates that
Deborah is paying the real property taxes and insurance on the property.
¶19.
The chancellor’s opinion that Daniel profited from his seven-month marriage to
Deborah is supported by the record. Daniel left this short marriage without his substantial
premarital debt, returned to his previous girlfriend, and threatened to quit his job to avoid
paying the mortgage on the marital home. Daniel’s actions left unemployed Deborah without
any means to pay the mortgage and, after Hurricane Katrina, homeless with a large amount
of debt and no assets.
¶20.
We find that Daniel’s assertions of error are without merit, and the chancellor’s award
of rehabilitative periodic alimony is affirmed; however, we remand so the chancellor may
clarify the number of months which Daniel must pay rehabilitative periodic alimony upon
the sale of the marital home.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY
IS AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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