Emmitt Paige, Sr. v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00328-COA
EMMITT PAIGE, SR., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL WRONGFUL DEATH
BENEFICIARIES OF CHERRYL PAIGE,
DECEASED
APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/09/2008
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
HERBERT LEE
LEONARD MCCLELLAN
D. COLLIER GRAHAM
CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED FOR
DEFENDANT
AFFIRMED: 10/06/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Emmitt Paige, Sr., individually and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of
his wife, Cherryl Paige (“Cherryl”), filed a medical negligence and wrongful-death action
against Dr. William Harris and Mississippi Baptist Medical Center (“MBMC”) as a result of
Cherryl’s death following aortic-valve-replacement (“AVR”) surgery performed by Dr.
Harris. The circuit court granted MBMC’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims
against MBMC. Paige appeals claiming: (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in limiting
Paige’s right to discovery of MBMC’s corporate bylaws, medical-staff bylaws, and
organizational charts; (2) the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of Paige’s expert
witnesses; and (3) summary judgment was improperly granted. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On February 16, 2004, Cherryl was admitted into MBMC for AVR surgery performed
by Dr. Harris. Following surgery, Cherryl was transported to the cardiovascular-surgeryrecovery unit. At the time she arrived in recovery, her vital signs were stable. Minutes later,
Cherryl’s vital signs became unstable, and Dr. Harris was called immediately. He, along
with anesthesiologist Dr. Barry Aden, tried to determine the cause of Cherryl’s change in
condition. Dr. Harris decided to take Cherryl back to the operating room for exploratory
surgery. Cherryl ultimately died during this surgery.
¶3.
Paige filed suit against Dr. Harris and MBMC on March 4, 2005. He alleged that
MBMC owed Cherryl: a duty to provide competent physicians and surgical staff, a duty to
have sufficient staff in the cardiovascular-surgery-recovery unit, and a duty to exercise
reasonable care in hiring, retaining, supervising, and monitoring the work of Dr. Harris and
his surgical staff.
¶4.
During discovery, Paige requested a copy of MBMC’s corporate bylaws, medical-staff
bylaws, and organizational chart. MBMC argued that these documents were not relevant,
and MBMC refused to produce these documents. Paige filed a motion to compel. The
circuit court reviewed the requested documents in camera and determined that certain
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portions of the documents were relevant. Those portions determined by the judge to be
relevant were produced in discovery.
¶5.
Paige identified Dr. Calvin Ramsey, an internal medicine primary care physician from
Lexington, Mississippi, as an expert expected to testify that Cherryl died as a result of the
gross negligence of Dr. Harris and the staff of MBMC. Dr. Harris and MBMC moved to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Ramsey based on his lack of qualifications. The circuit court
determined that Dr. Ramsey lacked the education, and the experience or training in the
speciality of cardiovascular surgery; thus, the circuit court granted the motion to exclude Dr.
Ramsey’s testimony.
¶6.
Paige also designated as an expert Dr. Charles Bridges, a cardiovascular surgeon.
However, Dr. Bridges’s report focused solely on Dr. Harris’s negligence. The report gave
no opinion on the standard of care for MBMC or its staff. On October 15, 2007, MBMC
moved for summary judgment. Paige did not request additional time under Mississippi Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(f). Neither did Paige complain that he did not have an adequate
opportunity for discovery.
¶7.
On November 1, 2007, Paige submitted a supplemental report from Dr. Bridges.
MBMC moved to exclude this opinion as untimely because this was the first time Paige had
made any disclosure that Dr. Bridges might offer an opinion against MBMC. This filing
occurred long after the final deadline for expert-witness supplementation and only thirty-two
days before trial was set to begin.
¶8.
The circuit court held that the supplemental report from Dr. Bridges contained new
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opinions that violated the circuit court’s scheduling order and Rule 4.04 of the Uniform Rules
of Circuit and County Court and were unfairly prejudicial to MBMC. The motion to exclude
was granted. Because Paige failed to submit expert testimony that MBMC violated the
standard of care, there was no genuine issue of material fact presented. The circuit court
granted MBMC’s motion for summary judgment thereby disposing of all claims against
MBMC. Paige now appeals the circuit court’s ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9.
The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. PPG
Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So. 2d 47, 49 (¶8) (Miss. 2005) (citing Hurdle
v. Holloway, 848 So. 2d 183, 185 (¶4) (Miss. 2003)). It is well settled that "[a] summary
judgment motion is only properly granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists. The
moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists
within the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits.” M.R.C.P. 56(c).
¶10.
The supreme court has set forth the standard of review in medical-negligence actions
as follows:
Absent error so obvious that a layman could easily determine fault, expert
testimony is generally required to survive summary judgment and establish the
negligence of a physician. A trial judge's determination as to whether a
witness is qualified to testify as an expert is given the widest possible
discretion and that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion.
Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So. 2d 854, 856 (¶6) (Miss. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
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ANALYSIS
1.
¶11.
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in limiting Paige’s right
to discovery of MBMC’s corporate bylaws, medical-staff bylaws, and
organizational charts.
Paige argues that he should have been given full access to MBMC’s corporate bylaws,
medical-staff bylaws, and organizational charts during the discovery phase of this matter.
MBMC responds that the circuit court thoroughly reviewed the documents in camera, and
those portions of the documents which were deemed relevant to the case were disclosed to
Paige.
¶12.
Paige requested the documents from MBMC; however, MBMC objected to disclosure
on the basis that the documents were not relevant to the claims alleged in Paige’s complaint.
Paige filed a motion to compel, and after a hearing on the matter, the circuit court ordered
an in-camera review of the documents to determine whether there were “any provisions of
those documents that are relevant to the hiring, supervision and review of doctors to whom
staffing privileges are granted by the hospital and whether or not there are any provisions that
relate to patient care.” After the circuit court’s in-camera review of the documents, the
circuit court ordered that several sections of the documents be disclosed to Paige. MBMC
timely complied with this order.
¶13.
Paige claims that it was a gross discovery violation for MBMC to produce these
documents almost two years after the discovery requests were propounded. However, Paige
waited well over a year to file a motion to compel with the circuit court. It was his obligation
to bring this alleged discovery violation to the circuit court’s attention, and his delay
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substantially contributed to the length of time between the request and the circuit court’s
ruling.
¶14.
Further, Paige claims that the delay prejudiced his case because he did not have
sufficient time to obtain an expert in hospital administration between the time that he
received the relevant portions of the documents and the circuit court’s grant of the summary
judgment for MBMC. However, this claim is inconsistent with the proceedings before the
circuit court. On September 24, 2007, the circuit court ordered that the relevant portions of
the documents be disclosed to Paige. MBMC filed its motion for summary judgment on
October 15, 2007. Paige failed to make any request for an extension of time for discovery
before the circuit court’s November 29, 2007, ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
¶15.
In fact, “[p]ursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, the
[circuit] court has discretion to postpone consideration of a motion for summary judgment
and to order that discovery be completed.” Frye v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 915
So. 2d 486, 491 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). However, Paige failed to request further time
pursuant to Rule 56(f).
¶16.
Paige claims that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court abused its
discretion as to the discovery matters in this case.
However, we find this argument
unsubstantiated considering that Paige had all relevant medical records, had the ability to
depose all MBMC personnel involved in the treatment of Cherryl, was given multiple
extensions of time in order to designate medical experts, failed to file his motion to compel
in a timely fashion, and failed to request additional time before the circuit court ruled on the
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motion for summary judgment. His argument that, after years of discovery in this case, he
found himself unprepared to oppose MBMC’s motion for summary judgment is
unconvincing.
¶17.
“The control of discovery is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.” Holland v. Mayfield, 826 So. 2d 664, 673 (¶37) (Miss. 1999). We find no abuse of
discretion in the circuit court’s discovery rulings. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
2.
¶18.
Whether the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of Paige’s
expert witnesses.
The circuit court held that Paige failed to present expert testimony showing that
MBMC violated the standard of care; thus, MBMC’s motion for summary judgment was
granted. Paige contends that summary judgment was improper because the testimonies of
his expert witnesses – Dr. Ramsey and Dr. Bridges – were erroneously excluded by the
circuit court.
A.
¶19.
Dr. Ramsey
Dr. Ramsey is a board-certified internist practicing general medicine in Lexington,
Mississippi. Paige stated in his expert disclosure that “Dr. Ramsey is expected to testify that
Cherryl Paige died because of gross negligence and recklessness on the part of Dr. William
Harris and others, including the medical staff at the Baptist hospital, the nurses, the surgical
technicians and the [a]nesthesiologist.” Dr. Harris, who performed Cherryl’s surgery, is a
thoracic surgeon.
¶20.
MBMC joined Dr. Harris’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ramsey based on
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Dr. Ramsey’s lack of qualifications as a surgeon. Dr. Ramsey has no training in surgery of
any type, including thoracic surgery. There was no evidence presented that Dr. Ramsey has
ever observed or supervised the members of a surgical team such as the team who assisted
Dr. Harris. Based on Dr. Ramsey’s lack of qualifications as a thoracic surgeon, the circuit
court granted MBMC’s motion to exclude Dr. Ramsey’s testimony.
¶21.
Paige argues that Dr. Ramsey was a qualified expert under the requirements of Rule
702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which states that:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
MBMC responds that the circuit court, in its role as gatekeeper, had wide discretion to
exclude Dr. Ramsey’s testimony. See Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31,
34 (Miss. 2003) (citing Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 342 (Miss. 1999) (stating “the
admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”)
¶22.
To be accepted under Rule 702 as an expert in an medical malpractice case, it is not
necessary that the proposed expert be of the same specialty as the physician who is the
subject of the testimony. Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So. 2d 951, 957 (¶13) (Miss. 2007).
However, it is required that the expert show “[s]atisfactory familiarity with the specialty of
the defendant doctor.” Id.
¶23.
The supreme court recently decided this very issue in McDonald v. Memorial Hospital
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at Gulfport, 8 So. 3d 175 (Miss. 2009). There, McDonald designated a board-certified
pathologist and psychiatrist to testify about the standard of care for a gastroenterologist. The
supreme court noted that:
[the expert] has never practiced in the field of gastroenterology, and since
medical school has not performed any procedures in this field other than one
colonoscopy in 1976. Further, [he] has never admitted a patient to an
acute-care facility other than a psychiatric facility, and he has not performed
an EGD, the procedure Mr. McDonald was undergoing, since medical school
in the 1960s.
Id. at 181 (¶16). Thus, the expert was not familiar with the standard of care to which a
gastroenterologist is held. Id.
¶24.
Here, as in McDonald, Dr. Ramsey is not familiar with the standard of care to which
a thoracic surgeon performing AVR surgery is held. Dr. Ramsey is not a surgeon, nor has
he performed or participated in the type of thoracic surgery like that Dr. Harris performed
on Cherryl. Paige claims to have offered Dr. Ramsey not as a surgical expert but as an expert
testifying as to the standard of care of the members of the surgical team. However, there is
no basis in the record to show that Dr. Ramsey is familiar with the requirements of a surgical
team because he is an expert in internal medicine, not surgery.
¶25.
We find that the circuit court was correct in excluding Dr. Ramsey’s testimony
because Dr. Ramsey lacks the required familiarity with Dr. Harris’s specialty in thoracic
surgery.
B.
¶26.
Dr. Bridges
Dr. Bridges is a board-certified cardiovascular surgeon who was timely designated as
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one of Paige’s expert witnesses. However, his proposed testimony was relevant only to the
claims against Dr. Harris, and there was no mention of the standard of care or any resultant
breach by MBMC or its personnel. The deadline for expert-witness disclosures was extended
numerous times by the circuit court during the two years of discovery in this matter.
However, there was no indication that Dr. Bridges would offer testimony that MBMC
breached its standard of care.
¶27.
This case was set for trial on December 3, 2007, and the deadline to make final
supplemental expert disclosures was extended to September 7, 2007. On October 15, 2007,
MBMC moved for summary judgment. On November 1, 2007, just over one month before
trial, Paige submitted a supplemental report from Dr. Bridges that, for the first time, included
opinion testimony regarding MBMC’s standard of care.
¶28.
MBMC moved to exclude this testimony as a violation of both the circuit court’s
deadline of September 7, 2007, and Rule 4.04A of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County
Court which requires that all expert disclosures must be made at least sixty days before trial
absent special circumstances. Paige neither presented any special circumstances, nor did he
request additional time.
¶29.
We find that circuit court was correct in holding that this disclosure was untimely and
caused prejudice to MBMC which would not have had adequate time before trial to review
the evidence.
¶30.
As the supreme court held in McDonald: “as a general rule, expert testimony must be
used in proving the elements of medical negligence. Absent expert testimony, there is no
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triable issue of fact with regard to the alleged medical negligence.” McDonald, 8 So. 3d at
182 (¶19). Because Paige failed to timely provide expert testimony regarding the standard
of care of MBMC, there is no issue of fact as to the alleged medical negligence of MBMC.
Accordingly, this issue is without merit, and the circuit court’s order granting MBMC’s
motion for summary judgment is affirmed.
¶31. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON,
JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. BARNES AND MAXWELL, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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