Kelli Slaughter Burch v. Tina Florane Pomes
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CP-00753-COA
KELLI SLAUGHTER BURCH
APPELLANT
v.
TINA FLORANE POMES
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
03/03/2008
HON. R.I. PRICHARD III
PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
KELLI SLAUGHTER BURCH (PRO SE)
TINA FLORANE POMES (PRO SE)
CIVIL - CONTRACT
JUDGMENT FOR POMES IN THE
AMOUNT OF $500
AFFIRMED - 08/04/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Kelli Slaughter Burch and Tina Florane Pomes entered into a verbal agreement
whereby Pomes would assume the notes on Burch’s mobile home until Pomes could arrange
financing for an outright purchase. Claiming that Pomes was behind on her payments, Burch
filed an eviction notice in the Justice Court of Pearl River County. The justice court judge
awarded Burch $1,468.96 in damages and ordered the removal of the mobile home from
Pomes’s property.
¶2.
Pomes filed an appeal in the Circuit Court of Pearl River County. The trial court
appointed a special master to hear the case, and a bench trial was held on January 25, 2008.
The special master found that, in light of Pomes’s payments made to Burch, the judgment of
the justice court should be partially set aside. The special master found that Burch should
only be entitled to court costs, some rent, constable fees, and partial removal fees. Burch was
awarded $500. The special master also determined that Pomes was entitled to $1,000, but
the judgment was reduced by Burch’s award of $500. Consequently, Pomes was awarded
$500. The trial court adopted the special master’s report and found that Pomes was entitled
to a net judgment of $500 with interest at 8% per annum.
¶3.
Burch now appeals, asserting three issues which can better be addressed as one:
whether the trial court erred in awarding Pomes a judgment of $500.
DISCUSSION
¶4.
We first note that both parties in this case are representing themselves. Our supreme
court has held that “[p]ro se parties should be held to the same rules of procedure and
substantive law as represented parties.” Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d
112, 118 (Miss. 1987). However, the supreme court has also held that we will “credit not so
well-pleaded allegations so that a [pro se] prisoner’s meritorious complaint may not be lost
because inartfully drafted.” Ivy v. Merchant, 666 So. 2d 445, 449 (Miss. 1995). Our courts
also allow the same deference to pro se litigants in other civil actions. Zimmerman v. Three
Rivers Planning & Dev. Dist., 747 So. 2d 853, 856 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶5.
As a corollary to the pro se representation in this case, we reiterate that “[i]t is the duty
of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial court’s judgment
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by demonstrating some reversible error.” Edlin v. State, 533 So. 2d 403, 410 (Miss. 1988);
see Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So. 2d 374, 380 (Miss. 1996) (holding that the appellate
court does not consider unsupported assignments of error).
¶6.
In her brief, Burch has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Burch has simply listed
three issues and fails to expand on these issues with any facts, exhibits, or law to support her
arguments. Pomes’s reply brief is similar in this regard.
¶7.
Regardless of the shortcomings of the briefs, we have reviewed the record “for any
self-evident error for which no authority would be necessary.” Kellar v. Miss. Employment
Sec. Comm’n, 756 So. 2d 840, 842 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Finding none, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
¶8.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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