Edward Bourgeois v. Barbara Parker
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00693-COA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
BARBARA A. PARKER, DECEASED: EDWARD
BOURGEOIS, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
ESTATE OF BARBARA PARKER AND
BARBARA SLOANE ROTOLO,
ADMINISTRATRIX
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
3/26/2008
HON. JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
PEARL RIVER COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
JACK PARSONS
TADD PARSONS
NANCE FITZPATRICK STOKES
CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING
BOURGEOIS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
AFFIRMED - 7/21/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Barbara Parker (Barbara) and her husband, Larry Parker (Larry), owned a plot of land
and a mobile home as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Larry died in a work-
related accident, and Barbara received his workers’ compensation benefits.1 Barbara also
received money from a lawsuit related to Larry’s accident and fee simple title to the subject
property.
¶2.
Shortly after Larry’s death, Barbara began a romantic relationship with Edward
Bourgeois (Edward), who moved into Barbara’s mobile home. Barbara and Edward lived
together unmarried for approximately fifteen years until Barbara died intestate on November
23, 2005. In 1992, Barbara and Edward opened a joint checking account out of which all
living expenses were paid. In 1995, Barbara began building a house on her land. Barbara
invested between $60,000 and $70,000 in building materials, and Edward withdrew $20,000
from his retirement account to invest in the home. Edward testified that all building expenses
were withdrawn from the joint checking account, but he failed to produce receipts to
document the expenses at trial. Edward further testified that he and Barbara had an oral
agreement that in exchange for investing his funds into building the house, he would have
the right to continue to live in the house after Barbara’s death until his own death, at which
time the home would pass to Barbara’s children.
¶3.
Barbara’s illnesses, which included a kidney disorder and cancer, spanned over the
last six years of her life. Conflicting testimony arose during trial as to the role Edward
played in Barbara’s life toward the end of her battle with cancer.
¶4.
Prior to her death, Barbara had closed the joint checking account and split the money
evenly between her and Edward. Barbara also revoked a prior power of attorney she had
1
The record does not contain the exact date of Larry’s death, but it indicates he died
sometime in 1990.
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given to Edward. She also left a note indicating she wanted her estate to repay Edward for
the money he had invested in her home. The note instructed the estate to pay Edward
$20,000 from a certificate of deposit. This particular certificate of deposit contained
approximately $41,000 with terms stating that upon Barbara’s death, Edward would receive
all the funds. Since the payment terms of the certificate of deposit had not been changed
prior to Barbara’s death, Edward received all the money from the certificate of deposit.
Subsequently, in hopes of continuing to live in Barbara’s home, Edward approached
Barbara’s children and asked if he could remain in the home in exchange for $20,000. The
heirs refused. Still living in Barbara’s home, Edward began locking the children out of the
home which prevented them from accessing Barbara’s papers. When Edward denied the
children access to Barbara’s ashes, the children sought to have Edward evicted from the
home.
¶5.
On April 14, 2006, Edward filed a probate claim in the Pearl River County Chancery
Court against Barbara’s estate claiming he was entitled to equitable relief in the form of a
constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of Barbara’s real property. After a trial, the
chancellor denied Edward’s claims, finding that he had failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was entitled to a constructive trust over Barbara’s real estate.
Edward filed a motion for reconsideration, which the chancellor denied. Edward now
appeals, asserting the following issues: (1) the chancellor erred in finding that he did not
establish a constructive trust, and (2) the chancellor erred in finding that he was not entitled
to reimbursement for personal property currently retained by Barbara’s estate. Although
Edward’s brief lists two issues, he only briefs this Court on the first issue. Thus, our
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discussion will be limited to whether the chancellor erred in finding that Edward did not
establish a constructive trust. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
This Court will not disturb findings of the chancellor unless the chancellor was
manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Tinnin v. First
United Bank of Miss., 570 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Miss. 1990). Where there is substantial
evidence to support the chancellor’s findings, this Court is without the authority to disturb
his conclusions, although this Court might have found otherwise as an original matter. In re
Estate of Harris, 539 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Miss. 1989). The applicability of a constructive
trust is a “pure question” of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo. Davidson v.
Davidson, 667 So. 2d 616, 620 (Miss. 1995).
DISCUSSION
¶7.
Edward argues that the chancellor erred in finding that he did not establish a
constructive trust. A constructive trust arises in order to prevent unjust enrichment by a
person gaining property that rightfully belongs to someone else. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.
2d 1057, 1064 (¶24) (Miss. 2000). The supreme court has defined a constructive trust as
follows:
A constructive trust is one that arises by operation of law against one who, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission
of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or
questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience,
either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1034 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Sojourner
4
v. Sojourner, 247 Miss. 342, 353, 153 So. 2d 803, 807 (1963)). A chancellor may “construct
a trust for the benefit of the party whose confidence has been abused.” Davidson, 667 So.
2d at 620. The existence of a constructive trust must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. McNeil, 753 So. 2d at 1064 (¶25).
¶8.
In support of his argument, Edward claims that a confidential relationship existed
between himself and Barbara, and he relied upon that relationship and Barbara’s promises
when he provided funds with which to build the house. We do note that, according to
Edward’s testimony, he withdrew approximately $20,000 from a retirement account to put
into the construction of the house. However, Edward stated that the funds were withdrawn
in either 2000 or 2001, well after construction was finished and they were living in the house.
For a “confidential relationship to exist between two persons, there must be a relation in
which one person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence upon the other.” Tatum
v. Barrentine, 797 So. 2d 223, 230 (¶32) (Miss. 2001). The chancellor determined that there
was absolutely no evidence that Barbara was in a position to exercise a dominant influence
upon Edward. Rather, Edward’s testimony attempted to portray Barbara as weak, ill, and in
need of constant care. The chancellor found that Edward knew their relationship was ending
and made no effort to get Barbara to execute a document leaving him a life estate.
Furthermore, the testimony concerning Barbara’s intent to leave Edward a life estate was
conflicting at best. We find that the chancellor did not err in finding that Edward failed to
prove the existence of a constructive trust by clear and convincing evidence.
¶9.
Edward also claims that he spent in excess of $150,000 on the construction of the
home and should be reimbursed. Edward included a list of expenses, but he produced no
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receipts. Edward also admitted that many of the expenses were paid from his and Barbara’s
joint account. Finding no evidence of a constructive trust, we cannot find that Edward is
entitled to reimbursement for expenses relating to the construction of the home.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEARL RIVER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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