City of Vicksburg, Mississippi v. Anthony Lane
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00287-COA
CITY OF VICKSBURG, MISSISSIPPI AND
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CITY OF
VICKSBURG
APPELLANTS
v.
ANTHONY LANE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEE
01/15/2008
HON. ISADORE W. PATRICK JR.
WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
NANCY DAVIS THOMAS
BOBBY R. ROBINSON
RAMEL L. COTTON
CIVIL - OTHER
AFFIRMED CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION’S DECISION AND
AWARDED ADDITIONAL RELIEF
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
AND RENDERED IN PART – 06/02/2009
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On July 19, 2006, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Vicksburg (Board)
terminated Anthony Lane from the Vicksburg Police Department (VPD). Lane appealed the
Board’s decision to the Vicksburg Civil Service Commission (Commission), and the
Commission upheld the termination. Lane then appealed the Commission’s decision to the
Warren County Circuit Court, which also upheld the termination. However, the circuit court
also found that Lane’s July 22, 2005, suspension was issued because he was indicted for
criminal charges. The circuit court further found that because Lane was acquitted of those
charges, the Board should issue him back pay.
¶2.
Aggrieved, the Board appeals and asserts: (1) that the circuit court erred in
determining that Lane’s July 22, 2005, suspension was “implicitly affirmed” by the
Commission and (2) that the circuit court erred in awarding Lane back pay.
¶3.
We find merit to both issues raised by the Board. Therefore, we reverse and render
that portion of the judgment of the circuit court finding that the Commission implicitly
affirmed Lane’s suspension and awarding back pay.1
FACTS
¶4.
Lane was employed with the VPD and assigned to work at the Vicksburg High School
as a resource officer. The VPD was informed that Lane had been involved with a female
student at the school. The VPD investigated the matter, and Lane admitted to having a
sexual relationship with the student. On May 12, 2005, the VPD sent Lane a letter informing
him that the Board was going to convene at a future date to address the VPD’s
recommendation to suspend him for twenty days without pay for conduct unbecoming an
officer.
The letter further stated that Lane had a right to be present and/or have
representation at the Board hearing. Lane chose not to appear. The Board accepted the
recommendation of the VPD and ordered the suspension. Lane served the twenty-day
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Lane did not file a cross-appeal challenging the portion of the judgment upholding
his termination.
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suspension and returned to the VPD.
¶5.
On July 21, 2005, Lane was indicted for sexual battery against a child, and on July 22,
2005, the Board sent Lane a letter suspending him indefinitely without pay because of the
indictment. The letter stated that the suspension was to stay in effect “until the court issue[d]
a decision.” The letter further stated that if Lane desired to appeal the Board’s decision, he
must do so within ten days of the letter’s date. Lane did not appeal.
¶6.
On June 12, 2006, Lane was acquitted of the charge. Soon after his acquittal, he
petitioned for reinstatement to the VPD. The Board’s response was to set a pre-termination
hearing instead.
Thereafter, the Board terminated Lane on the grounds of “conduct
unbecoming an officer, loss of public trust and respect, and violation of his oath as a police
officer.”
¶7.
Lane appealed the termination to the Commission, which affirmed. Lane then
appealed to the Warren County Circuit Court. In the circuit court, Lane argued, as he had
done before the Commission, that his termination was violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The circuit court agreed
with the Commission’s decision that double jeopardy did not apply and affirmed the
Commission’s decision, upholding Lane’s termination.
¶8.
Additionally, the circuit court addressed Lane’s July 22, 2005, suspension even
though only the termination decision had been appealed. The court’s order stated in pertinent
part:
The Court now addresses the second suspension of [Lane] on July 22, 2005.
Said suspension was without pay and was implicitly affirmed by the order of
the Civil Service Commission.
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The second suspension was brought due to [Lane] being indicted by Warren
County Grand Jury. The suspension letter of July 22, 2005 stated in part that
“. . . the Board of Mayor and Alderman met in a Special Call Meeting on
Thursday[,] July 21, 2005 and voted to suspend [Lane] indefinitely without
pay because of the charges filed against [Lane]. [Lane’s] suspension will stay
in effect until the Court issues a decision . . . .”
It is unquestioned that the charges referred to in said letter were the criminal
charges in the Circuit Court of Warren County. Since a jury of Warren County
after a trial, found [Lane] not guilty and a judgment of acquittal was rendered
by the Circuit Court, then the suspension without pay was without merit.
[Lane] having been acquitted of the criminal charges that he was suspended for
should have been reimbursed for said time that he was suspended without pay.
That time specifically being from July 22, 2005 (date of second suspension
letter) until the date of July 19, 2006 (date of termination letter).
(Emphasis added).
¶9.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be addressed in the analysis and discussion of the
issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
¶10.
The civil service commission reviews the employment decisions of a city to remove,
suspend, demote, or discharge a civil service employee. Miss. Code Ann. § 21-31-23 (Rev.
2007). A commission is authorized to reverse a city’s disciplinary action if it was made for
political reasons, religious reasons, or was not made in good faith for cause. Id. Decisions
of the commission are appealed to the circuit court of the county within which the
municipality is located. Id. On appeal, the circuit court’s standard of review is limited to
determining whether the act of the commission was or was not made in good faith for cause.
Id. In City of Jackson v. Froshour, 530 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Miss. 1988) (quoting City of
Meridian v. Hill, 447 So. 2d 641, 643 (Miss. 1984)), our supreme court stated the appellate
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court’s standard of review as follows:
On appeal here, the question before [the appellate court] is whether or not the
action of the Civil Service Commission was in good faith for cause.
Intertwined with this question is whether or not there was substantial evidence
before the Civil Service Commission to support its order and whether it is
arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and capricious.
¶11.
Here, the Board argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the July 22, 2005,
suspension of Lane was “implicitly affirmed” by the Commission because the July 22, 2005,
suspension was not appealed to the Commission as required by law. We find this argument
persuasive.
¶12.
Section 21-31-23 states that “[n]o person in the classified civil service . . . shall be
removed, suspended, demoted or discharged, or any combination thereof, except for cause
. . . .” The statute further describes the appellate process afforded to a civil service employee
when he has been removed, suspended, demoted, or discharged by his employer. The statute
states in pertinent part:
Any person so removed, suspended, demoted, discharged or combination
thereof may, within ten (10) days from the time of such disciplinary action, file
with the commission a written demand for an investigation, whereupon the
commission shall conduct such investigation. The investigation shall be
confined to the determination of the question of whether such disciplinary
action was or was not made for political or religious reasons and was or was
not made in good faith for cause. . . .
****
The findings of the commission shall be conclusive and binding unless either
the accused or the municipality shall, within thirty (30) days from the date of
the entry of such judgment or order on the minutes of the commission and
notification to the accused and the municipality, appeal to the circuit court of
the county within which the municipality is located.
****
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The said circuit court shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine such
appeal. However, such hearing shall be confined to the determination of
whether the judgment or order of removal, discharge, demotion, suspension
or combination thereof made by the commission, was or was not made in good
faith for cause, and no appeal to such court shall be taken except upon such
ground or grounds.
(Emphasis added).
¶13.
The only disciplinary action that Lane appealed was his termination, which occurred
on July 19, 2006. Pursuant to section 21-31-23, the circuit court was confined strictly to a
determination of whether the termination was made in good faith for cause. Lane did not
appeal the suspension that was given him on July 22, 2005. Had he desired to appeal that
suspension, he was required to do so within ten days of July 22, 2005. Further, the July 22,
2005, suspension was not mentioned anywhere in Lane’s notice of appeal of his termination.
It follows then that, according to section 21-31-23, the only matter that could have come
before the circuit court on appeal was the termination. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to address the July 22 suspension and, therefore, erred in finding that the
Commission “implicitly affirmed” the suspension.
¶14.
Next, the Board argues that the circuit court erred in ordering back pay to Lane. As
previously stated, the circuit court determined that the July 22 suspension was based on the
outcome of Lane’s criminal trial, and since the trial resulted in an acquittal, the suspension
lacked merit. However, since Lane did not appeal that suspension, the circuit court did not
have jurisdiction to address any consequences which may have flowed from it.
¶15.
Since the circuit court addressed the suspension, notwithstanding its lack of
jurisdiction, we briefly address this issue also to dispel any notion that the Board owes Lane
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back pay. In deciding that Lane was entitled to back pay, the circuit court heavily relied on
the following language from the letter suspending Lane:
The Board of Mayor and Alderman met in a Special Call Meeting on Thursday
July 21, 2005 and voted to suspend you indefinitely without pay because of the
charges filed against you. Your suspension will stay in effect until the Court
issues a decision . . . .
(Emphasis added). After noting the language quoted above, the circuit court stated:
It is unquestioned that the charges referred to in said letter were the criminal
charges in the Circuit Court of Warren County. Since a jury of Warren County
after a trial, found [Lane] not guilty and a judgment of acquittal was rendered
by the Circuit Court, then the suspension without pay was without merit.
However, the circuit court failed to address the remaining contents of the letter. The
suspension letter further stated that “the Vicksburg Police Department will review your
employment status with them once your legal issues have been resolved.” From this
language, it cannot be concluded that the Board promised Lane that he would be given back
pay or reinstated if he were acquitted. The only promise made to Lane was that his
employment status would be “reviewed” after the case was over. Upon a review of his
employment status, the Board decided that because of additional disclosures made during the
trial, Lane’s employment should be terminated.
CONCLUSION
¶16.
We find that the decision of the Commission was made in good faith for cause and
that there was substantial evidence before the Commission to support its order. Therefore,
we reverse and render that portion of the judgment of the circuit court finding that the
Commission implicitly affirmed Lane’s suspension and awarding back pay.
¶17.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
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AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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