Willie Prater v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00489-COA
WILLIE PRATER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
08/03/2006
HON. LEE J. HOWARD
OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GEORGE T. HOLMES
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
FORREST ALLGOOD
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF CAPITAL MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
AFFIRMED: 05/05/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On August 3, 2006, Willie Prater was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced
to life in the custody the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without the
possibility of parole. Aggrieved, Prater appeals arguing the following: (1) the trial court
erred in excluding a defense witness; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3)
the State made inflammatory remarks during closing argument; (4) the trial court erred in
allowing opinion testimony about canine olfactory evidence; (5) he was entitled to a lesserincluded-offense instruction; (6) the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (7)
his statements made to the Starkville Police Department and Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s
Department should have been suppressed; and (8) he was not mentally competent to stand
trial. Finding no error, we affirm Prater’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2.
At approximately 8:45 a.m. on August 20, 2001, Prater, Devail Hudson, James Paster,
Destiny Moore, “Little Mark,” 1 Derrick Turner, and Marcus Evans entered the home of
seventy-seven-year-old Wynetta Miller (Miller) through the unlocked garage entrance to the
house, shortly after her husband, Dalton Miller, left to run daily errands. Prater and his
partners in crime ransacked the Millers’ home and carried away personal property and
money. After leaving the home, Hudson allegedly returned and set fires in six different
locations in the home. Emergency personnel, who arrived at the Millers’ home in response
to a call triggered by the smoke alarms, found Miller unconscious with severe head injuries.
Later that day, Miller died from these injuries.
¶3.
On January 6, 2002, Bentoire Riley went to the Starkville Police Department and
confessed to being the lookout man for the men who allegedly robbed and assaulted Miller.
Riley testified that on August 20, 2001, he approached a group of men, which included
Hudson, “Little Mark,” Paster, Moore, Turner, Evans, and Prater, on the corner near the
Millers’ home adjacent to the trailer park where some of the men lived. Riley stated that the
1
The record does not contain any further information regarding Little Mark’s true
identity.
2
men were planning to rob and kill Miller if she caught them in her home. Riley claimed that
the men entered the home, took personal property and cash belonging to Miller, exited the
home, and scattered. Riley stated that Hudson went back inside the Millers’ home; minutes
later, Riley saw smoke coming from the house.
¶4.
On August 20, 2001, Prater was questioned by the Starkville Police Department
regarding his involvement in the offense.
Prater denied any involvement and was
subsequently released. On February 19, 2002, Prater was questioned again by the Starkville
Police Department. According to a written statement attributed to Prater, he met Hudson,
Riley, Moore, Evans, Paster, Turner, and Joshua Williams 2 on the corner and discussed plans
to rob the Millers’ home. Prater stated that he agreed to be the lookout man while the other
men went inside the house. Allegedly, Prater gave a similar written statement to the
Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department on February 19, 2002. Prater denies that he made
these statements to the authorities.
¶5.
In July 2002, an Oktibbeha County grand jury indicted Prater for capital murder. In
response to defense counsel’s motion to determine Prater’s competency, the trial court
ordered a mental evaluation of Prater on August 2, 2002. The mental evaluation was
performed by the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield, and a report was filed with the
court on March 7, 2003. Dr. Charles Harris and Dr. Reb McMichael stated that their
evaluations revealed that Prater was competent to stand trial.
¶6.
On February 1, 2005, the morning of trial, as a result of Prater’s disruptive and bizarre
2
The record does not contain any further information regarding Joshua Williams
beyond Prater’s written statement.
3
behavior before the venire panel during jury selection, the trial court declared a mistrial and
ordered Prater to undergo an emergency mental evaluation. In a report filed on May 11,
2005, Drs. McMichael, John Montgomery, and Paul Deal were divided in their opinions as
to Prater’s competency to stand trial. As a result, the trial court ordered Prater to be retained
for additional inpatient evaluation and treatment. After an additional three months of
treatment and evaluation, the staff was still divided. On December 12, 2005, after more than
fourteen months of treatment and evaluation, the mental health personnel at the State
Hospital unanimously decided that Prater was competent to stand trial.
¶7.
On August 1, 2006, Prater was tried for capital murder. On August 3, 2006, Prater
was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the MDOC without
the possibility of parole. On an ore tenus motion, Prater requested additional time to file all
post-trial motions. On September 7, 2006, the trial court granted Prater additional time to
file an out-of-time motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or,
alternatively, a new trial motion. In addition, because Prater’s trial counsel had been
suspended from the practice of law, the trial court appointed new counsel to represent Prater
in perfecting his case on appeal. The trial court directed the court reporter to produce
transcripts of all motion hearings and the trial to the new defense counsel on or before
February 28, 2007. On March 7, 2008, Prater filed a motion for a JNOV or, alternatively,
new trial. On March 10, 2008, the trial court denied Prater’s motion for JNOV or, in the
alternative, a new trial. Feeling aggrieved, Prater appeals his conviction and sentence.
DISCUSSION
I.
Exclusion of Defense Witness
4
¶8.
On the morning of trial, the State was given a list of seven witnesses by the defense.
That list contained two witnesses about whom the prosecution had no prior knowledge.
Tommy Scales, one of the two unknown witnesses, was to be called as an alibi witness. The
trial court held a hearing on the failure to timely disclose the witness list. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the trial court ruled that because the defense had failed to abide by the rules
of discovery and provide Scales’s name to the State in a timely manner prior to trial, Scales
would not be allowed to testify. The trial court held that defense counsel’s non-disclosure
of Scales as an alibi witness was intentional and done with an intent to obtain a tactical
advantage.
¶9.
Prater claims that Scales’s name was not given prior to trial because his defense
counsel had just learned about Scales a few days before trial and discovery was
supplemented as soon as possible. Prater asserts that the State cannot claim that it was
prejudiced or surprised by an alibi witness because there were other witnesses who could be
considered as possible alibi witnesses. The State asserts that Prater was aware of Scales’s
existence as an alibi witness prior to trial because Scales recounted details of the murder to
Jackie Bolton, an investigator who began working for the defense counsel shortly after the
murder. The State contends that it was prejudiced by the lack of disclosure because had
Scales’s name been timely disclosed, the State would have had sufficient time to make an
effort to conclusively determine the veracity of the testimony of the witness.
¶10.
“In reviewing rulings of a trial court regarding matters of evidence, relevancy and
discovery violations, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Sims v. State, 928 So.
2d 984, 986 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
5
¶11.
According to Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 9.05, if, prior to or during
trial, a party learns of an additional witness and fails to timely disclose that information to
the opposing party, the court may either (1) grant a continuance; (2) limit further discovery
of the party who failed to comply; (3) find the attorney who failed to comply in contempt;
or (4) exclude the testimony of the undisclosed witness. The supreme court has held that:
[I]f the trial court finds that the omission [of notice of an alibi witness] was
willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would
minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce
rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Compulsory Process Clause to simply exclude the witness’[s] testimony.
Coleman v. State, 749 So. 2d 1003, 1009 (¶15) (Miss. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
¶12.
In the case at bar, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of
the jury. During this hearing, defense counsel made a proffer of Scales’s testimony. Scales
testified that he saw Prater at approximately 8:00 a.m. on August 3, 2006, getting off the bus
at the Discovery House and later between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. in the parking lot of the
Discovery House. Scales also testified that he recalled disclosing this information to Bolton
five or six years prior to trial. After hearing Scales’s testimony and arguments from the
attorneys, the trial court reviewed the court file and found that Scales was served by Bolton
with a subpoena on July 28, 2006. The subpoena was returned and marked filed by the clerk
on July 31, 2006. The trial court ruled that the defense counsel had knowledge of this alibi
witness through his employee and that the failure to timely disclose the witness list was
willful and an attempt to give the defense a tactical advantage over the State.
¶13.
Because Prater did not properly disclose the witness to the State, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding Scales as an alibi witness. Therefore, this assignment of
6
error is without merit.
II.
¶14.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Prater alleges that his defense counsel was ineffective because: (1) he failed to timely
disclose two witnesses resulting in the court’s exclusion of Scales as an alibi witness; (2) he
failed to interview available witnesses or investigate the physical aspects of the case; and (3)
he was unfamiliar with the quality and substance of his investigator’s work. Prater claims
he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance because Scales’s testimony would
have impeached the credibility of the State’s key witness, Riley, and supported the challenge
to his alleged confession. The State contends that the disclosure of witnesses at the time of
trial was a strategic decision and did not constitute a deficient performance. The State claims
that on previous occasions both the defense counsel and the State had overlooked discovery
violations of this nature as a professional courtesy. Also, the State asserts that Prater has
failed to show that the alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense.
¶15.
“The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that, where the record cannot support an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, the appropriate conclusion is to deny
relief, preserving the defendant’s right to argue the same issue through a petition for postconviction relief.” Wilcher v. State, 863 So. 2d 776, 825 (¶171) (Miss. 2003). This issue will
not be addressed on direct appeal because the record is incomplete to decide Prater’s
argument of ineffective assistance of counsel. Prater may raise this argument in a timely
filed and appropriate post-conviction relief proceeding, if he so chooses.
III.
¶16.
Inflammatory Closing Argument
During its closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statements:
7
Statement 1:
And you’re told, ladies and gentlemen, one of the first things, that – and I find
this so disingenuous, you’re told that, ladies and gentlemen, that people get
convicted of crimes that they didn’t commit. And I’ve had those. I’ve had
those. I tried a woman in Columbus for killing her baby. The case got
appealed to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refused to allow some of the
evidence that was introduced in the first trial in at a second trial. The second
jury never got to hear that evidence and they found her not guilty. Does that
mean that she is subjective[ly] not guilty. No, it doesn’t. What it means is,
that the second jury didn’t hear the same case the first jury did.
Statement 2:
We have long held in the law that [a] man’s home is his castle. The one refuge
you have from the world that we spoke of, ladies and gentlemen. And on
August 20, 2001, [the] castle was breached and [the owner] slaughtered and
pillage fall [sic] on its heels. And which of us can say we’re immuned [sic]
from that? This Defendant has admitted that he had a hand in that horror, that
means something. And now the question becomes, whatever [sic] are you
going to do about it? You take the jury instructions, you find the facts, that’s
your job. And what all [sic] the State of Mississippi ask[s] of you is justice
that’s all. Nothing more and I hope nothing less.
¶17.
Prater asserts that both statements were inflammatory; thus, he argues that he was
denied a fair trial. Prater argues that the State’s reference to another case and to the appellate
process in closing argument in the first statement violated the rule recognized in Wiley, which
held that “a prosecutor’s argument which informed the jury that their verdict was subject to
a right of appeal” is reversible error. Wiley v. State, 449 So. 2d 756, 762 (Miss. 1984) (citing
Howell v. State, 411 So. 2d 772, 776 (Miss. 1982)). Prater contends that the State’s second
statement constituted a forbidden send-a-message argument condemned by the supreme court
in Payton v. State, 785 So. 2d 267, 270 (¶11) (Miss. 1998).
¶18.
“In general, the failure to object to the prosecution's statements in closing arguments
constitutes a procedural bar.” Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 1001 (¶71) (Miss. 2007). There
8
is no indication in the record that Prater objected to either comment. Because Prater failed
to object to the prosecution’s comments during closing argument, we find that this issue is
procedurally barred.
IV.
¶19.
Opinion Testimony Regarding Canine Olfactory Evidence
Paulette Weibel, a canine handler with Search Dog South, a non-profit organization
which looks for lost and missing people, testified that her bloodhound Hadley was able to
trace Hudson from a trailer at Landers Trailer Park to the carport door at the Millers’ home.
Weibel stated that a scent inventory confirmed that Hudson had been at the Millers’ home.
¶20.
Prater objected to Weibel’s testimony, but the trial court denied the objection. He
claimed a proper foundation had not been laid to establish Weibel as an expert in dog training
or scent.
Prater argues that Weibel did not mention any AKC registration or other
appropriate certification to prove Hadley’s competency and reliability in scent inventory or
any criminal investigative work performed by Hadley that was presented in court. Prater also
argues that Weibel did not mention any prior experience she has had testifying in court.
¶21.
In Hudson v. State, 977 So. 2d 344, 350 (¶¶30-31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), Hudson
argued that dog-tracking evidence was generally too unreliable to be admissible and that one
hundred years of Mississippi case law should not be followed. This Court ruled that the
qualifications of tracking dogs and handlers have been well documented at trial. Weibel
testified in Hudson that Hadley, who was a purebred bloodhound and had performed two
searches, was trained by the North American Search Dog Network. Id.
¶22.
In this case, Weibel testified that she completes about seventy missions a year, which
include locating missing people and performing cadaver work and gun detection. Weibel
9
stated that Hadley began performing puppy run-away training at nine months. Puppy runaway training is the first method to teach dogs like Hadley scent discrimination. Thereafter,
Hadley’s scent training became more complex when the handlers laid scents using unknown
individuals, and then the handlers had the dog locate the person. Hadley trains eight to ten
hours per week. Weibel also stated that Hadley is well trained and reliable. In 2001, Hadley
passed her required evaluations, and the dog had completed close to 200 missions. Weibel
testified that she had attended numerous seminars to receive instructions on how to handle
Hadley, and she has worked along side Hadley in her training since 1994.
¶23.
This Court has previously upheld the admissibility of opinion testimony about canine
olfactory evidence involving the same bloodhound and handler in Hudson. There is no case
law to refute this ruling since Hudson. We find that both Weibel and Hadley have sufficient
training and certification in olfactory inventory. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did
not err in admitting the canine olfactory evidence at trial. Therefore, this issue is without
merit.
V.
¶24.
Lesser-included-offense Instruction
During the jury instructions conference, the defense counsel made a verbal request for
a lesser-included burglary instruction. The trial judge refused the instruction stating that
there was nothing in the evidence that would warrant a lesser-included-offense instruction.
¶25.
Prater contends that the lesser-included burglary instruction should have been given
because counsel requested the instruction, and a factual basis existed for the instruction.
Prater claims that Riley’s testimony that he thought Hudson went back into the house to kill
the old lady and burn the house down was sufficient to show an arguable separation between
10
the arson and burglary. Prater contends that Riley’s testimony creates the possibility that
Miller was not murdered until the fires were set and not during the burglary.
¶26.
The State contends that a burglary instruction would have been an incorrect
application of the law and an instruction given without a rational evidentiary basis. The State
asserts that Prater presented no credible evidence that he had participated in a burglary and
then later absented himself from the Millers’ home before the victim was murdered. “[T]he
accused is entitled to have the jury instructed that it may consider convicting him of a lesser
offense only where there is in the record an evidentiary basis therefor.” Doss v. State, 709
So. 2d 369, 377 (¶16) (Miss. 1996).
¶27.
This Court held in Scarborough v. State, 956 So. 2d 382, 386 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App.
2007) that:
One who . . . aids and abets necessarily enters into an agreement that an
unlawful act will be done. He participates in the design of the felony. In
Crawford v. State, 133 Miss. 147, 151, 97 So. 534, 534 (1923), our supreme
court ruled that in order to be held criminally liable as an aider and abetter in
the commission of a felony, one must do something that will incite, encourage,
or assist the actual perpetrator in the commission of the crime. And it has been
further stated that [i]f two or more persons enter into a combination or
confederation to accomplish some unlawful object, any act done by any of the
participants in pursuance of the original plan and with reference to the
common object is, in contemplation of law, the act of all. As such, a person
who participates in the design and plan of committing an unlawful act which
is then carried out can be found guilty as a principal under either the theory of
conspiracy or the theory of aiding and abetting.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶28.
Prater was not entitled to a burglary instruction. In this case, the jury was charged
with finding Prater guilty as a principal of capital murder if it found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Prater did aid, assist, or encourage another or others in the crime by either entering
11
the Millers’ home and participating in the acts therein or by acting as the lookout while a
robbery took place. In a statement to the Starkville Police Department, Prater stated that he
agreed to be the “lookout” for the group of men on the corner while they broke into the
Millers’ home. Further Prater stated that when two of the men came out of the house, they
had blood on them. Even as the alleged “lookout” person, Prater agreed to assist the men in
carrying out an unlawful act. At some point during the robbery and the arson, Miller was
assaulted and later died. The record does not reflect any factual or rational evidentiary basis
for a burglary charge. Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
VI.
¶29.
Weight of the Evidence
Prater was tried and convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in the custody
of MDOC without the possibility of parole. Prater claims that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Prater acknowledges that he participated in the robbery, but he alleges that there is no
evidence to support the murder conviction. Prater argues that the murder and burglary were
separate transactions. The State asserts that if the evidence is taken in the light most
favorable to the verdict, then this Court must assume that Riley’s testimony was an accurate
account of the events and shows that each of the men conspired to rob the victim and
executed the assigned task.
¶30.
This Court's “standard of review for a post-trial motion is abuse of discretion.”
Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 764 (¶212) (Miss. 2003). The supreme court has stated that:
In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the
verdict. A new trial is the proper remedy in those instances where the verdict
12
is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to
stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.
Seeling v. State, 844 So. 2d 439, 443 (¶¶8-9) (Miss. 2003).
¶31.
The evidence showed that the men: entered the Millers’ home, took cash and other
personal belongings, assaulted Miller and set fires in six different locations in the Millers’
home; and Miller died as a result of the injuries she received during the attack. The jury gave
credence to Riley’s testimony that he saw Prater and his partners in crime enter the Millers’
home, leave the home, divide their loot, and then scatter. Riley also testified that he saw
Hudson re-enter the Millers’ home; thereafter, Riley saw smoke emitting from the Millers’
home after Hudson left the Millers’ home the second time. In Prater’s statements to the
authorities, he acknowledged that he was the lookout man for the others while they robbed
Miller, and that he observed blood on Hudson and Williams when they left the Millers’
home. Looking at the totality of the facts and circumstances, we do not find that allowing
the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Accordingly, we find that
this assignment of error is without merit.
VII.
¶32.
Suppression of Statements
On February 19, 2002, Prater made statements to the Starkville Police Department and
the Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department regarding his involvement in the offenses against
Miller. At trial, Prater filed a motion to have those statements suppressed. The trial court
denied Prater’s request. On appeal, Prater argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the statements.
¶33.
Prater asserts that because he neither understood the complex information involved
13
in his interrogation nor what the police read to him because of his history of mental illness
and illiteracy, his statements were not freely and voluntarily given. Prater also claims that
the police coerced him into signing a waiver of his rights and confessing that he had
committed the crimes for which he was indicted. He also claims that the police failed to stop
his interrogation when he requested they do so. The State asserts that Prater testified during
the suppression hearing that he understood his rights.
¶34.
“A statement by the accused is admissible if the accused was given the Miranda
warnings, and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the rights.” Busick v.
State, 906 So. 2d 846, 855 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “The voluntariness of a waiver, or
of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the
totality of the circumstances.” Hicks v. State, 812 So. 2d 179, 191 (¶32) (Miss. 2002). The
trial court in Morris v. State, 798 So. 2d 603, 606 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) held that:
When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his statement, the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the
admissibility of the confession. The State must prove the voluntariness of the
statement beyond a reasonable doubt. The State establishes a prima facie case
of voluntariness when the officer, or other person having knowledge of the
facts, testifies that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats,
coercion or offer of reward. When the State establishes its prima facie case of
voluntariness, the defendant must then rebut the State’s assertion of
voluntariness.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶35.
The judge sitting as the finder of fact is tasked with the responsibility of determining
beyond a reasonable doubt whether “the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily
given, and was not the result of force, threat or intimidation.” Baldwin v. State, 757 So. 2d
227, 234-35 (¶28) (Miss. 2000). “[T]he mental abilities of an accused are but one factor to
14
be considered in determining whether the confession was knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made.” McGowan v. State, 706 So. 2d 231, 235 (¶12) (Miss. 1997). This Court
cannot disturb the trial court’s determination that Prater’s confession was admissible “unless
the trial court committed manifest error, applied an incorrect legal standard, or the decision
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Morris, 798 So. 2d at 606 (¶8).
¶36.
The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury on Prater’s motion to
suppress his statements to the Starkville Police Department and the Oktibbeha County
Sheriff’s Department. The trial judge heard testimony from Officer Bill Lott of the Starkville
Police Department, Prater, Sheriff Dolph Bryant, and Detective William Durr of the
Starkville Police Department. The trial judge concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to conclude that Prater’s statements were freely and voluntarily given. We find that there is
no evidence to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination.
This issue is without merit.
VIII. Mental Competency
¶37.
After fourteen months of mental health treatment and evaluation, Drs. McMichael,
Montgomery, Gilbert S. Macvaugh, III, and Criss Lott, unanimously decided that Prater was
competent to stand trial. Prater asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that he was
competent to stand trial. Prater claims that his history of mental illness, mental retardation,
low IQ, functional illiteracy, and consumption of various medications for his physical and
mental conditions demonstrate that he lacked the mental competency to stand trial.
¶38.
The supreme court held in Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 11 (Miss. 1995) that:
When the trial court has made a finding that the evidence does not show a
15
probability that the defendant is incapable of making a rational defense, we
will not overturn that finding unless we can say, from the evidence, that the
finding was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The
evidence must show more than a possibility that defendant is incompetent to
stand trial--the evidence must go further until it appears to the trial court that
there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense.
In this initial inquiry, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and be the trier
of facts.
¶39.
On April 5, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing to evaluate Prater’s present
competency. During that hearing the trial court heard testimony from Dr. McMichael, a
medical doctor who specialized in psychiatry and was the Service Chief of Forensic Services
for the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield; Dr. Lott, a clinical psychologist and clinical
director at St. Dominic Hospital outpatient clinic and a consultant with the Mississippi State
Hospital Forensic Services; and Dr. Macvaugh, a clinical psychologist and practicing
psychologist at the Mississippi State Hospital. Based on the testimony and previous reports
that the court received, the trial judge concluded that Prater was presently competent to stand
trial. In their report dated November 30, 2005, the treating doctors were of the opinion that
Prater is mildly mentally retarded and is no longer exaggerating or malingering his
intellectual deficits. Having found Prater mentally competent, the trial judge scheduled the
case for trial. Therefore, Prater’s argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶40.
We find that Prater’s assignments of error are without merit.
Therefore, Prater’s
conviction and sentence are affirmed.
¶41. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OKTIBBEHA COUNTY
OF CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
16
ARE ASSESSED TO OKTIBBEHA COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
17
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
