Shaun Derrell Spratt v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-00791-COA
SHAUN DERRELL SPRATT
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/10/2007
HON. PAUL S. FUNDERBURK
MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
J. DUDLEY WILLIAMS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF DENIED
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 03/24/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Shaun Derrell Spratt pled guilty to selling cocaine. The Monroe County Circuit Court
sentenced Spratt to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(MDOC), with all but three years suspended, followed by five years of post-release
supervision. Spratt served his sentence and was on post-release supervision when his
supervising officer filed a petition to revoke his post-release supervision and to order Spratt
to serve his suspended sentence. During the revocation hearing, Spratt admitted that he had
violated the terms of his post-release supervision. Consequently, the circuit court revoked
Spratt’s post-release supervision and ordered, among other things, that Spratt was to serve
a portion of his suspended sentence. However, the circuit court’s written order reflected a
different basis for finding Spratt in violation of the terms of his post-release supervision.
What is more, the written order reflected a basis for revocation that the circuit court expressly
declined to find during the revocation hearing. To be precise, the written order stated that
Spratt violated the terms of his post-release supervision by failing to pay court costs, failing
to report to his supervising officer, and failing to pay supervision fees. In contrast, during
the revocation hearing, the circuit court expressly found that Spratt met those obligations.
Spratt filed a petition for post-conviction relief and claimed that the circuit court should set
aside the circuit court’s revocation and subsequent sentencing order. The circuit court denied
Spratt’s petition. Aggrieved, Spratt appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On September 13, 2001, Spratt pled guilty to selling cocaine. The Monroe County
Circuit Court sentenced Spratt to twenty years in the custody of the MDOC, with seventeen
years suspended and three years to serve, followed by five years of post-release supervision.
Spratt began his term of post-release supervision after he served approximately two and a
half years of his three-year sentence.
¶3.
However, on February 7, 2007, Spratt’s supervising officer filed a petition to revoke
Spratt’s post-release supervision and to impose Spratt’s suspended sentence. The circuit
court conducted a revocation hearing. During that hearing Spratt admitted that he had tested
positive for marijuana four times between February 17, 2005, and January 11, 2007.
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Additionally, Spratt admitted that he had received a ticket for having an insufficient childrestraint device on January 10, 2007. Spratt also admitted that he was charged with having
an unprescribed Lortab tablet on that date. Finally, Spratt admitted that he also had a ninemillimeter pistol in his possession on January 10, 2007.
¶4.
Having heard the evidence, the circuit court found that Spratt violated the terms of his
post-release supervision. The circuit court ordered Spratt to serve his seventeen-year
suspended sentence, with ten years suspended and seven years to serve, followed by five
years of post-release supervision.
¶5.
Spratt subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. According to Spratt, his
sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, Spratt raised the following
allegations:
Petitioner would show that the conviction or the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws
of Mississippi; That the trial [c]ourt was without jurisdiction to impose [the]
sentence; That the statute under which the conviction and/or sentence was
obtained is unconstitutional; That the sentence exceeds the maximum
authorized by law; That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard[,] that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in
the interest of justice; That his plea was made involuntarily; That his sentence
has expired; His probation, parole or conditional release was unlawfully
revoked and he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody; [o]r [T]hat the
conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any
grounds of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory
or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy.
Spratt’s generic laundry list of allegations notwithstanding, the crux of his argument was that
the basis in the circuit court’s order for revoking his post-release supervision did not
correspond to the circuit court’s decision during the revocation hearing. The circuit court
denied Spratt’s petition. Aggrieved, Spratt appeals.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
The standard of review this Court must employ upon a review of a trial court’s denial
of a petition filed pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act,
Mississippi Code Annotated sections 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2007) is well settled and has been
stated by the supreme court as follows:
When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a petition for post[]conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings
unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However, where questions of
law are raised[,] the applicable standard of review is de novo. Lambert v.
State, 941 So. 2d 804, 807 [(¶14)] (Miss. 2006) (quoting Brown v. State, 731
So. 2d 595, 598 [(¶6)] (Miss. 1999); see also Bank of Miss. v. S. Mem'l Park,
Inc., 677 So. 2d 186, 191 (Miss. 1996)).
Callins v. State, 975 So. 2d 219, 222 (¶8) (Miss. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶7.
According to Spratt, the violations addressed during the revocation hearing “were set
out as a basis for revocation of [his] post-release supervision in the [circuit court’s]
revocation [o]rder.” Spratt is correct, as the circuit court’s order states that Spratt violated
the terms of his suspended sentence by (1) failing to pay court costs as directed, (2) failing
to report as directed, and (3) failing to pay supervision fees as directed. During the
revocation hearing, the circuit court specifically found that, aside from one instance in which
Spratt failed to report to his supervising officer, Spratt met as ordered and “paid as ordered.”
It is clear that the discrepancy in the circuit court’s oral pronouncements and the written
revocation order are nothing more than scrivener’s errors.
¶8.
In Willicutt v. State, 910 So. 2d 1189, 1196 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), this Court
found that a sentencing order did not reflect a sentence that was announced during a hearing
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on a motion to vacate a judgment and sentence. This Court went on to hold as follows:
Perhaps it was a scrivener’s error that caused the incongruity between the
sentence announced at the hearing and the sentence reflected in the amended
sentencing order. In any event, the trial judge should be given an opportunity
to correct the error, and we remand this case to him for entrance of a proper
order in conformity with the sentence given at the hearing on the motion to
vacate judgment and sentence.
Id. We find that the discrepancy in the circuit court’s oral basis for revocation and the basis
set forth in the revocation order calls for the same course of action described in Willicutt. We
find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. However, we must
remand this matter to the circuit court for entry of a proper order that conforms with the basis
for revocation as stated during the revocation hearing.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENYING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED
AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MONROE
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE
AND CARLTON., JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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