Mary Dixon v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-00770-COA
MARY DIXON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/13/2006
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM R. LABARRE
VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LISA LYNN BLOUNT
ELEANOR FAYE PETERSON
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF CAPITAL MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED: 2/17/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On August 19, 2004, Melcenia Bell was robbed and assaulted. Nearly four months
later, on December 12, 2004, Bell died as a result of the complications from the injuries she
sustained in the assault. On October 5, 2006, a Hinds County jury convicted Mary Dixon
of the robbery and murder of Bell. Thereafter, Dixon filed a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Dixon’s motion
was denied on January 8, 2007. Aggrieved, Dixon now appeals arguing the following
assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress Dixon’s statements; (2)
the trial court erred in denying Dixon’s motion for a directed verdict, rejecting Dixon’s
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and refusing to grant Dixon’s
request for a peremptory jury instruction; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of Dr. Stephen Hayne and photographs from the autopsy of Bell.
FACTS
¶2.
On the morning of August 19, 2004, shortly after 7:30 a.m., Elizabeth Eubanks
arrived at 827 Dreyfus Street, Jackson, Mississippi, the home of Bell, to assist Bell with her
personal needs and carry out some household chores as Eubanks had done every Thursday
over the past three years. Shortly after Eubanks arrived, Daryl Bell, the decedent’s son, left
home to haul some scrap metal to a recycling center in Flowood, Mississippi. He had plans
to return home soon to take his mother to the hairdresser in preparation for a trip to
Cleveland, Ohio that Sunday to visit her daughter and grandson. As her usual practice,
Eubanks helped Bell pin her wallet in her housecoat after Bell took her bath. Bell, who
owned rental property directly behind her home, was known to keep the weekly rental
payments in her wallet pinned to her housecoat. On this day Bell had $300 in rental
payments as well as $475 from her son to pay for her son’s ticket to Ohio.
¶3.
Eubanks testified that she left Bell’s house between 8:45 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. after
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having placed a Coke on the stand near Bell’s daybed, which was located in the front room
of Bell’s home. Eubanks also testified that she (Eubanks) left the front door unlocked so that
the Meals on Wheels driver would be able to gain entrance into the house without Bell
having to get up. At approximately 9:45 a.m., Jack Turner, the Meals on Wheels driver,
arrived at Bell’s home and found her lying naked on the floor in a pool of blood with a
screwdriver sticking out of her neck and a bloody axe lying on the daybed. Turner retreated
to his vehicle and requested that his dispatcher notify the authorities.
¶4.
Approximately, three hours after the assault, Jacqueline Wallace, Tony Edwards, and
Dixon, who were all persons of interest in the robbery and assault, were transported to the
police department for questioning. Officer Charmaine Valentine testified that while
transporting Dixon to the police department, Dixon stated that Edwards killed that old lady.
Officer Valentine subsequently relayed this information to the detectives. Detective James
Roberts testified that when Dixon arrived at the police department she was Mirandized and
then questioned regarding the crime against Bell. Although Dixon did not sign a written
waiver of rights, she spoke with Detective Roberts. Detective Roberts reduced Dixon’s
responses to writing. Thereafter, Dixon initialed each answer and signed the statement.
After interviewing Dixon, Detective Roberts testified that he continued his investigation and
talked with several other individuals. Detective Roberts stated that during the investigation
of this offense, he found no physical evidence to link Dixon to the assault and robbery.
Investigator Andrew McGahey testified that latent prints were found on the Coke can, but
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none of the evidence collected and analyzed linked Dixon to the crime.
¶5.
On December 12, 2004, Bell died as a result of complications from her injuries.
Approximately five months later, on May 18, 2005, Detective Roberts received a call from
Deputy Pamela Turner of the Hinds County Sheriff’s Department, who informed him that
she had information regarding the robbery and murder of Bell. Deputy Turner testified that
she had spoken with Dixon at least four times prior to contacting Detective Roberts and at
least two times thereafter. Deputy Turner recalled that on three occasions in which she
spoke with Dixon, Dixon confessed to being present and witnessing the robbery and assault
of Bell.
¶6.
In May 2005, a Hinds County grand jury indicted Dixon for the murder and armed
robbery of Bell. During trial, a suppression hearing was held to determine the voluntariness
of the statements made by Dixon to Deputy Turner. The trial court ruled that Dixon’s
statements that linked her to the scene of the crime were given freely and voluntarily. On
October 5, 2006, a jury found Dixon guilty of capital murder. Dixon was sentenced to life
imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved,
Dixon appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
¶7.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard. Graves v. State, 492 So. 2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1986).
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¶8.
Dixon argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements which she
made to Deputy Turner on May 4, 9, 11, 16, 20, and 25, 2005. Dixon contends that the
statements were involuntary and were given without adequate warning or waiver of her
fundamental rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article 3, Sections 14 and 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.
Dixon gave six separate statements to Deputy Turner. All the statements were given while
in custody. Deputy Turner testified that Dixon was actually given her Miranda warning
prior to making the May 9th statement, reminded of her rights prior to making the May 11th
statement, and in the subsequent statements on May 16th, May 20th, and May 25th, Dixon
was either reminded or stated that she understood her rights. In her brief, Dixon contends
that according to the Mississippi Law Enforcement Officer’s Handbook, section B.2.a.
(2006-2007), as a trained law enforcement officer, Deputy Turner should have been aware
that “Miranda warnings should have been given prior to any subsequent interrogation
session with the person in custody even though the warnings were given in a prior
interrogation.”
¶9.
On May 4, 2005, Deputy Turner was ordered by her supervisor to speak with a
female housed at the Raymond Detention Center, who had pertinent information about drug
activity in the Jackson area. The female, who was later identified as Mary Dixon, was
checked out of the detention center to aid in a drug buy. Deputy Turner testified that while
en route to conduct a drug buy, Dixon identified herself as the female that the Jackson Police
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Department had in custody for hurting Melcenia Bell. After Dixon stated that she witnessed
the crime while at the abandoned building next door to Bell’s home, Deputy Turner asked
Dixon if they could talk later. Dixon agreed.
¶10.
Deputy Turner testified that on May 9, 2005, after receiving permission from Dixon’s
attorney, Tom Fortner, to speak with Dixon, Dixon was properly Mirandized and signed a
Miranda waiver before giving a statement. Deputy Turner testified that during the interview,
Dixon disclosed pertinent information relating to Bell’s assailant. At the conclusion of the
interview, the recording, which was turned over to the division secretary to be transcribed,
was found to be inaudible.
¶11.
Due to the recording problems on May 9th, Deputy Turner came back on May 11,
2005, and took another statement from Dixon. Dixon stated that while she was at the
abandoned building next door to Bell’s home with her crack pipe and dope, she observed
Tony Tucker a/k/a Antonio Dixon go to Bell’s home and commit the crime.
¶12.
On May 16, 2005, Dixon agreed to take a polygraph test, but shortly after beginning
the process, Dixon declined. In an effort to understand Dixon’s refusal to take the polygraph
test, Deputy Turner took Dixon outside to smoke a cigarette. Deputy Turner allowed Dixon
to use her cell phone to call her daughters. At the end of the call, Dixon began to cry.
Deputy Turner inquired as to what was wrong, and Dixon responded that she wanted to tell
the truth. Dixon stated that she was on Bell’s porch inside the doorway the day of the
incident watching Tucker hurt Bell. Thereafter, Dixon stated that she did not want to talk
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anymore, but she was willing to talk later.
¶13.
Deputy Turner testified that on May 20, 2005, she checked Dixon out of jail, drove
her to McDonald’s to eat and then to Bell’s home before interviewing Dixon again about the
robbery and assault of Bell. Deputy Turner testified that after reminding Dixon of her
Miranda rights, Dixon stated in a recorded interview that she was on Bell’s porch, in the
doorway smoking crack when Tucker assaulted and robbed Bell. Dixon gave a description
of Bell’s clothing, the location of the money, as well as a detailed description of how the
crime was committed.
¶14.
Deputy Turner testified that on May 25, 2005, Dixon identified Tucker in a lineup
as Bell’s assailant. No additional statements were made after the identification. Dixon was
neither advised of her Miranda rights nor was a waiver signed.
¶15.
“A statement by the accused is admissible if the accused was given the Miranda
warnings, and then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights.” Busick v.
State, 906 So. 2d 846, 855 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).
“The
voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by
the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Hicks v. State, 812 So. 2d 179, 191
(¶32) (Miss. 2002).
¶16.
“[T]he judge should ascertain, under a totality of the circumstances and beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given, and was
not the result of force, threat, or intimidation.” Baldwin v. State, 757 So. 2d 227, 234-35
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(¶28) (Miss. 2000). “Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact
which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed
manifest error, or the decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”
Hicks, 812 So. 2d at 191 (¶32).
¶17.
In Morris v. State, 798 So. 2d 603, 606 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), this Court stated:
When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his statement, the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the
admissibility of the confession. The State must prove the voluntariness of the
statement beyond a reasonable doubt. The State establishes a prima facie case
of voluntariness when the officer, or other person having knowledge of the
facts, testifies that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats,
coercion, or offer of reward. When the State establishes its prima facie case
of voluntariness, the defendant must then rebut the State’s assertion of
voluntariness.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶18.
A suppression hearing was conducted prior to Deputy Turner’s testimony in order to
exclude the six statements Dixon made to Deputy Turner. The trial court ruled that the May
4th statement and the May 25th statement did not fall within the definition of a confession.
The trial court held that although Dixon was read her Miranda rights on May 9th, the
statement given was not a confession, nor was there any evidence to suggest that the
statement made was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary statement. Dixon alleges that
she is functionally illiterate; therefore, she lacked the ability to understand a waiver of her
rights. However, testimony from both Detective Roberts and Deputy Turner indicated that
she understood her rights. As to the May 11th statement, the trial court ruled that although
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it was not satisfied that what Dixon said fell within the definition of a confession, even if it
did, Miranda rights are only factors for the court to consider when determining whether or
not, from the totality of the circumstances, that the statement given by one in custody is a
voluntary statement. The trial court ruled that although the facts and circumstances
surrounding the May 16th statement were lacking, the factors and qualifications required
under the law for a statement to be admissible were met. The trial judge also ruled that
Dixon’s statement on May 20, 2005, was freely and voluntarily given.
¶19.
On each of the aforementioned dates, Dixon spoke with law enforcement officials and
stated that she was either present at the scene of the crime or witnessed the crime being
committed against Bell. During each of the statements, Dixon either gave a statement after
waiving her Miranda rights or continued to disclose information after being reminded of her
rights. There is no evidence to suggest that Dixon requested counsel before making any
statement to law enforcement. Moreover, Dixon presented no evidence to suggest that her
statements were not voluntary. In addition, Dixon’s willingness to continue previous
conversations with Deputy Turner as to what happened implies that Dixon freely and
voluntarily made the statements.
¶20.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Dixon’s motion to suppress the
statements made to Deputy Turner. Thus, we find this issue is without merit.
II. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR A
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND REQUEST
FOR A PEREMPTORY JURY INSTRUCTION
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¶21.
The standard of review applied to a denial of a request for peremptory instructions,
motions for a directed verdict, and motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the
same. Easter v. State, 878 So. 2d 10, 21 (¶36) (Miss. 2004). Each of them challenges the
legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Id. In considering whether to disturb a
jury verdict our supreme court will consider:
whether the evidence shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that accused
committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that
every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this
test it is insufficient to support a conviction.” The relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Stewart v. State, 986 So. 2d 304, 308 (¶12) (Miss. 2008).
¶22.
Dixon maintains that the State failed to prove by sufficient evidence the necessary
elements of capital murder pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e)
(Rev. 2006), which states:
The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means
or in any manner shall be capital murder . . . [w]hen done with or without any
design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime
of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural
intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual
unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such
felonies[.]
¶23.
Dixon specifically argues that there was no physical evidence to link her to the
robbery and assault resulting in Bell’s death. Dixon asserts that although witnesses testified
that the scene of the crime was very bloody, no blood stains were discovered on the clothing
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that she had worn that day. Dixon argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she did kill Bell without authority of law while engaged in the commission of the
crime of robbery as required pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e).
¶24.
Detective Roberts testified that none of the information surrounding the crime had
been released to the public. The only person(s) besides the person committing the crime
who had significant knowledge of the crime scene were Turner, the Meals on Wheels driver;
law enforcement; crime scene personnel; and medical personnel. Deputy Turner testified
that although Dixon alleged that Tucker had committed the crime, on May 20, 2005, Dixon
was able to provide an accurate description of how the assault occurred, a description of
Bell’s clothing, and the location of Bell’s wallet where Bell kept her money.
¶25.
Charmaine Kelly testified that in October 2005, she wrote a letter to the district
attorney informing the State of Dixon’s involvement in the crime against Bell. Kelly, who
was Dixon’s cellmate on two occasions, testified that during their incarceration, Dixon
confessed to the robbery and assault against Bell. Kelly also testified that Dixon told her that
after committing the crime, she bought drugs with Tucker. Kelly stated that Dixon said she
left Bell naked to make it appear as if a man had committed the crime.
¶26.
Gladys Powell a/k/a Denise Bates, a former coworker of Dixon, testified that in
response to her question as to whether Dixon committed the offense against Bell, Dixon
responded, “if they said she did it, then she did it.” Powell claims that at no point during
their conversation did Dixon deny having killed Bell.
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¶27.
“[Q]uestions regarding weight and worth of witness testimony or witness credibility
are for the jury to settle.” Jones v. State, 783 So. 2d 771, 778 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:
Jurors are permitted, indeed have the duty, to resolve the conflicts in the
testimony they hear. They may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject, the
utterances of any witness. No formula dictates the manner in which jurors
resolve conflicting testimony into findings of fact sufficient to support their
verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and observing the
witnesses as they testify, augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve
individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A reviewing court cannot and need
not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury
believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict.
Jones v. State, 920 So. 2d 465, 472-73 (¶22) (Miss. 2006) (citation omitted).
¶28.
The jury in this case has found that the evidence was sufficient to convict Dixon on
the offenses for which she was indicted. In making its determination whether to find Dixon
guilty or innocent, the jury resolved any issues of credibility of the witnesses presented at
trial and, thus, found it reasonable to accept their representation of the facts.
¶29.
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
trial court did not err in denying Dixon’s motion for a directed verdict, motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and request for a peremptory jury instruction. We
find that this issue is without merit.
III. TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN HAYNE AND AUTOPSY
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DECEDENT
¶30.
Exhibits 36, 38, 40, and 42 were marked for identification only. Exhibits 37, 39, 41,
43, and 44 were admitted into evidence.
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¶31.
Dixon contends that the use of Exhibits 38, 40, and 42 was in error, and when coupled
with other errors, the exhibits deprived Dixon of a fair trial free of inflammatory prejudice.
Dixon argues that the photographs were not necessary to identify Bell because Eubanks and
Daryl had done so earlier in trial. Dixon asserts that Exhibits 37, 39, 41, 43, and 44 were
merely admitted to horrify the jurors at the brutality of a crime against one so vulnerable as
Bell. Dixon claims that Exhibits 43 and 44 were irrelevant to testimony as to the cause of
Bell’s death because Bell’s medical records indicated there were no stab wounds on her right
side depicted in the picture and, thus, inadmissible. However, in her rebuttal brief, Dixon
asserts that although Exhibits 37, 39, 41, 43, and 44 are relevant. Dr. Hayne used the
aforementioned exhibits to explain that Bell’s death was the result of multiple organ failure,
and the scars Bell sustained were consistent with being stabbed.
¶32.
Exhibit 37 is a facial view of decedent Bell. This photograph depicts a large scar
located over the left side of the forehead. Exhibit 39 is a photograph of decedent Bell’s left
upper extremity, showing part of the left arm and left forearm with multiple scars
predominantly located over the outer surface of the left arm. Exhibit 41 is a photograph of
the left flank or outer flank left chest wall of decedent Bell. There are multiple scars, some
medical in origin, located over the site going up to the front surface of the left shoulder.
Exhibit 43 is a photograph of the outer surface of the right upper extremity including the
right shoulder, right arm, and upper part of the right forearm. There are multiple scars on
the site as well as the shoulder and right arm. Exhibit 44 is a photograph of the thumb, part
13
of the back, and the second digit of the right hand.
¶33.
The supreme court has held:
Photographs that aid in describing the circumstances of the killing, the
location of the body and cause of death, or that supplement or clarify a
witness's testimony have evidentiary value and are admissible before a jury.
Admission of photos of a deceased is within the sound discretion of a trial
court and is proper so long as the photos serve some useful, evidentiary
purpose. The discretion of a trial judge to admit photos in criminal cases, runs
toward almost unlimited admissibility regardless of gruesomeness,
repetitiveness, and the extenuation of probative value.
Bennett v. State, 933 So. 2d 930, 946 (¶53) (Miss. 2006) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). “Some probative value is the only requirement needed in order to support a trial
judge's decision to admit photographs into evidence.” Jones, 920 So. 2d at 476-77 (¶35)
(citation omitted).
¶34.
“[A]bsent an abuse of discretion, the [trial] court’s decision [as to the admissibility
of photographs] will be upheld on appeal. . . . Reversal of the trial court will occur only
where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 476 (¶35).
¶35.
Prior to direct examination of Dr. Hayne, the trial judge conducted a hearing outside
the presence of the jury, which was treated as a motion in limine to address the matter of the
photographs. During the hearing, defense counsel objected to the inflammatory and
prejudicial nature of the photographs, but made no objections as to the relevance of the
photographs. Defense counsel asserted that at the time of the motion in limine, he could not
address the issue of relevance. He contended that he was not aware of how Dr. Hayne
reached a conclusion as to the scars depicted in the photographs or what he intended to show
14
by the photographs. Dixon asserts that testimony had been given as to the number of scars
and Dr. Hayne’s inability to identify the origin of the scars. As a result of the hearing, the
trial court ruled that as the trial progressed, defense counsel could make timely objections
as to the relevancy of the photographs. Later after the jury returned, defense counsel
objected only to the relevancy of Exhibits 36 and 38. The trial court sustained the objection
and allowed the Exhibits 36 and 38 to be received and marked for identification only.
¶36.
As the trial progressed, defense counsel made no additional objections as to the
relevancy or the inflammatory nature of Exhibits 37, 39, 41, 43, and 44. Being within his
sound discretion, the trial judge found that the photographs served some probative value;
therefore, the photographs were deemed admissible. Dixon presented no evidence that the
trial court abused its discretion; thus, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.
¶37.
Next, Dixon argues that Dr. Hayne was forced to acknowledge the inconsistency of
his testimony. Dixon contends that Dr. Hayne concluded that scars in Exhibits 43 and 44
were on the right side of the body and were consistent with the type of injuries that would
be received in this type of attack, while the medical records showed that none of the stab
wounds were on the right side of the body. In addition, Dixon contends that Dr. Hayne
could not specify the origin of the scars, and his testimony was inconsistent with emergency
room records; therefore, it was error to permit Dr. Hayne’s testimony and admission of the
exhibits. However, the State asserts that Dixon failed to contemporaneously object to Dr.
Hayne’s testimony. Therefore, the State asserts that Dixon is procedurally barred.
15
¶38.
Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
“According to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 703, the expert may base his opinion on
personal observation as well as facts or data ‘made known to him at or before the hearing.’
All evidence must also pass the requirements of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, which
excludes evidence if it is unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or a waste of time.” Ross v. State,
883 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “A forensic pathologist, addresses two
basic questions: what was the cause of death, and what was the manner of death?” Bell v.
State, 725 So. 2d 836, 853-54 (¶51) (Miss. 1998).
¶39.
The State offered Dr. Hayne to testify to as to Bell’s cause of death. Dr. Hayne was
tendered as an expert witness in the areas of anatomic, clinical, and forensic pathology. Dr.
Hayne was deemed qualified to provide expert testimony regarding the interpretation of
laboratory tests, prepare tissues or specimens to make a determination of disease or lack
thereof, and to determine the cause and manner of death.
¶40.
Dixon’s argument as to the inconsistency of Dr. Hayne’s testimony and review of the
photographs is flawed. Dr. Hayne’s testimony was based on his observation of the body,
facts made known to him, and his observation of anatomical drawings and photographs at
16
trial. Dr. Hayne testified that he had reviewed Bell’s medical records and was able to reach
an opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause and manner of Bell’s
death. Dr. Hayne’s testimony fulfilled the requirements as outlined in Ross.
¶41.
Nevertheless, “if no contemporaneous objection to a witness's testimony is made, the
error, if any, is waived. Application of the contemporaneous objection rule is not diminished
in a capital case.” Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 751 (¶27) (Miss. 2006) (internal
citation omitted). Dixon made no objections as to Dr. Hayne’s qualifications as an expert
witness or testimony. Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred and without merit.
¶42. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO HINDS COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS
AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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