Jonathan M. Harbit v. Mary Melissa Scarberry Harbit
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-01474-COA
JONATHAN M. HARBIT
APPELLANT
v.
MARY MELISSA SCARBERRY HARBIT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/14/2007
HON. VICKI B. COBB
GRENADA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
CARLOS EUGENE MOORE
A.E. (RUSTY) HARLOW
SABRINA ANN DAVIDSON
CIVIL – DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE ENTERED
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED – 02/17/2009
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Chancery Court of Grenada County granted Mary Melissa (Melissa) and
Jonathan Harbit a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Pursuant to a consent
of issues agreement, the chancellor also resolved certain issues which were submitted to her
for resolution. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s decision, Jonathan appeals and asserts the
following points of error, which we quote verbatim:
1. Whether the Chancellor erred when she failed to grant Mr. Harbit’s Motion
for New Trial after the Chancellor allowed “unsworn” testimony to be taken
in violation of Miss. Rule of Evidence 603.
2. Whether the Chancellor erred when she allocated a debt incurred during the
course of the marriage to Mr. Harbit.
3. Whether the Chancellor erred when she ordered Mr. Harbit to pay Ms.
Harbit’s attorneys fees.
¶2.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
Melissa and Jonathan agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences
and submitted to the chancellor for resolution the issues of child custody, child support,
division of the marital estate, alimony, and attorney’s fees.1
¶4.
Prior to the commencement of trial, Melissa made an offer of judgment pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. We defer any further discussion of the
offer until we address the attorney’s fee issue. It is sufficient at this juncture to note that the
offer was rejected by Jonathan.2 After the trial, which included the testimony of only the
parties, the chancellor awarded custody of the parties’ minor child to Melissa and ordered
Jonathan to pay the balance owed on a Toyota 4Runner in the amount of $2,046.76.
Additionally, the chancellor, after unsealing and reading the offer of judgment, ordered
Jonathan to pay Melissa’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,000, as the chancellor
determined that Jonathan had received a judgment less favorable than the offer tendered to
him by Melissa. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and
1
The parties later agreed that Melissa would have physical custody of the parties’
minor child.
2
After Jonathan rejected the offer, it was sealed and filed among the clerk’s papers.
2
discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Unsworn Testimony
¶5.
Upon commencement of the trial, both Jonathan and Melissa testified without first
being sworn. When Jonathan was later recalled as a rebuttal witness, the trial judge
expressed concern that the witnesses may not have been sworn. On this point, the record
reflects the following:
[APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]:
THE COURT:
May I approach the witness?
Yes, you may. Let me ask a question.
[APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]:
Okay.
THE COURT:
Were these witnesses sworn before we started our
testimony?
[APPELLANT]:
Nope.
THE COURT:3
Your Honor, very candidly we swore the prior witnesses
and I think we proceeded right on along without that, and
I think the Court is correct. We need to make a record
right at this very moment on both of them.
THE COURT:
I am going to ask the Clerk to please swear these
witnesses and ask if they will swear that the testimony
they have already given -- and I want both of you to
think long and hard about that, because we did not
administer an oath, and I’m sorry. I just forgot that we
had not sworn y’all.
[COURT] CLERK:
All witnesses please stand up. Do you and each
3
We assume that the court reporter made an error in transcribing that this statement
was made by the court. It seems more likely that this statement was made by one of the
attorneys.
3
of you solemnly swear and affirm that the
existing testimony that you have given, plus the
testimony you are about to give is the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
[APPELLANT]:
[APPELLEE]:
¶6.
Yes, I do.
Yes, sir.
In this issue, Jonathan contends that the trial judge erred in basing her findings of fact
and conclusions of law on “unsworn” testimony. Jonathan heavily relies on Rule 603 of the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which reads: “Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.”
¶7.
Further, Jonathan relies on Scroggins v. Ellzey Beverages, 743 So. 2d 990 (Miss.
1999) and Pierce v. Heritage Properties, Inc., 688 So. 2d 1385 (Miss. 1997). Neither of
these cases involve the failure of a witness to be sworn before giving trial testimony. Rather,
they deal with the failure of witnesses to give truthful information during discovery.
Scroggins, 743 So. 2d at 997 (¶36); Pierce, 688 So. 2d at 1388. Therefore, they provide no
support for Jonathan’s position.
¶8.
In this case, although Jonathan and Melissa initially gave unsworn testimony, they
each later affirmed under oath that the unsworn testimony that they had given was true and
correct. Therefore, the real issue is whether the swearing in of Jonathan and Melissa, after
they had given unsworn testimony, was effective. We answer in the affirmative.
¶9.
Jonathan has cited no authority in support of this specific issue, and we have not
found any Mississippi case law on this specific issue. Therefore, we consider authority from
4
other states and circuits that have spoken to the issue.
¶10.
In Saxton v. State, 389 So. 2d 541(Ala. Crim. App. 1980), an Alabama trial court was
faced with a situation substantially analogous to ours. There, a state witness testified on
direct examination without being sworn. Id. at 543. At the conclusion of the direct
examination, the defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the witness had not
been sworn. Id. The court interrupted the proceedings, swore in the witness, and allowed
the witness to be reexamined. Id. The court denied the motion for a mistrial. Id. On appeal,
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted that defense counsel made no objection during
the first examination of the witness and held that the trial court did not err in overruling the
motion for a mistrial. Id. The court also held that “[i]f a witness is allowed to give evidence
before the jury without first being lawfully sworn, it is the duty of the judge, as soon as it is
called to his attention, to immediately administer a proper oath.” Id.
¶11.
In United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1981), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the general rule is that the failure to swear a
witness may be waived. The court also noted that the waiver “may occur by knowing silence
and an attempt to raise objection after verdict or by the mere failure of counsel to notice the
omission before completion of trial.” Id. (footnote omitted).
¶12.
In Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1939), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed “that the irregular administration of
the oath to a witness, or the taking of testimony without an oath at all, must, if known to the
adverse party, be objected to at the time.” The court further noted that a defendant “may not,
with knowledge of the irregularity, permit the trial to proceed, and raise the question after
5
verdict.” Id.
¶13.
Finally, in State ex rel. Tucker v. Alvis, 89 N.E.2d 328, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949), the
Ohio appeals court for the second district observed that when the failure to swear a witness
is known at the time, “the defect must be taken advantage of at once and the failure to do so
is such acquiescence in the testimony as will preclude objection after the verdict.”
¶14.
We find the holdings of the above cases quite persuasive. Consequently, we hold that
the chancellor in today’s case acted promptly and properly when it occurred to her that the
witnesses had not been sworn. As noted in the colloquy quoted above, the chancellor had
the witnesses sworn immediately and required them to attest under oath that the testimony
already given was true and correct. We also note that Jonathan never objected to the
witnesses not being sworn and was about to give rebuttal testimony when the court on its
own questioned whether the witnesses had been sworn. After the court was assured by
Jonathan that he and Melissa had not been sworn, the court moved immediately to correct
the oversight. Rather than object to the court’s failure to swear in the witnesses, Jonathan
waited until after the chancellor was almost completely finished rendering the verdict
favorable to Melissa before he suddenly moved for a mistrial on the ground of “unsworn”
testimony. Therefore, even though we find no fault with the chancellor’s handling of this
matter, we find that Jonathan waived the issue of the court’s failure to initially swear in the
witnesses, because he failed to timely object. This contention of error is without merit.
2. Equitable Distribution
¶15.
Next, Jonathan argues that the chancellor erred in requiring him to pay the
indebtedness on the Toyota 4Runner. Melissa owned the 4Runner prior to the marriage, but
6
it was used as collateral for a loan made during the marriage, and the proceeds of that loan
were used for marital obligations.
¶16.
Jonathan accurately states that assets classified as marital are distributed equitably.
Bowen v. Bowen, 982 So. 2d 385, 395 (¶41) (Miss. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 650
So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Miss. 1994)). However, equitable distribution of marital assets is
committed to the discretion of the chancellor and is not disturbed absent clear error or
application of an erroneous legal standard. Bodne v. King, 835 So. 2d 52, 60 (¶33) (Miss.
2003) (citing Arthur v. Arthur, 691 So. 2d 997, 1003 (Miss. 1997)). Moreover, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the chancellor’s division and
distribution will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence.” Bowen, 982
So. 2d at 394 (¶32) (quoting Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss. 1994)).
¶17.
Here, the record reflects uncontradicted testimony that the indebtedness was incurred
to assist with marital obligations because Jonathan was unemployed for a prolonged period
of time. Accordingly, we cannot find an abuse of discretion with the chancellor’s decision
to assign the debt solely to Jonathan. This issue is without merit.
3. Attorney’s Fees
¶18.
Finally, Jonathan argues that the chancellor erred by ordering him to pay Melissa’s
attorney’s fees. Jonathan specifically argues that the court should have considered the
McKee factors4 in determining whether or not to award Melissa attorney’s fees. McKee v.
4
The McKee factors include “the relative financial ability of the parties, the skill and
standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the
questions at issue, as well as the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the
cause, the time and labor required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and
7
McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982). We find that the primary purpose of requiring
the trial judge to perform the McKee analysis is to ensure that any award of attorney’s fees
that the judge may order is reasonable and supported by the evidence. It should be noted that
“the matter of determining attorneys fees in divorce cases is largely entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. (citing Walters v. Walters, 383 So. 2d 827, 828 (Miss.
1980)).
¶19.
In awarding $2,000 in attorney’s fees to Melissa, the chancellor relied on the dictates
of Rule 68 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
At any time more than fifteen days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment
to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in
his offer, with costs then accrued. If within ten days after the service of the
offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either
party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of
service thereof and thereupon the court shall enter judgment. An offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party
to another has been determined by verdict, order or judgment, but the amount
or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the
party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall have the
same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable
time, not less than 10 days, prior to the commencement of hearing to
determine the amount or extent of liability.
(Emphasis added).
¶20.
The chancellor determined that the judgment rendered was less favorable to Jonathan
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case.”
McKee, 418 So. 2d at 767.
8
than the offer. According to Rule 68, Jonathan would only be required to pay the costs
incurred by Melissa from the point of rejection of the offer until the conclusion of the trial.
Therefore, the real issue is whether costs, as specified in Rule 68, include attorney’s fees.
Since Jonathan has not provided us with any Mississippi authority on this point, and our
independent research has revealed none, we look to federal jurisprudence.5 In Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (overruled on other grounds), the United States Supreme Court
held:
[T]he most reasonable inference is that the term “costs” in [Federal] Rule 68
was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under [a] relevant
substantive statute or other authority. . . . Thus, absent congressional
expressions to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines “costs” to
include attorney’s fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs
for the purposes of [Federal] Rule 68.
¶21.
We are not aware of any Mississippi statute that authorizes a chancellor to award
attorney’s fees, as part of the costs, to a prevailing party in a divorce proceeding. While
there is plenty of authority authorizing a chancellor, in the chancellor’s discretion, to award
attorney’s fees to a party in a divorce action, that authority is decisional law and is based on
the financial needs of the party. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994).
Therefore, we find that the chancellor erred in using Rule 68 to calculate the amount of
attorney’s fees awarded to Melissa. However, as previously mentioned, the matter of
determining attorney’s fees in divorce cases lies within the sound discretion of the
5
Rule 68 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure is patterned after Federal Rule
68, which provides that “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more
favorable than the unacceptable offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer
was made.” (Emphasis added).
9
chancellor.
¶22.
In discussing the attorney’s fees, the chancellor stated:
THE COURT:
With regard to Mrs. Harbit’s request for attorney’s fees,
I did some calculations on the attorney’s fees. It’s
obvious from the bill that was submitted and affidavit
that was submitted as Exhibit Five that this bill is up to
the trial of this case.
There is no charge on the bill for today’s trial and I have
basically added two hours of time for Mr. Harlow. I
know you have probably been here longer than that, Mr.
Harlow, and you have two assistants here and I know
they are going to bill for their time also.
But when I added two hours to Mr. Harlow’s time his
bill totals $3,313.93, and my initial reaction was that I
was going to require you, Mr. Harbit, to pay one half of
those attorney’s fees; however, then after I had written
out all of my notes I did open the offer of judgment that
was done on April the 16th and basically I have awarded
or y’all have agreed upon -- some of the things y’all
agreed upon on your own, some of the things I have
awarded y’all or I have made a ruling on.
But I think you would have been much better off to take
the offer of judgment at that time, but the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure say that once an offer of
judgment is made, if it’s not accepted within ten days,
then any attorney’s fees, costs associated with
prosecuting the case or that are incurred after that time
are assessable to you.
The Court is not required to, but the Court certainly has
every bit of authority to assess those against you. So I
went back through that attorney’s affidavit and that bill
and added up the time that was spent on your case prior
to the offer of judgment being made and subtracted that
from the total bill and according to my calculations it
was a little over $2,000 that you would be assessed with.
So I changed my little notes about what I was going to
10
rule and I am going to assess you with $2,000.00 of Mrs.
Harbit’s attorney’s fees and that will be payable within
30 days directly to Mr. Harlow.
¶23.
The chancellor essentially determined that but for Rule 68 she would have ordered
Jonathan to pay one-half of Melissa’s attorney’s fees. While we find that the chancellor
erred in using Rule 68 to calculate the amount of attorney’s fees due, we also find clear and
substantial evidence that the chancellor would have awarded attorney’s fees to Melissa even
if there had been no offer of judgment. We further find that based on the chancellor’s own
pronouncement, that amount would have been one-half of the amount of attorney’s fees
incurred by Melissa in the litigation. Exhibit 5, which was admitted into evidence, was
Melissa’s attorney’s bill for all services rendered except for the trial. The chancellor found
that the trial lasted two hours, and she added $350 to the bill for service rendered during the
trial, bringing the total amount of the attorney’s bill to $3,313.93.
¶24.
An appellate court may affirm a trial court on other grounds if it finds that the trial
court reached the right result despite its flawed or erroneous premises. Mason v. S. Mortg.
Co., 828 So. 2d 735, 738 (¶15) (Miss. 2002) (citing Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So. 2d 978, 980
(Miss. 1993)). Here, we find that the chancellor was justified in awarding attorney’s fees
to Melissa. Therefore, we exercise our authority to affirm on other grounds the chancellor’s
decision to award attorney’s fees to Melissa. We do so despite the fact that the chancellor
did not perform the McKee analysis, because, for the following reasons, we find that this
omission did not cause Jonathan to suffer any prejudice. The divorce complaint was filed
on February 20, 2007. The two-day trial commenced on June 14. The docket index reflects
that in the approximate four months prior to trial, a modest amount of activity occurred. As
11
stated, the chancellor indicated that she would have ordered Jonathan to pay one-half of
Melissa’s attorney’s fees. That amount would have been $1,656.97. We find that, on these
special facts, a McKee analysis is not indispensable to determining the reasonableness of this
amount. Accordingly, we modify the amount of attorney’s fees awarded from $2,000.00 to
$1,656.97 to represent one-half of the total amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Melissa.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other particulars.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF GRENADA COUNTY
IS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE,
J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS,
J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION JOINED BY LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ. CARLTON, J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.
GRIFFIS, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART:
¶26.
I concur with the majority regarding issues one and two. I respectfully dissent as to
the holding of issue three.
¶27.
In my opinion, the majority is correct to rule that the chancellor erred when she cited
Rule 68 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure as appropriate authority for the
chancellor to award attorney’s fees. There is no legal authority for this conclusion. Rule 68
does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees as costs.
¶28.
In McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 766-67 (Miss. 1982), the supreme court
determined that an award of attorney’s fees in a divorce case may be awarded at the
discretion of the chancellor, but the award must be reasonable and supported by the evidence.
12
The supreme court held:
The fee depends on consideration of, in addition to the relative financial ability
of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the
case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, as well as the degree
of responsibility involved in the management of the cause, the time and labor
required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the preclusion
of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case.
Id. at 767.
¶29.
The majority concludes that “on these special facts, a McKee analysis is not
indispensable to determin[e] the reasonableness of this amount. Accordingly, we modify the
amount of attorney’s fees awarded from $2,000 to $1,656.97 to represent one-half of the total
amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Melissa.”
¶30.
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion. Based on McKee, the supreme court
has ruled that an award of attorney’s fees must be supported by a chancellor’s analysis of
what has become known as the McKee factors. Here, the chancellor has not made this
analysis. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the proper holding by this Court is to reverse
the award of attorney’s fees and remand this issue to the chancellor for an analysis of the
McKee factors. Accordingly, I dissent as to issue three. I would reverse the chancellor’s
award of attorney’s fees and remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
LEE, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., JOIN THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.