Charles J. Rudd v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CP-01249-COA
CHARLES J. RUDD
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/25/2006
HON. SAMAC S. RICHARDSON
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHARLES J. RUDD (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF DISMISSED
AFFIRMED: 01/06/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Charles J. Rudd appeals the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction collateral
relief by the Circuit Court of Madison County. He claims that the circuit court erred when
it determined that his motion was time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 9939-5(2) (Rev. 2007). We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On July 17, 2002, Rudd pleaded guilty to charges of armed robbery and escape. He
filed his first motion for post-conviction collateral relief on December 6, 2004.1 He
supplemented this first motion by filing a second motion for post-conviction collateral relief
on March 3, 2005. In its order entered on April 5, 2005, the circuit court found that Rudd’s
claims were frivolous and without merit. Rudd never appealed this dismissal of his motion
for post-conviction collateral relief.
¶3.
On December 2, 2005, Rudd filed yet another motion for post-conviction collateral
relief. This motion was dismissed on January 25, 2006, because the court found the motion
to be time-barred by section 99-39-5(2). It is from that dismissal that Rudd brings this
appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
A circuit court’s dismissal of a motion for post-conviction collateral relief will not be
reversed on appeal absent a finding that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous.
Williams v. State, 872 So. 2d 711, 712 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). However, when
reviewing issues of law, this Court’s proper standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State,
731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
ANALYSIS
¶5.
The question presented in this appeal is whether it was error to dismiss Rudd’s motion
as time-barred under section 99-39-5(2). In cases involving a guilty plea, a motion for postconviction collateral relief must be filed within three years of the entry of the judgment of
conviction. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). There are exceptions to this statute of limitations
1
Rudd titled each motion for post-conviction collateral relief as a writ of habeas
corpus. The circuit court treated the filings as motions for post-conviction collateral relief.
2
for cases involving an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court or the
Mississippi Supreme Court or newly discovered evidence that would have caused a different
result in the conviction or sentence. Id. However, Rudd does not argue that his case fits
within any exception contained in section 99-39-5(2).
¶6.
After accepting Rudd’s guilty pleas, the circuit judge entered a judgment of
conviction on July 17, 2002. This began the running of the three-year statute of limitations
for him to file a motion for post-conviction collateral relief. His third motion for postconviction collateral relief – the only motion that is the subject of this appeal – was not filed
until December 2, 2005, which was months after the three-year deadline had ended on July
18, 2005.2 Therefore, the circuit court correctly dismissed the motion as time-barred
pursuant to section 99-39-5(2).
¶7.
Rudd’s motion was further barred by Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(6)
(Rev. 2007) because it was a successive motion for post-conviction collateral relief. The
circuit court’s April 5, 2005, order dismissing Rudd’s claims for post-conviction collateral
relief was a final judgment that was never appealed by Rudd. Thus, his subsequent and
untimely motion for post-conviction collateral relief filed on December 2, 2005, was a
successive motion and, therefore, barred by section 99-39-23(6). Again, Rudd does not
claim any of the exceptions to this bar that are provided by the statute.
¶8.
Accordingly, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated sections 99-39-5(2) and
2
The three-year deadline actually concluded on July 17, 2005, which was a Sunday.
Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 1-3-67 (Rev. 2005), the time period ran until
the end of the next day which was Monday, July 18, 2005.
3
99-39-23(6), Rudd’s motion for post-conviction collateral relief was properly dismissed by
the circuit court.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS
AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
