William Presley Brown, II v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-01330-COA
WILLIAM PRESLEY BROWN, II
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/08/2007
HON. ISADORE W. PATRICK, JR.
WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND
G. GILMORE MARTIN
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED - 12/16/2008
BEFORE LEE, P.J., CHANDLER AND ISHEE, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
William Presley Brown II was convicted of murder and sentenced by the Warren
County Circuit Court to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. He appeals this conviction, arguing that: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when officers unlawfully seized his vehicle without probable cause, and (2) the trial
court erred in not granting his circumstantial-evidence and accessory-after-the-fact jury
instructions. We find that neither of these arguments has merit. Therefore, we affirm his
conviction and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On the evening of October 15, 2005, Vicksburg police responded to a report of a dead
female lying face down next to a garbage dumpster at the Vicksburg Hotel, an apartment
complex in downtown Vicksburg. Officers later identified the deceased woman as Chenara
Young and determined that she had died as the result of blunt force trauma. Officer Billy
Brown and Sergeant Virgil Woodall also concluded that Young had been moved to the
location due to the presence of blood smears and the lack of blood pooling near the body.
They suspected that a vehicle had been used in moving the body due to Young’s weight,
which was later determined to be in excess of three hundred pounds.
¶3.
At approximately 2:20 a.m. on the morning of October 16, 2005 (eight hours after the
discovery of Young’s body), Officer Daniel Thomas responded to a complaint of a
suspicious truck that was parked across from a sports bar where another car usually parked.1
Officer Thomas observed what appeared to be a bloody smear and drip marks on the tailgate
and in the bed of the truck. The driver’s side front-seat cover had been removed, and there
was a large red stain on the Styrofoam padding of the seat. The seat cover was bundled up
in the truck’s bed. The truck was located less than two blocks from the location where
Young’s body was found. Sergeant Woodall was called to the scene and determined that the
substance could possibly be blood. Based on the truck’s proximity to the crime scene, the
1
There is some inconsistency in the record on whether there was a sports bar across
from the vehicle or a barber shop.
2
substance located on the truck, the stain on the driver’s seat, the suspicion that a vehicle was
used in the crime, and the absence of the truck’s owner, the officers had the truck towed half
a block away to the city’s impound lot to be secured until further tests could be done and a
search warrant could be obtained. No tests were done at the truck’s original location to
determine if the substance was blood.
¶4.
The next morning, a group of investigators did a presumptive blood test and
determined that the substance on the truck’s tailgate was, in fact, blood. Then, they obtained
a search warrant for the vehicle.2 Inside the vehicle, they found a wallet belonging to the
defendant, Brown. The truck was titled in another individual’s name without any evidence
that it had been signed over to Brown. Through the course of their investigation, officers
were able to determine that Brown lived at the Vicksburg Hotel, and they obtained a search
warrant for his apartment. Upon execution of the search warrant, officers discovered blood
stains and spatters on the living room carpet and walls, bloody clothing and pillows in the
living room, human feces on the living room carpet, bloody clothes and shoes in the bedroom
closet, and blood in the bedroom and bathtub. The blood was later analyzed and determined
to be the Young’s blood.
¶5.
An arrest warrant was issued for Brown and he was taken into custody. After waiving
his Miranda rights, he gave two videotaped statements. In those statements, Brown gave the
following story. In the predawn hours of October 14, Brown went to a nearby convenience
store where he was approached in the parking lot by Young, whom he did not know. She
propositioned him to exchange sex for money. He declined the offer, but they decided to go
2
The stain on the driver’s seat tested negative for the presence of blood.
3
back to his apartment and smoke crack. The two were joined by another man who is only
referenced in the record as “the man with the crooked eye.” The trio went to purchase crack.
Then, they proceeded to Brown’s apartment to smoke it. According to Brown, Young and
the man with the crooked eye got into an argument over the drugs, and the man with the
crooked eye picked up Brown’s baseball bat and began beating Young. Brown went to the
kitchen to get a knife. When he got back to the living room, the man with the crooked eye
was gone. Brown told Young to leave, but she was unable to do so due to the seriousness
of her injuries. Some time later, Young died. Instead of calling authorities, Brown attempted
to dispose of Young’s body by dragging it to the service elevator and ultimately dumping it
in the parking lot. Brown explained that Young was found partially nude because he and she
were going to engage in sexual activity at some point, but never did.3 Brown also told
officers that he parked his truck nearly two blocks away from the Vicksburg Hotel after he
saw the officers investigating Young’s dead body in the parking lot.
¶6.
Brown was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury in the Warren County Circuit
Court for the murder of Young. He appeals that conviction alleging that: (1) his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when officers unlawfully seized his vehicle without
probable cause, and (2) the trial court erred in not granting his circumstantial-evidence and
accessory-after-the-fact jury instructions.
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER BROWN’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN OFFICERS IMPOUNDED HIS VEHICLE WITHOUT
A WARRANT.
3
He later said in his statement that he and Young did engage in sexual activity.
4
A. Standing
¶7.
As a threshold matter, the State renews its argument that Brown lacks standing to
challenge the seizure of the truck on Fourth Amendment grounds because no evidence was
presented at the suppression hearing regarding the issue of ownership. Whether a defendant
has standing to challenge a seizure is a question of law; therefore, we address this issue de
novo. United States v. Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir. 1990). “The proponent of a
motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Lyons v. State, 942 So. 2d 247, 250 (¶11)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n.1 (1978)). “[T]he
question of whether a defendant can claim the protection of the [F]ourth [A]mendment
hinges ‘not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who
claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.’” Lee, 898 F.2d at 1038 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143).
¶8.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that when a person has borrowed an
automobile from another, with the other's consent, the borrower becomes a lawful possessor
of the vehicle and has standing to challenge its search. Id. We have no direct evidence in
the trial record about whether Brown was lawfully in possession of the truck. But, the State
never presented any evidence that he was not in lawful possession of the vehicle. Therefore,
there is no indication from the record that Brown lacked standing.
B. Standard of Review
¶9.
Brown argues that the officers seized his truck without probable cause; therefore, all
evidence that derived from the seizure was inadmissible as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
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The analysis of whether there has been an unlawful seizure is subject to a mixed standard of
review. Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (¶20) (Miss. 2006). The determination of the
existence of probable cause is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). However, that de novo review is limited to the “trial judge's decision
based on historical facts reviewed under the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous
standards.” Id. (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 113 (¶11) (Miss.
1999)). The basic elements of “a determination of . . . probable cause will be the events
which occurred leading up to the . . . search, and then the decision whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount . . . to
probable cause.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. “In determining whether evidence should be
suppressed, a trial court’s findings of fact are not disturbed on appeal absent a finding that
the ‘trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a
decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.’” Clair v. State, 845 So. 2d
733, 734-35 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Taylor v. State, 733 So. 2d 251, 255 (¶18)
(Miss. 1999)).
C. The Alleged Fourth Amendment Violation
¶10.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “where probable cause exists, a
warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 (1974). In Cardwell, the
Supreme Court found that no significant expectation of privacy was infringed by a search
limited to an examination of the vehicle’s tire and the taking of paint scrapings from the
exterior of the vehicle. Id. at 591. The Supreme Court stated that “the invasion of privacy,
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'if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.’” Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592 (quoting Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974)). This is because when
a person knowingly exposes something to the public, that object is not given Fourth
Amendment protection. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
¶11.
A somewhat different situation is presented when police seize a vehicle by
transporting it to a secure location before searching its exterior. The United States Supreme
Court has addressed this situation as well, holding that the seizure of a vehicle followed by
a search of the exterior was permissible because the police had probable cause for the search.
Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592. The Supreme Court stated that the fact that “police impounded
the car prior to the examination, which they could have made on the spot,” does not create
“a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence obtained thereby.” Id. at 593. The
Supreme Court’s analysis highlighted the special status that automobiles occupy under the
Fourth Amendment, stating: “[T]he circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a
particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.” Id. at 590 (quoting Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970)). The Supreme Court has also held that if the police
have probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself is contraband to a crime, it may be
seized from a public place without a warrant. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1999).
¶12.
In Edlin v. State, 523 So. 2d 42, 46 (Miss. 1988), an officer investigating the death of
a woman killed when her car was run off the road noticed that the front bumper of Edlin’s
car was scuffed and scraped and the car's rear quarter panel had greenish-blue paint on it.
Edlin’s vehicle was impounded by the police, and the next day, a search warrant was issued
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for the vehicle. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the police had probable cause
to impound the vehicle pending the issuance of a warrant. Id. at 47-48. The vehicle already
had been moved once, and there was a danger that the vehicle could be moved or tampered
with if left in place. Id. at 48. Because there was no warrantless search of the car’s interior,
no important privacy interest was implicated. Id. And the impoundment for a single day did
not impermissibly interfere with Edlin’s possessory interest in the vehicle. Id. The supreme
court held that the impoundment was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
(citing Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592-93).
¶13.
Based upon this precedent, if probable cause existed to conduct the presumptive blood
test at the scene, the officers did not violate Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights when they
impounded his truck for that purpose. We turn to whether there was probable cause to
impound the truck.
¶14.
“[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149 (1925). Probable cause does not require the same level of specific evidence for
every element of an offense as would be needed to support the actual conviction. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). However, the officer must entertain more than mere
unfounded suspicion that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). Probable cause is an objective concept, and a police officer’s
subjective belief, no matter how sincere, that he has good cause to seize someone or
8
something does not, in and of itself, constitute probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
97 (1964).
¶15.
Probable cause must be based upon the totality of the circumstances. Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). The supreme court has further defined probable cause
as follows:
a practical, nontechnical concept, based upon the conventional considerations
of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians
act. It arises when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge,
or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in
themselves to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has
been committed and that a particular individual committed it.
Conway v. State, 397 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Miss. 1980) (quoting Strode v. State, 231 So. 2d
779, 782 (Miss. 1970)).
¶16.
We review the facts and circumstances that led to the impoundment of the truck to
determine if the facts, when viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to probable cause. The following facts were adduced at the suppression
hearing. Police officers were called to investigate the death of a woman, Young, whose body
was found near a dumpster at the Vicksburg Hotel. Young, who weighed over three hundred
pounds, had been beaten to death, but no large pools of blood were found near her body.
Also, blood smears were found near her body in the parking lot. All of this information led
officers to conclude that a vehicle had more than likely been used to transport the body from
where Young was killed to the dumpster. Less than eight hours after the discovery of
Young’s body, Officer Thomas was asked to check on a suspicious vehicle parked two
blocks away from the Vicksburg Hotel. Upon closer inspection of the truck, Officer Thomas
9
observed a substance that appeared to be blood smeared on the tailgate, in the bed, and on
the front seat. Officer Brown arrived on the scene, and he also believed the substance was
blood. Officer Thomas contacted his superior, Sergeant Woodall, who believed that, based
on his twenty-four years of experience as a police officer, the substance on and in the truck
was blood. Thus, the police were confronted with a bloody body that they thought had been
moved using a vehicle and, nearby, a suspiciously parked truck with what appeared to be
blood on its tailgate, in its bed, and on the front seat. We find these facts were sufficient to
justify a person of average caution in the belief that a crime had been committed and that this
particular vehicle had been used in its commission.
¶17.
We conclude from the totality of the circumstances that probable cause existed to
impound the truck. There was probable cause to perform the presumptive blood test. The
mobility of the truck and its placement on a public street created a danger that the truck
would be moved or the substance tainted before testing could be performed. It was,
therefore, reasonable for the officers to transport the vehicle to a secure location in
anticipation of the presumptive blood test. See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592. Because the
officers had probable cause to impound the truck in order to perform the presumptive blood
test, there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and the evidence derived from the
impoundment was not subject to exclusion as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” We affirm
the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE
PROPOSED CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE AND ACCESSORYAFTER-THE-FACT JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
A. Standard of Review
10
¶18.
When reviewing the denial of a requested jury instruction, “we are required to read
and consider all of the jury instructions together as a whole.” Richardson v. Norfolk S. Ry.
Co., 923 So. 2d 1002, 1010 (¶19) (Miss. 2006). The final jury instructions do not have to be
perfect, they only have to fairly announce the applicable rule of law. Milano v. State, 790
So. 2d 179, 184 (¶14) (Miss. 2001). There is no reversible error if the jury instructions fairly
describe the applicable law pertaining to the case and create no manifest injustice toward the
defendant. Williams v. State, 803 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (¶7) (Miss. 2001).
B. Proposed Circumstantial-Evidence Jury Instruction
¶19.
During jury instruction deliberations, Brown offered a circumstantial-evidence jury
instruction that provided:
The Court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial
evidence to establish its theory of guilt of the defendant, then the evidence for
the State must be so strong as to establish the guilt of the defendant, not only
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the evidence must be so strong as to exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt.
This proposed jury instruction was excluded by the trial judge.
¶20.
A circumstantial-evidence instruction must only be given when the State does not
present direct evidence at the trial in the form of an eyewitness or a confession by the
defendant. Clark v. State, 503 So. 2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Bunkley v. State, 495
So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 1986)). Additionally, an admission by the accused on an important
element of the offense obviates the need for a circumstantial-evidence instruction. Smith v.
State, 981 So. 2d 1025, 1032 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). “An admission is but a statement
by the accused which may be direct or implied by facts pertinent to the issue and tending to
11
prove his guilt.” Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1266 (¶27) (Miss. 2004).
¶21.
In this case, much of the State’s evidence was circumstantial. The State did not
present an eyewitness or a confession. However, the State did present the testimony of Percy
Lynch (Percy). Brown visited Percy the morning after Young’s body was found. Percy
testified:
And he [Brown] told me, you know, he might have killed somebody. He said,
you know, I said, “What do you mean you might have killed somebody?” He
said, “Well, we was [sic] at my house and me and this guy got into it and I
stabbed him.” I said: “Yeah. Did you call the police?” He said: “no.” And
I said: “Well, that’s what you need to do is call the police, if anything
happened like that.” And then I said: “Man, are you serious?” He said: “Man,
Percy, me and a guy and a girl was [sic] at the house.” And he said the guy
and girl got to arguing. I said: “What do you mean, man?” He said that we
was [sic] smoking. I said: “Cool.” He said the girl had gave [sic] the guy
some dope. The guy wanted some more. The guy got mad and picked up a bat
and hit the girl. He said he jumped up, and the guy turned around and said:
“I’ll kill you, too.” Said he backed up toward the kitchen. Said the guy was
following him, and the lady said something. I guess she must have come to or
something, said something. He said the guy turned around, he turned around
and grabbed a knife and stabbed him two or three times in the back, and the
guy took off running.
In this statement made by Brown to Percy, Brown does not admit that he killed Young, but
he does admit to the facts surrounding her death.
¶22.
In Lynch, 877 So. 2d at 1260 (¶1), Lynch was convicted of capital murder with the
underlying felony of robbery after Lynch’s accomplice killed someone during a carjacking.
Officers asked Lynch if he knew his accomplice was going to carjack someone, and Lynch
answered, “I think so. I really don’t know.” Id. at 1262 (¶12). The supreme court found in
that case that the statement explained what Lynch thought before the carjacking and
subsequent murder. Id. at 1266 (¶¶27-28). The court also found the statement was an
12
admission because it tended to prove Lynch’s guilt when viewed in connection with the other
facts showing Lynch’s involvement in the crime. Id. at (¶28). Because Lynch’s statement
was an admission as to the intent to commit the robbery, which was an underlying element
of the ultimate conviction for murder, the supreme court held that the State’s case was not
entirely made up of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1266-67 (¶29).
¶23.
Viewed in connection with the other facts showing Brown’s involvement in the crime,
Brown’s statements to Percy tend to prove his guilt. Brown admitted that he and Young were
at his apartment when the murder occurred, which was corroborated by the large amounts of
Young’s blood found all over the apartment. He also testified that Young had been beaten
to death by a baseball bat. This testimony was consistent with the type of injuries found on
Young’s body. Brown told Percy that there was another man in the apartment and that this
man was the person who beat Young to death. However, this version of events was never
corroborated because there was no man found in the Vicksburg area with stab wounds, there
was no knife found in the building that could have been used in the alleged stabbing, and no
blood was found on the door casing except that belonging to Young.
¶24.
Brown argues that Lynch is distinguishable from this case because Brown first said
he thought he killed someone, but then specified that the person he thought he killed was the
man with the crooked eye. Thus, Brown argues that he did not admit to an element of the
murder of Young, but to an element of the murder of a completely separate person. To
determine whether Brown’s statement constituted direct evidence of his guilt, we carefully
review the admission at issue in Lynch. Lynch was asked by authorities whether he knew
his accomplice was going to carjack someone and take the person's car. Id. at 1262 (¶12).
13
Lynch’s responsive statement that he thought his accomplice was going to carjack someone
did not pertain to the specific victim. Moreover, in Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785
(¶228) (Miss. 2006), the supreme court found that the defendant had admitted to a significant
element of capital murder when he admitted to a fellow inmate that he was wanted for
shooting his wife, daughter, and daughter's boyfriend, when in reality he had shot his stepson,
stepson’s wife, and stepson’s daughter. Thus, in Rubenstein, an admission to the murder of
a different victim was treated as direct evidence of guilt. In this case, Brown admitted that
he was at the crime scene and that he might have killed someone. We find that Brown was
not entitled to a circumstantial-evidence instruction. This issue is without merit.
C. Proposed Accessory-After-the-Fact Jury Instruction
¶25.
During jury instruction deliberations, Brown requested an accessory-after-the-fact jury
instruction that provided:
The Court instructs the Jury that if you are unable to arrive at a verdict on the
charge of Murder, you may consider whether or not William Presley Brown,
II committed the crime of accessory after the fact to Murder.
If you believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that William Presley Brown, II did
on or about October 14, 2005, in Warren County, Mississippi, conceal or aid
an [sic] assist another who did Murder, Chenara Young, in an effort for said
to person a [sic] avoid arrest, trial[,] conviction or punishment, you may find
him guilty of accessory after the fact to murder.
This proposed instruction was denied by the trial judge.
¶26.
Accessory after the fact is a separate and distinct crime from murder. See Dampier
v. State, 973 So. 2d 221, 231 (¶28) (Miss. 2008). A defendant may properly “request an
instruction regarding any offense carrying a lesser punishment if the lesser offense arises out
of a nucleus of operative fact common with the factual scenario giving rise to the charge laid
14
in the indictment.” Gangl v. State, 539 So. 2d 132, 136 (Miss. 1989). However, a lesseroffense instruction should only be granted by the trial judge when an evidentiary basis exists
in the record to support such an instruction. Id. A lesser-included offense instruction should
be granted unless the trial judge can say that no reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty of the lesser offense after taking all evidence in the light most favorable to the accused.
Giles v. State, 650 So. 2d 846, 854 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Harper v. State, 478 So. 2d 1017,
1021 (Miss. 1985)). Thus, if any evidence is found in the record that could support the
finding of the lesser offense, the trial judge should give the lesser-included offense
instruction, but if the instruction is not supported by evidence, the instruction should be
excluded. Perry v. State, 637 So. 2d 871, 877 (Miss. 1994).
¶27.
The elements of accessory after the fact are: (1) a felony has been committed; (2) the
defendant “concealed, received, or relieved any felon, or having aided or assisted any felon,
knowing that such person had committed a felony”; and (3) the defendant intended “to enable
such felon to escape or to avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, after the commission
of such felony.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-5 (Rev. 2006). Brown claims that he inadvertently
aided the man with the crooked eye by disposing of the body. Brown also argues that had
the man with the crooked eye been caught, Brown would have faced criminal charges based
upon his purchase and possession of crack cocaine on the night of the murder.
¶28.
The crime of accessory after the fact requires that the defendant act with the intent to
help the felon escape detection. There was no evidence put on at trial that Brown acted with
the intent to enable the man with the crooked eye to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction,
or punishment for the murder of Young. Considering the evidence in the light most
15
favorable to Brown, due to the absence of evidence supporting the intent element, a
reasonable jury could not have found Brown guilty as an accessory after the fact. Therefore,
Brown was not entitled to an accessory-after-the-fact jury instruction. This issue is without
merit.
CONCLUSION
¶29.
For the above reasons, we affirm Brown’s conviction and sentence.
¶30. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO WARREN COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
16
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