Sparky Darnez Watson v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-01747-COA
SPARKY DARNEZ WATSON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/14/2007
HON. C.E. MORGAN III
GRENADA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BRENDA JACKSON PATTERSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
DOUG EVANS
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF COUNT I, SALE OF
MARIJUANA, AND SENTENCED TO
THREE YEARS AND COUNT II, SALE OF
COCAINE, AND SENTENCED TO
TWENTY YEARS, WITH EIGHT YEARS
SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE
YEARS AND TWELVE YEARS, WITH THE
SENTENCE IN COUNT II TO RUN
CONCURRENTLY TO THE SENTENCE IN
COUNT I, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED - 11/25/2008
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Sparky Darnez Watson was convicted in the Circuit Court of Grenada County of sale
of marijuana and sale of cocaine. On appeal, Watson argues that the trial court erred in (1)
admitting evidence of another crime and (2) admitting evidence of a “PC buy.” Finding no
error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On February 19, 2004, Terry Peeples, an agent with the Central Mississippi Narcotics
Task Force, set out to make an undercover drug buy in Grenada, Mississippi. Agent Peeples
enlisted the aid of Brenda Wade, a confidential informant (CI) he had worked with on more
than twenty previous buys. Agent Peeples outfitted the CI’s vehicle with undercover
surveillance equipment and provided her with task force funds to use in the buy.
¶3.
Agent Peeples and the CI then drove to Boone Alley in Grenada, where they
encountered Watson. According to Agent Peeples, he “pulled up” to Watson and told him
that he wished to purchase some “green,” a street name for marijuana. Watson responded,
“Okay,” and got into the backseat of the car. After negotiating a purchase of $20 of
marijuana from Watson, Agent Peeples told Watson that he wished to purchase $20 of
“hard,” a street name for crack cocaine. Watson responded that he would get the cocaine if
Agent Peeples gave him the money and dropped him off at a certain location. Agent Peeples
complied, and approximately one and one-half minutes later, Watson returned and handed
the CI a bag containing crack cocaine.
¶4.
Watson was subsequently indicted for and convicted of one count each of sale of
marijuana and sale of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Watson to serve three years for the
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marijuana sale and twenty years for the cocaine sale, with eight years suspended; the
sentences were ordered to run concurrently and all in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether Watson was denied a fair trial by introduction of a crime not
charged in the indictment.
¶5.
Watson’s first assignment of error encompasses two interrelated issues. We shall
address each individually.
A. Whether the surveillance videotape contained evidence of an uncharged
crime.
¶6.
Watson argues that the trial court erred in admitting a portion of the surveillance
videotape that showed Watson passing a bag to Agent Peeples, who examined it and passed
it to the CI. The sale of cocaine that Watson was charged with occurred approximately ten
minutes later, and was not entirely visible on the tape. Watson asserts that this first portion
of the videotape was evidence of a separate sale of cocaine, distinct from the sale at issue.
¶7.
Generally, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” M.R.E.
404(b). However, our supreme court has held:
Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that
offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or
occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Such
proof of another crime is also admissible where it is necessary to identify the
defendant, where it is material to prove motive, and there is an apparent
relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged,
3
where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved
to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty
knowledge.
Jones v. State, 920 So. 2d 465, 474 (¶28) (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted). Furthermore,
“[t]he State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened
. . . . Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the complete story of the crime,
evidence or testimony may be given even though it may reveal or suggest other crimes.” Id.
at (¶29) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
¶8.
The trial court, in considering the defense’s motion in limine to exclude that portion
of the surveillance videotape, found that it did not amount to evidence of an uncharged sale
of cocaine. The trial court did, however, instruct the State not to refer to the bag as
containing cocaine, as the contents had not been secured and verified to be cocaine. On
appeal, Watson disputes the trial court’s finding that the videotape did not show evidence
of an uncharged crime.1 While Watson concedes that at no point on the videotape are the
contents of the bag explicitly identified as cocaine, he argues that this would have been a
reasonable inference from the events depicted.
¶9.
Watson contends that the videotape purported to show him hand a bag to Agent
Peeples, who asked whether it was “$120 worth.” Watson then replied that it had been
weighed on a scale and verified to be at least that amount, and “some more” had been
subsequently added. Watson asserted that the value of the bag was $130, but he would
1
The trial court observed that “there is nothing in the language in there that anybody
could understand that denotes [the bag as containing] cocaine.”
4
accept $120 for it. Agent Peeples then handed the bag to the CI, who commented that she
had only $40, an amount insufficient to purchase it. Agent Peeples then made a comment
about marijuana, and Watson replied that he had “some of that, too.”
¶10.
"Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial
court and [an appellate court] will reverse only where that discretion has been abused."
Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So. 2d 1122, 1128 (Miss. 1995). Watson argues that
because the videotape never clearly shows the CI return the bag to him, it would have
appeared to the jury to be a completed sale. Even if we accept Watson’s account of what the
videotape showed, we cannot say that the trial court erred in not reaching the same
conclusion. The CI stated that she did not have enough money to purchase the bag, and
Agent Peeples testified at trial that he purchased only $20 of cocaine from Watson and that
the sale occurred off-camera, later in the transaction.
¶11.
Furthermore, even if the videotape did show evidence of a crime, such as an
attempted sale, it was part of the same transaction or occurrence as the subsequent drug sales
Watson was charged with. The full surveillance videotape was not offered to show Watson's
character or that he was acting in conformity with a particular character trait; instead, it was
evidence of the very actions for which he was indicted. The videotape shows Watson
offering to sell a bag containing what is implied to be cocaine. Agent Peeples and the CI,
however, did not have sufficient funds to effectuate the purchase. This provides context for
the subsequent completed sale of a smaller quantity. The trial court did not err in admitting
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the disputed portion of the surveillance videotape even if it constituted evidence of other
crimes.
B. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the videotape under Rule 403.
¶12.
Watson argues that the trial court erred in admitting the contested portion of the
surveillance videotape because of its potential to mislead the jury. Watson asserts that the
jury could have confused the passing of the bag with the later sale with which Watson was
charged.
¶13.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 allows that “even relevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Miley v. State, 935 So. 2d 998,
1003 (¶21) (Miss. 2006) (citing M.R.E. 403). We again note that "[r]elevancy and
admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and [an appellate
court] will reverse only where that discretion has been abused." Terrain Enters., 654 So. 2d
at 1128.
¶14.
While there may have been some possibility of confusion had the videotape been
shown to the jury absent any elaboration, Agent Peeples clearly explained on both direct and
cross-examination that the sale of cocaine occurred off-camera, later on the videotape.
Watson’s attorney, in fact, based his closing argument in part on Agent Peeples’s admission
that the cocaine sale was not visible on the surveillance videotape. This assignment of error
6
is without merit.
II. Whether Watson was denied a fair trial by introduction of evidence
of a “PC buy” at trial.
¶15.
Watson argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question Agent
Peeples on redirect about a “PC buy.”2 Watson’s attorney submitted into evidence a lab
report that indicated two bags of cocaine had been tested under Watson’s case number. One
bag contained 0.1 gram of cocaine; another contained 1.1 grams of cocaine. Watson’s
attorney then asked Agent Peeples whether this amount of cocaine could have been
purchased for only $20, eliciting an admission that the combined street value of the two bags
tested would be over $100. On redirect, the State was allowed, over the defense’s objection,
to elicit testimony where Agent Peeples explained that the second bag had come from a
subsequent “PC buy.” Agent Peeples then explained what a “PC buy” is, in general terms,
and explained that the second bag of cocaine had been submitted to the drug lab more than
a month after the first. He did not otherwise elaborate on the circumstances surrounding the
“PC buy.”
¶16.
Watson argues on appeal that this testimony amounted to evidence of another crime
with which he was not charged, again citing Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). However,
Watson himself entered the lab report into evidence. A defendant may not, himself,
introduce evidence at trial and then assert on appeal that the admission of the evidence
2
Agent Peeples explained that a “PC buy” is a drug purchase undertaken by law
enforcement to gain probable cause to search a suspected drug house.
7
constituted reversible error. Hobson v. State, 730 So. 2d 20, 24-25 (¶15) (Miss. 1998).
Furthermore, “trial courts have broad discretion in allowing or disallowing redirect
examination of witnesses and when the defense attorney inquires into a subject on crossexamination of the State’s witness, the prosecutor on redirect is unquestionably entitled to
elaborate on the matter.” Manning v. State, 835 So. 2d 94, 99-100 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App.
2002). Since Watson’s attorney elicited the initial testimony about the second bag of
cocaine, admitted the lab reports, and used this evidence to raise doubt about the State’s case,
the State was entitled to elicit testimony explaining the discrepancy. This assignment of
error is without merit.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRENADA COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT I, SALE OF MARIJUANA, AND SENTENCE OF
THREE YEARS AND COUNT II, SALE OF COCAINE, AND SENTENCE OF
TWENTY YEARS, WITH EIGHT YEARS SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE
YEARS AND TWELVE YEARS TO SERVE, WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT
II TO RUN CONCURRENTLY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, ALL IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO GRENADA
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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