Rotundo Jenkins v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-00814-COA
ROTUNDO JENKINS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/26/2007
HON. ROBERT WALTER BAILEY
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ERIC JOHN HESSLER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD
BILBO MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF
COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO SERVE
FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITH TWO YEARS
SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF
REPORTING PROBATION AND ORDERED
TO PAY A FINE OF $1,000 AND A CRIME
LAB FEE OF $300
AFFIRMED: 10/28/2008
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Rotundo Jenkins was convicted of possession of 4.27 grams of cocaine. The
Lauderdale County Circuit Court sentenced Jenkins to serve five years in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with two years suspended and four years
of reporting probation, and ordered Jenkins to pay a $1,000 fine and crime lab fees in the
amount of $300. Jenkins filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which the trial court denied. Aggrieved, Jenkins
appeals, raising two issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Jenkins’s motion in limine and
overruling objections to Officer Kevin Boyd’s testimony regarding
information he obtained from an unknown, unidentified source.
II. Whether the trial court erred by giving jury instructions S-2 and S-3, which
included the weight of the cocaine.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On the afternoon of August 18, 2006, Officer Kevin Boyd and Officer O.L. Sanders
of the Meridian Police Department were dispatched to an area to look for a white female
soliciting herself for drugs. The officers did not find the white female. However, Officer
Boyd testified that a white male in a black SUV informed him that he witnessed a black
male, who was riding a mini-bike, give crack cocaine to a white female. Upon receiving this
information, Officer Boyd headed to the location of the incident, and Officer Sanders
followed him.
¶3.
After arriving in the area, the officers saw a black male on a mini-bike. The man
looked directly at the officers, and the officers saw a clear plastic bag containing a white
substance hanging from his mouth. At this point, Officer Boyd testified that he activated his
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blue lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop because the driver did not have his helmet on
properly, there was no tag on the mini-bike, and the mini-bike did not have any turn signals.
The man sped away upon seeing the officers, and the officers pursued him. During the
pursuit, the man signaled as if he were pulling over. Instead of pulling over, the man cut
across a lawn, drove beside a parked vehicle, and threw something underneath the car. In
his attempt to get away, the man fell off of the mini-bike. The officers apprehended the
suspect and retrieved a bag from underneath the car’s front tire. After arresting the man, the
officers were able to identify the suspect as Jenkins. Tests revealed that the bag contained
4.27 grams of cocaine.
¶4.
Jenkins was indicted for possession of 4.27 grams of cocaine. On March 21, 2007,
Jenkins was convicted and sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the MDOC, with
two years suspended and four years of reporting probation. Jenkins was also ordered to pay
a $1,000 fine and a $300 crime lab fee. Jenkins filed a motion for a new trial or, in the
alternative, a motion for a JNOV, and the trial court denied the motion. Feeling aggrieved,
Jenkins timely filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Jenkins’s motion in limine
and overruling objections to Officer Boyd’s testimony regarding
information he obtained from an unknown, unidentified source.
¶5.
Jenkins argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine and
overruling his objections to Officer Boyd’s testimony because the testimony was clearly
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hearsay, irrelevant, unreliable, and more prejudicial than probative. The State argues that
the officer’s testimony was admissible to show why the officers proceeded to the area where
they found Jenkins.
¶6.
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
M.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay statements are not admissible except as provided by Mississippi
Rule of Evidence 802. However, “[t]o the extent necessary to show why an officer acted as
he did, an informant's tip is admissible.” Hill v. State, 865 So. 2d 371, 380 (¶36) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing Swindle v. State, 502 So. 2d 652, 657-58 (Miss. 1987)). The admissibility
of evidence is largely within the trial court’s discretion, and this Court will not disturb the
trial court’s ruling absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Gary v. State,
796 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Gulley v. State, 779 So. 2d 1140,
1149 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)).
¶7.
During the trial, Officer Boyd testified that a white male in an SUV informed him that
he witnessed a black male on a mini-bike give crack cocaine to a white female. Jenkins filed
a motion in limine before trial to prohibit this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
and the statement suggested that Jenkins was selling cocaine. The trial court overruled the
motion, stating that the statement did not implicate anybody and that it was an explanation
as to why the officers were in the area. During trial, Jenkins objected to Officer Boyd’s
testimony on this point, and the trial court overruled the objection. Based on a review of the
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record, we find that Officer Boyd’s statement was admissible to show why the officers
noticed Jenkins and acted the way that they did. Hill and Arnold v. State, 809 So. 2d 753
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002) are analogous cases and, therefore, guide this discussion.
¶8.
In Hill, law enforcement received anonymous tips from community residents that the
defendant was involved in illegal drug activity in the neighborhood. Hill, 865 So. 2d at 375
(¶3). Tipsters informed law enforcement that the defendant would park his red Nissan Sentra
on the side of the road and sell drugs from his vehicle. Id. at 376 (¶4). One day, an officer
noticed the red Nissan Sentra on the side of the road and pulled the defendant over. Id. at
(¶5). The officer found cocaine in the defendant’s possession and arrested him. Id. at (¶6).
After being released on bond, the defendant sold drugs to a confidential informant and was
arrested for the sale of a controlled substance. Id. at (¶7). The defendant was convicted for
both the sale of a controlled substance and possession of cocaine. Id. at (¶8). On appeal, the
defendant argued that he was prejudiced by the hearsay testimony obtained from law
enforcement regarding the anonymous tips. Id. at 380 (¶33). This Court found that the
testimony was admissible and stated the following:
The evidence used to accuse Hill was not the various statements of anonymous
tipsters but the evidence acquired by [the officer] which resulted in Hill's
arrest. [The officer], for all practical purposes of this issue, was the accuser
and [the officer] was confronted and cross-examined by Hill at trial.
Id. at (¶37). The Court held that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but the statement simply explained why law
enforcement approached the defendant. Id. at (¶36).
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¶9.
Similarly, in Arnold, an informant called police and reported that the defendant was
driving a truck in an erratic manner and almost ran the informant off the road. Arnold, 809
So. 2d at 755 (¶3). An officer proceeded to the area and observed the defendant’s reckless
driving and initiated a traffic stop. Id. As a result of failing the field sobriety tests, the
defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. Id. at (¶4). On appeal, the defendant
argued that the lower court erred when it allowed the officer to testify in regard to the
informant’s statement because it was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 758 (¶16). This Court
found that the officer’s testimony was admissible because it was offered to show why the
officer responded to the complaint and why the officer was present at the scene at that
particular time, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at (¶19). Additionally, the
Court found that the statement was properly admitted because the trial judge instructed the
jury that the statement could not be considered as proof that the defendant was driving under
the influence. Id.
¶10.
In the instant case, Officer Boyd testified that the informant told him that he
witnessed a black male on a mini-bike give crack cocaine to a white female. Like Hill and
Arnold, Officer Boyd’s statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
to implicate Jenkins in a drug sale. In fact, Jenkins was not charged with the sale of cocaine.
Instead, Officer Boyd’s statement simply explained why he and Officer Sanders proceeded
to the area where they found Jenkins and why they noticed Jenkins on the mini-bike. As in
Hill, Jenkins was not arrested, indicted, or convicted based upon the statement made by the
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anonymous tipster. Instead, Jenkins was convicted based upon the evidence Officer Boyd
and Officer Sanders acquired during their pursuit of him, and Jenkins had the opportunity
to cross-examine both officers during the trial. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err
by denying Jenkins’s motion in limine and objections to testimony regarding information
obtained from the unidentified tipster. This issue is without merit.
II. Whether the trial court erred by giving jury instructions S-2 and S-3,
which included the weight of the cocaine.
¶11.
In reviewing the grant or denial of jury instructions, the jury instructions actually
given must be read as a whole. Taylor v. State, 841 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App.
2003) (citing Fultz v. State, 822 So. 2d 994, 997 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). If the
instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error
will be found. Id.
¶12.
Jenkins argues that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions S-2 and S-3, which
included the weight of the cocaine, because the weight of the cocaine was irrelevant and
prejudiced him with the jury. Jury instruction S-2 instructed the jury to find the defendant
guilty of possession of cocaine if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins
willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly possessed 4.27 grams of cocaine and to find Jenkins
not guilty if the State failed to prove their case. Jury instruction S-3 instructed the jury how
to return the verdict: “We, the jury, find the Defendant guilty of Possession of Cocaine
(4.27g)”; or “We, the jury, find the Defendant not guilty.”
¶13.
Jenkins failed to cite to any authority to support his claim that inclusion of the weight
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of the cocaine in the jury instructions was error. “[F]ailure to cite any authority may be
treated as a procedural bar, and we are under no obligation to consider the assignment [of
error].” Turner v. State, 721 So. 2d 642, 648 (¶20) (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted). Despite
this procedural bar, we will address the merits of Jenkins’s argument.
¶14.
Jenkins was indicted for and convicted of possession of 4.27 grams of cocaine in
violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(c) (Rev. 2005), which states in
pertinent part that:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess any
controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or
pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this
article. . . .
The statute also provides a sentencing scheme based upon the amount of the controlled
substance found in the defendant’s possession. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(1).
When granting the two jury instructions, the trial judge noted that the weight of the cocaine
was not required in the jury instructions. However, the trial judge noted that including the
weight of the cocaine in the instructions did not prejudice Jenkins because the weight of the
cocaine had already been presented to the jury through the indictment and through testimony
by the police officers and the Mississippi Crime Laboratory personnel.
¶15.
This Court has found that section 41-29-139 does not specify a minimum amount of
cocaine in order to constitute a crime. Carroll v. State, 755 So. 2d 483, 485 (¶5) (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding that cocaine residue found on syringes provided a sufficient basis for
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the conviction of possession of cocaine) (citing Hampton v. State, 498 So. 2d 384, 386
(Miss. 1986)). We have found no authority indicating that the inclusion of the weight of
cocaine in a jury instruction constitutes error, and Jenkins has not presented any evidence
that the jury was prejudiced by the inclusion. In reviewing the instructions as a whole, we
find that the instructions were an adequate representation of the law and find no error in the
trial court’s decision to allow the jury instructions. Therefore, we find that Jenkins’s
argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶16.
We find that the trial court did not err by denying Jenkins’s motion in limine and
objections to exclude testimony regarding the unidentified tipster’s statement to Officer
Boyd because the statement was admissible to show why Officer Boyd and Officer Sanders
proceeded to the area where they found Jenkins and why the officers noticed Jenkins on the
mini-bike. Additionally, we find that Jenkins’s argument that the trial court erred by
including the weight of the cocaine in the jury instructions is without merit. For these
reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY
OF CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND SENTENCE OF FIVE
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITH TWO YEARS SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF
REPORTING PROBATION, AND TO PAY A FINE OF $1,000 AND A CRIME LAB
FEE IN THE AMOUNT OF $300, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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