Stacy Hicks v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-00696-COA
STACY HICKS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
03/30/2007
HON. ROBERT WALTER BAILEY
CLARKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
LESLIE S. LEE
BRENDA JACKSON PATTERSON
EARL P. JORDAN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
BILBO MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER
WITH NO ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR
PROBATION
AFFIRMED - 08/12/2008
EN BANC.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On February 26, 2007, Stacy Hicks (Hicks) was convicted of aggravated domestic violence.
He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. Hicks now appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial
court erred by allowing improper opinion testimony from a lay witness. Finding no error, we affirm
Hicks’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2.
On October 28, 2005, Hicks was living with his seventy-two-year-old mother, Villa Hicks
(Villa), after serving time in jail. Hicks had an appointment that morning with his dentist. To
prepare for his appointment, Hicks began ironing a suit in the living area of the home. Hicks’s
mother was close by in her recliner, drinking her morning coffee. Villa and Hicks had an argument
about the suit Hicks planned to wear to the appointment. Villa believed the suit belonged to one of
her grandchildren, while Hicks claimed to have purchased the suit from that grandchild.
¶3.
The discussion then turned to the subject of paying bills. Hicks, apparently angered by the
discussion, folded up the ironing board, and then began to beat his mother with it. Villa testified that
Hicks hit her three or four times while she was still sitting in her chair and then three or four more
times after she fell to the floor.
¶4.
Villa testified that she asked Hicks to call 911 to get medical help for her, but he refused.
Hicks left his mother on the floor, went back to his bedroom to put his suit on, and then left the
house on foot. Villa tried to call 911 for herself, but her phone would not work. She was able to
walk to a neighbor’s house to call for help. Once help arrived, Villa was transported to the hospital
for the treatment of her injuries. Villa’s injuries required several stitches, and she was hospitalized
for two days. Further, one of her eyes was so badly injured that she no longer has sight in it. Villa’s
wounds were photographed, and the scene of the assault was also photographed.
¶5.
Hicks was arrested and charged with aggravated domestic violence or, alternatively, the
lesser crime of simple assault; he was also charged as a habitual offender. Hicks claimed that he
acted in self-defense, responding to his mother’s threats of violence with a steak knife. During
2
questioning by police, Hicks indicated that he had injuries from the altercation, and the officer
photographed those injuries.
¶6.
At trial, the State called three witnesses: (1) Villa; (2) Ann Follins, the neighbor who helped
Villa call the police; and (3) Officer J.G. Kufel. Officer Kufel is the investigator who photographed
the crime scene and the wounds on Villa and Hicks. Hicks testified in his own defense and was the
only witness for the defense.
DISCUSSION
¶7.
Hicks raises only one issue for our review on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred
in allowing into evidence portions of Officer Kufel’s testimony which refuted his claim of selfdefense. Hicks argues that because Officer Kufel’s opinion testimony was based on his years of
experience as a law enforcement officer, it should have been excluded because Officer Kufel had
not been qualified as an expert witness.
¶8.
The State contends that the issue is procedurally barred due to Hicks’s failure to raise an
objection to the testimony at trial or in his motion for a new trial. The State cites to Spicer v. State,
921 So. 2d 292, 305 (¶22) (Miss. 2006) for the proposition that raising a specific objection as to one
or more specific grounds before the trial court waives all other grounds for objection. Hicks’s
objection, the State argues, was insufficient because it did not specifically refer to Rule 702 of the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
¶9.
The problematic portion of Officer Kufel’s testimony occurred during direct examination by
the State. That portion of Officer Kufel’s testimony is as follows:
Q. Okay. And you photographed those because [Hicks] pointed them out to you?
Did he point those out to you?
A. Actually, when he told me that [Villa] had attacked him, then I wanted to see if
3
[Hicks] had any injuries on him, and we asked [Hicks] at the jail about any injuries
he had. And at that time, I told him I wanted to photograph them, and he allowed us
to photograph them.
Q. Okay. Now, with 18 years of law enforcement experience, someone that got the
injuries that are associated with photograph [p]age 4, 5, and 6, would that – would
[p]hotographs 9 and 10, the photos depicted there, would that corollate [sic] to
defensive wounds to a struggle that is depicted in 4, 5, and 6?
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, we are going to object to the definition of what
she is calling defensive wounds in relation – I don’t think that is a clear question. I
didn’t understand it, anyway.
BY THE COURT: Sustained. I don’t know if he is going to be – I think it probably
would require expert testimony.
Q. Can you compare the wounds from [e]xhibits 9 and 10 as compared to the
wounds that were inflicted on [p]hotograph [p]ages 4, 5, and 6?
A. The wounds on 5 and 6 –
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Object as to compare. What is her question? Can you
compare them? What is the question?
BY THE STATE: Severity, Your Honor. I mean, these are photographs, but he was
actually there to see the wounds. I think his – although the photographs are good
evidence, he was actually there to see the wounds on the person, and I want him to
compare the severity of the injuries to [Villa] as compared to [Hicks].
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: To which gets back to the question of severity, and he
is not qualified.
BY THE COURT: I am not sure I understand the question. Rephrase your question.
....
Q: Would you expect to see the type of injuries that are depicted on [p]ages 9 and 10,
or would you expect to see injuries that are much worse than that, with a knife – if
you are defending yourself in a knife altercation?
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Renew my objection.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. I will let him answer that question, if he can.
4
A: If I understand it correct[ly], the injuries in 9 and 10 appear to be very minor
injuries compared to the [e]xhibits 4, 5, and 6, which are a lot more severe-type
injuries.
Q: All right. But let me ask you this: If someone was defending themselves in a
knife fight from someone with a knife, defending themselves, would you expect to
see the kinds of wounds that are associated with the pictures on [p]ages 9 and 10 or
something worse than that?
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Same objection, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. I will let him answer. The photos speak for
themselves. He will be subject to cross-examination.
A: If they were defending themselves from a knife wound, I would expect to see a
lot more severe injury.
Q: Okay. And in 18 years, have you been associated with cases where people were
defending themselves from knife attacks?
A: Yes, ma’am.
¶10.
It is clear to this Court that Hicks’s counsel raised the objection to Officer Kufel’s testimony
before the trial court. The trial judge sustained Hicks’s first objection, stating, “I think it probably
would require expert testimony.” As the State continued to question Officer Kufel, Hicks continued
to object, arguing, “which gets back to the question of severity, and he is not qualified.” The trial
court overruled Hicks’s objections and allowed the testimony into evidence. We find the issue to
be properly preserved for our review. We now must consider whether the trial court erred in
allowing Officer Kufel’s opinion testimony.
¶11.
This Court has articulated its standard of review in cases where the admission of evidence
is at issue. “We review the admission or exclusion of evidence under the abuse of discretion
standard of review and will not reverse unless a substantial right of the defendant is adversely
affected by the improperly admitted or excluded evidence.” Young v. State, 981 So. 2d 308, 313
5
(¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 113 (¶12)
(Miss. 1999)).
¶12.
Hicks argues that Officer Kufel’s statements were based on his eighteen years of experience
in law enforcement and criminal investigations. Because his testimony was based on his experience
as a law enforcement professional, Hicks argues that Officer Kufel’s testimony should have been
considered expert opinion testimony and subjected to the foundational requirements of Rule 702 of
the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, as well as discovery procedures of Rule 9.04(A)(4) of the
Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court.
¶13.
Hicks cites Ramos v. State, 710 So. 2d 380, (Miss. 1998), in support of his argument that the
testimony should have been excluded. In Ramos, a deputy sheriff testified against the defendant
regarding the street value of marijuana, the typical methods used by drug smugglers to mask the
smell of marijuana, and the freshness of the marijuana seized during the stop. Id. at 387 (¶32). The
supreme court in that case reversed the trial court, holding that the testimony was expert, not lay
testimony. Id. at 388 (¶38).
¶14.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Ramos. The testimony provided by Deputy Bosarge
in Ramos required more expertise than the testimony provided by Officer Kufel. In Ramos, the
testimony went further than just the deputy’s first-hand observations. Deputy Bosarge testified,
based on his experience and training as a law enforcement officer. See Ramos, 710 So. 2d at 387-88
(¶¶33-38). His statements went beyond a description of the items seized and ventured into expert
opinion testimony based on his expertise and experience as a law enforcement officer. See id. at 388
(¶38).
¶15.
As the supreme court in Sample v. State, 643 So. 2d 524, 529 (Miss. 1994) noted, “[t]here
6
is often a very thin line between fact and opinion.” Further, the supreme court held:
There is a bright-line rule. That is, where, in order to express the opinion, the
witness must possess some experience or expertise beyond that of the average,
randomly selected adult, it is a Miss. R. Evid. 702 opinion and not a Rule 701
opinion.
Id. at 529-30 (citing Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367, 377 (Miss. 1992)).
¶16.
In the case at bar, the testimony at issue required only personal observation. No particular
knowledge was necessary for Officer Kufel to compare the severity of Villa’s injuries to the severity
of Hicks’s injuries. Officer Kufel did little more than describe the injuries that he observed firsthand shortly after the assault occurred. His descriptions of the wounds and their relative severity
were factual descriptions and fall within Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701. However, to the extent
that Officer Kufel blurred the line between fact and opinion testimony with regard to his testimony
that he would expect Hicks to have more severe injuries if he had been defending himself against
a knife attack, we find any error to be harmless in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence
of his guilt.
¶17.
“An error is harmless only when it is apparent on the face of the record that a fair-minded
jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty." Young, 981 So. 2d at 313 (¶17)
(quoting Forrest v. State, 335 So. 2d 900, 903 (Miss. 1976)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has
further explained our standard regarding harmless error, stating:
To warrant reversal, two elements must be shown: error, and injury to the party
appealing. Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, and not
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in no way
affects the final outcome of the case; it is prejudicial, and ground for reversal, only
when it affects the final result of the case and works adversely to a substantial right
of the party assigning it. Obviously, in order for the rule of harmless error to be
called into play in support of a judgment, the judgment must be otherwise
supportable, and will be reversed when there is nothing in the pleadings or evidence
to support it.
7
Gray v. State, 799 So. 2d 53, 61 (¶30) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson
v. Jaquith, 224 So. 2d 216, 221 (Miss. 1969)).
¶18.
We find the evidence in the record so overwhelming as to convince us that a fair-minded jury
could have arrived at no other verdict than guilty. The photographs that Officer Kufel identified as
being accurate recordings of the crime scene, the ironing board, and the injuries to the victim and
to the defendant clearly support the verdict. The photograph of the ironing board, which Hicks used
to beat his mother, shows that the ironing board was crumpled at the ends and had a significant
amount of blood on it after the attack. Villa testified at trial that the blood on the ironing board was
hers. The photograph of Villa’s nightgown, which she was wearing at the time of the attack, shows
significant amounts of blood. Follins, Villa’s neighbor, testified at trial that the gown was so soaked
with blood that it was clinging to Villa’s body. Photographs of Villa at the hospital show that she
had significant injuries.
¶19.
The photographs of Hicks’s injuries, however, show that he had only minor scratches
following the attack on his mother. The evidence at trial contradicts his testimony that he acted in
self-defense. Hicks testified that he did not hit his mother with the ironing board; rather, he had only
tried to push her away with it. Hicks testified that when he left his mother in the house after the
attack, she just had “a few nicks” on her. The photographs and testimony contradict both of those
claims. Further, Officer Kufel testified that when he went to the crime scene to photograph it and
to gather evidence, he did not find a steak knife.
¶20.
An officer is allowed to describe his first-hand observations of injuries. See Seal v. Miller,
605 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 1992) (holding that testimony from an officer that she did not perceive
any evidence to indicate that a car had spun before hitting a pole did not require any special
8
expertise or skill. It was enough that the witness had first-hand knowledge of what was present at
the scene). However, officers may not give expert testimony without first being qualified under
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702. To the extent that Officer Kufel’s testimony regarding the
defensive nature of Hicks’s wounds constituted expert testimony, we find any such error to be
harmless. Therefore, we affirm Hicks’s conviction and sentence.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CLARKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SENTENCE OF LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE
OR PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
CLARKE COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER,
J. ROBERTS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
KING, C.J., DISSENTING:
¶22.
I dissent. With appropriate regard for the majority, I believe it errs in affirming Hicks’s
conviction. As repugnant as the offense charged in this case may be, as an appellate court, it is our
responsibility to resolve the issues presented to us consistent with the applicable law.
¶23.
Hicks and his mother, Villa Hicks, agree that on October 28, 2005, Hicks had been back at
home living with his mother for a week since returning from jail. That morning, Hicks awoke after
his mother. He came out of his room and began ironing a suit. Meanwhile, Villa, Hicks’s seventytwo-year-old mother, was sitting in her recliner drinking her morning coffee. A discussion began
regarding who actually owned the suit. Villa stated it was one of her grandchildren’s suits, while
Hicks alleged that he had bought it from the grandchild.
¶24.
At this point, Hicks and Villa testified to different versions of the events. Villa testified that
the discussion turned to whether Hicks was going to help pay bills. When Hicks finished ironing,
9
he began to fold up the ironing board. After he had folded the ironing board, Hicks then began to
beat her with the ironing board for no reason. She testified that he hit her three to four times while
she was sitting in her chair and then three to four more times after she fell to the floor. Villa testified
that while on the floor, she asked Hicks to call 911; instead, he left her for dead. After he left, she
attempted to call 911 from her phone, but it would not work. She tried to clean some of the blood
off of her, and then she went to a neighbor’s house to call the police. After help arrived, she was
taken to the hospital for treatment of her wounds.
¶25.
Hicks testified to a different version of events. He testified that the disagreement over the
suit caused his mother to come at him with a steak knife. He testified that he hit his mother with the
ironing board only in self-defense while trying to fend off the knife attack.
¶26.
Both parties testified that they received injuries from the altercation that morning. However,
Villa’s injuries were much more severe requiring several stitches to close some of the wounds she
received. In addition, she suffered damage to one eye, which caused her to lose sight in that eye.
Hicks had injuries to his hands and leg. He testified that he received those injuries when Villa tried
to cut him with a steak knife.
¶27.
At trial, only four witnesses were called to testify, three by the State and one by the defense.
Villa, her neighbor, and Officer J.G. Kufel testified for the State. Hicks was the only witness who
testified for the defense. The neighbor’s testimony was merely that Villa came to her house that
morning after having received substantial injuries, especially to her head.
¶28.
The only issue in this case centers around the testimony of Officer Kufel, the officer who
responded to Villa’s call. He took pictures of the scene of the altercation, as well as the injuries to
Hicks and Villa. While on the stand he testified, that from his experience, he expected that wounds,
10
which one would likely receive from defending against a knife attack, would have been more severe
than the ones which Hicks received.
¶29.
The troublesome testimony is found in the following exchange during the State’s direct
examination of Officer Kufel:
Q. Okay. Now, with 18 years of law enforcement experience, someone that got the
injuries that are associated with photograph [p]age 4, 5, and 6, would that - - would
[p]hotographs 9 and 10, the photos depicted there, would that correlate to defensive
wounds to a struggle that is depicted in 4, 5, and 6?
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, we are going to object to the definition of what
she is calling defensive wounds in relation - - I don’t think that is a clear question.
I didn’t understand it, anyway.
BY THE COURT: Sustained. I don’t know if he is going to be - - I think it probably
would require expert testimony.
Q. Can you compare the wounds from [e]xhibits 9 and 10 as compared to the
wounds that were inflicted on [p]hotograph [p]ages 4, 5, and 6?
A. The wounds on 5 and 6 - BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Object as to compare. What is her question? Can you
compare them? What is the question?
Q. Severity, Your Honor. I mean, these are photographs, but he was actually there
to see the wounds. I think his - - although the photographs are good evidence, he
was actually there to actually see the wounds on the person, and I want him to
compare the severity of the injuries to [Villa] as compared to [Hicks].
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: To which gets back to the question of severity, and he
is not qualified.
BY THE COURT: I am not sure I understand the question. Rephrase your question.
....
Q. Would you expect to see the type of injuries that are depicted on pages 9 and 10,
or would you expect to see injuries that are much worse than that, with a knife - - if
you are defending yourself in a knife altercation?
11
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Renew my objection.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. I will let him answer that question, if he can.
A. If I understand it correct [sic], the [Hicks’s injuries] appear to be very minor
injuries compared to [Villa’s injuries] which are a lot more severe-type injuries.
Q. All right. But let me ask you this: If someone was defending themselves in a
knife fight from someone with a knife, defending themselves, would you expect to
see the kinds of wounds that are associated with the pictures [of Hicks’s wounds] or
something worse than that?
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL: Same objection, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. I will let him answer. The photos speak for
themselves. He will be subject to cross-examination.
A. If they were defending themselves from a knife wound, I would expect to see a
lot more severe injury.
Q. Okay. And in 18 years, have you been associated with cases where people were
defending themselves from knife attacks?
A. Yes, ma’am.
¶30.
Hicks alleges that Officer Kufel’s opinion testimony in reference to the types of wounds that
would be inflicted upon someone defending himself in a knife fight was expert testimony based
upon Officer Kufel’s training and eighteen years of experience as a law enforcement officer.
Therefore, Officer Kufel should have been classified as an expert witness and subjected to the
appropriate foundational and discovery requirements. For support, Hicks cites to Ramos v. State,
710 So. 2d 380 (Miss. 1998).
¶31.
In Ramos, a deputy testified as a lay witness as to the street value of marijuana, the method
used by drug smugglers to transport marijuana, and that the marijuana found was fresh when it was
opened. Id. at 387 (¶32). The supreme court found that since his testimony was based upon “some
experience or expertise beyond that of the average, randomly selected adult, the opinion is [expert
12
testimony] and not [lay testimony].” Id. at 388 (¶37) (citing Couch v. City of D’Iberville, 656 So.
2d 146, 153 (Miss. 1995)). Therefore, the supreme court held that the deputy’s testimony should
have been subject to the foundational requirements of Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence
and the discovery requirements of Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit Court. Id. at (¶¶3738).1
¶32.
In this case, Officer Kufel was asked if the wounds Hicks received were the same kinds of
wounds that an individual would receive while defending himself from being attacked with a knife.
He responded, “If they were defending themselves from a knife wound, I would expect to see a lot
more severe injury.” The State then asked, “And in 18 years, have you been associated with cases
where people were defending themselves from knife attacks?” During the exchange about Hicks’s
wounds, the State twice referenced Officer Kufel’s eighteen-year experience when discussing
whether Hicks’s wounds appeared to be defensive from a knife altercation. Clearly, the State
successfully sought expert opinion testimony from Officer Kufel as to the severity of Hicks’s
wounds, as opposed to lay testimony based upon ordinary observation. Officer Kufel could have
described the wounds received by Villa and Hicks since he actually viewed both sets of wounds,
and perhaps provided some limited comparison. However, absent the proper foundation, he was not
qualified under our rules to give an expert opinion based on his law enforcement experience as to
whether the wounds Hicks received were defensive wounds from a knife altercation.
¶33.
Therefore, his opinion crossed the line from permissive lay opinion into expert opinion, and
the trial court should have sustained Hicks’s objection at the very least to the State’s question, “All
right. But let me ask you this: If someone was defending themselves in a knife fight from someone
1
Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit Court is now Rule 9.04 of the Uniform Rules
of Circuit and County Court.
13
with a knife, defending themselves, would you expect to see the kinds of wounds that are associated
with the pictures [of Hicks’s wounds] or something worse than that?” In addition, it is unclear from
the record whether Officer Kufel could have been qualified as an expert witness capable of testifying
as to whether the wounds Hicks received were defensive wounds from a knife attack. All that is
clear from the record is that in his eighteen years of law enforcement, Officer Kufel had seen the
wounds of someone who had defended himself from a knife attack.
¶34.
The next issue we must consider is whether the error is harmless. Rule 103(a) of the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence requires that for error to be based on an evidentiary ruling, it must
affect a substantial right of the offended party. “Few, if any, prosecutions have been perfect, and
there can be errors . . . which do not require reversal of a conviction.” Tran v. State, 962 So. 2d
1237, 1246 (¶36) (Miss. 2007). Harmless errors are only those errors “which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed harmless[.]” Id.
at 1247 (¶37). Here, we cannot say that the error was harmless, as it affected Hicks’s right to a fair
trial.
¶35.
This error cannot be classified as harmless due to the nature of the evidence in this case.
Only three people offered testimony relevant to the incident that occurred between Villa and Hicks.
They were Villa, Hicks, and Officer Kufel. The testimony of Villa and Hicks directly contradicted
each other. Villa testified that she was attacked by Hicks without any provocation, while Hicks
testified that he was merely defending himself from Villa’s knife attack. It appears that both Villa
and Hicks received injuries from the incident, with Villa’s injuries being much more severe.
Further, throughout the investigation and at trial, Hicks maintained that he was merely acting in selfdefense from Villa’s knife attack. This case boils down to a “he said, she said” case with Officer
14
Kufel’s testimony fully in support of Villa’s testimony. Therefore, the admission of Officer Kufel’s
opinion as to whether Hicks received defensive wounds affected a substantial right of Hicks, the
right to a fair trial.
¶36.
Due to the limited testimony in this case, the error of admitting Officer Kufel’s opinion
testimony as to whether these were defensive wounds was magnified at trial. I do not believe that
this Court can say with confidence that the opinion of Officer Kufel did not affect the jury’s decision
in this case. Therefore, the conviction should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
¶37.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
CHANDLER, J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
15
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.