Mauyad Mike Alqasim v. Capitol City Hotel Investors, LLC
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-00531-COA
MAUYAD “MIKE” ALQASIM
APPELLANT
v.
CAPITOL CITY HOTEL INVESTORS, LLC D/B/A
HAMPTON INN NORTH AND SECURITY ONE,
INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
02/20/2007
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DEREK L. HALL
MELTON JAMES WEEMS
ROY A. SMITH
TARA STRICKLAND CLIFFORD
MICHAEL J. TARLETON
SHANDA L. LEWIS
CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
AFFIRMED - 08/26/2008
BEFORE LEE, P.J., CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
On December 31, 2003, Mauyad “Mike” Alqasim was unloading his vehicle in the parking
lot of the Hampton Inn North on Briarwood Drive in Jackson, Mississippi at approximately 10:15
p.m. when he was approached by an unknown person and told to “give it up.” The assailant took
Alqasim’s money and jacket and shot him in the left leg. A hotel guest found Alqasim in the parking
lot and called the police and an ambulance.
¶2.
On January 23, 2004, Alqasim filed a complaint in the Hinds County Circuit Court against
Capitol City Hotel Investors, Inc., the owner and operator of Hampton Inn North (“Hampton Inn”).
The complaint alleged negligence against Hampton Inn for failing to keep its guests safe. Security
One, Inc., an independent contractor hired by Hampton Inn to provide security, was later added as
a defendant. Hampton Inn and Security One filed motions for summary judgment. After hearing
arguments from the parties, the circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment. The circuit
court found summary judgment was proper because no genuine issue of material fact was presented
regarding causation.
¶3.
Alqasim now appeals, citing the following issues: (1) genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding Hampton Inn’s and Security One’s duty to him; (2) genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding Hampton Inn’s and Security One’s actual or constructive knowledge of the atmosphere
of violence on the premises; (3) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Hampton Inn’s and
Security One’s breach of the duty of care; and (4) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
the proximate cause of his injuries. As all the issues relate to whether or not negligence was shown
sufficient to defeat summary judgment, they will be discussed together.
¶4.
Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
In reviewing a lower court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court employs a de novo
standard of review. Anglado v. Leaf River Forest Prods., 716 So. 2d 543, 547 (¶13) (Miss. 1998).
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
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of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court will consider all of the evidence before the lower court in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Palmer v. Anderson Infirmary Benevolent Ass’n, 656
So. 2d 790, 794 (Miss. 1995). The party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” M.R.C.P. 56(e).
“[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of
the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 678, 684 (Miss. 1987).
DISCUSSION
¶6.
Alqasim argues that the trial court’s finding of a lack of causation between the alleged breach
of duty and his injury was in error, and summary judgment was not appropriate.
¶7.
Three elements must be shown in analyzing negligence in premises liability cases: “first, the
court must determine the status of the injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser; second, based
on the injured’s status, the court must determine what duty the landowner/business operator owed
the injured party; and third, the court must determine whether the landowner/business operator
breached the duty owed the injured party.” Thomas v. The Columbia Group, LLC, 969 So. 2d 849,
852 (¶11) (Miss. 2007).
¶8.
We find that Alqasim’s status when he was injured was that of an invitee. An invitee is one
who “enters the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or
occupant for their mutual advantage.” Id. at (¶12). At the time of the injury, Alqasim was a paying
guest of the hotel; thus, he was an invitee of Hampton Inn. As an invitee, Hampton Inn owed
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Alqasim, “a duty of reasonable care to protect its patrons from attacks by third parties while they
are on its premises.” Gatewood v. Sampson, 812 So. 2d 212, 219 (¶13) (Miss. 2002). “The duty
imposed upon a business proprietor to protect a patron from assaults by other patrons is that the
business owner, though not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, has a duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect the invitee from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons.” Id. (quoting
Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So. 2d 397, 399 (Miss. 1991)).
¶9.
We will first examine if Security One owed a duty to Alqasim, and if so, did Security One
breach that duty. Since the contract to provide security services was between Security One and
Hampton Inn, Alqasim must first be deemed to be a third-party beneficiary to the contract before
liability is found against Security One. “In order for the third person beneficiary to have a cause of
action, the contracts between the original parties must have been entered into for his benefit, or at
least such benefit must be the direct result of the performance within the contemplation of the parties
as shown by its terms.” Rein v. Benchmark Constr. Co., 865 So. 2d 1134, 1146 (¶38) (Miss. 2004)
(citation omitted). That is, the right of a third party to a contract to maintain an action “must spring
from the terms of the contract itself.” Id. The service agreement between Hampton Inn and Security
One states that Security One will “provide uniformed personnel and equipment to provide services
at Client’s premises . . . .” Security One’s mission statement regarding its responsibilities to
Hampton Inn states, “It is our responsibility to maintain the highest level of protection and safety
for the employees, property[,] and guests.” One of Security One’s duties under the contract was to
protect guests of Hampton Inn. We agree with the trial court that as a guest of Hampton Inn,
Alqasim was a third-party beneficiary to the contract with Security One.
¶10.
Security One’s standard operating procedures and on-site duties overview states, “The
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function of the Security Officer primarily involves the monitoring of the parking lots and the hotel
interior using high visibility as a deterrent.” Security One used a “Deggy” system to track the
general location of its guards. The Deggy system is a computer-based program with small buttons
placed around the premises in locations selected by Hampton Inn. The guards carry hand-held
wands which they use to touch the buttons with as they walk near them. A report then can be
generated for the client showing the time and area patrolled.
¶11.
Alqasim asserts three arguments to show that Security One breached the applicable standard
of care owed to him on the night of the shooting. First, he argues that some of the buttons in the
Deggy system were not working; thus, a jury could find that Security One breached the applicable
standard of care in failing to provide proper security. To support his argument, Alqasim points to
a few entries in the report generated by the Deggy system that stated, “button not registered.”
According to Wes Scrape, the general manager of Hampton Inn, this meant that either the button had
become not registered or that the name of the button was not correctly inputted. We find this
argument to be without merit as all the other buttons were pressed three times in the hour before the
shooting as was consistent with the standard operating procedures.
¶12.
Second, Alqasim argues that the security was “inept, at best,” because the lock on the door
to the west entrance of the hotel, near where he was shot, was broken, allowing anyone to enter the
hotel. One of the duties of the security guards was to check all doors, other than storage doors, and
to look for doors that may be unlocked, ajar, or not functioning properly. While it is possible that
Security One was negligent in its duty to check all the doors, this breach of duty must also be the
proximate cause of Alqasim’s injuries. Alqasim was not injured inside the hotel, and the assailant
never entered the hotel. Alqasim was robbed and shot in the parking lot of the hotel. Thus, the
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broken lock was not the proximate cause of Alqasim’s injury, and this argument also fails to create
a genuine issue of material fact.
¶13.
Third, Alqasim points out that according to the Deggy system, the last patrol of the parking
lot occurred at 10:01 p.m., at least fifteen minutes before the incident. Alqasim argues that the
failure to patrol the parking lot more frequently could be determined by a jury to be a breach of the
applicable standard of care. According to Scrape, a security guard and his supervisor were on duty
at the time of the shooting. Scrape testified that the security guard and his supervisor were speaking
to each other in the front area of the hotel when the incident occurred. The shooting occurred
between 10:15 and 10:30 p.m. on the northwest side of the building. According to Scrape, the
security guard was “just on the northwest side of where the incident occurred” based on the report
generated by the Deggy system. In the hour prior to the assault, the parking lot had been patrolled
three times, as required by the standard operating procedures. The Deggy report showed that the
guard touched the northwest light-pole button at 9:48 p.m., the west light-pole at 10:00 p.m., and
the northwest light-pole again at 10:01 p.m. We find no breach by Security One of its duty to have
a security guard make three rounds per hour in the parking lot. Further, Alqasim cannot show that
more patrols per hour would have prevented him from being robbed and shot on Hampton Inn’s
premises.
¶14.
We cannot find any genuine issue of material fact that would be sufficient to defeat Security
One’s motion for summary judgment. The “duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee
from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons” is placed on the owner of the
business. Gatewood, 812 So. 2d at 219 (¶13). Security One had no ownership interest in Hampton
Inn; thus, Security One did not owe a duty to Alqasim beyond the terms and conditions of its
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security contract.
¶15.
Finally, we find no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Hampton Inn acted
negligently. Alqasim argues that Hampton Inn knew that an atmosphere of violence existed on the
premises, yet it failed to put into place security procedures that would adequately protect its guests.
To support his argument, Alqasim introduced the affidavit of Tyrone Lewis, a security expert and
former police commander with the Jackson Police Department. Lewis’s affidavit makes general
statements and broad conclusions as to Hampton Inn’s negligence. For example, Alqasim’s expert
designation states that Lewis was expected to testify, inter alia, that Hampton Inn “knew or should
have known that an atmosphere of violence existed”; “did not provide adequate security”; “had no
surveillance cameras in place”; “should have provided a fenced-in parking area”; “should have
provided for additional trained officers”; should have foreseen the incident “in light of the
atmosphere of violence which existed on the premises”; and should have known that the “security
measures provided . . . were unreasonable, inappropriate[,] and unsatisfactory for a hotel property
of similar size and location.”
¶16.
These assertions are not sufficient to show that any action or inaction of Hampton Inn caused
Alqasim’s injury. Alqasim has not shown that if the security was somehow different, the incident
would not have occurred. Therefore, we find that Alqasim has failed to present any evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby avoiding summary judgment.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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