Kathleen W. Heaney v. Thomas F. Hewes, M.D.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-01083-COA
KATHLEEN W. HEANEY
APPELLANT
v.
THOMAS F. HEWES, M.D. AND WILLIAM L.
SEIDENSTICKER, M.D.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
04/25/2007
HON. JERRY O. TERRY, SR.
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOSEPH E. ROBERTS
GRADY L. MCCOOL
HARRY R. ALLEN
ROSS DOUGLAS VAUGHN
CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS
AFFIRMED - 09/30/2008
EN BANC.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Kathleen W. Heaney sued Dr. Thomas F. Hewes and Dr. William L. Seidensticker for
medical malpractice. During voir dire, several members of the venire indicated that they had
either direct or indirect professional contact with Dr. Hewes and/or Dr. Seidensticker.
Heaney requested that the circuit court excuse those members of the venire for cause, but the
circuit court declined to excuse some of those jurors. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict
for Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker, and Heaney filed unsuccessful post-trial motions.
Aggrieved, Heaney now appeals and claims the circuit court erred when it did not remove
all prospective jurors who had prior contacts with Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker. Finding
no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
Heaney underwent surgery to replace her right hip. Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker
performed that surgery. Heaney later sued Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker for medical
malpractice. According to Heaney, Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker did not properly
perform the hip replacement surgery, and she suffered multiple hip dislocations as a result.
Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker denied that they committed medical malpractice, and the
matter proceeded to trial in the Harrison County Circuit Court.
¶3.
During the circuit court’s voir dire of the venire, many prospective jurors indicated
that they personally – or members of their family – had been treated by Dr. Hewes or Dr.
Seidensticker. Eight members of the venire had personally been treated by either Dr. Hewes
or Dr. Seidensticker. Two members of the venire had personally been patients of Dr. Hewes.
Those members of the venire were James Webb and Mary Ann Blount. Six members of the
venire had been patients of Dr. Seidensticker: Keith Starita, David Mohler, Jan White, Ruby
Necaise, William Jackson, and Lana Hoda. Additionally, Mohler’s mother had been treated
by Dr. Seidensticker.
¶4.
Aside from Mohler, eight additional members of the venire had a family member who
had been a patient of Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker. Dr. Hewes had treated a family
member of six members of the venire: Donna Winstead, Theresa Wilson, Susan Beckham,
Kelle Mayfield, Nancy Peterson, and Nancy Graben. Mayfield and Peterson also each had
2
a family member who had been treated by Dr. Seidensticker. Additional voir dire by the
circuit court and counsel for Heaney resulted in more information about those prior contacts,
which will be discussed later.
¶5.
During the challenges for cause portion of jury selection, the circuit court mentioned
that it had notes on several jurors that were potential candidates to excuse for cause. The
circuit court excused juror fifteen, Kathy Hanephin, because Hanephin expressed an opinion
that damages should be limited in medical malpractice cases. The circuit court also excused
juror twenty-three, Francesca McKay, because McKay would have to go out-of-town soon.
The circuit court later excused juror thirty-nine, Gearldine Williams, for the same reason.
Next, the circuit court excused juror twenty-six, Jan White, for cause. Heaney’s stated
reason for challenging White was “[s]he said that she could not put out of her mind the
limits.” The circuit court then added, “she or some member of her family also was treated
by . . . Dr. Seidensticker.” 1
¶6.
After the circuit court excused White from the jury, the circuit court stated that it had
juror twenty-seven, Ashley Harris, “marked as possible cause.”
Counsel for Heaney
requested that Harris be excused for cause since “[s]he said she could not set her personal
feelings aside . . . with regard to caps.” The circuit court added that Harris had a conflict
with her employer that might interfere with her duties as a juror. Accordingly, the circuit
court excused Harris. Next, the circuit court mentioned that it “made a notation about cause
1
It is unclear whether White’s prior contact with Dr. Seidensticker was one of the
reasons the circuit court struck White. Based on the circuit court’s statement, it seems
appropriate to assume that her prior contact was at least one of the circuit court’s reasons for
excusing her for cause.
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on Niki Burwell, Dr. Burwell’s wife. He’s an orthopedic [physician].” Heaney’s attorney
challenged Burwell, and the circuit court excused her for cause.
¶7.
Following the circuit court’s removal of Burwell for cause, Heaney’s attorney
challenged juror thirty-five, Peterson, and juror thirty-six, Carmon Gaines. During voir dire,
Peterson’s responses indicated that both Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker had previously
treated people in her family. Peterson also stated that she had previously sat on a jury in a
medical malpractice case. According to Peterson, that jury returned a verdict for the
defendant physicians.
Peterson also expressed her opinion that “there should be a
predetermined limit on the amount of damages [one] can recover in a lawsuit against a
doctor[.]” Like Peterson, Gaines indicated that there should be a limit to the damages one
can recover in a lawsuit against a doctor. The circuit court struck Gaines for cause, but
declined to strike Peterson. According to the circuit court, “just because [the jury on which
Peterson sat] ruled for the defendants, I don’t think that that gives any reason for a cause
challenge. So [Peterson will] remain.”
¶8.
The circuit court then stated, “[n]ow I see nothing on any of the rest of them that
would indicate to me that they should be struck for cause, but that doesn’t limit you if you
want to try it.” Counsel for Heaney then challenged all members of the venire that had a
previous relationship with Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker. Heaney’s attorney also attempted
to have juror seventeen, Mohler, struck for cause. Heaney’s attorney mistakenly thought that
Mohler had been treated by Dr. Hewes, and that Mohler’s son had been treated by Dr.
Seidensticker. In fact, Mohler’s voir dire responses indicated that he and a member of his
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family had been a patient of Dr. Seidensticker.2 In any event, the circuit court declined to
strike Mohler for cause. Likewise, the circuit court declined to strike all members of the
venire that had prior contacts, directly or indirectly, with Dr. Hewes and/or Dr. Seidensticker.
The circuit court’s stated reasoning was that “I’m not going to strike the others because I’d
almost have to strike the whole panel.”
¶9.
To summarize, the circuit court excused seven jurors for cause – one of whom had
been previously treated by Dr. Seidensticker. However, the circuit court refused two of
Heaney’s attorney’s specific challenges for cause. That is, the circuit court refused to strike
Peterson and Mohler for cause. The circuit court also declined to strike all members of the
venire with prior direct or indirect contact with Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker.
¶10.
At that point, the parties moved along to the peremptory challenge portion of jury
selection. Counsel for Heaney used peremptory challenges on (1) juror two, Webb; (2) juror
seven, Winstead; and (3) juror twelve, Wilson.
Heaney’s attorney declined to use a
peremptory challenge on juror sixteen, Starita, because “although he has been a previous
patient of Dr. Seidensticker, . . . if we did take our peremptory challenge on him, the next
person we would get is David Mohler . . . [a]nd we would therefore still have a . . . previous
patient of one of the defendants on the jury.” Counsel for Heaney then tendered the panel
2
Mohler indicated that at some unspecified time prior to the trial, Dr. Seidensticker
had performed a hip replacement surgery on his mother. Mohler also indicated that his
mother had “problems with dislocations.” Additionally, Dr. Seidensticker performed knee
surgery for Mohler at some unspecified time prior to the trial. Counsel for Heaney asked
Mohler, “would that weigh on your mind that you had seen Dr. Seidensticker and your mom
had seen Dr. Seidensticker?” Mohler answered, “[n]o, sir.” Later, counsel for Heaney
asked, “there’s nothing about the relationship that would make you favor Dr. Seidensticker?”
Again, Mohler responded, “[n]o.”
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to counsel for Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker.
¶11.
After counsel for Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker exercised their four peremptory
challenges, the panel was tendered back to Heaney’s attorney. Heaney’s attorney used his
last peremptory challenge on Mohler. As for the alternates, neither of the two alternates had
prior contact with Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker. However, one juror, Starita, personally
saw Dr. Seidensticker fifteen years prior to the trial.
The record reflects that Dr.
Seidensticker performed some surgical procedure for Starita, but the precise procedure is
unclear beyond that it was not a hip replacement surgery. When asked whether his prior
experience would cause him to favor Dr. Seidensticker, Starita answered, “[n]ot at all.”
¶12.
The transcript before us is restricted to the events related to jury selection. Thus, we
are unaware of anything that occurred at trial beyond voir dire and jury selection. The jury
ultimately returned a verdict for Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker. Heaney appeals and
claims the circuit court erred when it declined to excuse all jurors who had prior direct or
indirect contact with Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13.
“Article 3, § 14 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantees due process of law,
including a fair and impartial trial.” Brown by & Through Webb v. Blackwood, 697 So. 2d
763, 769 (Miss. 1997). The circuit court has an absolute duty to see that the jury selected to
try any case is fair, impartial, and competent. Id. (citing Scott v. Ball, 595 So. 2d 848, 850
(Miss. 1992); King v. State, 421 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (Miss. 1982)). Where, as here, we review
a circuit court’s decision whether to excuse a potential juror for cause, we are mindful that
circuit courts have “wide discretion in determining whether to excuse any prospective juror,
6
including one challenged for cause.”
Brown, 697 So. 2d at 769 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we will reverse the circuit court only where its decision is clearly erroneous or
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Burnett v. Fulton, 854 So. 2d 1010, 1013
(¶7) (Miss. 2003) (citations omitted). We defer to the circuit court due to its relative
proximity to the venire during voir dire and the fact that the circuit court is in a better
position to measure the prospective jurors’ responses. Id.
ANALYSIS
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLINED TO ALLOW
HEANEY’S REQUEST TO EXCUSE SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE VENIRE FOR
CAUSE.
¶14.
Heaney claims the circuit court committed reversible error when it did not grant her
challenges for cause. Sixteen members of the fifty-three-person venire had direct or indirect
prior professional contacts with Dr. Hewes and/or Dr. Seidensticker. According to Heaney,
the circuit court should have excused those people for cause or taken other remedial
measures to ameliorate those people’s influence over the rest of the venire.
¶15.
In Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So. 2d 359, 361-62 (Miss. 1989), twelve people out of the
twenty-five-person venire had contacts with the defendant doctor, his medical partners, or
his attorney. The plaintiff unsuccessfully requested that the circuit court excuse for cause
every member of the venire who had such prior contacts. Id. at 362. The Mississippi
Supreme Court held that there was a “statistical aberration” in the number of jurors who had
previously been treated by the defendant in Hudson. Id. at 364. The supreme court went on
to hold that the circuit court should have: (1) afforded counsel more peremptory challenges;
(2) increased the size of the venire “as well as affording additional challenges”; or (3)
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sustained at least some of the challenges for cause. Id. at 363. Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id.
at 364. Hudson suggests that the proper resolution is to reverse the circuit court based solely
on the number of jurors who had prior contacts with Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker and the
circuit court’s decision not to take remedial measures to ameliorate the influence such
members of the venire could have on the jury. However, a more recent decision by the
Mississippi Supreme Court suggests that jurors with prior contacts should not be per se
summarily excused for cause.
¶16.
In Hamilton v. Hammons, 792 So. 2d 956, 962 (¶28) (Miss. 2001), “several of
twenty-three potential jurors noted that they knew one of five plaintiffs or counsel for the
plaintiffs.” “Moreover, some of those potential jurors further stated that if they had to hire
a lawyer, they would hire [counsel for the plaintiffs].” Id. Counsel for the defendant
challenged six of those jurors for cause, but the circuit court declined to excuse all such
members of the venire. Id. at 962-63 (¶31). After a successful verdict for the plaintiffs, the
defendant appealed and claimed, among other things, that the circuit court erred when it did
not excuse for cause all members of the venire who had prior contacts with the plaintiffs or
their attorney. Id. at 958-59 (¶¶2-3, 10).
¶17.
The supreme court noted that, after peremptory challenges, only one juror that the
plaintiff attempted to have removed for cause sat on the jury. Id. at 964 (¶37). That juror
previously stated that she would seek out the plaintiff’s attorney if she needed legal
representation.
Id.
However, that juror had not sought out the plaintiff’s attorney’s
representation in the past. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court declined to find reversible
8
error. Id. at (¶38). In so doing, the supreme court stated that there are two competing forces
“that enter into the equation as to the impartiality of a juror.” Id. at 963 (¶34). The first
“force” is “the factor or circumstance which tends to indicate a potential for bias on the part
of that juror.” Id. The second “force” is “the juror’s promise that he or she can and will be
impartial.” Id. The supreme court went on to state:
To the extent that any juror, because of his relationship to one of the parties,
his occupation, his past experience, or whatever, would normally lean in favor
of one of the parties, or be biased against the other, or one's claim or the other's
defense in the lawsuit, to this extent, of course, his ability to be fair and
impartial is impaired. It should also be borne in mind that jurors take their
oaths and responsibilities seriously, and when a prospective juror assures the
court that, despite the circumstance that raises some question as to his
qualification, this will not affect his verdict, this promise is entitled to
considerable deference . . . . These varied imponderables make selection of
jurors a judgment call peculiarly within the province of the circuit judge, and
one we will not on appeal second guess in the absence of a record showing a
clear abuse of discretion.
Id.
¶18.
Though Hudson suggests that, without more, the circuit court committed reversible
error by declining to strike all jurors with prior contacts to the defendants, Hamilton states
otherwise. The supreme court did not distinguish Hudson and Hamilton based on the fact
that a physician was the defendant in Hudson, and the defendant was not a physician in
Hamilton. Accordingly, that the defendants in this case are retired physicians is of no
moment, and we therefore balance the competing forces as mentioned in Hamilton.
Hamilton, 792 So. 2d at 963 (¶34). Further, Hamilton specifically states that the circuit
court’s decision is entitled to “considerable deference.” Id. at 964 (¶37).
¶19.
Out of fifty-three specifically mentioned members of the venire, sixteen veniremen
9
had direct or indirect contacts with one or both of the defendants. In Hudson, twelve of
twenty-five veniremen had prior contacts with the defendant, his partners, or his attorney.
Consequently, there is no severe “statistical aberration” in this case – at least not to the
degree as in Hudson. Additionally, both Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker were retired at the
time of the trial. Thus, no member of the venire had an ongoing doctor/patient relationship
with one of the defendants, and there was no risk that a member of the venire would be
influenced by the possibility of future treatment by one of them.
¶20.
Though it is not singularly outcome determinative in this case, it bears mentioning that
Heaney’s attorney did not request that the circuit court grant him additional peremptory
challenges, nor did he request that the circuit court increase the size of the venire – which are
both curative steps the circuit court might consider under Hudson. Hudson, 546 So. 2d at
363. Additionally, Heaney’s attorney only challenged two specifically named members of
the venire for cause on the basis of their prior contacts with Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker.
That is, while counsel for Heaney generally attempted to have all members of the venire with
prior contacts removed for cause, he only challenged for cause two members of the venire
on any specific basis.
¶21.
What is more, Peterson and Mohler both indicated that their prior experiences would
not cause them to be partial toward Dr. Hewes or Dr. Seidensticker, and neither one of them
sat on the jury. Mohler’s voir dire responses indicated that he and his mother had been
treated by Dr. Seidensticker. However, Mohler did not state that he would believe Dr.
Seidensticker over anyone else. Based on Mohler’s voir dire responses, Mohler could have
just as easily been biased against Dr. Seidensticker based on Dr. Seidensticker’s having
10
performed hip replacement surgery on his mother and his mother’s subsequent problem with
dislocations. That is, one could reasonably argue that Heaney had more reason to keep
Mohler on the jury in that Mohler could have been sympathetic to Heaney, who suffered
problems similar to his mother.
¶22.
Starita sat on the jury. Starita personally saw Dr. Seidensticker fifteen years prior to
the trial. Dr. Seidensticker performed some unspecified surgical procedure for Starita. The
exact procedure is unclear, but it was not hip replacement surgery. Heaney’s attorney did
not ask Starita how many times he personally saw Dr. Seidensticker, whether he was pleased
or displeased with Dr. Seidensticker’s treatment, whether he formed an opinion of his skills
as a physician from his prior relationship with him, or any other such questions which would
shed light on Starita’s ability to decide the case based solely on the facts and the law. From
the record, it appears that Heaney was not even aware that Dr. Seidensticker assisted Dr.
Hewes during her procedure until after her recovery. As far as we can surmise from the
record, Starita’s relationship with Dr. Seidensticker fifteen years earlier may well have been
the same. Moreover, when asked whether his prior experience would cause him to favor Dr.
Seidensticker, Starita answered, “[n]ot at all.”
¶23.
“[J]urors take their oaths and responsibilities seriously, and when a prospective juror
assures the court that, despite the circumstance that raises some question as to his
qualification, this will not affect his verdict, this promise is entitled to considerable
deference[.]” Hamilton, 792 So. 2d at 963 (¶34). Suffice it to say, we are not prepared to
say that, in general, jurors commit perjury when they promise they can remain impartial. The
jury’s verdict was eleven to one in favor of Dr. Hewes and Dr. Seidensticker. The record
11
only contains the events that took place during jury selection. We do not know how Starita
voted. Regardless of his vote, the result would have been the same.
¶24.
With due respect for the dissent, there is nothing in the record regarding whether
Starita was pleased or displeased with Dr. Seidensticker’s service \as a surgeon. We only
know that, fifteen years prior to Heaney’s trial, Dr. Seidensticker performed some
unspecified surgery on Starita. Whatever opinion Starita had, he swore that his prior
experience would not cause him to favor Dr. Seidensticker. While it is within the realm of
possibilities that Starita could have a favorable impression, based on the voir dire at trial,
there is no reason to reach that conclusion. Dr. Seidensticker was retired at the time of
Heaney’s trial. Starita did not expect that he or anyone in his family would ever again have
a patient/physician relationship with him. There were no circumstances that tended to
“indicate a potential for bias” on Starita’s part. Hamilton, 792 So. 2d at 963 (¶34).
Combined with Starita’s sworn statement that nothing about his experience with Dr.
Seidensticker would cause him to favor Dr. Seidensticker, the circuit court was well within
its discretion when, per Hamilton, it balanced the two competing forces and did not excuse
Starita for cause. Id. After all, these “varied imponderables make selection of jurors a
judgment call peculiarly within the province of the circuit judge, and one we will not on
appeal second guess in the absence of a record showing a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.
¶25.
Starita swore that he would not favor Dr. Seidensticker even though he had a prior
relationship with him.
That promise is “entitled to considerable deference.”
Id.
Notwithstanding Starita’s promise, the dissent would find that the circuit court clearly abused
its discretion because (a) Dr. Seidensticker performed some unspecified surgery on Starita
12
fifteen years prior to Heaney’s trial, and (b) the circuit court could have excused Starita for
cause and still would have had enough jurors to fill a jury panel. Without more evidence to
indicate a bias on Starita’s part, to find an abuse of discretion under these facts would be to
find a complete lack of discretion. That would be contrary to the supreme court’s decision
in Hamilton. We cannot find a clear abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decisions
regarding jury selection. Accordingly, we are required to affirm the judgment of the circuit
court.
¶26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
MYERS, P.J., ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J., AND GRIFFIS, J. LEE, P.J., AND
CHANDLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
IRVING, J., DISSENTING:
¶27.
Because I believe the majority fails to follow the precedent established in Hudson v.
Taleff, 546 So. 2d 359 (Miss. 1989), reaffirmed in Brown v. Blackwood, 697 So. 2d 763
(Miss. 1997), and followed by this Court in Davis v. Powell, 781 So. 2d 912 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000), I dissent.
¶28.
After the trial court refused to remove for cause jurors who were former patients of
one or both of the defendant doctors or had a close family member who was a former patient,
Heaney used all of her peremptory challenges to remove them. Nevertheless, one former
patient, Keith Starita, remained as a juror. Dr. William L. Seidensticker had performed some
unspecified surgery on Starita fifteen years earlier. However, in my judgment, the passage
13
of time does not mean that Starita could not still harbor a positive opinion of Dr.
Seidensticker. On this point, I note that during voir dire when Starita was asked if his prior
experience would cause him to favor Dr. Seidensticker, he answered, “[n]ot at all.” There
is nothing in the record to indicate that Starita was displeased with the surgery. If he was
satisfied with the surgery, we know from human nature that he would likely favor Dr.
Seidensticker. Our supreme court made this very observation in Scott v. Ball, 595 So. 2d
848, 850-51 (Miss. 1992):
In a suit in which a physician is a party, a circuit judge must be sensitive to the
qualification of a juror who has himself or herself been treated by him, or
whose family members have at one time or another been patients of his. This
is especially true in our smaller cities and towns, where often there is a
shortage of practicing physicians. Mississippians in less populated areas enjoy
a close, fraternal relationship with their doctors, and regardless of a
prospective juror’s complete sincerity in his belief of his ability to be fair, it
is only human nature that in most cases he will be more than reluctant to
return a verdict against the physician. The circuit judge recognized this, of
course, when he excused seven of the jurors challenged for cause for this
reason. He erred in not excusing prospective juror Smith, No. 20, for cause for
this reason.
(Emphasis added).
¶29.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge could have excused Starita for cause, and there
would have been thirty-five jurors left on the panel, more than an ample supply from which
to select twelve jurors who were neither challenged for cause nor were former patients of
either of the defendant doctors, nor had a family member who was a former patient. On these
facts, I cannot discern any justification for the trial judge’s decision not to strike for cause
juror Starita.
Therefore, I am compelled to conclude that the trial judge abused his
considerable discretion when he refused to strike Starita for cause. The majority posits that
14
Kathleen W. Heaney might have had a better reason for keeping another juror, David Mohler,
on the panel and using her peremptory strike on Starita.3 It seems to me that there was no
good reason to keep either. From Mohler’s responses, it is very reasonable to assume that
he may not have been entirely candid. Again, human nature tells us that if Mohler’s mother
had problems with the surgery performed by Dr. Seidensticker, that fact would weigh on his
mind, notwithstanding his assertion that it would not.
¶30.
For the reasons presented, I dissent. I would reverse and remand this case for a new
trial.
KING, C.J., AND GRIFFIS, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
3
Mohler indicated during voir dire that Dr. Seidensticker had performed hip
replacement surgery on Mohler’s mother and knee surgery on him and that his mother had
had problems with dislocations. Mohler also said that these facts would not weigh on his
mind. At some later point, Mohler said that there was nothing about the relationship with
Dr. Seidensticker that would make him favor Dr. Seidensticker.
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