Jeffery Earl Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CP-01880-COA
JEFFERY EARL JONES A/K/A JEFFERY JONES
A/K/A JEFF JONES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
6/21/2006
HON. BOBBY BURT DELAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JEFFERY EARL JONES (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
AFFIRMED - 7/01/2008
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER AND BARNES, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Circuit Court of Hinds County dismissed Jeffery Earl Jones’s motion for post-conviction
relief as successive-writ-barred. Jones appeals the dismissal, citing numerous errors for our review.
Finding no error in the decision of the circuit court, we affirm the dismissal.
FACTS
¶2.
On September 26, 2001, Jones entered guilty pleas to five charges under the Controlled
Substances Act. Jones was sentenced to five separate terms of imprisonment, to be served
consecutively, for a total of eighteen years, with five years of post-release supervision. On August
19, 2004, Jones filed his first motion for post-conviction relief; however, the circuit court denied
relief on that motion. Jones filed the instant motion for post-conviction relief on March 13, 2006,
arguing that his sentences were ambiguous and perhaps illegal. The circuit court found the petition
frivolous, ordered a deduction of accrued time earned, and dismissed this motion for post-conviction
relief as a successive writ.
DISCUSSION
¶3.
The relevant code section on successive attempts to obtain post-conviction relief reads in
part: “The dismissal or denial of an application under this section is a final judgment and shall be
a bar to a second or successive application under this article.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev.
2007). Excepted from the successive-writ bar are certain enumerated exceptions, such as an
application filed regarding insanity prior to the execution of a sentence of death, intervening cases
of either the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi Supreme Court that would have
actually adversely affected the outcome of conviction or sentence, or newly discovered evidence
which was not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial. See id. However, Jones cites none of
these aforementioned exceptions as applicable to the case at hand. We do not find that any
exceptions apply to Jones’s claim; thus, his second motion is procedurally barred as an
impermissible successive attempt to obtain post-conviction relief pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-27(9).
¶4.
We also note that Jones’s motion, in addition to being procedurally barred under section
99-39-27(9), is time-barred as it was not filed within the three-year time limit. This three-year time
limit appears in Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev.2007), which reads in relevant
part: “[a] motion for relief under this article shall be made within three (3) years after the time in
which the prisoner’s direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi or . . . in case
of a guilty plea, within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction.” Jones’s guilty plea
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was entered on September 26, 2001, and his second motion for post-conviction relief was filed more
than three years later on March 13, 2006. Thus, Jones’s third motion is also time-barred, unless it
fits within some enumerated statutory exception as mentioned above. Again, Jones does not assert
that an enumerated exception applies, and we find no relevant, applicable exception evident in the
record.
¶5.
Jones’s motion is procedurally barred as an impermissible second attempt to obtain
post-conviction relief, as it does not fall within any of the enumerated statutory exceptions.
Furthermore, Jones’s motion is time-barred because it was filed beyond the statutory three-year time
limit. We will not overturn a denial of a motion for post-conviction relief without a showing that
an exception to the successive-writ bar exists. Johnson v. State, 962 So. 2d 87, 89 (¶12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Jones’s motion for postconviction relief.
¶6.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY DISMISSING
THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITH PREJUDICE IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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