Steven Walter Eason v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-KA-01067-COA
STEVEN WALTER EASON
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
2/20/2006
HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH
PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GLENN S. SWARTZFAGER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
JON MARK WEATHERS
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND
SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF THIRTY
YEARS EACH ON COUNTS I, II, AND III, EACH
TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. CONVICTED OF
SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCED TO
SERVE A TERM OF THIRTY YEARS ON COUNT
IV, WITH TEN YEARS TO SERVE IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS AND THE REMAINDER
SUSPENDED WITH FIVE YEARS POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION.
AFFIRMED - 03/04/2008
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Steven Walter Eason was convicted in Perry County of four counts of sexual battery and
sentenced to serve a total of thirty years each on Counts I, II, and III, each to run consecutively.
Eason was also sentenced to thirty years on Count IV, with ten years to serve in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections and the remainder suspended with five years of post-release
supervision, with all four of the sentences to run consecutively. Eason seeks review of two issues.
First, Eason argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the indictment, particularly
with regard to Count IV of the indictment. Second, Eason asserts that the trial judge erred in
denying his motion for a new trial, arguing the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶2.
Eason challenges both the weight and sufficiency of the evidence against him on appeal. A
motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence, and a motion challenging the verdict
contests the sufficiency of the evidence. Dilworth v. State, 909 So. 2d 731, 735 n. 4 (¶16) (Miss.
2005). This court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion
standard. Gilmer v. State, 955 So. 2d 829, 833 (¶6) (Miss. 2007). We will only overturn the denial
of a new trial if the record demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion, causing the verdict
to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. Therefore, “we will not order a new trial
unless we are convinced that the verdict was contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence so
that justice requires that a new trial be granted.” Id. at 833 (¶7). A motion for a directed verdict
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Vaughn v. State, 926 So. 2d 269, 271 (¶4) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006). Specifically, a challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court
to determine whether “the evidence is of such quality that reasonable and fairminded jurors in the
exercise of fair and impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Gilmer, 955 So. 2d at
833 (¶7). If not, the denial of a motion for directed verdict is proper. When determining whether
or not to grant a motion for directed verdict, the trial court should look at the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 833 (¶6).
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¶3.
Further, Eason questions the trial court’s interpretation of Mississippi Code Annotated
section 97-3-95 (Rev. 2006), claiming that the State failed to prove sexual penetration by Eason, a
necessary element required for conviction. This Court reviews the interpretation of statutes de novo.
Gilmer, 955 So. 2d at 833 (¶9) (citing McLamb v. State, 456 So. 2d 743, 745 (Miss. 1984)). First,
this Court must determine whether the statute itself is ambiguous. Gilmer, 955 So. 2d at 833 (¶9)
(citing Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (Miss. 2001)). If not found to be ambiguous, we
will apply the “plain meaning of the statute and refrain from the use of statutory construction
principals.” Gilmer, 955 So. 2d at 833 (¶9) (citing Pinkton v. State, 481 So. 2d 306, 309 (Miss.
1985)). Further, it is the “Court's primary objective . . . to employ that interpretation which best
suits the legislature’s true intent or meaning.” Gilmer, 955 So. 2d at 833 (¶9) (citing Clark v. State
ex. rel Miss. State Med. Ass'n, 381 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980)).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶4.
Eason was arrested, charged, and convicted by a jury of four separate counts of sexual
battery against two minor children, R.M.1 and J.M. At trial, the State presented evidence that
alleged Eason, the stepfather to minor children R.M. and J.M., committed sexual battery upon both
R.M. and J.M. The State presented testimony from Eason’s stepdaughter, R.M., that Eason forced
her to engage in Count I, vaginal intercourse, Count II, anal intercourse, and Count III, oral
intercourse with him. Further, testimony presented at trial asserted that Eason under Count IV,
forced J.M. to perform sexual intercourse on his sister, R.M., while Eason watched.
¶5.
Eason maintained throughout trial that the testimonies of both victims were untrustworthy
and insufficient to prove the first three counts of the indictment. Eason further maintained that the
State failed to prove sexual penetration as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-34
1
This case involves the sexual battery of two minors. Therefore, in order to protect their
identity, we use initials to identify the two minor children.
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(Rev. 2004); therefore, the trial court’s verdict should be reversed as being against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. The jury found him guilty on all four counts, and Eason was sentenced to
serve thirty years each on Counts I, II, and III. Eason was also sentenced to thirty years on Count
IV, with ten years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with five
years of post-release supervision, with all four of the sentences to run consecutively.
¶6.
After the jury verdict, Eason sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the
alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied both motions, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶7.
Eason alleges that the State failed to prove specifically on Count IV that Eason engaged in
penetration with R.M. and J.M. because Eason himself did not penetrate R.M. or J.M., but rather he
directed the children to have sexual intercourse with each other while he observed them. Eason
claims the State failed to prove penetration since he directed the penetration rather than actually
perform the penetration himself. However, the State argued that forcing two minor children to
engage in a sex act for that person’s own lustful gratification is prohibited under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-3-95 (Rev. 2006).
¶8.
Additionally, Eason alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict as to
Counts I, II, and III. Eason contends that the victim’s testimony was impeached, unbelievable, and
contradictory to the other evidence presented. The State argues that the record is replete with
testimony to support every count, including corroborating testimony from a medical expert.
I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE COUNT IV OF
THE INDICTMENT.
¶9.
The statute under which Eason was charged reads as follows: “(1) A person is guilty of
sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with . . . (d) A child under the age of
fourteen (14) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child.”
4
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (Rev. 2006). To “engage” in an act is defined in part as “to involve
oneself or become occupied; participate.” The American Heritage College Dictionary 455 (3d ed.
1993). This Court has stated,“[a]lthough criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the
accused, we will not adopt an interpretation that is absurd or unreasonable.” Smith v. State, 800 So.
2d 535, 540 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Lewis v. State, 765 So. 2d 493, 499 (¶25) (Miss.
2000)). “When the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous . . . and where the
statute conveys a clear and definite meaning . . . [an appellate court] will have no occasion to resort
to the rules of statutory interpretation.” Miss. Ethics Comm’n v. Grisham, 957 So. 2d 997, 1001
(¶12) (Miss. 2007) (citing Marx v. Broom, 632 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Miss. 1994)). “Courts have a
duty to give statutes a practical application consistent with their wording, unless such application
is inconsistent with the obvious intent of the legislature.” Grisham, 957 So. 2d at 1001 (¶12).
¶10.
Reasonably and practically construed, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95 (Rev.
2006), prohibits any penetration of a child’s genital or anal openings by any part of the body or any
object for lustful gratification. It is certain the Legislature did not intend to omit this type of conduct
from punishment under this statute. Here, according to testimony in the record, the child, R.M.,
clearly, was penetrated by J.M. at the direction of Eason. The fact that Eason merely ordered the
penetration of one minor child by another minor child, rather than doing it himself, is of no
consequence. Eason was actively involved in the incident, which was for his own lustful
gratification. Moreover, while “the definition of sexual penetration announced in Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-3-97 encompasses any penetration, the Court holds the parameters of the
definition of sexual penetration are logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual
behavior or libidinal gratification.” Frei v. State, 934 So. 2d 318, 325 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App.
2006)(quoting Roberson v. State, 501 So. 2d 398, 400 (Miss. 1987)).
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¶11.
This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have interpreted Mississippi Code Annotated
section 97-3-97 (Rev. 2006) to include common sense applications where the accused attempts to
engage in semantics regarding the literal reading of the statute. See Frei, 934 So. 2d at 325 (¶18)
(holding that Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95 was not overbroad despite the fact that
innocent penetrations can occur during the course of parental activities or clinical duties and the
meaning of sexual penetration is legitimately confined to those activities which are done for sexual
gratification); see also Hennington v. State, 702 So. 2d 403, 407-08 (¶¶12-20) (Miss. 1997)
(Defendant claimed the State failed to meet its burden of proof since the indictment charged him
with penetration of a child, instead of penetration with a child; however, the court held “fulfillment
of the sodomy penetration requirement is not restricted to acts wherein the accused does the
penetrating.”). We see no reason why the literal reading of Mississippi Code Annotated section 973-95 (Rev. 2006) would not include a perpetrator participating in penetration of a minor child by
directing a second minor child to perform said penetration for the perpetrator’s own sexual or lustful
gratification. The evidence before us in the record was sufficient to support the jury verdict.
II. WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
¶12.
Eason argues that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and
he asserts, in support of his argument, that the victim’s testimony was unreliable. However,
“Mississippi case law clearly holds that the unsupported testimony of a victim of a sex crime is
sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” Frei, 934 So. 2d at 324 (¶13) (citing Winters v. State, 814 So.
2d 184, 187 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). The State presented testimony from both victims, R.M.
and J.M., identifying Eason as the alleged abuser. Eason finds error with the trial court’s instruction
to the jury that it could find him guilty of sexual battery if they found that he forced the two victims
6
to have sexual intercourse. Eason asks that this jury instruction be found erroneous since Eason
himself did not engage in sexual penetration with either of the victims as alleged in Count IV.
¶13.
From this Court’s reading of the record, the State also presented ample testimony from Dr.
Patricia Tibbs, an expert witness on child sexual assault, to support the jury’s verdict. While there
was evidence presented by both sides regarding alternative theories of the case, the jury chose to
believe the evidence and testimony presented by the State. Further, the jury had the benefit of
hearing the witnesses and observing the presentation of evidence, and the jury chose to believe the
State’s presentation of evidence. This Court recognizes that a jury’s verdict will generally be given
great weight. Burr v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 909 So. 2d 721, 731 (¶35) (Miss. 2005) (quoting
Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 308 (¶9) (Miss. 2003)). The jury, sitting as the fact-finder,
determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence against the accused. Ward
v. State, 881 So. 2d 316, 323 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, this Court cannot find that the
verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PERRY COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF COUNT I-SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS;
COUNT II-SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS; COUNT IIISEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS, WITH SAID SENTENCES
IN COUNTS I, II, AND III TO RUN CONSECUTIVE WITH EACH OTHER; COUNT IVSEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS, WITH TEN YEARS TO
SERVE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND THE REMAINDER SUSPENDED WITH FIVE YEARS POST-RELEASE
SUPERVISION, WITH SAID SENTENCE IN COUNT IV TO RUN CONSECUTIVE WITH
SENTENCES IN COUNTS I, II, AND III, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO PERRY COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON,
JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND RESULT. ROBERTS, J., CONCURS
IN COUNT I, II, III AND SPECIALLY CONCURS IN COUNT IV WITH SEPARATE
OPINION JOINED BY LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
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¶15.
I concur with the majority’s well-reasoned decision to affirm Eason’s convictions for Counts
I, II and III. As for Count IV, I reach the same conclusion as the majority, but by a different
analysis. I must disagree that Eason himself “engaged” in penetration. However, Eason may most
definitely be convicted as an aider and abettor of that penetration.
¶16.
Count IV of the indictment charged that Eason:
did willfully, purposely, unlawfully and feloniously commit Sexual Battery upon
[R.M.] and [J.M.], without the consent of the said [R.M.] and [J.M.], by engaging in
the act of sexual penetration, to wit: forcing [J.M.] to place his penis in the annus
[sic] of [R.M.], contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided,
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.
As the majority notes, “A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration
with . . . [a] child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (24) or
more months older than the child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2006). According to
section 97-3-97(a) of the Mississippi Code Annotated, among other things not relevant to our
present purposes, sexual penetration includes “any penetration of the . . . anal openings of another
person’s body by any part of a person’s body, and insertion of any object into the . . . anal openings
of another person’s body.”
¶17.
The proof at trial demonstrated that, because R.M. and J.M. did not complete their chores
to his satisfaction, Eason offered them two choices: they could get a spanking or they could
complete an additional “chore.” Since the children did not want to be spanked, they chose option
two. At Eason’s instruction, R.M. inserted his penis into J.M.’s anus. Therefore, there is no
evidence that Eason actually penetrated or engaged in penetration of J.M., nor did he insert an object
into J.M. R.M. is a human being. He is not an “object.” Instead, R.M. penetrated J.M. To be sure,
there is no evidence that R.M. did so willingly. He did so under coercion or duress based on a threat
of force.
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¶18.
“[A]ny person who is present at the commission of a criminal offense and aids, counsels, or
encourages another in the commission of that offense is an ‘aider and abetter’ and is equally guilty
with the principal offender.” Mitchell v. State, 915 So. 2d 1, 13-14 (¶57) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted). Eason was not indicted as an aider and abettor. Even so, that does not preclude
an instruction that the jury could convict him as such. E.g., Norris v. State, 893 So. 2d 1071, 1074
(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
¶19.
According to jury instruction S-6, the jury was instructed to convict Eason for sexual battery
if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Eason, “willfully, purposely, unlawfully and feloniously
commit[ted] Sexual Battery by forcing [R.M.] to place his penis in the anus of [J.M.] without the
consent of said [J.M.].” (emphasis added). Of significance is the fact that defense counsel stated
“no objection” when called upon by the trial court to voice any complaint he had with the principles
of law stated in jury instruction S-6. The trial judge was never presented with any proposed jury
instruction from either party on the concept of Eason’s potential guilt as an aider and abettor. I
hesitate to find any error on a matter never presented to the trial judge for consideration.
¶20.
If a jury may convict someone as a principal for “encouraging” the commission of a crime,
by extension, a jury may certainly convict someone as a principal for “forcing” the commission of
a crime. “Forcing” someone to commit a crime absolutely contemplates, encompasses, and
surpasses “encouragement.” Moreover, as a principal, Eason’s guilt is not dependent upon R.M.’s.
Scales v. State, 289 So. 2d 905, 908 (Miss. 1974).
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¶21.
Without question, Eason’s behavior was criminal.2 I find no logical reason why Eason may
not be convicted as a principal under the circumstances. Although jury instruction S-6 did not use
the magic words “aider and abettor,” I believe it adequately covered the correct principle of law.
I find it sufficient to uphold Eason’s conviction incident to Count IV. Because I reach the same
conclusion as the majority, but by a different analysis, I respectfully concur.
LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ., JOIN THIS
OPINION.
2
Had the prosecution chosen to do so, it could have charged Eason with violating section
97-1-6 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev. 2006). Section 97-1-6 provides:
In addition to any other penalty and provision of law, any person over the age of
seventeen (17) who shall direct or cause any person under the age of seventeen (17)
to commit any crime which would be a felony if committed by an adult shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be fined not more than Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00) or imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, or both.
10
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