Bobbie Hodgins v. Philadelphia Public School District
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CC-01919-COA
BOBBIE HODGINS
APPELLANT
v.
PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/3/2006
HON. J. MAX KILPATRICK
NESHOBA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
WILLIAM T. MAY
TERRY L. JORDAN
TANYA L. PHILLIPS
DONALD JOSEPH KILGORE
CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
AGENCY DECISION AFFIRMED
AFFIRMED – 10/23/2007
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This appeal arises out of the Philadelphia Public School District’s decision not to renew
Bobbie Hodgins’s employment contract. After Hodgins unsuccessfully challenged the nonrenewal
before the Philadelphia School Board, she appealed to the Neshoba County Chancery Court, which
affirmed the nonrenewal. Aggrieved, Hodgins appeals and alleges that (1) she was wrongfully
denied her right to a hearing, (2) that she was not given statutorily-mandated notice, and (3) that the
board acted improperly when it refused to record in its minutes its decision on whether to have a
hearing.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
In July 2003, Hodgins was hired by the Philadelphia School District as an assistant principal
for the 2003/2004 school year. In 2004, Hodgins was hired for the 2004/2005 school year,
specifically for the period “beginning on 07/12/2004 and ending on 06/24/2005.” On April 8, 2005,
Hodgins was informed that the district was not going to renew her employment contract. Hodgins
received notice of the nonrenewal in a letter from Britt Dickens, the superintendent of the
Philadelphia Public School District. In the letter, Dickens informed Hodgins that she would not be
entitled to a hearing because she had “not completed two consecutive years with a Mississippi
School District,” pursuant to the Education Employment Procedures Law of 2001. On April 25,
2005, Dickens suspended Hodgins with pay for the remainder of the 2005 school year, stating that
Hodgins’s presence and actions had “created an atmosphere that is not conducive to the effective
functioning of [the] school.”
¶4.
Hodgins requested hearings before the school board for both the nonrenewal and her
suspension. She was granted a hearing for the suspension, but was denied a hearing for the
nonrenewal. When Hodgins appeared at the hearing for her suspension, she requested a hearing
regarding the nonrenewal and asked that the board record in its minutes its decision to deny a hearing
on her nonrenewal. After members of the board briefly conferred, the board stated that, since
Hodgins was not entitled to a hearing on the nonrenewal pursuant to state law, the board would not
vote on the nonrenewal. Therefore, there was nothing to record in the minutes. Hodgins chose not
to present any evidence as to her suspension with pay, which the board affirmed. Hodgins then
appealed the board’s decision regarding the nonrenewal to the Neshoba County Chancery Court,
which found in favor of the board.
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¶5.
Additional facts, if necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Denial of Hearing
¶6.
Because the school board is an administrative agency, we will not disturb its decision unless
it “was unsupported by substantial evidence; was arbitrary or capricious; was beyond the [board’s]
scope or powers; or violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party.” A&F
Props., LLC v. Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 933 So. 2d 296, 300 (¶6) (Miss. 2006) (quoting
Ladner v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 793 So. 2d 637, 638 (¶6) (Miss. 2001)).
¶7.
Hodgins makes two separate arguments for why she was entitled to a hearing on the
nonrenewal: first, she contends that she was covered under the statute which guarantees the right of
a hearing to a nonrenewed employee if the employee has been employed by the local school district
for a continuous period of two (2) years,1 and second, she argues that the school’s policy manual did
not contain a requirement that an employee be employed for two continuous years in order to receive
a hearing. For clarity’s sake, we address each contention separately.
Second Continuous Year
¶8.
We find that Hodgins is clearly incorrect as to her first contention. The provisions at issue
here are part of the Education Employment Procedures Law of 2001 (EEPL), which are found in
Mississippi Code Annotated sections 37-9-101 through 37-9-113. The EEPL section that describes
the protections offered to employees of a school district, Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9109 (Rev. 2001), states:
1
Hodgins was in her second year of employment with the school district when she received
the notice of nonrenewal.
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An employee who has received notice under Section 37-9-105, upon written request
from the employee received by the district within ten (10) days of receipt of the
notice by the employee, shall be entitled to:
(a) Written notice of the specific reasons for nonreemployment, together with a
summary of the factual basis therefor, a list of witnesses and a copy of documentary
evidence substantiating the reasons intended to be presented at the hearing, which
notice shall be given at least fourteen (14) days prior to any hearing; if the district
fails to provide this information to the employee, then the recommendation for
nonreemployment shall be null and void, and the board shall order the execution of
a contract with the employee for an additional period of one (1) year;
(b) An opportunity for a hearing at which to present matters relevant to the reasons
given for the proposed nonreemployment, including any reasons alleged by the
employee to be the reason for nonreemployment;
(c) Receive a fair and impartial hearing before the board or hearing officer;
(d) Be represented by legal counsel, at his own expense.
The EEPL defines an “employee” as:
(a) Any teacher, principal, superintendent or other professional personnel employed
by the local school district for a continuous period of two (2) years with that district
and required to have a valid license issued by the State Department of Education as
a prerequisite of employment; or
(b) Any teacher, principal, superintendent or other professional personnel who has
completed a continuous period of two (2) years of employment in a Mississippi
public school district and one (1) full year of employment with the school district of
current employment, and who is required to have a valid license issued by the State
Department of Education as a prerequisite of employment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-103 (Rev. 2001) (emphasis added).
¶9.
Hodgins contends that she meets the definition of employee as set forth in the EEPL because
she was in her second year of employment with the school district when she was given notice of the
nonrenewal. The school district contends that the statute should be interpreted to mean that an
employee must complete her second year before the nonrenewal. We agree with the district that the
clear meaning of the statute is that an employee must complete a second year of employment before
the employee is entitled to the protections afforded “employees” by the EEPL. Otherwise, the use
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of the word “complete” in section 37-9-103(b) would be devoid of meaning. Under Hodgins’s
interpretation, any employee would qualify as long as the employee had completed one year of
employment with the school district and was currently in the second year of employment. Such
clearly was not the intent of the legislature based on the express language of the statute.
¶10.
As the chancellor properly found, the EEPL must be read to mean that an employee such as
Hodgins must complete two years of employment with the school district before being considered
an “employee” for EEPL purposes. Because Hodgins met neither of the definitions in section 37-9103, she is not entitled to the protections granted to employees in other provisions of the EEPL.
Employee Manual
¶11.
We turn now to Hodgins’s contention that the school district’s personnel policy created a
right for her to have a hearing regarding the nonrenewal.
¶12.
In 2001, section 37-9-103 of the EEPL was amended and changed to its present form, which
is quoted above. Prior to 2001, the section read:
As used in Sections 37-9-101 through 37-9-113 the word “employee” shall include
any teacher, principal, superintendent elected by a board of trustees and other
professional personnel employed by any public school district of this state and
required to have a valid license issued by the State Department of Education as a
prerequisite of employment.
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-103. Therefore, prior to 2001, there was no requirement that an assistant
principal work for a school district for two years before gaining the protection of the statute. The
personnel policy to which Hodgins refers indicates that it was written in January 1999, and contains
no requirement that an assistant principal work for the school district for any period of time before
being entitled to a hearing and other protections. The policy, however, clearly states:
School board policies follow state and federal laws and related regulations and
procedures for employment, retention, and dismissal of all personnel. {MS Code 379-1 through 75, 37-9-101 through 113, and 37-7-301(p)(w)} Standard 6, Bulletin 172
(1998).
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(emphasis added).
¶13.
Likewise, the termination letter sent to Hodgins stated: “You are not covered by the
provisions of the Education Employment Procedures Law of 2001, Mississippi Code Ann. 37-9-101
et seq. Therefore, you are not entitled to a hearing regarding the District’s decision.” Hodgins’s
employment contracts stated that they were “subject to all applicable policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations of the employer and the laws of the State of Mississippi, copies of which are available
from the Superintendent’s office.”
¶14.
The school district essentially makes two arguments: first, that the personnel policy
referenced by Hodgins espouses a clear intent to follow current state law, and second, that any
conflict between the statute and the policy must be resolved in favor of the statute. Hodgins
contends that the statute merely creates a minimum level of protection and that the district is free to
create more stringent protections than current state law. Thus, Hodgins contends that there is no
conflict between the statute, which requires an assistant principal to work for two years before
gaining protection under the statute, and the district’s policy, which simply has no threshold
requirement before an assistant principal is entitled to a hearing and other administrative protections.
¶15.
While we agree that the policy manual used by the school is poorly written, we cannot find
that it is intended to give greater protection to school employees than is afforded by statute. Nor do
we find any indication or evidence that the district’s intention was to do anything other than follow
the current version of the statute. First, the policy references the statute, although it first references
the pre-amendment version of the statute. Regardless, had Hodgins gone to look up the current
version of the statute, she would have found that she would not be considered an “employee” entitled
to the protections of the statute until after she had worked for two continuous years for the school
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district. The current version of the statute was also clearly referenced in the nonrenewal letter sent
to Hodgins, and her employment contract states that it is subject to all Mississippi laws.
¶16.
In support of her contentions, Hodgins cites Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 603 So. 2d 356
(Miss. 1992). In Bobbitt, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that an employer had to follow the
procedures outlined in its employment manual rather than dismissing an employee without following
any of the procedures in the manual on the ground that the employee was at-will. Id. at 357.
Essentially, the specific holding of Bobbitt was that when there are termination procedures outlined
in an employment manual, an employer cannot simply dismiss an at-will employee without using
the procedures set forth in the manual. Such is not the case before us. Additionally, since Hodgins
was employed by a school district, her employment is specifically addressed by the EEPL.
Furthermore, the Bobbitt court made it clear that, in Bobbitt, “there [was] nothing in the employment
contract to the contrary.” Id. In the present case, however, Hodgins’s employment contract
specifically referenced the EEPL, and stated that the contract was subject not only to any personnel
policies, but also to the laws of the state of Mississippi. The personnel policy itself manifested an
intention to follow statutory law, and referenced the relevant code provisions. Finally, our standard
of review necessitates that we give deference to the board’s decision, whereas the Bobbitt court had
no administrative agency to which it owed any deference. Bobbitt is of no help to Hodgins.
¶17.
It is clear that the school district simply neglected to update its personnel policy to conform
to a change in the relevant statute, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the district intended to
create greater protections than the EEPL when it failed to update its policy. In the absence of any
intent to do so and in the presence of evidence indicating the district’s intent to follow current state
law, we affirm the board’s finding that Hodgins was not entitled to a hearing and other
administrative protections.
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2. Notice
¶18.
Hodgins contends that she “was entitled to automatic renewal of her contract based on the
District’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in the Education Employment
Procedures Law of 2001.” Specifically, Hodgins cites section 37-9-105 (Supp. 2006), which
requires a school board to provide written notice of nonrenewal to an employee, complete with
reasons for the nonrenewal. However, as with section 37-9-109, the requirements promulgated in
section 37-9-105 apply only to employees who have worked with the school district for two
continuous years. As we have found, Hodgins has not worked for the school district for two
continuous years and was, therefore, not entitled to notice as required in section 37-9-105.
¶19.
This issue is without merit.
3. Board Minutes
¶20.
Finally, Hodgins contends that the board erred when it refused to record its vote “to deny
[her] a due process hearing.” Hodgins further contends that this refusal “hindered her right to an
appeal.” As Hodgins is currently appealing that decision, it is unclear to this Court how the refusal
hindered Hodgins’s right to an appeal, and Hodgins does not provide any further explanation of any
hindrance she has encountered.
¶21.
We note at the outset that the board did not actually vote to deny Hodgins a hearing. After
conferring, the board simply stated that it would not hold a hearing because Hodgins was not entitled
to one under the statute. The board further stated that since the decision was dictated by statute, the
board did not need to vote to deny Hodgins a hearing. Therefore, the board declined to officially
record any decision in its minutes.
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¶22.
The record is silent as to why the board felt compelled to refuse to record its decision to deny
Hodgins a hearing in its minutes. The school district quotes Mississippi Code Annotated section 376-9 (Rev. 2001), which states in part:
Minutes shall be kept of all meetings of the school board showing (a) the members
present and absent; (b) the date, time and place of the meeting; (c) an accurate
recording of any final actions taken at such meeting; (d) a record by individual
member of any votes taken at such meeting; and (e) any other information that the
school board requests to be reflected in the minutes.
Apparently the board did not view its decision as a “final action,” which would have had to have
been recorded in the minutes regardless of whether the board’s decision was mandated by statute.
The school district does not elaborate on how the decision to refuse Hodgins a hearing was anything
other than a “final action,” which it appears to this Court that it was. Additionally, under subsection
(e) above, the board clearly could have recorded its decision simply by requesting that the decision
be reflected in its minutes.
¶23.
In our judgment, the board should have recorded its decision in its minutes. However,
Hodgins has offered no showing of prejudice as a result of this error. Although she states that her
right to appeal has been hampered, she offers no further indication of how. In the absence of any
showing of prejudice to one of Hodgins’s substantial rights, we find the board’s refusal to record its
decision to be harmless error. See M.R.C.P. 61. In other words, although we find error, we find no
error of such magnitude that warrants granting Hodgins any relief.
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE NESHOBA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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