Tomechia McNair v. Bridget N. Clark
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-01826-COA
TOMECHIA MCNAIR
APPELLANT
v.
BRIDGET N. CLARK
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/26/2005
HON. H. DAVID CLARK, II
SCOTT COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
CHARLES E. LAWRENCE
BRETT BAGLEY THOMPSON
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
GRANTED, ORDERING JOINT LEGAL
CUSTODY, SETTING VISITATION SCHEDULE,
AND ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR TAX PURPOSES AND
FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES. CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER GRANTED, INCREASING
MCNAIR’S SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM $297
PER MONTH TO $591 PER MONTH.
REVERSED: 07/24/2007
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Tomechia McNair appeals the portion of the chancellor’s order granting an increase in the
award of child support from the amount of $297 per month to $591 per month. Because Bridget N.
Clark failed to prove the required material change in circumstances to warrant an increase in child
support, the Court reverses the chancellor and reinstates the original support order of $297 per
month.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
Tomechia McNair and Bridget N. Clark are the parents of three children, an eleven-year old
and eight-year old twins. McNair is also the father of two other children, and Clark also has another
child. McNair and Clark never married.
¶3.
On May 17, 1999, McNair and Clark entered into a Stipulated Agreement of Support and
Admission of Paternity. In that agreement, McNair agreed to pay $297 per month in child support
and to provide health insurance for the children. The parties submitted the order to a chancellor in
Scott County, who approved the agreement and entered an order to that effect on July 29, 1999. The
parties operated under this agreement for almost six years until April 26, 2005, when Clark filed a
petition for modification.
¶4.
In that petition, Clark requested that the terms and conditions of McNair’s child support
obligations be increased to include payments for school uniforms, medical costs not covered by
insurance, extracurricular activities, and college expenses. Clark alleged in the petition that a
material change in circumstances had occurred.
¶5.
McNair responded to the petition and filed a counterclaim. In his response, he specifically
denied that there was a material change in circumstances that warranted an increase in support. He
further alleged that Clark had denied him visitation rights. McNair sought visitation rights and joint
legal custody of the three minor children. Additionally, McNair alleged that Clark’s recently attained
employment constituted a material change in circumstances and grounds for modifying the current
order of child support to require Clark to begin providing health insurance for the children.
¶6.
Both parties submitted financial statements to the chancellor, in compliance with Uniform
Chancery Court Rule 8.05. The chancellor then conducted a hearing on August 19, 2005. At the
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hearing, the parties announced that they had reached agreement on all of the issues pertaining to
visitation and custody and insurance coverage and payments. The only issue for the chancellor’s
consideration was the modification of McNair’s child support payments. The chancellor heard
arguments from the attorneys, but neither side provided any testimony for the chancellor’s
consideration. A close reading of the record and briefs indicates that the parties themselves were not
present at the hearing.1
The chancellor did not address the issue of a material change in
circumstances. Instead, following the announcement of the stipulations, the chancellor proceeded
directly to arguments and analysis of the child support guidelines and whether McNair was entitled
to a deviation from those guidelines.
¶7.
McNair raised several issues in support of a deviation from the child support guidelines.
McNair argued that he should be credited for providing non-court-ordered support to his oldest child,
who lived with McNair’s parents but for whom McNair provided support and necessities. McNair
also requested a deviation for his fifth child, for whom he provided $140 per month in court-ordered
child support. McNair then argued that his commuting expenses should be taken into consideration,
as well as his mortgage and other living expenses incurred to provide a home for his children to visit.
Finally, McNair raised the issue of $50,000 in anticipated medical bills incurred when one of the
twins underwent two brain surgeries in 2005.
¶8.
The chancellor denied all of McNair’s requests for a deviation from the child support
guidelines, with the exception of the $140 monthly court-ordered child support payments for
McNair’s fifth child. The chancellor ruled that McNair was not entitled to a deviation for his support
1
The record is clear that Clark was not present, as the chancellor specifically asked if Clark
was present during the discussion of the Medicaid issue. Clark’s brief indicates that McNair also
was not present at the hearing.
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of his oldest child because the support that he provided was not court-mandated support. With
regard to the anticipated medical expenses, the chancellor denied the deviation because it was
unclear whether McNair would be required to pay those bills or whether Medicaid would cover those
expenses. The chancellor advised the parties, however, that he would reconsider his position if
McNair became liable for those expenses, as that liability would constitute a material change in
circumstances. The chancellor then calculated McNair’s child support payments at $591 per month.
¶9.
McNair appealed the chancellor’s decision. In his appellate brief, McNair raises three issues:
(1) that the chancellor abused his discretion by not allowing a deviation for McNair’s oldest child
and that the failure to permit the deviation violated the equal protection rights of both McNair and
his child; (2) that Clark failed to prove a material change in circumstances that would permit the
chancellor to modify the existing final order of child support between the parties; and (3) that the
chancellor abused his discretion in failing to allow a deviation for the medical bills and that the
chancellor’s failure to do so violated McNair’s right to equal protection under the law.
¶10.
Upon its initial review of the record, this Court determined that it could not substantively
review the case absent specific findings of fact and conclusions of law from the chancellor. The
chancellor’s final judgment, dated August 26, 2005, ordered McNair to pay $591 a month in child
support but listed no findings of fact or conclusions of law that supported the chancellor’s decision
to increase the amount of child support that McNair paid to Clark. Accordingly, the Court ordered
the chancellor to enumerate the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the following
issues: (1) “the material change in circumstances that warranted an increase in child support” and
(2) the “decision to disallow any deviation from the child support guidelines.”
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¶11.
The chancellor submitted his findings of fact and conclusions of law in an opinion and order
dated May 16, 2007. The order opined that the issue of the material change in circumstances was
stipulated to by the parties and, therefore, was not before the chancellor at the time of the hearing.
The order further states that even if the parties had not stipulated that a material change in
circumstances existed, the chancellor would have found a material change in circumstances based
on the following: (1) the increased age of the children, (2) the doubling of McNair’s income over the
six year period following the signing of the first child support order, and (3) the increase in the
medical expenses and care for the child who recently had undergone two brain surgeries.
¶12.
With regard to the chancellor’s initial order that McNair was not entitled to a deviation from
the child support guidelines, the chancellor held that the three reasons that McNair cited in support
of a deviation from the child support guidelines were without merit. The chancellor found that
McNair was not entitled to a reduction based upon his non-court-ordered support of his oldest child.
The chancellor also held that McNair’s commuting expenses and housing expenses were not unusual
enough to qualify McNair for a deviation. Finally, the chancellor held that the evidence of medical
bills incurred on behalf of the child who underwent two separate brain surgeries was not sufficient
to permit the chancellor to make a finding. According to the chancellor, the evidence presented did
not establish that McNair was, in fact, liable for those expenses.
¶13.
The Court has now had the opportunity to review the chancellor’s specific findings and holds
that the chancellor erred as follows: (1) the parties did not stipulate to a finding of a material change
in circumstances; and (2) the chancellor’s alternate finding that Clark established a material change
in circumstances that entitled her to a modification of the existing order of child support is not
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supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Court reverses the chancellor’s decision to
increase child support without addressing McNair’s remaining points of error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14.
This Court reviews a chancellor’s award of child support under the substantial
evidence/manifest error standard. See Leiden v. Leiden, 902 So. 2d 582, 585 (¶¶9-10) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2004). The chancery court has broad discretion, particularly in the areas of divorce and child
support, and a chancellor’s decision will not be overturned by this Court unless the findings of fact
are manifestly wrong or are not supported by substantial credible evidence or an erroneous legal
standard was applied. Id. See also Sarver v. Sarver, 687 So. 2d 749, 753 (Miss. 1997); Nichols v.
Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 781 (Miss. 1989).
ANALYSIS
Stipulation of the parties
¶15.
The chancellor found that the issue of a material change in circumstances, the predicate
finding necessary for a modification of a child support order, was not before the court at the time of
the hearing on Clark’s petition for modification because the parties stipulated that there was, in fact,
a material change in circumstances. In support, the chancellor cites the following exchange from
the transcript of the hearing:
MS. THOMPSON:
....
And the issue that remains before the Court is the amount that
should be awarded today as to child support.
THE COURT:
All right. The amount of child support. That is the only issue
before the Court, correct?
MR. LAWRENCE:
That is correct, Your Honor.
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The chancellor further states that McNair did not contest Clark’s allegation in her pleading that a
material change in circumstances had occurred, thereby warranting an increase in child support. The
chancellor cites McNair’s response to Clark’s petition for modification, in which the chancellor
contends that McNair alleged that “[t]here has been a material change in circumstances since the
rendition of the Order Approving Stipulated Agreement of support was entered by this Court [sic]2,
which necessitates the Defendant seeking a modification of said order.” On the basis of these
excerpts from the record, the chancellor states that “[t]he parties so stipulated.”
¶16.
This Court finds that the parties did not stipulate that a material change in circumstances had
occurred and that the chancellor erred in failing to consider the issue. A more thorough examination
of the record reveals the following:
¶17.
In his response to Clark’s petition for modification, McNair specifically denied Clark’s
allegation “[t]hat a material change in circumstances has occurred and warrants a substantial increase
in child support with the defendant being responsible for paying a reasonable attorney’s fee and all
costs of Court.”
¶18.
McNair not only responded to Clark’s petition and denied that Clark was entitled to an
increase in child support, McNair counterclaimed for a modification in his favor. The chancellor
contends that McNair agreed that a material change in circumstance had occurred to warrant an
increase in child support, when McNair actually was arguing that a material change in Clark’s
circumstances had occurred which warranted a decrease in his child support obligations. In his
counterclaim, McNair’s full statement reads as follows:
2
The chancellor inserted the [sic] symbol in his quotation from McNair’s response.
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There has been a material change in circumstances since the rendition of the Order
Approving Stipulated Agreement of support was entered by this Court, which
necessitates the Defendant seeking a modification of said order. The Plaintiff is
gainfully employed and the Order of Support entered in this cause should be
modified to require the Plaintiff to maintain health and medical insurance coverage
upon said minor children with the parties to be responsible for one-half of any and
all medical bills not covered after payment has been made by each of their insurance
carriers.
¶19.
The pleadings clearly demonstrate that the parties did not agree that a material change in
circumstance had occurred, as both Clark and McNair each believed that they were entitled to a
modification in their favor.
¶20.
The parties did reach agreement on many of the issues prior to the hearing on August 19,
2005. The stipulation, which Clark’s counsel read into the record at that hearing states as follows:
We have stipulated to visitation for the Defendant Tomechia McNair as to all three
minor children. We have a scheduled visitation agreement that we have both
approved. As to the defendant claiming one of the children as a dependent for
federal tax purposes, we have stipulated that the defendant may claim the oldest
child. As to legal custody, we have stipulated that the defendant shall be allowed
joint legal custody with the plaintiff Bridget N. Clark. We have stipulated that the
plaintiff Bridget N. Clark shall have sole physical custody of the minor children.
And we have stipulated that as to any and all expenses as far as insurance, what
insurance doesn’t cover that both parties shall be responsible equally for those
expenses.
And the issue that remains before the Court is the amount that should be awarded
today as to child support.
These stipulations are quite specific as to the nature of the issues to which the parties are stipulating
as well as the details and parameters of each stipulation. Nothing in the stipulation indicates that
McNair and Clark agreed that a material change in circumstances had occurred which warranted an
increase in child support, and there is no specific finding to that effect. The parties’ subsequent
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actions on appeal also indicate that they did not intend to stipulate to a finding of a material change
in circumstances.
¶21.
The second issue that McNair raised on appeal was that Clark failed to meet the burden of
proof to demonstrate that a material change in circumstances occurred. McNair argued that Clark’s
only proof was McNair’s increased salary which, he argued, could not by itself constitute a material
change in circumstances. In her response brief, Clark does not argue that McNair is barred from
raising the issue on appeal because the parties stipulated to a finding of a material change in
circumstances. Instead, Clark argues the merits of the chancellor’s decision and contends that she
submitted sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of material change in circumstances and, therefore,
an increase in child support.
¶22.
Neither party seems aware that it stipulated to a finding of a material change in
circumstances. Such a stipulation, had it been entered into between the parties, would have been
binding on both McNair and Clark. See generally Wilbourn v. Hobson, 608 So. 2d 1187, 1189-90
(Miss. 1992). This Court is unwilling to bind parties to a stipulation absent a specific statement
setting forth the agreed-upon facts. Accordingly, this Court finds that the parties did not stipulate
to a finding of a material change in circumstances and holds that the chancellor erred, as a matter of
law, in failing to address the issue.
Material change in circumstances
¶23.
The standard applicable to modification of a final child support order is well-established:
In seeking a modification of child support obligations, the moving party must prove
that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree,
that such change was unforeseeable at the time of the decree, and that the change was
not caused by willful or bad faith actions on the moving party's part. Magee v.
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Magee, 755 So. 2d 1057, 1059-60 (¶9) (Miss. 2000) (citing Varner v. Varner, 666
So. 2d 493, 497 (Miss. 1995)).
Leiden, 902 So. 2d at 585 (¶10). The material change in circumstances may be linked to any of the
interested parties – the father, the mother, or the children. See Edmonds v. Edmonds, 935 So. 2d 980
(¶19) (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted).
¶24.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has articulated a number of factors that a chancellor should
apply in determining what constitutes a material change in circumstances. See Caldwell v. Caldwell,
579 So. 2d 543, 547 (Miss. 1991). Those factors include:
(1) increased needs caused by advanced age and maturity of the children (2) increase
in expenses, and (3) inflation factor. Other factors include (4) the relative financial
condition and earning capacity of the parties, (5) the health and special needs of the
child, both physical and psychological, (6) the health and special medical needs of
the parents, both physical and psychological, (7) the necessary living expenses of the
father, (8) the estimated amount of income taxes the respective parties must pay on
their incomes, (9) the free use of a residence, furnishings, and automobile and (10)
such other facts and circumstances that bear on the support subject shown by the
evidence.
Id.
¶25.
Although the chancellor asserted that the issue of a material change in circumstances was not
before him at the time of the August 19, 2005, hearing, the chancellor also states in his opinion that
had the issue been before him, he would have found that a material change in circumstances did exist
which warranted an increase in child support. The chancellor cites the increased ages of the children,
given the six-year period between the first order of support and the petition for modification, the
increase in McNair’s salary over that six-year period, and the increased expenses associated with
caring for the child who had undergone two brain surgeries as sufficient proof of a material change
in circumstances.
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¶26.
The chancellor’s review in this case is limited to the documentary evidence submitted with
the petition for modification, the response, and the documents introduced into evidence at the
hearing. The attorneys for both McNair and Clark opted not to present any testimony at the hearing,
so neither McNair nor Clark testified. Rather, the parties relied on the oral arguments that their
attorneys made before the chancellor. The documentary evidence consisted of the first order of child
support, the parties’ Rule 8.05 financial statements, a single paycheck stub belonging to McNair, and
the documents detailing the medical expenses accrued as a result of one of the children’s brain
surgeries. Accordingly, the Court reviews these documents to determine whether the chancellor’s
finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred was supported by substantial evidence.
1.
¶27.
The increased ages of the children
The chancellor first cites the increased ages of the children. At the time of the first support
order, the couple’s oldest child was four years and nine months old, and the twins were two years
and six months old. The chancellor then notes that, at the time of the hearing, the oldest child was
almost eleven years old, and the twins were eight years old. Relying on their ages alone, the
chancellor states that “the passage of time itself can constitute a material change in circumstances
warranting an increase in child support,” citing Varner v. Varner, 588 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1991).
¶28.
Varner does not stand for the proposition that the chancellor asserted in his opinion. In fact,
Mississippi law holds the opposite: a “child's change in age alone does not constitute a material
change in circumstances.” See Pierce v. Chandler, 855 So. 2d 455, 458 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Best v. Hinton, 838 So. 2d 306, 309 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). In speaking tangentially
on the issue of the ages of the children, Varner does note that “[r]are is the child whose financial
needs do not increase with age.” Varner, 588 So. 2d at 433. However, Varner makes no further
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comment on the increased age of the children as grounds for finding a material change in
circumstances.
¶29.
This Court agrees with the principle asserted in Varner and in other Mississippi cases – that
as children grow older, meeting their needs becomes more expensive. As children age, they eat
more, their basic clothing needs increase, and they become involved in extra-curricular activities.
All of these factors lead to an increase in the amount of money necessary to raise and support a child.
While the increase in a child’s age alone is an indicator that an increase in support may be warranted,
it is not, standing alone, evidence of a material change in circumstances. See Pierce, 855 So. 2d at
458 (¶12). To find a material change in circumstances based upon increased expenses, the amount
of those expenses must not have been foreseeable at the time of the original order, and the parent
seeking an increase in child support must state specifically the basis and amounts of those increased
expenses. See Kilgore v. Fuller, 741 So. 2d 351, 353 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶30.
In the case sub judice, Clark’s Rule 8.05 financial statement lists several activities in which
the three children are involved, but there is no evidence to indicate whether these activities were
unforeseeable or whether the amount necessary to sustain those activities was unforeseeable. Such
evidence could easily have been supplied through testimony from Clark, had she testified, and the
burden rested with Clark to prove an increase in expenses that constituted a material change in
circumstances. See Adams v. Adams, 591 So. 2d 431, 435 (Miss. 1991). However, the chancellor
had no such evidence. The only evidence before the chancellor was the increased ages of the
children and a line-item statement in Clark’s Rule 8.05 financial statement that the children were
involved in extra-curricular activities. Without evidence of unforeseeability in either the activities
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or the amount of those activities, however, the record cannot support the chancellor’s finding that
the increased ages of the children constitutes a material change in circumstances.
2.
¶31.
The increase in McNair’s income
The chancellor next found that the increase in McNair’s income, from $1,350 per month in
1999 to $2,686.79 in 2005, constituted a material change. Again, Mississippi law is clear that an
increase in income is just one factor to be considered in determining whether a material change in
circumstances has occurred. See Caldwell, 579 So. 2d at 547. Increased income by the parent
paying child support is not, by itself, enough to warrant an increase in child support. See Pipkin v.
Dolan, 788 So. 2d 834, 838-39 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
3.
¶32.
Medical needs of a child
Finally, the chancellor found that because one of the twins had recently undergone two
separate brain surgeries, “[n]ot only have medical expenses for the child increased, but incumbent
with that increased medical cost would be an increase in the cost of support and maintenance of the
child by the custodial parent.” The chancellor cited the child’s medical issues as a material change
in circumstance.
¶33.
This Court disagrees with the chancellor’s findings because they are unsupported by the
evidence. The only evidence before the chancellor regarding the child’s health were the statements
from the insurance company notifying McNair of potential medical expenses. Nothing in those
documents indicates that the child will have ongoing or extraordinary medical expenses following
the surgeries, and the chancellor heard no testimony regarding the child’s current health status or the
need for any future medical treatment. Additionally, the parties stipulated that they would split any
future medical costs not covered by insurance; therefore, the chancellor would be overstepping his
13
authority to increase the amount of child support in contradiction to the parties’ stipulation.
Accordingly, the chancellor’s finding that one of the children’s health issues constituted a material
change in circumstances cannot stand.
¶34.
Without evidence of unforeseeable increased expenses due to the increased ages of the
children or evidence of extraordinary medical expenses for one of the children, the only evidence
in the record that would tend to support a finding of a material change in circumstances is the
increase in McNair’s income. Mississippi law is clear that a finding of a material change in
circumstances is predicated on consideration of a number of factors, and an increase in income alone
is not sufficient to warrant the modification of a child support order.
¶35.
In reversing the chancellor’s order increasing the amount of child support that McNair is
obligated to pay, the Court finds that the chancellor erred in failing to consider initially, at the time
of the hearing, the issue of a material change in circumstances. Additionally, the Court finds that
the chancellor’s subsequently ordered findings of fact and conclusions of law do not support a
finding that there was, in fact, a material change in circumstances that warranted an increase in child
support. Accordingly, this Court holds that the chancellor erred in increasing McNair’s child support
payments from $297 per month to $591 per month. Because the Court holds that the chancellor
erred in increasing child support, the Court need not address McNair’s remaining point of error –
whether he was entitled to any deviations from the guidelines.
¶36. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SCOTT COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED
AND THE ORIGINAL $297 MONTHLY SUPPORT ORDER IS REINSTATED. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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