Marquette Randolph v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-KA-02233-COA
MARQUETTE RANDOLPH
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/8/2005
HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
HERBERT H. KLEIN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION
OF MORE THAN THIRTY GRAMS OF
COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITH FIVE YEARS
SUSPENDED AND FIFTEEN YEARS TO
SERVE.
AFFIRMED – 08/07/2007
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Marquette Randolph was convicted by a jury of attempted possession of more than thirty
grams of cocaine and was sentenced by the Jones County Circuit Court to twenty years with five
years suspended and fifteen years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. Aggrieved, he appeals and asserts the following issues, which we quote verbatim:
I.
II.
The Trial Court erred in preventing cross-examination regarding
fingerprinting analysis.
III.
The Trial Court erred in preventing Defendant from presenting his theory of
defense.
IV.
The Trial Court erred in preventing Defendant from testifying regarding his
earlier statements.
V.
The Trial Court erred in giving State’s Jury Instruction “S-1-A” without the
circumstantial evidence language and in refusing Defendant’s Jury
Instructions “D-4”, “D-5”, “D-8”, “D-10”, “D-11”, “D-12”, and “D-13”
containing circumstantial evidence language.
VI.
The Trial Court erred in giving State’s Jury Instruction “S-2” as a lesser
included offense instruction.
VII.
The Trial Court erred in allowing the Assistant District Attorney to make
inflammatory statements during closing argument.
VIII.
The Trial Court erred in overruling Defendant’s Motion for [a] New Trial or
in the Alternative Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
IX.
¶2.
The Trial Court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress Evidence.
The cumulative effect of the errors committed by the Trial Court were [sic]
of a prejudicial effect and prevented the Defendant from receiving a fair trial.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On July 8, 2003, Randolph drove his blue Ford Crown Victoria to the home of Terrence
Shanks, located on Bartlett Street in Laurel, Mississippi. Randolph parked his vehicle on the street
in front of Shanks’s home. Shanks approached Randolph’s car and sat in the passenger’s seat. As
they sat in Randolph’s car, Randolph attempted to convince Shanks to give him one-half gram of
cocaine on credit.
¶4.
During this time, Trea Staples and Mitchell Van Syckel, narcotics agents with the Laurel
Police Department at the time of the incident, were conducting surveillance of the area. The officers
2
noticed that Randolph’s car was parked facing eastbound in the westbound lane of traffic. The
officers passed Randolph’s car and continued down the street before turning around and parking their
unmarked Ford Expedition nose to nose with Randolph’s car. The officers exited their vehicle and
approached Randolph’s car. At this point, Shanks exited Randolph’s car, emptied a beer bottle onto
the street, and threw the bottle into a nearby garbage can. The City of Laurel has an ordinance
prohibiting public possession of open containers of alcohol. According to Staples, while he was
speaking with Shanks about Shanks’s violation of the open container ordinance, he noticed that Van
Syckel had become involved in a foot pursuit with Randolph, so he radioed for backup to assist Van
Syckel.
¶5.
Van Syckel testified that as he approached Randolph’s car he observed Randolph moving in
the driver’s seat. As a result, Van Syckel suspected that Randolph was either retrieving something
from underneath his seat, or trying to hide something under the seat. Concerned, Van Syckel hurried
to the driver’s door and instructed Randolph to exit the vehicle. At this point, Van Syckel noticed
two clear plastic bags sitting on the seat that contained what appeared to be a powdery white
substance.
¶6.
Randolph fled the scene and Van Syckel gave chase. In short order, Van Syckel caught
Randolph, handcuffed him, and waited for a patrol officer to arrive. When an officer arrived, Van
Syckel put Randolph in the patrol car and walked back to where Randolph’s car was parked.
¶7.
While Van Syckel was involved in the foot pursuit with Randolph, Staples took Shanks into
custody. Staples escorted Shanks over to the driver’s side of Randolph’s car. Staples testified that
the door to the car was open, and that he also saw two bags that contained a white powdery substance
sitting on the front seat. Staples also stated that a pat down of Shanks revealed that he had $1,300
in his pants pocket.
3
¶8.
When Van Syckel arrived back at the original scene, he noticed that the two bags that were
on Randolph’s seat had been moved to the roof of the car. Van Syckel returned the bags to the
driver’s seat and took pictures of them. Sergeant Layne Bounds of the Laurel Police Department
conducted an inventory search of Randolph’s car, during which he found three additional bags also
containing a white powdery substance between the driver’s seat and the “hump” that is located in
the center of the car.
¶9.
Later, Staples and Van Syckel obtained a search warrant and searched Shanks’s house. As
a result of the search, they found clear plastic sandwich bags, a set of scales, money, and money
wrappers. According to Staples, sandwich bags similar to the bags found in Shanks’s house are
sometimes used to package and sell units of cocaine. Testing revealed that all of the bags found in
Randolph’s car contained cocaine. The five bags of cocaine weighed a total of 120.36 grams.
¶10.
On July 21, 2004, the Jones County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Randolph and
charged him with possession of approximately 120.36 grams of cocaine. Randolph filed a motion
to suppress the admission of, among other things, the bags of cocaine, arguing that the evidence was
obtained due to an illegal arrest and an illegal search and seizure. On October 13, 2005, Randolph
went to trial. After jury selection, Randolph’s counsel brought his unresolved motion to suppress
to the court’s attention. The court conducted a suppression hearing and overruled Randolph’s
motion.
¶11.
Randolph took the stand and testified on his own behalf. Randolph stated that in July 2003,
he was addicted to cocaine, was unemployed, and was dependent on his family for financial
assistance. Specifically, he testified that on July 8, 2003, he attempted to get Shanks to “[g]ive [him]
some cocaine on credit.” Randolph testified that he is not guilty of possession of cocaine because
he attempted to get cocaine, but failed to do so because he was interrupted by Staples and Van
4
Syckel. The court allowed the State to submit an attempted possession instruction to the jury. Jury
instruction S-2 instructed the jury that it could convict Randolph of attempted possession of cocaine
if it found that Randolph was not guilty of possession of cocaine. Randolph objected, but the court
allowed the instruction over his objection. Thereafter, Randolph was convicted by the jury of
attempted possession of cocaine.
¶12.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Motion to Suppress
¶13.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court looks to determine whether the
trial court’s findings, considering the totality of the circumstances, are supported by substantial
credible evidence.” Jim v. State, 911 So. 2d 658, 660 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Evans v.
State, 823 So. 2d 617, 621 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “Where supported by substantial credible
evidence, this Court shall not disturb those findings.” Id.
¶14.
As previously stated, Randolph filed a motion to suppress evidence. In that motion, he
argued that the evidence seized from his car was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Randolph contends that Staples and Van Syckel approached his car without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. The State responded, and the trial judge agreed that Randolph’s car was
parked illegally. However, the State has not pointed to any ordinance or statute making it illegal to
park on the street in front of a house in a residential neighborhood.1 Despite the State’s failure to
cite any authority for its position, we agree that Randolph was illegally parked, since Mississippi
Code Annotated section 63-3-907 (Rev. 2004) requires all vehicles stopped or parked upon a
1
The State cites Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-211 (Rev. 2004), which regulates
the enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities. This section, however, does not prohibit
parking on the street in a residential neighborhood.
5
roadway, where there is an adjacent curb, to be parked “with the right-hand wheels of such vehicle
parallel with and within twelve inches of the right-hand curb.”
¶15.
In INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that:
Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere questioning of an individual
by a police official, without more, can amount to a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, our recent decision in [Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983)]
plainly implies that interrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for
identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.
The court further held, “police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment
violation.” Id.
¶16.
Therefore, if officers are not prohibited from approaching a person and interrogating him
relating to his identity, it seems only logical that officers have the inherent authority to approach a
vehicle parked on a public street, even one that is parked legally. Randolph’s act of fleeing the scene
and Shanks’s act of pouring out the beer gave the officers probable cause to believe that the men
were involved in illegal activity. We find no merit to this issue.
2. Cross-Examination Regarding Fingerprint Analysis
¶17.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence pursuant to an abuse of
discretion standard. Stallworth v. State, 797 So. 2d 905, 908 (¶8) (Miss. 2001) (citing Floyd v. City
of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 113 (¶12) (Miss. 1999)).
¶18.
In this issue, Randolph argues that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting his
attorney from cross-examining Staples regarding whether officers conducted a fingerprint analysis
of the bags of cocaine. The following exchange occurred during the cross-examination of Staples:
Q.
Did you send [the bags of cocaine] off to the crime lab for fingerprints?
A.
I don’t recall if they were analyzed for latent prints or not.
Q.
You didn’t request it though.
6
[ATTORNEY FOR STATE]:
THE COURT:
¶19.
Your Honor, I’m going to
object to this. He stipulated.
We didn’t go into it because he
stipulated that was cocaine
found in the car.
Sustained.
Randolph based his defense on the theory that he only attempted to possess cocaine, but never
actually possessed cocaine. According to Randolph, the cocaine belonged to Shanks; therefore,
possession and ownership of the cocaine were central issues. Randolph’s question was relevant to
determine whether anyone examined the bags of cocaine for fingerprints, and if so, whether
Randolph’s fingerprints were discovered. “‘Relevant Evidence’ means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” M.R.E. 401. Whether Randolph’s
fingerprints appeared on the bag tends to make it more or less probable that he possessed the cocaine,
either actually or constructively.
¶20.
We agree that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Randolph’s attorney the opportunity
to cross-examine Staples about whether the bags of cocaine were analyzed for latent fingerprints.
However, even had the most favorable testimony possible been elicited regarding the fingerprints, that
evidence would have had no bearing on Randolph’s attempt conviction. Furthermore, we find that
the error was harmless because Randolph was convicted of attempting to possess cocaine, and he
admitted that he met with Shanks in an attempt to get Shanks to give him cocaine on credit.
3. Search of Shanks’s House
¶21.
As in the previous issue, this issue also arises from Randolph’s cross-examination of Staples.
Specifically, this issue concerns the trial court’s decision to prohibit Randolph from demonstrating
that Shanks was a cocaine dealer and that Randolph was an abuser of cocaine. Randolph claims that
7
he intended to show that Shanks had paraphernalia indicative of his status as a cocaine dealer in his
house. Randolph’s attorney attempted to ask Staples about the search of Shanks’s house: “And y’all
conducted a search of [Shanks’s] home?” Staples answered, “That’s correct.” The State objected and
stated, “Your Honor, I’m going to object to moving on past this incident to a search of somebody’s
house that’s not on trial.” The trial court sustained the State’s objection.
¶22.
Randolph’s attorney then stated, “Your Honor, if I may, this goes to the heart of our defense.
There was -- may I be heard outside the presence of the jury?” The trial court allowed Randolph’s
attorney to approach the bench. According to the record, a bench conference occurred, but the
conference was not reported and it does not appear in the record. Regardless, the trial court allowed
Randolph’s attorney to make a proffer. During this proffer, Staples stated that the search of Shanks’s
home uncovered bags similar to the bags found in Randolph’s car, a digital set of scales, money, and
$1,000 bank bands, which are used to wrap money. After Randolph’s attorney concluded his proffer,
he stated:
[ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT]:
THE COURT:
Your Honor, when we attempted on
cross-examination to go into the search
warrant, our defense is that the drugs in
the car belonged to and were possessed
by Terrance Shanks to the exclusion of
Marquette Randolph. They obtained
evidence in the home of Terrance
Shanks that corroborates and verifies
our defense that all that dope belonged
to Terrance Shanks to the exclusion of
Marquette Randolph. To not be able to
further our defense that it’s not his
dope makes it impossible for us to put
forth a complete defense.
My ruling stands. It’s two different venues. One, as you call
it, one set of dope or one amount of dope, where it was versus
where another amount of dope was. You have a co-indictment
here, but you also asked that there be a severance. And there’s
8
been a severance. Whatever Shanks’ dope has nothing to do
with the dope in this case. This man is being tried based on his
involvement in the dope at hand.
Randolph contends that the trial court erred. We disagree. The fact that drug paraphernalia was
found in Shanks’s home is irrelevant, and does not tend to prove that the drugs found in Randolph’s
car belonged to Shanks and not to Randolph. However, assuming that such testimony was relevant,
we find this error to be harmless. As previously stated, Randolph was convicted of attempted
possession of cocaine. Randolph, by his own admission, testified that he was trying to possess
cocaine from Shanks at the time the officers approached his car. Thus, this issue lacks merit.
4. Randolph’s Prior Statements
¶23.
On direct examination Randolph attempted to testify about an exchange that occurred between
Randolph and Shanks after they had bonded out of jail. The record reflects the following:
Q.
Now, you were booked and then you bonded out?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Did you have an opportunity to see Terrance Shanks after that?
A.
Yes. After -- we actually was bonded out together. And that’s when I saw
him, after we bonded out.
Q.
Did you speak with him?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What did you ask him?
A.
I asked him was he --
The State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. Randolph argued that his attorney was
simply trying to elicit from Randolph what he asked Shanks and not what Shanks said to Randolph.
Again, the trial court sustained the objection and stated, “[w]hat good would it do if he can’t answer
what [Shanks] said. I sustain.”
9
¶24.
We find no abuse of discretion. Randolph argues that his response would not have been
hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence which provides that a
statement is not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive.
However, we do not find Rule 801(d)(1)(B) applicable to the facts of this case because the testimony
was not offered “to rebut an express or implied charge against Randolph of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive.” Nevertheless, if Randolph’s own statement, made prior to trial, was
offered for the truth of the matter asserted within it, it would be hearsay. As we read the record and
the trial judge’s ruling, it was Shanks’s response to Randolph, not Randolph’s question to Shanks that
Randolph sought to have admitted. Randolph was not attempting to prove the truth of the contents
of his question to Shanks, but rather Shanks’s response to the question. Presumably, Randolph would
have testified about some exculpatory statement made by Shanks after their arrest. However,
Randolph’s testimony about what Shanks said to him in response to his question would have been
hearsay. Therefore, allowing the jury to hear what Randolph asked Shanks would not have benefitted
Randolph because he actually wanted to get Shanks’s response before the jury. Thus, although
Randolph’s prior statement would not have been hearsay, the trial judge’s refusal to allow it to come
into evidence resulted in no prejudice to Randolph. As such, we find no merit to this issue.
5. Denial of Circumstantial Evidence Instructions
¶25.
Randolph argues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s instructions, which did not
include circumstantial evidence language, and in denying his instructions which did include such
language. The State contends that a circumstantial evidence instruction was unnecessary because
“[t]here was testimony of eyewitnesses who saw [Randolph] in control and dominion of the vehicle
10
in which cocaine was found.” Specifically, the State argues that “[t]his was direct evidence.” We
disagree. The eyewitness testimony only tended to prove that Randolph was making movements in
the driver’s seat shortly before Van Syckel approached Randolph’s car. Therefore, we find that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow circumstantial evidence language to be included in the jury
instructions. Nevertheless, Randolph was convicted of attempted possession, and there was direct
evidence of the attempt in the form of his admission to attempting to possess cocaine from Shanks.
Therefore, we again find the trial court’s error to be harmless, as Randolph was convicted of
attempted possession. There is no merit to this issue.
6. Lesser Included Offense Instruction
¶26.
In this issue, we understand Randolph’s argument to be similar to the argument in his previous
issue, in that he contends that the State’s jury instruction, S-2, should have contained circumstantial
evidence language. Instruction S-2 reads as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that if you fail to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, MARQUETTE RANDOLPH, possessed the cocaine in question, then and
only then you must consider the lesser included offense of attempted possession of
cocaine.
The Court further instructs the jury that the defendant, MARQUETTE RANDOLPH,
is guilty of attempted possession of cocaine if you find from the evidence in this case
beyond a reasonable doubt that MARQUETTE RANDOLPH met with Terrance
Shanks by driving to meet him for the purpose of purchasing cocaine, more than thirty
(30) grams, and that he was prevented from making the cocaine purchase only because
of the arrival of Laurel Narcotic Police Officers.
If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
MARQUETTE RANDOLPH, attempted to purchase cocaine, more than thirty (30)
grams, and he was prevented from doing so by the arrival of Laurel Narcotic Police
Officers, then you shall find him not guilty of attempted possession of cocaine more
than thirty (30) grams.
Randolph makes several arguments in this issue: (1) that there was no evidentiary basis for the
attempt instruction, because he was only trying to possess one-half gram, and not more than thirty
11
grams, as stated in the instruction, (2) that attempt is not a lesser-included offense of possession, and
(3) that he cannot be convicted of attempt when the crime charged in his indictment was possession
of cocaine.
¶27.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-5(1) (Supp. 2006) provides:
On an indictment for any offense the jury may find the defendant guilty of the offense
as charged, or if any attempt to commit the same offense, or may find him guilty of
an inferior offense, or other offense, the commission of which is necessarily included
in the offense with which he is charged in the indictment, whether the same be a
felony or misdemeanor, without any additional count in the indictment for that
purpose.
Thus, section 99-19-5 makes clear that a jury may find a defendant guilty of the offense as charged,
or any attempt to commit the same offense, or the jury may find him guilty of an inferior offense on
an indictment for any offense. Therefore, this issue lacks merit.
7. Improper Statements by Prosecution
¶28.
Randolph contends that the following references made by the State during its closing argument
unduly influenced the jury:
You know, I just listen rabbit trail, rabbit trail, rabbit trail. Talk about who moved the
dope. I didn’t kill the woman. I know she was in my back seat, but turn me loose.
The cops moved the body and put it back.
[ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT]:
Objection, Your Honor. He’s talking
about murder now.
[ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE]: I’m giving an example.
THE COURT:
Keep your argument within the facts of the case.
[ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE]:
Well, let’s just say I got 100 pounds of cocaine
on the back seat.
[ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT]:
THE COURT:
Again, Your Honor, that’s outside. 100
pounds, what are we talking about?
100 pounds of cocaine.
Stick to the facts.
12
****
[ATTORNEY FOR STATE]:
His defense in this case is, I didn’t commit a
crime. The cops caught me before I could do
it. Boy, that’s a new one, ain’t it. I didn’t rob
the bank. They stopped me before I could do
it. I didn’t shoot the woman. They stopped me
before I cold [sic] do it.
[ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT]:
[ATTORNEY FOR STATE]:
THE COURT:
¶29.
Objection, Your Honor. Talking about
robbing banks and -I didn’t do this. I didn’t do anything.
Ya’ll want me to rule on it or just blab on? I’m up here for a
purpose. When somebody makes an objection, you stop and
let me make the proper ruling. Overruled. Go ahead.
The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening
statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument
is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the
prejudice so created.” Slaughter v. State, 815 So. 2d 1122, 1130 (¶45) (Miss. 2002) (citing Sheppard
v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 660 (¶7) (Miss. 2000)).
¶30.
It is well established that “attorneys are allowed wide latitude in closing arguments.” Id. at
1132 (¶55) (citing Holly v. State, 716 So. 2d 979, 988 (¶33) (Miss. 1998)). In Ahmad v. State, 603
So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1992), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that “the court should . . . be very
careful in limiting free play of ideas, imagery, and personalities of counsel in their argument to [a]
jury.” Moreover, the Ahmad court stated, “any allegedly improper prosecutorial comment must be
considered in context, considering the circumstances of the case, when deciding on their propriety.”
Id. Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[t]he trial judge is in the best position
a [sic] to determine if an alleged objectionable remark has a prejudicial effect.” Slaughter, 815 So.
2d at 1132 (¶55) (citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Miss. 1990)).
13
¶31.
As is readily apparent from the above exchange, the trial judge overruled the objections, while
instructing the State to stick to the facts of the case. This issue lacks merit, as we cannot conclude
that the natural and probable effect of the State’s argument was to create unjust prejudice against
Randolph.
¶32.
Randolph also argues that the State improperly made a “send the message” argument to the
jury in its closing argument. We note at the outset that this issue is procedurally barred due to
Randolph’s failure to object at trial. “In order to preserve an issue for appeal, counsel must object.
The failure to object acts as a waiver.” Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 791 (¶34) (Miss. 2006)
(quoting Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991, 1004 (¶35) (Miss. 2004)). Procedural bar notwithstanding,
we address this issue on its merits.
¶33.
Randolph contends that this case should be reversed because of the following statements made
by the prosecutor:
This crap, this cocaine is in your community. If you want people like him to keep on
doing it, you can turn him loose.
****
We don’t need to allow that kind of mess to happen. You do what you think is right,
not what me or him [sic], for community and we’ll be satisfied.
¶34.
We agree with Randolph that the State’s “send a message” argument was improper. However,
in light of Randolph’s admission, and his failure to object, we conclude that this error was harmless.
8. Sentencing
¶35.
Randolph contends that the trial court erroneously sentenced him based on facts which were
not presented at trial. Specifically, Randolph argues that “the [t]rial [c]ourt allowed and considered
evidence that the [d]efendant purchased large amounts of baking soda commonly used to cut cocaine
14
and to cook crack.” Randolph also argues that the court considered evidence that demonstrated that
he was “one of the major cocaine players in Laurel, Mississippi.”
¶36.
Our review of the record reveals that these statements were made after Randolph’s attorney
told the court that Randolph had been “clean and sober” since his arrest. Thus, the State was offering
a rebuttal to the defense’s claim. Furthermore, we point out that there is nothing in the record that
indicates that the trial judge took this information into consideration when he sentenced Randolph.
This issue lacks merit.
9. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence
¶37.
Randolph complains about the denial of his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and the denial of his motion for a new trial. A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Foster v. State, 919 So. 2d 12, 15
(¶14) (Miss. 2005). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that in cases where the facts point
overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant “that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary
verdict, we are required to reverse and render.” Id. (quoting Cmty. Bank v. Courtney, 884 So. 2d 767,
772 (¶9) (Miss. 2004)). However, the Court also stated that “if there is substantial evidence in
support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded
jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is
required.” Id. In making this determination, we “consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn
from the evidence.” Id.
¶38.
Applying this standard to the facts in the present case, we find that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain Randolph’s conviction. The evidence is clear that Randolph attempted to possess cocaine
from Shanks. The testimony of Staples and Van Syckel, as well as Randolph’s own admission,
15
prohibits us from reaching a contrary conclusion. Therefore, we find that a reasonable jury could find
Randolph guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted possession of more than thirty grams of
cocaine.
¶39.
A motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence used to sustain the conviction.
Carter v. State, 743 So. 2d 985, 989 (¶25) (Miss. 1999). “Only when the verdict is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable
injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal.” Id. (quoting Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957
(Miss. 1997)). This Court will only reverse a trial court’s decision where there has been an abuse of
discretion. Id.
¶40.
The evidence presented to the jury in Randolph’s defense was that the cocaine belonged to
Shanks, and Randolph merely attempted to possess one-half gram of cocaine. It is well established
that issues of weight and credibility lie with the jury. Eakes v. State, 665 So. 2d 852, 872 (Miss.
1995) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993)).
Staples, Van Syckel, and
Randolph testified before the jury, who apparently found Randolph’s testimony only partially
credible. This is clear because the jury found that Randolph attempted to possess more than thirty
grams of cocaine, rather than the one-half gram that he claimed. We find that allowing Randolph’s
conviction to stand will not “sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Accordingly, we find no merit
to this issue.
10. Cumulative Error
¶41.
Randolph contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors denied him the right
to a fair trial. We disagree. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “individual errors, not
reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error.” Byrom v. State,
863 So. 2d 836, 847 (¶12) (Miss. 2003) (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 142 (Miss. 1991)).
16
Therefore, we must consider “whether the cumulative effect of all errors committed during the trial
deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair and impartial trial.” Id. We find no reversible error,
as the harmless errors taken in the aggregate, did not deprive Randolph the right to a fair and impartial
trial.
This issue lacks merit.
¶42. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JONES COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF MORE THAN THIRTY GRAMS OF
COCAINE AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS, WITH FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED, IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
17
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.