Brenda Joyce Smith Tate v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-CP-00757-COA
BRENDA JOYCE SMITH TATE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
12/13/2005
HON. SHARION R. AYCOCK
MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BRENDA JOYCE SMITH TATE (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 07/17/2007
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Brenda Joyce Smith Tate, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for post-
conviction relief. Finding no error, this Court affirms.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On June 14, 2001, Tate was indicted on one count of uttering a forgery, in violation of
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-21-59 (Rev. 2006). She pled guilty to the charge of uttering
a forgery on November 15, 2001, and as part of the agreement stemming from her guilty plea, the
district attorney agreed to retire a separate indictment to the file. During her guilty plea, Tate
admitted that she had presented a check in the amount of $349.08 to Wal-Mart in Amory,
Mississippi. The check was drawn on an account belonging to Rochelle Adams. During her plea
colloquy, Tate advised the trial court that she had opened the account using an alias and that
Rochelle Adams did not exist.
¶3.
Her sentencing was deferred until February 2002, but she did not appear for sentencing until
February 24, 2004. At that time, the trial court sentenced Tate to ten years’ imprisonment with five
years suspended and five years post-supervision release. The trial court further ordered that Tate pay
a $5,000 fine, which the trial court then suspended, as well as court costs, bond fees, assessments,
and restitution in the amount of $2,215.23.
¶4.
On November 14, 2005,1 Tate filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. In that motion,
Tate raised the following issues: (1) Tate improperly was charged with uttering a forgery, even
though the facts supported a charge of false pretenses; (2) Tate should have been sentenced as a
misdemeanant because the check at issue was less than $500; and (3) Tate’s sentence was
disproportionate to others who were sentenced for various crimes on the day of her sentencing. The
trial court accepted Tate’s motion as a motion for post-conviction relief and denied the motion on
the grounds that the trial court could not modify Tate’s sentence once she began to serve that
sentence. Tate appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
In reviewing an order denying post-conviction relief, this Court will not disturb the trial
court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. See Brown v. State, 731 So.
1
Tate mailed her motion on November 14, 2005; however, the trial court did not receive the
motion until December 5, 2005. Although the motion was timely under either date, Mississippi
courts have adopted the “mailbox rule” for inmate motions. See Sykes v. State, 757 So. 2d 997,
1000-1001 (¶12-14) (Miss. 2000); Maze v. Mississippi Dep’t of Corr., 854 So. 2d 1090, 1092 (¶6)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Accordingly, for purposes of recounting the procedural history of the case
sub judice, this Court considers the motion filed on the date that Tate mailed it.
2
2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999). The applicable standard of review for questions of law, however, is
de novo. Id. at 598 (¶6). Additionally, the Court notes that Tate is proceeding pro se; therefore, the
Court “shall take into consideration that fact, and in [its] discretion, not dismiss meritorious
complaints simply because they are not artfully drafted.” Lewis v. State, 776 So. 2d 679, 680 (¶8)
(Miss. 2000) (citing Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. 1990)).
ANALYSIS
¶6.
Based on this Court’s broad reading of Tate’s appellate brief, Tate raises the same three
issues that she raised in her motion for post-conviction relief: (1) that she improperly was charged
with uttering a forgery, as the evidence supports a charge of false pretenses; (2) that the trial court
improperly imposed a felony sentence rather than a misdemeanor sentence; and (3) that Tate’s
sentence was disproportionate. The trial court denied Tate’s motion on the grounds that the trial
court could not disturb Tate’s sentence once she began serving her time in jail. While the trial
court’s statement that it did not have the authority to alter Tate’s sentence was correct, this Court
finds that the trial court should have addressed the issues raised in Tate’s motion because the trial
court accepted that motion as a motion for post-conviction relief. Ultimately, however, the Court
agrees that the trial court’s dismissal of the motion was proper, and this Court “may on appeal affirm
the decision of the trial court where the right result is reached, even though we may disagree with
the trial court's reasons for reaching that result.” Pass Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Walker, 904
So. 2d 1030, 1032 (¶6) (Miss. 2004) (citing Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So. 2d 978, 980 (Miss. 1993)).
Accordingly, the Court affirms the denial of Tate’s motion for post-conviction relief.
1.
The charge of uttering a forgery was proper.
¶7.
Tate argues that she improperly was charged with uttering a forgery. Specifically, Tate
contends that because the bank account she used to write the bad check was her own checking
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account, the check was legitimate and could not be considered a forged instrument. Although Tate
acknowledged that she opened the account using an alias, she maintains that both the account and
the check were authentic. Accordingly, Tate argues that false pretense, and not forgery, was the
proper charge.
¶8.
In response, the State contends that Tate is procedurally barred from raising the argument that
her crime was actually a form of false pretense. The State cites Mississippi Code Annotated Section
99-39-21(1) (Rev. 2006), which states as follows:
Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors
either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct
appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the Constitution of the
state of Mississippi or of the United States, shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall
be procedurally barred, but the court may upon a showing of cause and actual
prejudice grant relief from the waiver.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). Because Tate elected to plead guilty rather than to proceed with a
trial, the State argues that Tate waived her right to raise an objection or defense to the charge of
uttering forgery.
¶9.
This Court agrees that Tate’s first point of error is procedurally barred. See, e.g. Gaddis v.
State, 904 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (¶¶4-5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that failure to challenge the
factual basis for indictment during guilty plea created a procedural bar). Tate did not raise this issue
during her guilty plea, nor did she contend that the State could not prove the element of uttering a
forgery based upon the facts before the trial court.
¶10.
Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this Court addresses the merits of Tate’s argument and
holds that this point of error is without merit. The crime of uttering a forgery is defined by statute
as follows:
Every person who shall be convicted of having uttered or published as true, and with
intent to defraud, any forged, altered, or counterfeit instrument, or any counterfeit
gold or silver coin, the forgery, altering, or counterfeiting of which is declared by the
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provisions of this chapter to be an offense, knowing such instrument or coin to be
forged, altered, or counterfeited, shall suffer the punishment herein provided for
forgery.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-21-59 (Rev. 2006). Tate contends that because the bank account was a bona
fide account, forgery cannot be proven, despite the fact that Tate opened the account using an alias
that she knew constituted a fictitious identity. This contention must fail as a matter of law because
Mississippi law is clear that “evidence that the signee is a fictitious person is admissible to show that
the instrument is a forgery.” Sanders v. State, 219 So. 2d 913, 915 (Miss. 1969) (citing Coward v.
State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So. 2d 605 (1955)). Tate admitted during the plea colloquy that she
knowingly created the fictitious name Rochelle Adams for use on the bank account and presented
a check drawn on that account for payment at Wal-Mart. Accordingly, the charge of uttering a
forgery was proper and the trial court was correct in concluding that the facts presented during the
guilty plea were sufficient to prove the charge of uttering a forgery.
2.
The trial court acted within its discretion when imposing a felony sentence.
¶11.
Tate also argues that because the amount of the check uttered totaled less that $500, she was
entitled to a misdemeanor sentence. The trial court imposed a felony sentence of ten years with five
years suspended, a sentence that falls within the guidelines of “not less than two (2) years nor more
than ten (10) years” as set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-21-33 (Rev. 2006), the
statute setting forth the penalty for uttering a forgery. The trial court also imposed, and then
suspended, a $5,000 fine, an amount that also falls within the guidelines set forth in the forgery
statute. In addition to the guidelines set forth in the statute, however, the statute also provides that
when the amount of value involved is less than Five Hundred Dollars ($500) in lieu
of the punishment above provided for, the person convicted may be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not more than six (6) months, or by a
fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or both, within the
discretion of the court.
5
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-21-33 (emphasis added). The statute clearly states that the imposition of the
sentence is left to the discretion of the trial court. Given the second indictment, which was retired
to the file, and the trial court’s knowledge of a similar charge in Lowndes County for which Tate
owed restitution, this Court holds that the trial court acted properly and within its discretion in
imposing a felony sentence.
3.
Tate’s sentence was not disproportionate and must stand.
¶12.
Tate’s final issue on appeal concerns the severity of her sentence. Tate argues that her
sentence is disproportionate to those imposed on other defendants on the date that she was sentenced,
including one case in which a woman was sentenced to a ten-year sentence with nine years
suspended for one count of uttering a forgery. The State contends that Tate has waived this
argument because she did not raise this issue at the time of sentencing, citing Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 99-39-21(1) (Rev. 2006).
¶13.
Because Tate did not object to or contest her sentence during the sentencing hearing, this
issue is procedurally barred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Henley v. State, 749 So. 2d 246,
249 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the failure of the defendant to protest his sentence
during the sentencing hearing constituted a procedural bar because the defendant could have, and
should have, raised the issue at the sentencing hearing). Notwithstanding the procedural bar,
however, the Court finds that Tate’s contention is without merit. Mississippi courts have long
recognized that “a sentence which does not exceed statutory limits is not cruel or unusual
punishment.” Jackson v. State, 740 So. 2d 832, 835 (¶11) (Miss. 1999). Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Tate to serve a sentence that lies squarely within the
guidelines set forth in the statute.
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¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MONROE COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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