Timothy Milligan v. Milligan's Ready Mix, Inc.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-01413-COA
TIMOTHY MILLIGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
AN HEIR OF THE ESTATE OF JACKIE R.
MILLIGAN
APPELLANT
v.
MARY V. MILLIGAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
TRUSTEE OF THE JACKIE R. MILLIGAN
TESTAMENTARY TRUST AND MILLIGAN’S
READY MIX, INC. AND KELLY KIRK MILLIGAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
6/13/2005
HON. JACQUELINE ESTES MASK
TISHOMINGO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
BRIAN H. NEELY
MICHAEL DALE COOKE
CIVIL - OTHER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS REGARDING CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES; INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
TIMOTHY MILLIGAN’S CLAIMS FOR ONEHALF ASSETS AND PROPERTY OF
MILLIGAN’S READY MIX, INC. OR MILLIGAN
BROTHERS READY MIX, INC.
AFFIRMED - 5/15/2007
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND BARNES, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Timothy Milligan appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Tishomingo County which
ruled in favor of defendants Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc., and Kelly Kirk Milligan. Timothy argues
the trial court erred in the following: its dismissing his claim of partial ownership of the “family”
business of Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.1 and the real property upon which the business is located;
failing to determine the type of business entity MRM operated as at the time of his father’s death;
and granting summary judgment regarding his right to damages. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
MRM is a concrete mixing and form business located in Iuka, Mississippi. The business has
been in the Milligan family for several decades. This dispute began over MRM’s storing its large
concrete products on a portion of a tract of property devised to Timothy in 1995 by his father, Jackie
Milligan. Pursuant to Jackie’s will, Timothy’s step-mother, Mary Milligan, held the tract of land in
trust for Timothy until he reached the age of fifty. An initial complaint was filed by Timothy in July
of 2001 against Mary Milligan, individually and as trustee of Jackie’s estate, and Milligan’s Ready
Mix, Inc. Timothy complained of storage by MRM of large concrete products on approximately a
one-half acre portion of his property. Timothy also complained of the encroachment onto his
property of a metal building owned by MRM. Timothy ultimately filed a second amended complaint
in June of 2004, expanding his claims to include a one-half ownership interest in MRM’s property
and business. Additionally, he added another defendant, his uncle, Kelly Kirk Milligan, who
currently operates the business.
¶3.
Because the business’s chain of title is in dispute, the history of the business must be
explained from its inception. “Milligan’s Ready Mix”2 was founded around 1958 by Timothy’s
1
The business has operated in different forms as a family-owned business. In 1988, the
business was officially incorporated as “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.” Prior to this time, the business
was known as “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” and “Milligan’s Ready Mix.” For clarity, when
referring to the business in general, and not its specific legal name, we shall call it “MRM”;
otherwise, we will specify its exact legal name or the name under which it was doing business.
2
This was the business’s original name before it became “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix,
Inc.” The exact date of this name change is not apparent from the record.
2
grandfather, Kell Milligan, as a sole proprietorship. At that time, Kell bought the property of the
business’s present location in Tishomingo County. In the 1960s the business continued to develop
under Kell and his two sons, Jackie and Kelly, as a family business. It is undisputed that in 1979,
Kell, via warranty deed, conveyed the property upon which MRM is located to his sons Jackie and
Kelly.
¶4.
The current dispute centers around three instruments: a warranty deed, a deed of trust, and
a promissory note. The warranty deed conveyed the MRM real property from Kelly and Jackie to
“Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” on November 1, 1986. However, at this time, while there was
evidence submitted to the court that “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” operated as a corporation,
the business was not incorporated at the Mississippi Secretary of State’s office until May 23, 1988,
when the business entity “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.” was incorporated. In sum, Timothy claims
that because “Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” was not officially incorporated at the time the
warranty deed was executed, or in fact at any time,3 the 1986 warranty deed is invalid, and thus
Jackie never sold his one-half interest in the property. Upon Jackie’s death, Timothy claims he was
entitled to a one-half interest in the real property and proceeds from the business.
¶5.
Pertinent documents submitted into evidence included a deed of trust, also signed on
November 1, 1986, from “Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” to Jackie to secure payment of
$82,500 at the rate of eight percent per annum for Jackie’s interest in the MRM real property. The
deed of trust stated “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” was to pay Jackie $10,000 per year for
fourteen years. Further, a promissory note dated October 31, 1986, granted Jackie $82,500 from
“Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.,” under the same terms as the deed of trust. Kelly Milligan and
3
When the business was incorporated, it was named “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.,” not
“Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.”
3
Ann Harwell, Kelly’s sister, signed the note respectively as president and secretary/treasurer of
Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.4
¶6.
In July of 1995, Jackie Mulligan passed away, leaving a will which devised most of his estate
to his wife, Mary, and son, Timothy. Timothy was bequeathed the parcel of land adjacent to the
Milligan’s Ready Mix business by his father. Jackie had purchased this property from T.B.
Woodruff in 1971; it is adjacent to but not a part of the MRM property. Pursuant to Jackie’s will,
the Woodruff property was held in trust for Timothy, with Timothy’s step-mother, Mary, serving as
trustee until Timothy reached the age of fifty, at which point all proceeds of the trust would be his.5
Also, upon Jackie’s death, Timothy moved into a home on this property. Large concrete products
were stored by MRM on a portion of this property since the 1980s, because of space constraints on
the ready-mix property, but with Jackie’s permission. Additionally, the metal building, constructed
in the early 1970s, was also partially on the MRM property and partially on Timothy’s property by
agreement of Jackie.
¶7.
Regarding the ready mix business, Jackie’s will only mentioned the following: “I give and
bequeath to my son Timothy . . . the balance of the proceeds due me from a note receivable from
Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” No mention was made in the will regarding Jackie’s retaining
any ownership interest in the ready mix business. At trial, receipts were entered into evidence
showing that after Jackie died, “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.” properly began paying Timothy $10,000
4
It is undisputed that Ann Harwell, Kell Milligan’s daughter, does not have an ownership
interest in any form of MRM, nor does she seek one.
5
Timothy had not reached fifty years of age at the time this suit was filed, thus the Woodruff
property was still held in trust by his step-mother.
4
per year commencing in 1995, concluding with a “paid in full” receipt on August 2000. Total funds
paid to Timothy after his father’s death were $60,169.28.6
¶8.
As previously stated, this dispute first began in July 2001 as an apparent attempt by Timothy
to rid his property of the large concrete products stored for several years by MRM and to receive
compensation for the encroachment of the metal building on his property. In his first complaint,
Timothy also complained that Mary had refused to stop the uncompensated use and damage to his
property and was thus negligent as trustee of his property. In response to this complaint, Milligan’s
Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly made a counterclaim seeking Timothy’s parcel of land by adverse
possession, noting the concrete products and metal garage had been on this property for over ten
years. Timothy, however, did not sue for partial ownership of the ready mix business until his
second amended complaint of June 2004, filed by new counsel. In the revised complaint, he sought
one-half of the assets of “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.,” $2 million in damages for his deprivation of
interest in the business, $2,000 per month for compensation of the use of his property, or
alternatively an order directing Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. to remove the materials from his land,
and compensation for any damage to his property. In response, Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly
renewed their adverse possession counterclaim.
¶9.
In January 2005, defendants Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly filed a motion for partial
summary judgment which was granted in part. The chancellor stated there was no genuine issue of
material fact for the following claims: $2 million in damages or for any other amount against
Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly, $2,000 per month rent on the disputed property, and any
damages to Timothy’s property by MRM or Kelly. The chancellor excepted, however, any potential
6
Timothy does not dispute that any funds are due him as beneficiary of the note payable to
Jackie.
5
claim to damages of Timothy’s property by the adverse use by Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. The
chancellor denied summary judgment for two claims: Timothy’s claim to one-half of the assets of
Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and the defendants’ counterclaim of adverse possession on the portion
of the metal building that allegedly encroached on Timothy’s property.
¶10.
A bench trial occurred on May 9, 2005, before the Chancery Court of Tishomingo County.
The remaining two claims were heard on the merits. Timothy called two witnesses during his casein-chief: Kelly as an adverse witness and Mary Milligan. Timothy then rested. Next, the chancellor
granted defendant Mary’s oral motion for an involuntary dismissal against her as trustee. The
remaining two defendants then moved for an involuntary dismissal regarding Timothy’s claim to
one-half interest in Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc., which the chancellor granted. Thus the only
remaining claim for adjudication was the defendants’ adverse possession counterclaim against
Timothy. After hearing testimony, the chancellor dismissed the adverse possession claim. On June
14, 2005, a final order was entered whereby Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. was ordered to remove all
of its personalty from the disputed property within ninety days. Timothy timely appealed to this
Court, challenging the judgment in favor of Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly Kirk Milligan.7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11.
“The sufficiency of the evidence is determined by the chancellor, who sits as finder of fact
and makes determinations as to the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Peters v. Peters, 906
So. 2d 64, 68 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Our standard of review is a limited one for a chancellor’s
findings of fact. This Court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings unless clearly erroneous,
manifestly wrong, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So. 2d
7
Since Mary Milligan was dismissed as a defendant, and Timothy has not appealed this
issue, the term “defendants” hereinafter shall refer only to Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly Kirk
Milligan.
6
623, 625-26 (¶8) (Miss. 2002). A finding of fact is considered clearly erroneous when, even though
there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court has a firm belief a mistake has been
made. Tutor v. Pannell, 809 So. 2d 748, 751 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). However, if a
chancellor’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, broad discretion is given to
support her determination. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶12.
Timothy raises ten issues in his brief. For discussion purposes, we will combine related
issues.
1.
¶13.
Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ motion for
involuntary dismissal of Timothy’s claim to partial ownership of Milligan’s
Ready Mix, Inc. or Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc. and the real property
upon which it is situated.
In his brief, Timothy raises two related issues separately: his claim to a partial ownership of
MRM (formerly Milligan Brother’s Ready Mix and now Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.) and his claim
to partial ownership of the real property upon which MRM is situated. For discussion purposes, we
shall combine these two issues. These issues were determined at the conclusion of Timothy’s casein-chief when the chancellor granted the defendants’ motion for an involuntary dismissal of
Timothy’s claim for one-half interest in MRM. We find proper the trial court’s determination that
Timothy did not have an interest in MRM’s assets or real property.
¶14.
Involuntary dismissals are rightly granted during a non-jury trial pursuant to Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief for failure to show a right
to relief. Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 755 So. 2d 395, 404 (¶23) (Miss. 2000). When considering
a motion to dismiss, the chancellor should review the evidence fairly, and not in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, which is the applicable standard for a motion for a directed verdict.
Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 369 (Miss. 1992). “The result
7
is that the ruling [for an involuntary dismissal] is practically equivalent to a finding of fact.”
Ainsworth v. Callon Petroleum Co., 521 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Miss. 1987). Therefore, the standard
of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) is one of substantial evidence and manifest error.
Stewart v. Merchants Nat’l Bank, 700 So. 2d 255, 259 (Miss. 1997).
¶15.
Timothy argues that the chancery court made insufficient findings of fact upon which to base
its involuntary dismissal, and thus the trial court erred. However, “[g]enerally, when there are no
specific findings of fact, this Court will assume that the trial court made determinations of fact
sufficient to support its judgment.” Century 21, 612 So. 2d at 367. When the chancellor does not
provide specific findings of fact, our Court must “look to the evidence and see what state of facts
will justify” her ruling. Id. (citations omitted). We disagree with Timothy’s assertion that the
factual findings of the trial court were insufficient to adjudicate the ownership issue. The lack of
evidence presented by Timothy during the bench trial to prove his right to relief justifies the
dismissal.
¶16.
Initially, the chancellor denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Because our standard of review is one of substantial evidence and/or manifest error, we do not need
to consider all of the evidence before the chancellor in support of her ruling of involuntary dismissal
during trial. We will, however, briefly recapitulate the uncontroverted evidence before the court
which justified the chancellor’s ruling.
¶17.
The following facts are not in dispute. In 1979, Kell conveyed MRM’s property to Jackie
and Kelly. On November 1, 1986, Kelly and Jackie conveyed the property on which the business
is located to “Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.” Kelly testified via deposition that he and his
brother ran the business as a partnership, but there was no partnership agreement. On October 31,
1986, a promissory note was entered into by Kelly and Ann Milligan, as president and
8
secretary/treasurer, respectively, of “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc., for $82,500 at eight
percent interest to be paid to Jackie Milligan over the next fourteen years at $10,000 per year
payments. Also, a deed of trust was entered into by the same parties, with the same terms, for the
MRM property. Pursuant to his father’s will, from 1995 until 2000 Timothy accepted a total of
$60,169.28 payments, as seen on six receipts for payment from Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.
to Timothy. Although not incorporated at the Secretary of State’s office, Milligan Brothers Ready
Mix, Inc. filed corporate United States and Mississippi state tax returns from 1980 until
approximately 1986, according to depositions and exhibits of tax documents. In his deposition, the
business’s former certified public accountant, David Nichols, testified he treated Milligan’s Brothers
Ready Mix, Inc. as a corporation for tax purposes until 1987, at which time “Jackie left the
corporation.” In 1988 documentation attests a corporation named “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.” filed
articles of incorporation in Mississippi. Finally, after Jackie’s death, Timothy also signed a waiver
of process and entry of appearance regarding his father’s will stating in effect the closing of the estate
was correct.
¶18.
Importantly, Timothy acknowledges in a deposition that he could produce no witnesses or
documents which would establish that Jackie owned a one-half interest in the business at the time
of his death. Timothy also explained that the reason he initiated this action was because the annual
payments of $10,000 from MRM suddenly stopped in 2000, and he was under the impression these
payments were disbursements for his father’s ongoing share of the business profits. Further, he
stated in a deposition that he felt as Jackie’s heir that he was due part of the $500,000 reported every
year on MRM’s tax returns. Yet, Timothy had no documents or witnesses to substantiate this claim.
¶19.
At the bench trial, Timothy rested without putting forth any further evidence to prove his
claim of a one-half ownership interest in the business. In fact Kelly, testifying as an adverse witness
9
for Timothy, stated that Jackie had “sold out” his interest in the business in 1986. In response,
Timothy provided no evidence to disprove this statement.
¶20.
Kelly stated that once Kell sold the business to his two sons, Kelly and Jackie, it was run like
a partnership with all profits and losses split fifty-fifty. However, Kelly was under the impression
that while he and Jackie were running the business it was already incorporated. Kelly testified that
they “filed everything as a corporation, but it wasn’t incorporated until after Jackie got out of it.”
Kelly testified that when he found out the business was not incorporated he properly filed articles
of incorporation for “Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc.” at the Secretary of State’s office in May of 1988,
which was after the November 1, 1986 warranty deed purportedly conveying the property and
interest from Jackie and Kelly to “Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc.”
¶21.
In his brief, Timothy insists that after his father died, Jackie’s estate retained a one-half
interest in the business. However, again, Timothy did not present the chancery court with any proof
to support his contention that the ownership interest in the business was never sold by Jackie. He
merely provided evidence that at one time Jackie did possess some interest in the business as a
partial owner with Kelly. There was no evidence present in the record proving Jackie died with any
interest in the business, regardless of its legal status.
¶22.
In their brief, the Appellees contend that Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc. was a de facto
corporation and thus had the legal ability to acquire ownership interest and title to property.
Therefore, they argue, the transfer of interest from Jackie to that entity in 1986 was valid. A de facto
corporation “is an association which actually exists for all practical purposes as a corporate body,
but which, because of failure to comply with some provision of the law has no legal right to
corporate existence as against a direct attack by the state.” Allen v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 544, 55960, 158 So. 2d 503, 509-10 (1963) (quoting 18 C.J.S., Corporations § 93). A de facto corporation
10
exists when there is “(1) a valid law under which a corporation with the powers assumed might be
incorporated; (2) a bona fide attempt to organize a corporation under such law; and (3) an actual
exercise of corporate powers.” Id. at 561 (quoting 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, § 49, 195). The effect
of de facto corporate status is that the entity “may be ousted in a direct proceeding brought by the
state for that purpose . . . but with a few exceptions . . . it has a corporate existence . . . against
individuals and other corporations. . . .” Id. at 559-60 (quoting 18 C.J.S., Corporations § 93).
¶23.
While the chancellor declined to make a finding of fact that the ready-mix business was a de
facto corporation at the time Jackie sold his interest in the property in 1986, we find this analysis
furthers her ruling that Timothy retained no ownership interest to MRM, and it invalidates Timothy’s
contention that there was no existing corporation to take title to MRM’s property. Examining the
record, we find Timothy failed to make a case for relief regarding his claim for any ownership
interest in the business or its property. Timothy has been paid for Jackie’s sale of his interest in the
business. Whether or not Jackie sold his interest in MRM is an issue of fact which the chancery
court already ruled upon in the affirmative. After applying the proper standard of deference to the
trial court, and carefully examining the record, we find the chancellor’s decision was based on
substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Thus the trial court did not err in issuing an
involuntary dismissal in favor of the defendants regarding whether Timothy was a partial owner of
the business or real property upon which MRM is situated. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
2.
¶24.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to determine the legal status of the
ready-mix business at the time of Jackie Milligan’s death.
Timothy raises several issues regarding the legal status of the ready-mix business, which we
shall combine for our discussion purposes. Timothy contends that the trial court erred in failing to
determine if the business was a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. Timothy argues that
11
since the court did not determine what type of legal status the ready-mix business held, it was
impossible for the trial court to determine who owned the business and its assets.
¶25.
The Appellees argue that this and related issues are improper because they were not raised
initially before the trial court. Burns v. Haynes, 913 So. 2d 424, 428 (¶18) (Miss. 2005) (citing Mack
v. State, 784 So. 2d 976, 978 (¶10)(Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). We agree. However, we will discuss the
issue on the merits since it is related to the involuntary dismissal of the ownership issue.
¶26.
The chancellor found, in her order denying defendants’ summary judgment regarding
Timothy’s partial ownership, that the business had operated in at least four different forms over the
years: “as a sole proprietorship owned by Kell Milligan, as a jointly-owned venture in some form
owned by Kelly Kirk Milligan and Jackie Milligan, as Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc., and as
Milligan Ready Mix, Inc.” The court went on to state “the points of transition of the business from
one of the foregoing forms to the other [are] unclear. One item of significance which remains
unanswered is the point at which the assets of Milligan Brothers Ready Mix, Inc. became the assets
of Milligan Ready Mix, Inc.” Further, the court acknowledges “the cloud of doubt that looms over
the history of the business’ ownership and structure, [is] likely due in large measure to its being
operated by a handful of family members over the years who did not anticipate litigation such as
this.”
¶27.
The crux of Timothy’s argument is that since the warranty deed of November 1986 conveyed
property to an entity that “did not exist,” the deed is void. However, neither at trial nor in his brief
does Timothy cite any case law to support this statement. Factually, Timothy contends the
corporation did not exist because “Milligan’s Brother’s Ready Mix, Inc.” had not been officially
incorporated at the Secretary of State’s office. He stated the entity functioned as a “sham
corporation” because it was a “family business.” Yet, the court noted otherwise in its order
12
regarding defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, stating “[t]he Court finds that no
reasonable person would conclude that there is an inconsistency between describing a business as
a corporation and referring to it as a ‘family business.’ Indeed, it is not unusual for a ‘family
business’ to function as a close corporation, which is a valid business form.”
¶28.
We find the trial court did not err in adjudicating the matter of Timothy’s potential ownership
without determining the exact legal status of the business. According to our deferential standard of
review, we are to assume the trial court made determinations of fact sufficient to support its ruling.
Century 21, 612 So. 2d at 369. Timothy failed to establish a prima facie case for his claim to
ownership. The court found the business was valid and not a “sham corporation.” In his brief,
Timothy quotes Gulf Land & Dev. v. McRaney, 197 So. 2d 212, 217 (Miss. 1967) (quoting Allen v.
Thompson, 248 Miss. 544, 158 So. 2d 503 (1963)) regarding de facto corporations, without
elaborating. As discussed supra, Milligan’s Brothers Ready Mix, Inc. did share many of the
characteristics of a de facto corporation. Yet, the trial court found it unnecessary to identify the exact
legal nature of the business, and we do not find this in error. If Timothy had been able to provide
some evidence to prove his ownership claim, it may have been necessary for the chancellor to
determine specifically what type of business MRM was at the time of Jackie’s death. However, as
was the case, the “cloud of doubt” regarding the family business’s ownership and structure was not
lifted because of the failure of Timothy to state a claim for relief. This issue is without merit.
3.
¶29.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to determine what interest Jackie had
in MRM at the time of his death.
Relatedly, Timothy asserts the chancellor is in error for failing to specify Jackie’s ownership
interest in MRM at the time of his death. Again, the Appellees argue that this issue is improper
because it was not raised before the trial court. Burns, 913 So. 2d at 428 (¶19). We agree.
13
¶30.
Indisputably, Timothy did not present any evidence contradicting the defendants’ claim that
Jackie did not retain any ownership interest, because of the warranty deed of 1986 and various
witness’s testimony that he sold it, nor does he put forward an argument in his brief to support his
contention. Because Timothy failed to present evidence for his prima facie case for ownership
interest in MRM before the trial court, this issue is moot. Additionally, we find there was substantial
evidence for the chancellor to find Jackie did not retain an ownership interest in the property, and
it was unnecessary for her to adjudicate the issue at bar. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
4.
¶31.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to determine a chain of title to the land
upon which MRM is situated.
The Appellees note this issue was not raised below and is thus improper for appeal. Burns,
913 So. 2d at 428 (¶18). Again, we agree. Furthermore, we find this issue moot because the
chancellor found Timothy did not retain any ownership interest in the real property MRM is situated
upon. Finally, Timothy does not present an argument in support of this specific issue in his brief.
¶32.
If we address this issue on the merits, Timothy argues that the trial court “completely
ignored” the chain of title regarding ownership to the real property. However, after making this bold
assertion – basing his prima facie case upon the warranty deed which gave title from Kell to Jackie
and Kelly – once again, Timothy fails to offer any documentation in support thereof, and simply
claims there is “not even an iota of evidence to dispute” Timothy’s uncontroverted chain of title. 8
Presumably in support of his position, Timothy cites Holliman v. Charles L. Cherry and Assoc., Inc.,
569 So. 2d 1139 (Miss. 1990). We find Holliman analogous to the case at bar. That court found
there was insufficient proof to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie claim for adverse possession based
upon the chancellor’s findings of fact. Id. at 1147. Procedurally similar to our case, the chancellor
8
Apparently Timothy finds the 1986 warranty deed from his father to Milligan Brothers
Ready Mix, Inc. as being unworthy of mention.
14
granted defendant-title holder’s motion for a directed verdict after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, based
on insufficient evidence. Id. at 1141. Holliman states “[t]he burden of proof is upon the party trying
to establish mutual mistake and the proof must establish such a mistake beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 1144. Although dealing with adverse possession, this case is instructive regarding Timothy’s
burden of proof, which he failed to meet for a claim to MRM’s property. We cannot find the trial
court erred in declining to adjudicate this issue. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
5.
¶33.
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Milligan Ready Mix, Inc. and Kelly regarding Timothy’s right to damages.
The chancellor granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Timothy’s
claim to damages. In his second amended complaint, Timothy sought $2 million in damages, or any
other amount; $2,000 per month for compensation by MRM for his property’s use; and recovery for
damage to his property. The trial court did except from summary judgment Timothy’s possible
recovery for damages arising from MRM’s use of his property by adverse possession at that time.
¶34.
In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is de novo.
Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson, Ins., Inc. 891 So. 2d 224, 228 (¶11) (Miss. 2005). Thus this Court
will review all evidence contained in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Id. Summary judgment is granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c).
The party opposing the motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings”
but instead must respond by setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. M.R.C.P. 56(e); Miller v. Meeks, 762 So. 2d 302, 304 (¶3) (Miss. 2000). If an issue
of fact is found, the trial court shall deny summary judgment; otherwise, the motion is affirmed. Id.
15
¶35.
After carefully examining the record, we find no evidence to substantiate Timothy’s claims
to either $2 million in damages or $2,000 per month in rent for the use of his property by MRM. As
the trial court notes in its order, in Timothy’s depositions he gives a vague rationale for these two
figures. During his examination by defense counsel, when asked “Why do you think you’re entitled
to $2 million against Milligan’s Ready Mix?” Timothy responds, “Because they’ve not given me –
they’ve not given me nothing, but what I thought was for that year, no money for – you know, it
stopped that.” When asked how he arrived at the figure of $2,000 a month, Timothy cryptically
responded, “I thought, well, they’re trying to screw me and the people of the United States, then I
think that’s a good deal. I think that that’s a reasonable price from – since they’ve stopped paying
what I thought was – not promotions, but since they’ve stopped paying the $10,000 a year, which
I thought was from – not gross income, but Jackie’s part of the ready mix. . . .” In another
deposition, in reference to his damage claims, Timothy responded that he did not have any
documents or witnesses to substantiate his claims to damages. Finally, in Timothy’s response to
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, he states, regarding compensation, that “tax
documents will show that Milligan’s Ready Mix, for the past few years, has routinely grossed over
$400,000.00. The question of compensation will be a matter of proof to be decided by the trier of
fact.” And yet, the law is clear that in a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party may
not rest on mere denials in pleadings, but must present some evidence of a genuine issue of material
fact. M.R.C.P. 56(e); Miller, 762 So. 2d at 304 (¶3). Timothy presents no evidence to justify his
claims to $2 million or $2,000 per month in damages. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding damages.9 This issue is without merit.
9
In addition, while we find the trial court correctly dismissed the $2 million in damages on
summary judgment due to lack of evidence, we note that once the trial court found, at the bench trial,
that Timothy failed to establish a claim of ownership to the business, his claim to any amount of
16
6.
¶36.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to determine the amount of damages
owed to Timothy for the use of his property.
The trial court found $2,000 per month compensation for use of Timothy’s property by MRM
was not a genuine issue of material fact because Timothy did not present any evidence explaining
from where he derived this figure. After our review of the record in the prior issue, we agree. If the
trial court finds no issue of material fact over a specific claim for damages, it is not the court’s duty
to find an alternative amount for damages other than the one requested. Furthermore, Timothy did
not prove that he was damaged in any way by MRM’s use of his property. Nor did he prove that he
was unable to rent his property because of the defendants’ actions. He merely alleges that several
individuals were interested in renting a trailer on his property, without putting forth evidence that
they were precluded from doing so because of any action by the defendants. Accordingly, this issue
is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶37.
For the above stated reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing Timothy’s
claim of partial ownership in the family business, Milligan’s Ready Mix, Inc., or the real property
upon which the business is located. Because of Timothy’s failure to establish a prima facie case for
his claim to ownership, it was unnecessary for the trial court to determine the business’ legal status
at the time of Jackie’s death. For the same reason, the trial court did not err in determining a chain
of title of MRM’s real property. Finally, Timothy failed to prove any entitlement to damages.
Consequently, we find the trial court was not in error and affirm its decisions.
¶38. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF TISHOMINGO COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
damages is moot.
17
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
18
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