John C. Laushaw, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-02037-COA
JOHN C. LAUSHAW, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/31/2004
HON. FORREST A. JOHNSON, JR.
AMITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHN C. LAUSHAW, JR. (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:
SCOTT STUART
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 11/29/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., CHANDLER AND ISHEE, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On May 24, 1990, John C. Laushaw, Jr. pled guilty in the Amite County Circuit Court to armed
robbery, kidnaping, and capital murder. Laushaw received a thirty year sentence for the armed robbery
charge and a ten year sentence for the kidnaping charge, with both sentences running concurrently. On the
capital murder charge, Laushaw received a life sentence to run consecutive to the armed robbery sentence.
On August 8, 2000, the Amite County Circuit Court denied Laushaw’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Laushaw then appealed that decision, and this Court denied Laushaw relief on June 5, 2001. Laushaw
v. State, 791 So. 2d 854 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). After exhausting all state remedies, Laushaw sought
federal habeas corpus relief. On April 30, 2003, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi, Jackson Division dismissed with prejudice Laushaw’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Laushaw then appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. On October 5, 2003, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Laushaw’s motion for a certificate
of appealability, finding that Laushaw had failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutionalright as to any of his claims. On August 25, 2004, Laushaw filed a motion for post-conviction
relief for a second time in the Amite County Circuit Court. The court denied Laushaw’s motion on August
31, 2004. Finding that Laushaw’s second post-conviction relief motion is procedurally barred as a
successive writ and by the statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the Amite County Circuit Court.
STANDARD OR REVIEW
¶2.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a post-conviction relief petition, we will not disturb the trial
court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
However, we review questions of law de novo. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶3.
An order dismissing or denying a prisoner’s request for post-conviction relief is a final judgment
and is conclusive unless reversed. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2000). Such an order serves
as a bar to any successive motions under this chapter. Id. This Court has previously affirmed the Amite
County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The original order denying Laushaw postconviction relief is conclusive as it has never been reversed.
¶4.
Among the few exceptions to the successive writ bar is the intervening decision exception. Id.
Under this exception, if the movant can show that there has been a decision by the Mississippi Supreme
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Court or the United States Supreme Court which would have caused a different result in the outcome of
the movant’s conviction or sentence, the movant is entitled to file a successive motion for post-conviction
relief. Laushaw claims that the district court’s decision which denied him federal habeas corpus relief is
such an intervening decision. This contention defies all logic and reason.
¶5.
First, Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2000) defines an intervening decision as
one rendered by the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi or the United States. Second, an
intervening decision is one which “create[s] new intervening rules, rights, or claims that did not exist at the
time of the prisoner’s conviction or during the three (3) year period circumscribed by the statute of
limitations.” Patterson v. State, 594 So.2d 606, 608 (Miss.1992). The case to which Laushaw cites is
neither a supreme court decision, nor does it create a new rule, right, or claim whatsoever. Accordingly,
his argument is without merit.
¶6.
Additionally, we note that Laushaw’s post-conviction relief motion is time-barred. When an
appellant who has pled guilty seeks post-conviction relief, MississippiCode Annotated § 99-35-5(2) (Rev.
2000) requires him to bring his post-conviction relief motion within three years after entry of the judgment
of conviction. Laushaw’s deadline for timely filing under the statute was May 24, 1993. Laushaw filed his
second motion for post-conviction relief in the Amite County Circuit Court on August 25, 2004. The
intervening decision exception, which also applies to the time bar, was not met in this case, nor do any other
statutory exceptions apply. Therefore, we again affirm the decision of the Amite County Circuit Court in
its denial of post-conviction relief.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE AMITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POST¶7.
CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO AMITE COUNTY.
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LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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