Bullock Brothers Trucking Company, Inc. v. Charles Carley
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-00592-COA
BULLOCK BROTHERS TRUCKING COMPANY,
INC., AND THE ESTATE OF WALLEY BULLOCK
APPELLANTS
v.
CHARLES CARLEY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/28/2003
HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH
FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
EDWARD C. TAYLOR
NANCY L. SIPLES BRUMBELOE
GLENN LOUIS WHITE
SHEILA HAVARD SMALLWOOD
CIVIL - PROPERTY DAMAGE
VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND MOTION
FOR JNOV DENIED
REVERSED AND RENDERED - 11/22/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND BARNES, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Bullock Brothers Trucking Company, Inc., challenges the denial of its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict by the Circuit Court of Forrest County. Finding that the trial judge erred in
denying the motion, we reverse and render in favor of Bullock Brothers Trucking and the estate of Walley
Bullock.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On the night of October 16, 1996, Gary Bullock drank a case of beer and became intoxicated.
After his cousin dropped him off at the store to purchase more beer, Bullock walked to the office of his
father/employer’s business, Bullock Brothers Trucking. While at the office, Bullock decided to take a truck
from the business and drive it to the home of his estranged girlfriend, Shannon McSwain, the daughter of
Charles Carley. Bullock testified via deposition that because the door to the office was unlocked, in order
to enter he merely had to shove the door open. 1 Bullock entered the office, took the key to a dump truck,
and drove it to McSwain’s mobile home. Upon arriving and finding that McSwain was not home, Bullock
accidentally backed the truck into the trailer while attempting to turn the truck around. Drunk and already
angry at McSwain for having pressed aggravated assault charges against him, Bullock intentionally slammed
the truck into the trailer, this time knocking the mobile home off its blocks and into a tree. Bullock then
proceeded to Carley’s house and intentionally smashed the dump truck into Carley’s pickup truck. Carley
testified that the force of the blow knocked the pickup truck into the garage’s interior wall, causing a great
deal of damage to both the house and the truck.
¶3.
After the incident, Carley instituted a civil action against Gary Bullock, Bullock Brothers Trucking,
and the estate of Walley Bullock. Carley proceeded against Bullock Brothers Trucking on a theory of
negligent entrustment, asserting that Bullock Brothers had supplied Gary Bullock with the dump truck
knowing of Bullock’s propensity to use the truck in a harmful manner. At trial in the Circuit Court of
Forrest County, the jury found for Carley and assessed damages at $44,350; it apportioned eighty percent
of the fault for the incident to Bullock Brothers and twenty percent of the fault to Gary Bullock, who did
1
Gary’s uncle, Lloyd Bullock, testified that when he visited the office three days after the incident,
it appeared that someone had broken through the side of the office. He testified that the door had in fact
been barred shut at the time. Furthermore, Gary Bullock stated in a sworn affidavit that he had broken into
and illegally entered the office.
2
not appear at the trial. As a result, a judgment of $35,480 was entered against Bullock Brothers Trucking.
Bullock Brothers thereafter filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the
alternative, a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Aggrieved, Bullock Brothers timely appealed
to this Court. Finding that the trial court erred in denying Bullock Brothers’s motion for JNOV, we reverse
and render.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
A motion for JNOV requires the trial court to test the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the verdict, not the weight of the evidence. Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 883 So. 2d 56,
63 (¶21) (Miss. 2004). In ruling on a motion for JNOV, the lower court must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that
reasonably may be drawn therefrom. Id. In making its evaluation, the trial court must consider not only
the evidence offered by the non-moving party, but any uncontradicted evidence offered by the moving
party. Corley v. Evans, 835 So. 2d 30, 36 (¶17) (Miss. 2003). “If the facts so considered point so
overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict,
we are required to reverse and render.” Wilson, 883 So. 2d at 63 (¶22). Furthermore, when the plaintiff
has failed to establish a prima facie case showing the elements of the cause of action, JNOV is proper. Id.
However, we must affirm the lower court’s denial of JNOV when there is substantial evidence in support
of the verdict such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have
reached different conclusions. Wilson, 883 So. 2d at 63 (¶23).
ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BULLOCK
BROTHERS’S MOTION FOR JNOV.
3
¶5.
In Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes County, 735 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1999), the Mississippi
Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of negligent entrustment. Liability
under this theory is defined as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the
supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or
otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and
others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject
to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
Id. at 969 (¶32); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390. Thus, the plaintiff must prove the following
elements in order to make out a prima facie case of negligent entrustment: (1) that the defendant supplied
a third party with the chattel in question for the use of the third party; (2) that the supplier of the chattel
knew or should have known that the third party would use the chattel in a manner involving an unreasonable
risk of harm; and (3) that harm resulted from the use of the chattel. Id. In the present case, the pivotal issue
is whether Bullock Brothers “supplied” the dump truck to Gary Bullock for his use; after examining all of
the evidence, we find that no reasonable juror could determine that it did.
¶6.
Carley cites this Court’s decision in Savage v. LaGrange, 815 So. 2d 485 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002),
as modifying the definition of negligent entrustment espoused in Sligh and its progeny. In his argument,
Carley focuses on the following passage: “Mississippi recognizes that tort liability may arise under the theory
of negligent entrustment against one who makes a dangerous instrumentality available to another person
under circumstances that create an unreasonable risk of injury to third persons and such injury, in fact,
occurs.” Savage, 815 So. 2d at 492 (¶18) (emphasis added). Carley argues that the Savage court
departed from the Restatement’s requirement that the defendant actively “supply” the third party with the
chattel in question, opting instead to require merely that the defendant make the chattel available to the third
party. However unfortunate our paraphrasing of the definition of negligent entrustment in Savage, a reading
4
of the remainder of the opinion makes it clear that we in no way sought to alter the doctrine. The next
sentence in the opinion reads: “The Mississippi Supreme Court in defining the circumstances under which
such liability will be imposed, has subscribed to the negligent entrustment definition set out in the
Restatement of Torts, Second.” Id. The opinion goes on to provide the Restatement definition of negligent
entrustment and applies § 390 to the letter. In fact, the opinion makes it clear that the Restatement
definition requires some action on the part of the supplier, stating that “It may be conceded that the record
contains some evidence that would tend to suggest that [the alleged supplier of the chattel] did not enjoy
a right of possession or control over the vehicle of a sufficient force to uphold a finding that he had
affirmatively exercised that power to entrust the operation of the vehicle to [the third party].” Id. at 493
(¶20) (emphasis added).
¶7.
Further contradicting Carley’s argument is this Court’s decision in Harrington v. L & B Wood,
Inc., 883 So. 2d 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). In that case, Kendall Daughdrill, without permission, drove
a loader off L & B’s lot in an attempt to retrieve his truck from a nearby ditch. After Daughdrill positioned
the loader so that it blocked an entire lane of travel on the highway, Harrington’s automobile collided with
the loader. Harrington brought suit against L & B on a theory of negligent entrustment, and we affirmed
the entry of summary judgment against him. Central to this Court’s analysis was the fact that Daughdrill’s
use of the loader was non-permissive. We stated:
We agree with the trial court that, even accepting all of Harrington’s contentions as true,
they would not, as a matter of law, support the proposition that his unilateral act of
removing L & B’s equipment for his own use without any effort to contact a company
representative and without any evidence that this was a customary or accepted practice
acquiesced in by L & B could arguably be considered to be permissive.
Id. at 593-94 (¶11) (emphasis added) (internal page numbers omitted). Our reasoning in Harrington
emphasizes that in order for a claim of negligent entrustment to lie, the defendant must have engaged in an
5
affirmative act, such as granting permission, in order to “supply” the chattel to a third party. Carley has
failed to provide any authority that holds otherwise.
¶8.
The record makes it clear that Bullock Brothers did not “supply” Gary Bullock with the dump truck
for his use on the night of October 16, 1996. The uncontradicted evidence, in fact, shows that Gary
Bullock broke into the office of Bullock Brothers in order to take the keys to the truck. Considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to Carley, we are unable to find that Bullock Brothers “supplied” Gary
Bullock with the dump truck as contemplated by Sligh. Accordingly, we find that because Carley failed
to establish a prima facie case of negligent entrustment, the trial court erred in denying Bullock Brothers’s
motion for JNOV.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FORREST COUNTY IS
REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
