Chris Duke v. Parker Hannifin Corporation
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-WC-01952-COA
CHRIS DUKE, ON BEHALF OF LAURA J. FULLER
DUKE, DECEASED
APPELLANT
v.
PARKER HANNIFIN CORPORATION, EMPLOYER
AND UNDERWRITERS SAFETY & CLAIMS, INC.
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
9/8/2004
HON. ANN H. LAMAR
PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
KENNETH H. COGHLAN
B. HUMPHREYS MCGEE, III
MARJORIE T. O’DONNELL
CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
AFFIRMED ORDER OF MISSISSIPPI
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DENYING DEATH BENEFITS TO APPELLANT
REVERSED AND REMANDED -11/22/2005
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS, AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Chris Duke (Duke) appeals the decision of the circuit court which affirmed the Workers’
Compensation Commission’s denial of a claim for a death benefit under the Mississippi Workers’
Compensation Act. Finding error, we reverse and remand with instructions to send the cause back to the
Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for a determination of benefits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on April 3, 2001, Laura Duke (decedent) arrived for work at her
employer, Parker Hannifin Corporation (Parker Hannifin). The decedent held a salaried position as the
Manufacturing Information Systems (MIS) Manager. The decedent was specifically responsible for all the
communications, including the computer systems, networks, telephone systems, fax machines, and copy
machines at Parker Hannifin’s plant.
¶3.
Shortly after the decedent arrived at work that morning, she was notified that the plant was being
evacuated due to a fire caused by a leaking hydrogen storage tank. The decedent was instructed to leave
the immediate area and to call her supervisor later that morning for further instructions as to when to return
to the facility. While hourly workers were released for the day due to the emergency, salaried workers,
including the decedent, were not released from work.
¶4.
After being notified of the evacuation, the decedent entered the facility to put a message on the
voice mail system informing callers of the plant closure. No one at the facility requested that the decedent
change the message on the voice mail system. The decedent then drove to Roger Smith’s home office,
which was approximately five miles from the plant. Smith was an independent contractor who occasionally
provided computer consulting services to Parker Hannifin. The administrative law judge at the Workers’
Compensation Commission determined that it was unclear from the record as to the specific reason the
decedent chose to travel to Smith’s home office during the evacuation. Although there was some indication
that Smith performed some work on the decedent’s lap top computer while at Smith’s home office, the
administrative law judge concluded that the work was incidental to the fact that the decedent chose to go
to Smith’s home office.
¶5.
At approximately 9:30 a.m., the decedent spoke by telephone with a plant manager who informed
her that she was to return to the plant. The decedent left Smith’s home, but was involved in a fatal, one
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vehicle accident, and was pronounced dead at the scene at 9:42 a.m. The accident report reflects that the
decedent lost control of her vehicle in a rainstorm, and as a result, her vehicle left the highway and struck
a tree.
¶6.
In September 2001, Duke filed a petition to controvert alleging that the decedent’s death was
compensable and that he was entitled to death benefits pursuant to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation
Act. A hearing was conducted, and in March 2003, the administrative law judge determined that the
decedent’s death was not compensable.
On October 20, 2003, the Commission adopted the
administrative law judge’s findings of fact in their entirety and affirmed the judge’s order. Duke then timely
filed a notice of appeal in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Panola County on October
28, 2003.
¶7.
In June 2004, Parker Hannifin filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Parker Hannifin
argued that the claim should be dismissed because Duke had failed to file a brief within forty days of filing
a notice of appeal as required by M.R.A.P. 31(d). Duke answered that a brief had not been filed due to
a misunderstanding on the part of the parties’ respective attorneys that the matter would not be heard until
settlement negotiations were exhausted. Duke argued that dismissal was at the court’s discretion and that
the cause should not be dismissed as Parker Hannifin had suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay.
¶8.
The circuit court subsequently denied Parker Hannifin’s motion to dismiss. In September 2004,
the circuit court ruled that the Commission’s findings and final order were supported by substantial
evidence. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s order denying compensation under the Worker’s
Compensation Act. Aggrieved, Duke appeals to this Court arguing that the circuit court erred in affirming
the Commission’s order.
DISCUSSION
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¶9.
Duke maintains that the circuit court erroneously affirmed the Commission’s order denying benefits
under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Duke asserts that the decedent was unquestionably covered by
the Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of her death. Duke maintains that the following facts support
a finding of compensability: the decedent arrived at work the morning of her death, and although she was
told to evacuate, she was not released from work; the decedent was empowered to perform her duties as
MIS manager in her own way, including the authority to travel to Smith’s home office at her discretion; the
decedent traveled to Smith’s home office for the purpose of downloading a computer program to the
Parker Hannifin-owned computer.
¶10.
Duke asserts that the decedent was within the period of her employment, at a place where she
would reasonably be in the performance of her duties, while fulfilling her duties, and furthering the business
of her employer. See Jefferson v. T.L. James & Co., 420 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1969). Furthermore,
Duke argues that the decedent’s death qualifies for compensation under the emergency exception for
safeguarding an employer’s property. See Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Seay’s Dependents, 350 So. 2d
689, 691 (Miss. 1977). In support of this position, Duke argues that the decedent was killed while
returning to the facility with the Parker Hannifin-owned computer backup tapes, laptop computer, and a
fireproof safe. Duke asserts that the data contained on the backup tapes was vital to Parker Hannifin’s
operations and Parker Hannifin had a great deal of interest in their safety. Duke maintains that the claim
should have been paid because injuries sustained by an employee in an attempt to save an employer’s
property arises out of and in the course of employment. See Ingram’s Dependents v. Hyster Sales &
Serv., Inc., 231 So. 2d 500, 503 (Miss. 1970).
¶11.
The appellate court’s function when reviewing an appeal from a Commission ruling is to determine
“whether there exists a quantum of credible evidence which supports the decision of the Commission.”
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Hale v. Ruleville Health Care Ctr., 687 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (Miss. 1997). This Court’s scope of review
is limited to a determination of whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial
evidence. Westmoreland v. Landmark Furniture, Inc., 752 So. 2d 444, 447 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.
1999). The Commission sits as the ultimate finder of facts in deciding compensation cases; therefore, its
findings are subject to normal, deferential standards upon review. Natchez Equip. Co. v. Gibbs, 623 So.
2d 270, 273 (Miss. 1993). We will only reverse the Commission's rulings where issues of fact are
unsupported by substantial evidence, matters of law are clearly erroneous, or the decision was arbitrary
and capricious. Westmoreland, 752 So. 2d at 448 (¶8); Hale, 687 So. 2d at 1225.
¶12.
We note that the Commission concluded, based on the record facts, that the decedent did not fit
any of the exceptions to the so-called “going and coming rule.” The Mississippi Supreme Court has
expressed the general “going and coming” rule as follows: “hazards encountered by employees while going
to or returning from their regular place of work and off the employer’s premises are not incident to
employment and accidents arising therefrom are not compensable.” Miller Transporters, Inc., 350 So.
2d at 691. The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, has established the following specific exceptions to
the general “going and coming rule”:
(1) where the employer furnishes the means of transportation, or remunerates the
employee; or (2) where the employee performs some duty in connection with his
employment at home; or (3) where the employee is injured by some hazard or danger
which is inherent in the conditions along the route necessarily used by the employee; or (4)
where the employer furnishes a hazardous route; or (5) where the injury results from a
hazardous parking lot furnished by the employer; or (6) where the place of injury, although
owned by one other than the employer, is in such close proximity to the premises owned
by the employer as to be, in effect, a part of such premises; or (7) when the employee is
on a special mission or errand for his employer, or where the employee is accommodating
his employer in an emergency situation.
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Wallace v. Copiah County Lumber Co., 223 Miss. 90, 98-99, 77 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (1955); Miller
Transporters, 350 So. 2d at 691. Finally, we emphasize that the Mississippi Supreme Court has placed
the burden of proof on the employee when he asserts that an exception applies. Id.
¶13.
The Commission determined that the decedent did not satisfy any of the aforementioned exceptions
based on the following record facts: the decedent was driving her own vehicle, and Parker Hannifin did not
provide transportation for her to and from work neither on the day of her death, nor on any other date;
Parker Hannifin did not compensate the decedent for her transportation expenses related to work; the
accident did not occur on Parker Hannifin’s premises; although the decedent was killed in a rainstorm, her
death was not due to any hazard or condition inherently dangerous to the interstate highway; Parker
Hannifin did not furnish a dangerous route to the decedent; it was the decedent’s decision as to where to
go during the evacuation and which route to travel; the decedent’s death occurred neither in the Parker
Hannifin’s parking lot, nor in close proximity to the Parker Hannifin’s facility. Finally, addressing exception
(8) above, the Commission found that when the facility was evacuated, Parker Hannifin was
accommodating the decedent. Parker Hannifin accommodated all of its employees by closing the facility
and losing production time to ensure their employees’ safety. Furthermore, the Commission was not
persuaded by Duke’s argument that the decedent was on a special mission from Parker Hannifin. The
Commission found that, although there was proof that Smith performed some work on the decedent’s
computer, the work was merely incidental to the decedent’s presence at Smith’s home and was not
performed at Parker Hannifin’s direction.
¶14.
Based on a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence does not support the
Commission’s finding. At the accident scene, it was discovered that the decedent had been in possession
of some computer backup tapes and a laptop computer. Mark Huelse, formerly the decedent’s direct
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supervisor, testified that the decedent was responsible for backing up Parker Hannifin’s computers and that
how she performed that duty was left to her discretion. Huelse further testified that, on a prior occasion,
he instructed the decedent to “obtain all of the vital information that she could,” including the tapes and the
laptop computer, in the event of a plant evacuation. James Thompson, who instructed the decedent to
evacuate, testified that the decedent was not released from work. Moreover, the computer program
downloaded at Smith’s home office was downloaded to a company-owned laptop.
¶15.
Duke asserts that these facts demonstrate that the decedent was on a special mission or errand for
Parker Hannifin at the time of her death. We agree. The record supports the conclusion that the decedent
was within the period of her employment, at a place where she would reasonably be in the performance
of her duties, while fulfilling her duties, and furthering the business of her employer. See Jefferson, 420
F.2d at 324. Moreover, even though it was not established that the decedent took the backup tapes from
the plant on the morning in question, it is clear that she was in possession of those tapes and the computer
when the accident occurred. It is further clear from the record that the decedent was not released from
work and that she was responsible for safeguarding the information on the tapes and the computer. It is
the long-standing rule of this Court that doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of compensation, so as
to fulfill the beneficent purposes of the statute. Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren, 633 So. 2d
1006, 1010 (Miss. 1994). Therefore, we find that there was not substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s conclusion that the tragic circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death did not fit any of
the exceptions to the “going and coming” rule. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court
and remand with instructions to send the cause back to the Mississippi Worker’s Compensation
Commission for a determination of benefits.
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¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF PANOLA COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO SEND THE CAUSE BACK TO THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION FOR A DETERMINATION OF BENEFITS. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS
AND BARNES, JJ., CONCUR.
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