A. Ray Beezley, Jr. v. Cheryl Beezley
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CA-01616-COA
A. RAY BEEZLEY, JR.
APPELLANT
v.
CHERYL BEEZLEY (NOW GRAY)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
5/15/2003
HON. JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ED PITTMAN
SAMUEL E. FARRIS
RENEE M. PORTER
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DENIED APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT OF
DIVORCE
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 10/04/2005
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
A. Ray Beezley (“Ray”) and Cheryl Beezley were granted a divorce. Neither party hired an
attorney for the divorce proceedings. Cheryl drafted the parties’ child custody and property settlement,
which Ray signed. The agreement required Ray to pay $5,000 per month in spousal support “without
limitations.” The agreement stipulated that the spousal support obligation was not to be considered alimony,
and Ray was not allowed to deduct the expense as alimony for income tax purposes.
¶2.
Two weeks after the divorce was finalized, Cheryl told Ray that she intended to remarry. After
Cheryl remarried, Ray filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligations and to relieve him of his
obligation to name Cheryl as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The Lamar County Chancery Court
denied Ray’s petition, finding that the spousal support obligations were in the nature of a property
settlement and therefore unmodifiable. Ray appeals, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RAY’S SPOUSAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS
WERE IN THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
II. WHETHER RAY IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN CHERYL AS A BENEFICIARY OF A LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY
¶3.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
¶4.
A. Ray Beezley and Cheryl Beezley Gray were married on November 1, 1980. At that time, Ray
worked while attending medical school and was the sole income earner throughout the marriage. He
currently works as an emergency room doctor at Wesley Medical Center. Three children were born of
this marriage, Rachel Lin Beezley, born March 31, 1983; Alyssa Rae Beezley, born August 8, 1987; and
Hunter Clay Beezley, born July 24, 1989. Rachel is a student at the University of Alabama, and Cheryl
provides home-schooling to Alyssa and Hunter. The parties divorced on December 3, 2001, and entered
their child custody and property settlement agreement with the chancery court at that time. Neither party
hired an attorney.
¶5.
The child custody and property settlement agreement was drafted by Cheryl, with Ray’s
understanding that it was a “gentleman’s agreement” that was contingent upon Cheryl’s need for support
and Ray’s ability to pay. Ray’s visitation rights and child support obligations were recited in section 1 of
the agreement. Section 1 of the agreement also imposed an obligation for Ray to pay $5,000 per month
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to Cheryl.1 These monthly payments were not considered alimony, and Ray was not allowed to deduct
this expense as alimony for income tax purposes. The agreement read:
In the matter of child support, in addition to and separate from child support payments, A.
Ray Beezley shall pay to Cheryl Beezley the agreed upon amount of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) per month with no limitations. This Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) is not alimony and per the I.R.S. tax code A. Ray Beezley shall not claim this
amount as alimony. A. Ray Beezley shall keep Cheryl Beezley as beneficiary to his life
insurance policy.
¶6.
Two weeks after the divorce, Cheryl told Ray that she intended to remarry. Ray was unaware that
Cheryl had any near-term marriage prospects. In June of 2002, Cheryl married Steve Gray. On
September 11, 2002, Ray filed a petition to terminate the spousal support obligation, arguing that the
obligation was in the nature of periodic alimony. Cheryl filed a counterclaim for Ray’s arrearage of spousal
support payments. In the time between Ray’s motion to terminate and the time of trial, Ray paid some of
his spousal support obligations, but he often failed to pay Cheryl the full $5,000. On March 20, 2003, the
day of the trial, Cheryl’s counterclaim was for the amount of $20,200, the amount of Ray’s arrearage at
that time.
¶7.
Ray testified that the spousal support was for the purpose of supporting Cheryl after the divorce,
and it was not intended to continue if Cheryl remarried. Ray explained that his understanding of the term
“no limitations” meant no specific time limitations, but this phrase was not intended for Ray to pay spousal
support after Ray’s death or on the remarriage of Cheryl. Cheryl testified that the purpose of the spousal
support arrangement was for Ray to provide support to her for the rest of her life. Ray and Cheryl both
testified that the life insurance provision was intended to provide a substitute for the spousal support
payments upon Ray’s death.
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The parties’ agreement as to their division of property is listed in section 2 of the contract.
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¶8.
The chancery court denied Ray’s petition to terminate spousal support payments, finding that
the payments were intended to be “some form of property settlement.” Accordingly, the chancellor
held that the spousal support provision was not modifiable. He also ordered Ray to pay the spousal
support arrearage.
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RAY’S SPOUSAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS
WERE IN THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
¶9.
Mississippi recognizes four basic types of alimony: (1) periodic, (2) lump sum, (3) rehabilitative,
and (4) reimbursement. Smith v. Little, 834 So. 2d 54, 57 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The spousal
support payment is clearly not rehabilitative alimony because Cheryl does not intend to enter the workforce.
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So. 2d 124, 130 (Miss. 1995). The spousal support payment is clearly not
reimbursement alimony because of the length of time that has passed since Ray has finished his residency.
Guy v. Guy, 736 So. 2d 1042, 1046 (¶15) (Miss. 1999).
¶10.
Lump sum alimony is a fixed and irrevocable sum, used either as alimony or as part of a property
division. Wray v. Wray, 394 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (Miss. 1981). Payment of such obligations become fixed
on the husband and terminate on some future date. Id. Lump sum alimony and property settlements are
payable in fixed and unalterable installments. Headrick v. Headrick, 788 So. 2d 784, 787 (¶9) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2001). “Absent fraud or a contractual provision stating otherwise, neither a property settlement
nor lump sum alimony may be modified.” Norton v. Norton, 742 So.2d 126, 129 (¶ 12) (Miss.1999).
¶11.
Periodic alimony is modifiable and vests as it comes due. Holley v. Holley, 892 So. 2d 183, 186
(¶11) (Miss. 2004). It has no fixed termination date but terminates upon the death or remarriage of the
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receiving spouse. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1993). Periodic alimony is
awarded on the basis of need. West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 212 (¶21) (Miss. 2004). “When the
judgment is worded so that we cannot tell whether the award is periodic or lump sum, we will consider that
the award is for periodic.” Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1281.
¶12.
Ray’s agreement to make spousal support payments may be considered alimony, even though the
parties stipulated that the payments were not classified as alimony. Courts determine an alimony award
based on the substance of what was provided, not the label. Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So. 2d 793, 795 (Miss.
1990).
¶13.
A property settlement agreement is no different from any other contract, “and the mere fact that
it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its
character.” East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986). Courts are bound by what the parties
have said, “provided only that we read the entire settlement agreement/divorce judgment and in the best
light possible, attributing to its provisions the most coherent and reasonable scheme they may yield.”
Webster v. Webster, 566 So. 2d 214, 215 (Miss. 1990). Where the question before us is essentially one
of interpretation of a legal text, our review is de novo. Id.
¶14.
When a contract is clear and unambiguous, this Court “is not concerned with what the parties
may have meant or intended but rather what they said, for the language employed in a contract is the surest
guide to what was intended.” Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 252 (Miss.1985). An appellate court
is not bound by a lower court’s conclusions with respect to ambiguity. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State
Bank & Trust Co., 571 So. 2d 937, 940 (Miss. 1990) (citing Boudreau v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp., 616 F.2d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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¶15.
In the present case, this Court finds that the parties’ child support and property division agreement
is ambiguous. First, the provision for spousal support payments were listed in section 1 of the parties’
agreement, whereas the property division arrangement was listed in section 2 of the parties’ agreement.
“In the case of property settlement and lump sum alimony, the court’s decision must hinge on the value of
the marital estate, or the spouses’ separate estates.” Heigle v. Heigle, 654 So. 2d 895, 898 (Miss. 1995).
In addition, there was no provision for a fixed total amount or duration of the monthly payment, and it is
not clear whether Ray’s obligations would continue after his death. Cheryl counterclaimed only for the
amount of Ray’s arrearage at the time of the trial. Thus, it is not clear that the spousal support payments
were intended as a property settlement. Second, the payments Ray was required to make were called
“spousal support” payments and were to be provided for “with no limitations.” These terms indicate that
the parties intended for Ray to provide continued financial support to Cheryl for an indefinite period of time.
Such an award is in the nature of periodic alimony.
¶16.
Where a contract is ambiguous, courts are obligated to pursue the intent of the parties by resorting
to parol evidence. Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Inc., 537 So.2d 1355, 1358 (Miss.1989). “In
addition, the construction which the parties have placed upon the contract, or what the parties to the
contract do thereunder, is relevant extrinsic evidence, and often the best evidence, of what the contract
requires them to do.” Id. Ambiguities are construed against the party preparing it. Id. On remand, the
chancellor shall reconsider the testimony that Ray and Cheryl presented at trial, in addition to all other
relevant parol evidence, to determine whether Ray’s spousal support obligation was intended as alimony.
If the chancellor determines that the obligation was intended as alimony, it must then determine whether the
alimony was periodic or lump sum. If the chancellor finds that Ray’s spousal support obligation is periodic
alimony, Ray shall be relieved of his obligation to pay spousal support.
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II. WHETHER RAY IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN CHERYL AS A BENEFICIARY OF A LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY
¶17.
In Johnson v. Pogue, 716 So. 2d 1123 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998), the ex-husband was required to
designate his ex-wife as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy in the amount of $75,000. The policy was
designed to protect the ex-wife if the ex-husband failed to make alimony payments and later died. Id. at
1134 (¶41). This Court held that the amount of insurance was excessive considering its purpose because
the chancellor reduced the ex-husband’s alimony monthly obligation from $1,000 to $500. Id. This Court
ordered the chancellor to calibrate the insurance policy amount to the new alimony obligation, with the
insurance policy to be extinguished if alimony is no longer required. Id. On remand, if the chancellor finds
that Ray is no longer required to pay alimony, and if the chancellor further finds that the purpose of the life
insurance policy was to compensate Cheryl in the event that Ray failed to make spousal support payments
or to compensate Cheryl in lieu of support payments, then Ray’s obligation to name Cheryl as a beneficiary
of a life insurance policy shall be terminated.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERYCOURT OF LAMAR COUNTY IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE,
JJ., CONCUR. IRVING J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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