Jamie White v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-01664-COA
JAMIE WHITE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/18/2002
HON. LAMAR PICKARD
JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
M. LAMAR ARRINGTON
JEFFREY A. VARAS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CRIMINAL - FELONY
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL DENIED.
AFFIRMED: 07/19/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Jamie White was convicted of robbery in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. White was
sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On January 22, 2002, Amy Gower telephoned her friend, Kermit Malloy to inform him that she
intended to visit him. Later that same evening, Gower called again explaining that she was stranded with
car trouble and needed help. Malloy asked Carlos Brown, his friend, to accompany him to help Gower
and the two drove in Brown’s vehicle to her location.
¶3.
Unbeknownst to Malloy, Gower and three other men had devised a plan. Malloy and Brown
arrived at Gower’s location and found her sitting on the roof of a Lincoln Towncar. Gower told them that
she was “out of gas,” and the two men began to assist her. Malloy and Brown returned to their vehicle
where they waited on Gower. Suddenly, the doors to their car were opened and three men stood and
pointed guns at Malloy and Brown. The three men instructed Malloy and Brown to remove their clothes
and lie face down on the ground. Personal items, a miniature Doberman Pincher, and a car stereo were
stolen. Gower and the three men then left the scene.
¶4.
Four individuals were arrested for their role in the robbery. Gower was arrested on January 28,
2002. She implicated Donald Craig, Jamie White, and Carl Corey. Subsequently, these three men were
arrested. Gower, Craig, and Corey pled guilty to robbery and testified against White at trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
The standard of review for denial of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is the same. Alford v. State, 656 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Miss.1995). Once the jury has
returned a guilty verdict, neither the trial court nor this Court is at liberty to direct that the defendant be
found not guilty unless, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Conners v. State, 822 So. 2d 290,
293 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). This Court must consider as true all evidence consistent with the
defendant's guilt, and the State must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences. McClain v. State, 625
So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993). It is not for this Court to pass on the credibility of witnesses, and where
the evidence justifies the verdict, it must be accepted as having been found worthy of belief. Grooms v.
2
State, 357 So. 2d 292, 295 (Miss.1978). Under this standard of review, we look at the evidence
presented at trial that favors the guilty verdict.
ANALYSIS
I.
¶6.
Improper closing remarks made by the district attorney.
White argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for
a new trial due to improper comments made by the prosecution in closing arguments. The State argues that
White did not properly object or timely seek a mistrial. Therefore, this argument is procedurally barred.
¶7.
In closing argument, the district attorney made the following statement: “It’s his right to have a trial,
but it’s your duty, it’s your duty to convict him for coming into Jefferson County robbing somebody.”
White’s counsel objected. The trial judge sustained the objection. The trial judge then instructed the
district attorney to rephrase his argument. The district attorney did so and continued with his closing
argument. The closing arguments were then completed. The trial judge next asked counsel if there was
anything further. At this time, White’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied. The jury was
sent out to deliberate, and the verdict was rendered. White made no other mention of the matter until filing
his motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
¶8.
If trial counsel deems opposing counsel to be “overstepping the wide range of authorized
argument,” he must make a timely objection and insist upon a ruling by the trial court.” Johnson v. State,
477 So. 2d 196, 209-10 (Miss.1985). The trial court must first determine if the objection should be
sustained or overruled. Id. Then, if the argument is improper and, the objection is sustained, the trial
counsel has a “further duty” to move for a mistrial at this time. Id. If the trial court rules that a statement
was improper, the court must then admonish the jury to disregard the statement, unless the statement
caused serious and irreparable damage; in that case, the trial judge may grant a mistrial. Id.
3
¶9.
We find that, even if the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, the particular statement at issue is
not a statement that caused serious and irreparable damage to White’s case. Far more damaging to
White’s case was the actual evidence put on by the State. We cannot say that this passing comment made
in closing argument so prejudiced White as to warrant a new trial. Therefore, we find this issue to be
without merit.
II.
¶10.
Jury instructions.
White argues that the trial court erred in two aspects regarding the jury instructions. First, by
allowing instruction S-5, White argues that the jury had two avenues to find him guilty. Specifically, White
maintains that under such instruction, White could have been found guilty as the principal, or as an
accomplice. White also contends that the trial court erred in refusing jury instruction D-7, his circumstantial
evidence instruction. White argues that the evidence supported such an instruction. We will consider each
instruction separately.
¶11.
The trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions.
Our principal concern is that the jury was fairly instructed and that it understood both the defendant’s and
the prosecution’s theory of the case. Rester v. Lott, 566 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (Miss.1990). When
examining jury instructions refused by the trial court, we look at the evidence from the view of the party
requesting the instruction. Splain v. Hines, 609 So. 2d 1234, 1239 (Miss.1992). Each party has the right
to have his theory of the case presented to the jury by instructions, provided that there is credible evidence
that supports that theory. Id.
¶12.
White argues that instruction S-5 was submitted in error because he was indicted as a principal,
not an accomplice. Instruction S-5 reads:
4
The Court instructs the Jury that the guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be
established without proof that the defendant personally did every act constituting the
offense alleged. The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself
may also be accomplished by that person as his or her agent, or by acting in concert with,
or under the direction of, another person or persons in a joint effort or enterprise.
If another person is acting under the direction of the defendant or if the defendant joins
another person and performs acts with the intent to commit a crime, then the law holds the
defendant responsible for the acts and conduct of such other persons just as though the
defendant had committed the acts or engaged in such conduct.
Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others it is
necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and
participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime.
Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being
committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and
abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a
participant and not merely a knowing spectator.
In other words, you may not find any defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these instructions was committed by
some person or persons, and that the defendant voluntarily participated in its commission
with the intent to violate the law.
White contends that this instruction provided too much information and confused the issues.
¶13. In Hollins v. State, 799 So. 2d 118, 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), we held that an aiding and abetting
instruction was proper where the evidence showed the defendant was present and assisted others in the
commission of the drug sale. Hollins was indicted for the sale of cocaine as a principal, not as a
accomplice. However, the evidence showed a constructive sale. Id. at 122 (¶8). Hollins was present at
the time the crime was committed, he gave the drugs to another participant to sell, and he shared in the
profits from the sale. Thus, we found that he obviously aided and abetted the crime committed. Regarding
the instruction, we found that it clearly informed the jury that if it found that Hollins aided and abetted
5
another in the commission of the crime, he could be held guilty as a principal and punished as such. Id. at
123 (¶14).
¶14.
Albeit White’s indictment charged him as a principal, the evidence presented supports the
instruction given. Both Craig and Cory testified that White participated in the robbery. Craig stated
specifically that he saw White rob Malloy and Brown. As in Hollins, there was sufficient evidence that
White participated along with the others in the robbery. Thus, we find no error in the submission of this
instruction.
¶15.
Instruction D-7 reads:
The Court instructs the Jury that where the evidence is circumstantial only, that there is no
direct evidence, then the State has the burden to prove by the evidence that the Defendant
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable
hypothesis consistent with innocence. If there are two interpretations of evidence, one
consistent with innocence and one consistent with guilty the Jury has a reasonable doubt
as to which is correct, the Jury must adopt the theory of innocence and find the Defendant
not guilty.
¶16.
For an accused to receive a circumstantial evidence instruction, the State must be unable to
produce either an eyewitness or a confession to the gravamen of the offense; only in such situations is the
evidence for the State wholly circumstantial in nature. Keys v. State, 478 So. 2d 266, 267 (Miss.1985).
Here, White’s involvement in the robbery was sufficiently shown by direct evidence so that a circumstantial
evidence instruction was not needed.
¶17.
The testimony established that Gower informed the police of White’s participation in the robbery.
Furthermore, both Craig and Corey testified that White participated in the robbery and used a pistol.
Specifically, Craig testified that he saw White use a .38 caliber pistol to rob Malloy and Brown. Our courts
have consistently held that the existence of any direct evidence eliminates the need for a circumstantial
6
evidence instruction. Sullivan v. State, 749 So. 2d 983, 992 (¶20) (Miss.1999). We find no error in the
trial court’s refusal of White’s circumstantial evidence instruction.
¶18.
It is well-settled that all jury instructions are to be read together and if the jury is fully and fairly
instructed by other instructions, the refusal of any similar instruction does not constitute reversal error.
Rester, 566 So. 2d at 1269. Having reviewed the instructions of the trial court to the jury, we find that they
accurately and sufficiently guided the jury in its deliberations.
III.
IV.
¶19.
Motion for directed verdict.
Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
White further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict, JNOV
and, in the alternative, for a new trial on the basis that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. All three requests implicate the sufficiency of the evidence. Montana v. State,
822 So. 2d 954, 967 (¶61) (Miss. 2002); Franklin v. State, 676 So. 2d 287, 288 (Miss. 1996). Thus,
we will consider these two assignments of error simultaneously.
¶20.
The standard of review for legal sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled: we must consider all
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt
must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence. We may reverse only where the evidence so considered is such
that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Id.
¶21.
White’s argument is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he robbed
Malloy and Brown. His argument relies heavily on the fact that there was no physical evidence of his
presence at the scene of the robbery and that the testimony against him was self-serving. White argues that
7
Craig, Corey and Groves pled guilty to the robbery and would do anything to get out of trouble. However,
the witnesses testified that they agreed to cooperate with the prosecution and were not threatened by the
police. It is the jury's function to accept the testimony of some witnesses and not others. Gathright v.
State, 380 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980). The jury was free to evaluate the testimony and assign to it
any or no credibility.
¶22.
Notwithstanding the testimony of Craig, Corey, and Groves, the evidence supported White’s
conviction. White testified that he knew both Gower and Craig. Additionally, White admitted that the
Towncar used in the robbery was given to him four days prior to the robbery. He also admitted to
possessing the Towncar and meeting Gower on the day after the robbery. When questioned as to his alibi,
White stated that he was in Natchez selling drugs, but provided no alibi witness. Clearly, it was within the
jury’s province to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence based on their experience and common
sense. Hester v. State, 463 So. 2d 1087, 1093 (Miss.1985).
¶23.
Considering the appropriate standards of review, we find the evidence to be of such weight and
sufficiency as to support the jury’s verdict that found White guilty of robbery. In viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, we do not find that the trial court erred in denying White’s motions
for a directed verdict, and JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. Thus, we find that this assignment of
error is without merit.
V.
¶24.
Illegal sentence.
Finally, White argues that his sentence is excessive, and therefore constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. The trial court found the sentence was within the statutory guidelines for robbery and not
disproportionate.
8
¶25.
White contends that he is entitled to a proportionality review under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983). Solem applies a three-factor analysis to determine if a sentence is disproportionately harsh so as
to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment: (1) the gravity of the
crime; (2) comparison with sentences imposed on other defendants for the same crime in the same
jurisdiction; and (3) comparison with sentences imposed in surrounding jurisdictions. Id. at 292. White
maintains that the gravity of his crime was minor and the sentence was far in excess of those imposed on
Gower, Craig and Corey for the same or similar crimes.
¶26.
The Supreme Court has subsequently altered its interpretation of Solem. The Eighth Amendment
does not contain a proportionality guarantee. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965, (1991).
Severe penalties are not, by themselves, violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 994-95. Before we
will make such comparisons, White must meet the threshold requirement of showing the sentence imposed
is grossly disproportionate to the crime charged. Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 538 (Miss.1996).
Unless White satisfies this preliminary requirement, he is not entitled to the extended Solem comparison
analysis. Id.
¶27.
White was sentenced to serve fifteen years under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-79
(Rev. 2000), which provides in pertinent part:
in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life in the state
penitentiary the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any
term not less than three (3) years.
The crime of robbery carries a maximum imprisonment penalty of life in prison. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-379 (Rev. 2000). White’s sentence was within the statutory limit. White relies heavily upon the comparison
of his sentence with others but provides no evidence as to why his sentence is inappropriate for the crime
of robbery. We find that his sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime of which he was
9
convicted. In addition, it is well settled that we will not disturb sentences which are permissible by statute.
Reynolds v. State, 585 So. 2d 753, 756 (Miss.1991). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err
in sentencing White.
¶28.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶29. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JEFFERSON COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ.
10
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.