Cameron D. Moore v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-02294-COA
CAMERON D. MOORE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
9/23/2003
HON. V. R. COTTEN
SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CAMERON MOORE (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
MARK SHELDON DUNCAN
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 12/14/2004
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Cameron D. Moore pled guilty to the possession of precursor chemicals with the intent
to manufacture methamphetamine. Moore was sentenced to serve two concurrent terms of twelve (12)
years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Moore was further ordered to pay a
fine of $3,000.
¶2.
Moore, pro se, filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. On
appeal, Moore asserts the following errors: (1) the trial court failed to explain the elements of the crime,
his burden of proof, and the consequences of entering a guilty plea, (2) he received ineffective assistance
of counsel, and (3) he was denied his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for post-conviction relief, the standard of
review is clear. The trial court's denial will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court's decision
was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
ANALYSIS
I.
¶4.
Whether the trial court failed to explain the elements of the crime, Moore's
burden of proof, and the consequences of entering a guilty plea.
Moore argues that the trial court erred by failing to explain the nature of the charges against him,
the burden of proof, and the consequences of pleading guilty. Specifically, Moore contends that the plea
agreement failed to articulate the State's burden of proof and since this burden was not announced in open
court, Moore's guilty plea was involuntary. Based on these contentions, Moore avers that he was denied
due process of law.
¶5.
At the outset, we recognize that this issue is procedurally barred. Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 99-39-21(1) (Rev. 2000) provides in part that "failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses,
claims, questions, issues, or errors either in fact or in law which were capable of determination at trial
and/or on direct appeal . . . shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred." Since
Moore did not raise this issue at the sentencing hearing, he waived its consideration on a motion for postconviction relief. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (Rev. 2000).
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¶6.
Even if the issue was not procedurally barred, it is wholly without merit. Moore has the burden of
proving that the guilty plea was involuntary by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. State, 876 So.
2d 422, 423 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); McClendon v. State, 539 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1989).
¶7.
The record reflects that the trial court thoroughly questioned Moore regarding the charges pending
against him. The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that the trial court informed Moore of the specific
charges, the State's burden of proof regarding those charges and the possible sentence. The trial court also
made a detailed inquiry as to whether Moore understood the plea agreement that he had signed. Moore
stated under oath that he understood the plea agreement and the consequences of pleading guilty. Moore
further affirmed that no one had made any threats or representations to him regarding his sentence.
Statements such as these made by Moore in open court under oath are viewed as highly credible. Gable
v. State, 748 So. 2d 703, 706 (¶11) (Miss. 1999); Young v. State, 731 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (¶12) (Miss.
1999).
¶8.
Moore has failed to show by the preponderance of the evidence the trial court's decision was
clearly erroneous. It is clear from the record that Moore was advised by the trial court regarding the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea; therefore, his plea is considered voluntary and intelligent.
Alexander v. State, 605 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Miss. 1992). We find Moore's argument to be without
merit.
II.
¶9.
Whether Moore received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The standard applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was first articulated in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by the United States Supreme Court. To prove ineffective
assistance of counsel, Moore must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that this
deficiency prejudiced Moore's defense. Id. at 687. The burden of proof rests with Moore and we will
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measure the alleged deficiency within the totality of circumstances. Hiter v. State, 660 So. 2d 961, 965
(Miss. 1995); Carney v. State, 525 So. 2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988); Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 839
(Miss.1983). However, a presumption exists that the attorney's conduct was adequate. Burns v. State,
813 So. 2d 668, 673 (¶14) (Miss. 2001); Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984).
¶10.
Moore contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel since his counsel failed to file a
motion for discovery. This contention is the sole ground for his argument. It is maintained by Moore that
this failure violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
¶11.
We find no merit to Moore's argument. We have consistently held that the failure to file a motion
for discovery is insufficient to substantiate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Powell v. State, 536
So. 2d 13, 16 (Miss.1988); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1984). Moore must provide
some assertion of critical evidence that would have been discovered had it not been for counsel's alleged
deficiency. Ivy v. State, 589 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (Miss. 1991). Moore makes no such allegation
establishing his argument as credible.
¶12.
Notwithstanding Moore's argument, he failed to object to counsel's representation when given the
opportunity. The record is clear that on two separate occasions, Moore answered the trial court that he
was satisfied with trial counsel's performance. Furthermore, the plea agreement that Moore signed
specifically addressed the adequacy of his counsel and Moore offered no complaint. Upon review, we find
the trial court was correct in ruling that Moore did not meet his burden of proof. Thus, we find no error.
III.
¶13.
Whether Moore was denied his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Moore asserts that the trial court erred in failing to specifically address his constitutionalright against
self-incrimination. It is Moore's contention that he never waived this right and, therefore, he was denied
due process.
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¶14.
The plea agreement signed by Moore expressly addressed each of Moore's constitutional rights.
Moore affirmed that he understood that he possessed certain constitutional rights and that a guilty plea
constituted a waiver of those rights. The agreement specifically addressed his right against selfincrimination. Moore was asked: "Do you understand that if you plead guilty, you are waiving your
constitutional right against self-incrimination . . .?" Moore answered, "Yes."
¶15.
Furthermore, a review of the plea transcript reveals that the trial court adequately addressed
Moore's constitutional rights. After ascertaining Moore's age, educational background and whether he was
under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, the trial court then focused on Moore's rights. Moore affirmed
again to the trial court that he understood that entering a guilty plea would constitute a waiver of his
constitutional rights. The record clearly contradicts Moore's claim.
¶16.
Although the better practice would have been for the trial judge to address Moore's right against
self-incrimination specifically, failure to do so is not reversible error. Dock v. State, 802 So. 2d 1051,
1056 (¶9) (Miss.2001). What we require is that the record confirm that the guilty plea was entered both
intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 1056 (¶9). Based on the record before us, there is ample proof that
Moore's guilty plea satisfied our standard and he was not denied his constitutional right against selfincrimination. Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Moore's
motion for post-conviction relief.
¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO SCOTT COUNTY.
KING, P.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, CHANDLER, BARNES AND ISHEE,
JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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